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Abstract 
 
Doctors in Management: A Study of Fundholding GPs 
 
Fundholding enabled General Practitioners (GPs) to have financial responsibility for 
practice budgets to purchase health services for their patients. This thesis examines 
that significant episode in the history of the UK‟s NHS (Chapter 2) when independent 
contractors chose to be accountable as part of the creation of the internal market 
within the ethos of New Public Management (NPM). The reasons for practices 
electing to go fundholding are investigated, followed by examination of the 
implications of, and potential for, accounting in the management of fundholding at 
practice level through an empirical study of twelve fundholding practices in one 
region in England (Chapter 4). Accounting per se did not loom large, but in addition 
to significant findings on why practices went fundholding, the role of the lead partner 
for fundholding and why they took on that role emerged as a significant issue.  
Several years after the completion of the fundholding episode in the NHS, the GPs 
concerned were asked to reflect on its implications for their careers, in particular the 
relationship between their work as doctors and managers (Chapter 7). This brings a 
longitudinal element to the research. 
 
This thesis is based on two major and one minor previously published refereed journal 
articles, together with further interpretation and more empirical work. The thesis 
structure reflects the emergent character of the overall research project (Chapter 3). 
After presenting the already-published research on why practices volunteered to go 
fundholding and how those practices selected their „lead‟ partner (Chapter 4) and 
attitudes of GPs who took the management role (Chapter 6), a second analysis of the 
first phase of data is presented for the first time, finding different levels of 
engagement in management once fundholding was „live‟ and evidence of doctors in 
primary care taking hybrid manager roles (Chapter 6). GPs are found to adopt 
different levels of engagement in management. The factors that contribute to doctors‟ 
engagement in management are identified. Accounting is found to enable doctors in 
management and assist them in securing notions of professionalism.  
 
The study contributes to knowledge on a number of levels: it presents the case of an 
application of a NPM „experiment‟ in an institutional setting recognising the context 
of general practice and financial responsibility as important in engaging doctors in 
management; it contributes to an emerging „doctors in management literature‟, 
complementing the majority of that literature by focusing on primary care rather than 
secondary care. The study recommends that as doctors are increasingly being asked to 
get involved in the management of the finite NHS resource that fundholding was a 
significant episode to guide the design of policy and structures that will engage 
doctors in management. Future studies should investigate doctors in management, 
using case studies to examine the schemes in order to capture the „lived experience‟, 
identifying the different levels of engagement, what they do and how they do it. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction and Background 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis focuses on GP fundholding (DoH, 1989), a phenomenon that gave GPs 
budgets and responsibility to purchase services direct from the hospital. Fundholding 
is a specific episode that is important in the history of the NHS with a legacy beyond 
its years. This study contributes by providing insights and contributions;  at a 
historical level for fundholding as the phenomena, where it documents and investigate 
fundholding in depth for the actors, the practitioners, therefore beyond a fleeting 
interest in the early stages of a short lived government policy; as an application of 
NPM (Hood, 1991;1995) in a different public sector segment; as an unusual 
applications of NPM, because organisations chose to go fundholding therefore 
electing for financial accountability and responsibility rather than it being imposed; 
how accounting may be implicated (Hood. 1991;1995) in that change (Hopwood, 
1985; 1987); and, at the individual levels as GPs who are medical professionals first, 
involve themselves in management.  
 
GPs are a collective of practitioners (a partnership) independently contracted to the 
NHS who could elect to go fundholding and become involved in the management of 
the financial aspects of the primary care system across the practice boundary by 
purchasing services. Alongside that responsibility went the allocation of practice 
budget and the inaugural marketisation of, and accountability for, their professional 
decisions. At first sight, fundholding may have looked like another application of 
NPM but because of its context it is far more interesting because its application was 
different to other application of NPM in the public services in the UK. 
 
Fundholding, as a key change in the scope of financial responsibility for primary care 
was a prodigy of New Public Management (NPM), based in those reforms, seeking to 
make public services more accountable and increasing visibility on the premise that 
organisations were inefficient. It was unusual because it was voluntary and required 
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the talents of accountability and potential for accounting to create market efficiencies 
by creating calculable spaces (Humphrey et al. 1993) where accountability had not 
been before. In NPM a lot was said in the name of accounting, and what that 
mechanism could achieve (for example, Hood, 1991; 1995; Humphrey, 1994; 
Laughlin et al., 1994; Llewellyn, 1998; Lapsley, 1999) when budgets were devolved 
within public sector organisations, e.g. hospital, police and probation services. 
Accounting as part of NPM reforms could contribute to the restructuring of the public 
services and the process of decentralisation and corporatisation (Lapsley, 1999) 
therefore it had a potential in the NHS (Lapsley, 1991). As NPM was rolled out so 
began a tranche of research: some in the name of accounting and accountability (for 
example, Broadbent, 1992; Llewellyn, 1998) and some in the name of management, 
for example, NPM in terms of subject matter (see Lapsley, 1999) and institutional 
context (Gray and Jenkins, 1986; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997; Barzelay, 2001). 
Many of those changes involved accounting, sometimes accounting underpinned them 
(Mellett and Ryan, 2008) and thus accounting and fundholding are inextricably linked 
yet it was largely ignored in the studies of fundholding. 
 
Thus, this doctoral journey began with the introduction of an apparently accounting- 
centric government policy. NPM stimulated research from an accounting and 
accountability perspective of the consequences of devolving budgets and opening up 
the visibility of organisations (for example, Humphrey et al., 1993; Llewellyn, 1998, 
2001) whose activities were not traditionally monitored by the devolvement of funds 
and budgets. Despite the accounting features and implications of enforced NPM 
appearing in the research literature for different institutions, little research appeared in 
fundholding despite its uniqueness: possibly for three reasons. Firstly, fundholding 
was a constituent part of the creation of the internal market in the NHS. Secondly, the 
research about the internal market neglected the social side of the organisations with a 
preference for market solutions and accountability patterns (Broadbent and Guthrie, 
1992). Thirdly, fundholding existed in a small window of its operation (1991-1999) 
on a voluntary basis. The fundholding scheme differed not only because it required 
volunteers: firstly, GPs elected to be fundholding in a series of waves; secondly, not 
all GPs were eligible according to the rules for entry of each wave; and thirdly, GPs 
were independent contractors to the NHS and not employees. Participants in 
fundholding were taking part in NPM reforms not only as volunteers but also as 
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principals rather than employees on whom the reforms were imposed, unlike the 
hospitals, from whom GPs were to purchase services. This study is unique and 
important because it examines a different application of NPM– it is not the same 
context as reform in, for example, the hospitals, police or probation services. Further, 
the longitudinal study brings the legacy of fundholding to the fore, to add, contribute 
and develop to already published papers (Cowton and Drake, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), 
bringing new contributions presented here in this thesis for the first time. 
 
There are two phases to the research. Phase one examines fundholding and its actors 
(GPs) in the institutional context (general practice) of going fundholding, punctuated 
by three publications (Cowton and Drake, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). This study shows 
fundholding studies were wanting because they concentrated on early waves so this 
study encompasses later waves, to present a more complete picture and analysis of 
fundholding. The study was based on the research assumption that, as in past 
institutional contexts, that accounting and accountability would be implicated in 
fundholding and would loom large and be important in fundholding. Accounting 
would be implicated in how actors lived the experience because it was the technique 
that would allocate the NHS funds more efficiently, effectively, and with economy if 
it were done by GP practices.  
 
The study of the organisation and financial perspective in phase one revealed the 
importance of the individual (the GP) choosing to take a lead in management within 
the fundholding practice but their lack of interest in, or engagement with accounting 
as part of that role. Whilst GPs were taking management roles the implication of 
accounting for the scheme per se was less important than expected. It was evident that 
doctors were getting involved in management (Dopson, 2009) and based on that a 
second analysis of phase one data is conducted. The second phase of data collection 
after fundholding ended was a response to an emerging literature of doctors in 
management (including Cowton and Drake, 1999a, 1999b, 2000) and the findings of 
the analysis of phase one. The aim was to investigate the GPs who engaged in the 
management of fundholding to see if they continued engaging in management and if 
so how. A second set of research questions was designed to address the emergent 
importance of the lead partner.  
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The research focus became the role of the GP in management after three publications 
(Cowton and Drake, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). Moreover, doctors in management roles 
were being investigated by other researchers and the research was not without 
implication and challenge (Brazell, 1987; Bruce and Hill, 1994; Hunter; 1992; 
Buchan et al., 1997; Rundall et al, 2004). Clinicians in management were 
characterised as reluctant to engage in management in both secondary (Dopson, 1994, 
1996; Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000; Witman et al., 2010; Russell et al., 2010) and 
primary care (Glennerster et al.,  1993; Greenfield and Nayak, 1996; Ennew et al., 
1998) which was at odds with the evidence from this study; fundholding was a choice 
as was the lead partner role, some were enthusiastic and some became more 
enthusiastic after the experience (Cowton and Drake, 1999a). There was a need to 
examine further how medical professionals engage in management by re-examining 
the original data. After reviewing the growing empirical literature, post-fundholding, 
to which the study had already contributed, a further analysis was conducted of the 
phenomenon of GPs choosing to get involved in management as a consequence of 
choosing the fundholding scheme. The analysis of the data from phase one shifted 
from the organisation (the practice) to individual (GP) to gain an understanding of 
why GPs became involved in management (chapter 4) and how they enacted that role 
(chapter 6). The important question here was if the role continued for doctors in the 
primary care setting, after the cessation of fundholding, and what factors contribute to 
that phenomenon. Since fundholding ceased there was an opportunity to see if doctors 
sought management roles after they had lost them. Therefore the second phase 
interview data was collected to examine the impact of engagement in management on 
doctors‟ career and if a management role was perpetuated (chapter 7). 
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
By the 1990s public services in the UK had experienced successive reforms in the 
name of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, none more so than the National 
Health Service (NHS). The „megatrends‟ associated with public administration 
(Hood, 1991) had pervaded the NHS including the reversal of government spending, 
privatisation (quasi or not), and introduction of information technology. One of the 
doctrines of such New Public Management (NPM) reforms was the disaggregation of 
the budgetary responsibility of units, to smaller geographically based units. 
Fundholding was a voluntary scheme central to the purchaser/provide split in the 
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National Health Service (NHS). The „split‟ was largely attributed to Professor Alain 
Enthoven, a US economist, with funding allocated to resident populations, in this case 
the unit of general practice who would purchase health services, a defined range of 
hospital and community services, drugs and fundholding staff (Harrison and Pollitt, 
1994). GPs could volunteer for shares of decentralised regional budgets awarded by 
the Health Authorities thus counteract the power of consultants and secondary care. 
GPs were deemed to be uniquely placed to manage budgets as the gatekeepers for the 
NHS, being closer to the patient and therefore the start of the process of healthcare. 
 
The scheme began in 1991 and expanded rapidly in a succession of „waves‟ of 
practices choosing to go fundholding. It was never compulsory though it has 
influenced, and continues to influence, compulsory models of devolved financial 
responsibility and resource allocation in primary care. By taking on board the 
responsibility for the resources and budgets, GPs were supported by a management 
allowance for staff, information technology support and the possible rewards of 
retaining surpluses on budget within the practice. Therefore in choosing to be 
fundholders the GP practices were choosing to be accountable through the mechanism 
and technology of the budget which was there to enable them to contract with 
secondary care providers as part of the purchaser /provider split. 
 
1.3 Research Motivation 
Fundholding was implemented by government in order to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public services by embodying key features of Hood‟s (1991) NPM 
and the doctrinal components therein (Hood, 1995). NPM is summarised by Osborne 
(2010): taking lessons from private-sector management; the growth of hands on 
management; focus on entrepreneurial leadership within public sector organisations; 
emphasis on input/output control, evaluation, performance management and audit; 
disaggregation of public services to the most basic unit (in this case GP as first point 
of patient contact);  markets, competition, contracts for resource allocation. Thus 
fundholding embodies the principles of NPM, and is a response to it. 
 
When applied to different segments of the public services, accountability gave 
visibility through delegation of control and reporting. Resources were dispersed into 
smaller units such as, hospitals (Lapsley, 1991; Broadbent, 1992; Laughlin et al., 
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1992), the police (Woodall, 2004), and probation services (Humphrey et al., 1993). 
Accounting was involved and therefore implicated in those changes, as accounting 
technology was an enabling and driving force by which the restructuring and 
operation of public services could be measured, negotiated and documented. Hood 
(1991; 1995) summarised the possible accounting implications of the NPM: more cost 
centre units; more identification of costs and understanding of cost structures; cost 
data becoming increasingly commercially confidential; private sector accounting 
norms; fewer general procedural constraints and more use of financial data for 
management accountability; more stress on the bottom line; more performance 
indicators and audit; broader cost centre accounting; blurring of funds for pay and 
activity.  Thus it seemed that accounting would have implications and would be 
important as part of fundholding. It was thought important to add to the studies of 
differential impacts of NPM in differing segments (Lapsley, 1999) contributing by 
investigating it in this new institutional area. Further, the study provided opportunity 
to investigate a voluntary scheme unlike other sectors such as hospitals and the police 
where it was imposed. 
 
1.4 Research Aims 
The original, principal aim of this study was to investigate fundholding, why GPs 
chose to go fundholding and how accounting was implicated in general practice. GPs 
were independent contractors in private partnerships and the reform would make the 
world of general practice potentially more visible to individuals and organisations 
outside the boundary of the practice. Accounting would loom large in the 
accountability of general practice and it was important to investigate because this was 
the first time that accounting and budgets had pervaded general practice for the 
purpose of external reporting on resource utilisation within the practice. Fundholding 
introduced a funding allocation mechanisms and models where they had not been 
used before. It was the first time accounting had proximity to doctors‟ professional 
accountability although doctors may have been involved in general practice internal 
management. 
 
The study is conducted from a subjectivist ontological approach and is interpretive 
using case studies of fundholding practices. Interviews were conducted with key 
players at practice level; the lead partner and fund manager. The findings from phase 
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one are analysed and presented, then re-analysed from an emergent perspective of the 
importance of the lead partner to give insights into what they did and how they did it. 
Though the role of accounting itself was found not important as a mechanism and part 
of the NPM, nor was it „all but demonised‟ (Lapsley, 1999) as part of accounting 
change (Hopwood, 1985;1987). Accounting and budgets, underpinned (Mellet and 
Ryan, 2008) the purpose of fundholding, they were a consequence of choosing to be 
fundholders and were therefore implicated and thus, indirectly, impacted on what GPs 
did and how they did management roles. Asking GPs and fund managers about the 
financial accountability brings insight into the management role adopted by GPs as 
professionals. Thus the longitudinal study examines how the GP‟s management role is 
enacted in the community of accounting and further, how a management role might 
transcend the moment of fundholding and impact on the doctors‟ career by having a 
perpetuated role in management.  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The research approach was essentially qualitative (Britten and Fisher, 1993).  The 
initial units of analysis were GP practices in England and participating practices were 
recruited using a mixture of methods.  Some responded to an invitation and leaflet 
which were mailed to several addresses on health authority lists.  Others became 
involved as a result of recommendations or introductions from existing participants or 
some other „champion‟ (Murphy et al., 1992).  The selection of practices was thus 
opportunistic, but there is a reasonable spread across different „waves‟ - three 1st, one 
2nd, five 3rd, one 4th and three 6th
1
, suggesting that many relevant issues are likely to 
be picked up from the interviews.  Indeed, one of the striking features of the findings 
is the range of experience and opinion found across the sample.  It is one of the few 
empirical studies of the fundholding period that extends beyond the early waves in 
data collection. 
The interpretive research philosophy (Saunders et al., 2009) from a subjectivist 
ontological view aims to explain what was occurring in general practice in order to 
investigate the meanings attached to going fundholding and investigate how 
                                                     
1 Beginning on 1st April 1991, the implementation of fundholding proceeded in a 
series of annual „waves‟.  The first wave set a minimum patient list size for 
fundholding applicants of 9,000, but subsequent waves gradually reduced that 
requirement. 
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accounting was implicated. The research explored and thus identified points of 
significance. Even if it is not possible to estimate how representative participants‟ 
views in this study are of the wider population of fundholding practices, or to claim to 
have exhausted all possible issues and perspectives, the study provides an in depth 
examination in the peculiar context of fundholding as a consequence of NPM and GPs 
engaging with management. Typical of a qualitative research study, the research does 
not seek population generalisability but it does add to the body of knowledge and 
understanding of how this group of professionals got involved in financial 
accountability and acted out management. The study provides visibility and interprets 
the phenomenon of fundholding in the context of how GPs carved out a management 
role. 
The first phase of the research has its origin in NPM and associated reforms. GP 
fundholding was voluntary and raised two key research questions;  
 
RQ 1     Why did the practice choose to go fundholding? 
RQ 2     How was accounting implicated in the management of fundholding?  
 
Accounting and accountability per se failed to loom large in the interview data, but 
the interpretive approach bore two further sets of research questions that contribute to 
the understanding of how doctors engage in management as a result of the reform;  
 
RQ 3    Why did the lead partner undertake that role? 
RQ 4   How did the lead partners enact the management role; what did they do 
and how did they do it? 
 
The demise of fundholding brought an end to the GPs‟ opportunity for volunteering 
for management as lead partner of a specific scheme and raises questions of 
professionals choosing a later management role. Therefore additional research 
questions address under what circumstances that engagement in management may be 
perpetuated and the impact on career; 
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RQ 5    Did lead partners continue to engage in management after fundholding, 
and if so, how?  
RQ 6      How did lead partners‟ careers fare after fundholding? 
 
Twelve practices yielded case studies in phase one of the study based on semi-
structured interviews with the lead partner and fund manager within each practice.  Of 
those twelve practices, six lead partners were interviewed for phase two of the 
research. 
 
1.6 Initial Findings: Going Fundholding and the Role of Accounting 
The main findings from the initial research questions were the clear identification of 
dominant and multiple reasons for going fundholding for each practice, thus 
addressing the first research question. The interviews bring more knowledge of the 
factors supporting the choice to go fundholding than previous studies. However, in 
respect of the second question, the role of accounting per se did not loom large for the 
practice, the lead partner or the fund manager.  What did emerge strongly from the 
data in this study was the significance of the lead partner and because accounting was 
implicated in fundholding it was therefore implicated in the professionals (GPs) 
choosing a management role.  
 
The second set of research questions investigates GPs in a new management role and 
what sort work they did and how they did it. The publications (Cowton and Drake, 
1999a, 1999b, 2000) revealed the significance of the lead partner taking on board a 
management role and debated the prospects beyond fundholding for GPs in 
management roles. However, the publications did not go far enough, based to some 
extent on debate and conjecture,  and while the first and third question loom large in 
the publications from this study there so much more that needed to be asked of the 
data. Therefore the thesis continues the story and explicates the legacy of 
fundholding, the implications of accounting in the management of it, and investigate 
the management roles and careers of fundholding GPs. Therefore the second phase of 
the research builds on the first phase by taking a different direction in order to 
understand and contribute to the literature on, and legacy of, fundholding beyond the 
three publications, and as such is presented for the first time in this thesis. 
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1.7 Doctors in Management 
A literature review of doctors in management (chapter 5) was conducted in order to 
support a secondary analysis and in-depth investigation of the first phase interview 
data to explain why doctors engaged in management and how they enacted the role 
they had adopted. It was found that there were limited empirical studies of doctors in 
management roles, the majority of which were in the secondary care setting of 
hospitals (Brazell, 1987; Bruce and Hill, 1994; Dopson, 1996; Hunter; 1992; Buchan 
et al., 1997; Rundall et al., 2004); Kirkpatrick et al., 2009; Neogy and Kirkpatrick, 
2009). The literature findings and recommendations were largely normative, that is, 
what GPs ought to do in management and how they might go about it (for example, 
Clark and Armit, 2008). The literature was repetitive in its recommendation that the 
way to get doctors engaged in and successful in management was by education 
through incorporation into the medical school curricula or through post-qualification 
courses (Newman and Cowling, 1993; 1994: Allen, 1995). This meant that it was 
important to revisit the original interviews to establish why the doctors engaged since 
few studies asked GPs who were actually in management roles.  
 
The literature in secondary care debated the notion of a hybrid manager. This study 
contributes by examining in more depth the choices in management made by doctors 
in the primary care setting. Further, through additional analysis of the evidence, the 
engagement of GPs in management is interpreted in order to make sense of the 
phenomenon. Based on this notion of a hybrid manager the  „choices for the manager‟ 
framework (Stewart, 1992) is used to interpret and make sense of  what the GPs as 
managers chose to do and the way they did such things in order to establish how GPs 
enacted their management role and to what level alongside their primary profession. 
In this study the hybrid manager is conceptualised as strong or weak and the factors 
that influence the degree of engagement in management are modelled. 
 
1.8 Doctors and Career 
This study provides insight and evidence of how professionals who volunteer for 
management engage. Moreover it was found from the original interviews that once 
involved those volunteers enjoyed it - even GPs who were reluctant at the outset of 
the scheme became more engaged with it. This contrasts to doctors as managers in 
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secondary care who were found to be reluctant and often did not perpetuate a career in 
management and who actively sought to return to doctoring. Therefore  the second 
phase of data collection examines if doctors who were lead partners continued to 
engage in management after fundholding, if so, how and how did lead partners‟ 
careers fare after fundholding? 
 
1.9 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters and is presented in an unconventional way. 
It is a confessional and trustworthy account of the research process, key stages and 
findings. This chapter, Chapter One, is introductory providing the background to the 
study, research aims and research methodology. It explains the original motivation for 
the research and how the initial findings, as published, impacted on the research 
journey to contribute in a different context, to doctors in management.  
 
Chapter 2 defines NPM and discusses the ethos behind the design of fundholding. It 
identifies and considers the different perspectives of accounting change using a 
seminal model of accounting change (Hopwood, 1987) to assist in understanding the 
potential implications of accounting in fundholding. The historical context of the 
fundholding is examined to build up a model of the factors shaping its design. As 
empirical studies emerged during fundholding these are identified and critically 
evaluated to identify any shortfalls in the analysis of fundholding. Finally, the chapter 
identifies the literature on going fundholding in the context of accounting to position 
the research questions (1 and 2), why did practices go fundholding, and how is 
accounting implicated in the management of fundholding?  
 
Chapter 3 describes the method of inquiry and theoretical approach presented as a 
confessional account of the research. It explains the time horizon, research strategy 
and research choices. The chapter has four key objectives in order to tell the story of 
the research strategy. Firstly it provides some assumptions that inform the 
methodology explaining the qualitative researcher as the „bricoleur‟. Secondly, it 
provides detail of the method and how the field work was conducted for the first 
phase of data collection. Thirdly, it explains the rationale and emergence of the 
second set of research questions which are applied to the phase one data, to explain 
and justify the empirical inductive approach. It describes the research method for 
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phase one and further, how the methodology evolved to analyse the phenomenon and 
emerging themes from phase one into phase two to make sense of the data. Finally, as 
a prologue to the forthcoming chapters, it explains the purpose of the second phase of 
research.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the results and analysis of the phase one interviews. It explains 
why the practices in the sample went fundholding and how they chose the lead 
partner. The role of accounting per se is found not to be important (Cowton and 
Drake, 1999a). Accounting is found to be instrumental to the design of fundholding 
and its objectives, enabling visibility, governance and, if chosen, participation in 
management by doctors. The background leading into becoming lead partner is found 
to be important rather than the organisational reasons for going fundholding. For the 
first time a study unpicks the seam between organisational reasons for fundholding 
and individual lead partner reasons for taking the role and seeks to interpret an explain 
the phenomena. The engagement in management for the GP becomes an important 
issue (Cowton and Drake, 1999a). Engagement in management by the GPs leads 
firstly, to further questions about why GPs became lead partner, hence involved in 
management and it leads secondly, to how did the doctors in primary care enact that 
role? The importance of the prospects of GPs engaging in management of the NHS 
was further recognised in the second publication from the study (Cowton and Drake, 
1999b), concluding that careful attention therefore needs to be paid to the assumptions 
being made about the motivations and priorities of doctors engaging in management, 
(Cowton and Drake, 1999b). The emergent third question is analysed more deeply in 
the thesis to categorise why lead partners took that role. 
 
Chapter 5 presents an overview of the empirical literature of doctors in management. 
The literature presents the case for a second analysis of the phase one data as there are 
gaps for doctors in management of primary care. Prior to 2000 there was little 
empirical evidence of doctors in management and the opportunity is taken to evaluate 
fundholding legacy of engaging doctors in management by expanding the analysis 
and data. 
 
In Chapter 6, the phase one interview data are analysed for a second time order to 
examine how GPs enacted the role in order to add to the doctors in management 
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literature to address research questions four. The framework to analyse what doctors 
did and how they did it, that is, the engagement of doctors in management is 
presented. The data are analysed and a case study for each lead partner is constructed 
to enable comparison of data on doctors in management in primary care to doctors in 
management in secondary care for the first time. It identifies the factors that influence 
engagement in management roles and present levels of hybridisation. 
 
Chapter 7 outlines the research method for the second phase of data collection and 
presents the case studies for each GP.  The analysis reveals how the careers of the 
doctors who chose management have developed after fundholding ceased.  It 
considers if a career in management continues, or for those who did not engage in the 
first place, if one develops. This study contributes to the literature from a different 
perspective by examining the individual doctor in career beyond their initial foray into 
management. Interviewing the lead partner enabled investigation of what the careers 
of the doctors who chose management look like and if they continue to choose 
management. Further, it identifies the satisfiers and dissatisfiers from having been a 
doctor in management as consequence of engaging in fundholding. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the research findings from both phases linking together 
the journey to identify limitations and draws conclusions with the researcher as 
„bricoleur‟. The chapter comprises five sections:  the first summarises multiple reasons 
for practices going fundholding, the significance of the lead partner and a typology 
developed to explicate why GPs take a lead role; the second explains the role of 
accounting, accountability and its interplay with management activity; the third covers 
the findings of this study relative to the doctors in management literature and the 
Hybrid Manager Engagement Model (HMEM); the fourth identifies some limitations 
of this study and the opportunities for further research; and, the final section identifies 
the principal contributions. 
 
1.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the subject of the thesis, introduced the contributions of the 
study, and explained the two phases of the research and the trajectory of the levels of 
analysis from fundholding practice to individual GPs in management. The 
background to fundholding, underpinned by accounting and accountability as 
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motivation for the study is explained. Glimpses of the story unfold as the legacy of 
fundholding is revealed and addressed through the outline of the research 
methodology and sequence of emergent research questions. Some of the contributions 
of the research are noted in this chapter that have  already been published in refereed 
journals, however based on a second phase of research, further contributions are 
presented in this thesis for the first time. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Fundholding 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is four fold: firstly, it explains the ethos behind the design 
of fundholding including defining NPM; secondly, because fundholding was based on 
accountability and accounting it considers the different perspectives of accounting 
change using a seminal model (Hopwood, 1987) to understand the implications of 
accounting; thirdly it considers the historical context of the fundholding by examining 
GPs relationship to the NHS to facilitate understanding of why fundholding looked 
the way it did and to assist later analysis; fourthly, it identifies the literature on going 
fundholding in the context of accounting.  
 
2.2 NPM: An introduction 
The first section introduces NPM to contextualise NPM research in the institutional 
setting and justify the examination of fundholding as one of the NPM „experiments‟ 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997). It recognises the common characteristics of NPM – 
accountable management at the point of delivery signalled by the introduction of 
budgets and therefore implications for accounting. It considers the role and 
importance of accounting as part of NPM and does so through the lens of accounting 
change (Hopwood, 1987) to consider its potential. The second section explains 
General Practice from a historical perspective to properly contextualize this study, 
helping to understand fundholding better and be able to analyse and interpret findings 
in that healthcare context. The third section identifies the literature on why practices 
went fundholding and the organisational impact of the reforms in the context of 
accounting for those reforms. 
 
Hood (1995) explains that NPM replaced progressive public administration (PPA). 
Public administration (PA) emphasised policy with a strong public sector ethos based 
on two doctrines of contrasting the public and private sectors and thus clearly defining 
them: 
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One of those doctrines was to keep the public sector sharply distant 
from the private sector in terms  of continuity, ethos, methods of doing 
business, organizational design, people rewards and career 
structure…the other doctrine was to maintain buffers against political 
and managerial discretion by means of an elaborate structure of 
procedural rules… (Hood, 1995, p.94) 
 
PPA presented a philosophical and practical divorce between the operation of the 
public, compared to the private sector. PPA was grounded in duality, presented in the 
contrast between the public and the private sector with „inextricably interrelated terms 
developed alongside one another‟ (Llewellyn, 2003). In sharp contrast PPA was 
followed by NPM bringing private sector principles into the public sector. For 
example, NPM introduced competitiveness with contract based provision seeking 
efficiencies and the implication of private sector management styles. A broad 
empirical literature developed from the application of NPM with two key themes, the 
institution it was applied to and the subject area impact of NPM in the context of that 
institution (Barzelay, 2001) e.g. human resources.  
 
This chapter does not seek to provide a full literature review of the subject matter and 
institutions NPM doctrines touched, but it does aim to contextualise NPM‟s impact on 
general practice and draw from the literature surrounding and pertinent to 
fundholding. Lapsley (1999), referring to the nature and role of accounting practices 
in NPM, noted that they were based on “the focus of quantification (i.e. what is more 
tractable for measurement purposes, ” (p.206, Lapsley, 1999)  and hence the primacy 
of accounting, for example, capital charging, the Private Finance Initiative, 
competitive tendering, cash to accrual accounting and financial management 
efficiency. Further, he argued for revisiting the paradigm of NPM for its meaning for 
key actors to establish broader and substantive efficiency gains rather than focus on 
the micro-efficiency gains which had not been found in research studies. Fundholding 
sought large scale NHS efficiencies as part of the internal market. Accounting change 
was evident in general practice by the introduction of budgets creating accountability 
as part of overall plans for organisational improvement in the NHS, thus the 
implication of accounting in the management of fundholding as perceived and acted 
out by GPs is an area to study as important as the other manifestations of NPM in 
other segments of the public sector. As a voluntary scheme it is necessary and 
valuable to investigate the scheme, as it was unusual then, and especially when more 
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recent schemes, such as trusts in the health sector and free schools and academies in 
the education sector, are being promulgated. 
 
2.2.1 NPM: Studies in the Institutional Context 
NPM experiments were examined in different organisations because of resource 
management implications, the potential for impact on and, reaction of, individuals in 
the organisations and the consequences of implementing mechanism to meet the aims 
and objectives of NPM. NPM had various descriptions and applications and multiple 
implications dependent on its context. Osborne (2010) recently summarised the 
breadth of applications: taking lessons from private-sector management; the growth of 
hands on management; focus on entrepreneurial leadership within public sector 
organisations; emphasis on input/output control, evaluation, performance 
management and audit; disaggregation of public services to the most basic unit (in 
this case GP as first point of patient contact); markets, competition, contracts for 
resource allocation. There are many examples of NPM and how it is portrayed in the 
literature because of a lack of agreement as to what NPM constitutes which caused 
Hughes (2010) to conclude that its most salient points and its worth are found in how 
it impacts the organisation rather than debate about what it might constitute as a 
system or programme. NPM was about a change from administration, moving to a top 
down approach, and to the introduction of management. Accounting was present in 
order to bring about accountability at service delivery level thus NPM was practised 
at a practical rather than theoretical level. It may be that NPM did not develop as a 
theory because it was based on the practical process of accountability. Concepts such 
as accountability that reflect practices have not generally been thought of as „theories‟ 
(Llewellyn, 2003) such that “practice-theory dualism is impeding any understanding 
of the “theory- status” of any concepts rooted in practice” (p.674). Indeed Broadbent 
and Laughlin (1997) described NPM and the changes it brought as policy 
experimentation and highlighted the failure of government to evaluate the NHS 
reforms in particular. Thus NPM as a bundle of policies and „experiments‟ became a 
significant term in the literature. There was no universalist approach to the study of 
the manifestations of NPM therefore perhaps it has been overlooked for the 
phenomena it was because it was not consistently and strategically implemented or 
studied. Under these circumstances it would be difficult to generalise about NPM but 
valid to investigate each case of its application in situ. Therefore, the fact that many 
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reforms were not evaluated as part of a wide-ranging universal programme leaves 
individual research studies to document these „experiments‟. 
 
Gray and Jenkins (1986) also recognised the need to contextualise NPM by 
institutional application. NPM had theoretical roots (Osborne, 2010) in rational/public 
choice theory and studies emphasised the management of organisation resources, 
organisational performance and the implication for performance management of 
individuals within the organisation, for example Butterfield et al. (2004) in the UK 
police force. The police also received attention where the subject focused on the 
impact on individual roles for those already in management, for example Butterfield 
and Edwards (2005) – NPM from the perspective of change. Research did not follow 
the study of a grand policy experiment, but application in miniature to specific 
institutions yet no attention had been paid to fundholding and the implications of 
accounting and its role in fundholding until this study.  
 
In some public sector segments there were  studies of organisations and individuals  
which looked at the consequence of implementing  NPM and its mechanism, for 
example, Laughlin (1991) looked at the information systems  in the NHS that were 
required as a result of the implementation of the internal market. Similarly, as 
accountability was a key feature of NPM, accounting was studied as part of the 
mechanism for change. This study views accounting as part of the mechanism for 
change under the universal characteristics of NPM. It aims to examine fundholding 
and the implications of accounting for the management of fundholding as part of the 
change brought about by NPM reforms and concurs with an intra-organisational 
perspective of studying NPM, hence avoiding a universalist approach (Gray and 
Jenkins, 1986). Some studies concentrated on the impact of delegating financial 
responsibility (see Humphrey et al., 1993; Llewellyn; 1998 and 2001) when the 
mechanism of accounting makes visible the activities which generate costs. Those 
studies are consistent with Lapsley‟s (1999) concern that focus on measurement and 
input and output could lead to “irrationalities or at least inhibit the fusion of 
management ideas and the actions of key groups in the organisation”, (p.206). 
Fundholding involved the delegation of budgets to GPs, presenting a different 
institutional setting for studying these accountable management changes. Therefore 
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accounting as a conduit for NPM reform suggests change and accounting needs to be 
considered as part of that change. 
 
2.2.2 Fundholding: Creating New Territory for Accounting 
Fundholding was based on concerns of value for money and efficiency as part of the 
larger internal market initiative for the NHS. Resource management was key and 
there were a number of „accountable management‟ reforms (Humphrey, Miller and 
Scapens, 1993). Accounting and its practice had been documented in the probation 
service (Humphrey et al., 1993; Humphrey, 1994), the social services (Llewellyn, 
1998) and the police (Woodall, 2004). These were services where accountability had 
not been delegated to smaller units at the bottom of the hierarchical services before; 
hence financial accountability had not loomed large. This is in contrast to the large 
organisational bodies within the public services such as hospitals which, traditionally, 
used financial and management accounting. Humphrey et al. (1993) considered the 
application of budgets in these new scenarios as “accounting technologies, of 
calculable selves and calculable space loosely linked to each other and to a centre of 
calculation provides the possibility of acting on the actions of other, guiding 
individuals without the need for direct control or supervision,” (p.17). Like Gray and 
Jenkins (1986),  Humphrey was also critical of the folly in the universalist approach 
which implies there was more to learn from considering the application in context.  
Thus it seems that NPM was a „loose‟ term featuring accountability to a lower 
denomination, a new calculable space (or unit) reporting up to a centre of calculation. 
Thus there was a need to study accounting in  context in a new and original calculable 
space – „new‟ in the content of not being accountable in a  previous structural and 
administrative form. Moreover, Humphrey et al. (1993) were proponents of the study 
of the „lived experience‟ of individuals who were applying the accounting 
technologies rather than technologies themselves, unlike Laughlin (1991) looking at 
the mechanism aspect as part of information technology. This consideration of the 
role of accounting as part of the accountable management reforms has common 
ground with the work of Hopwood (for example, 1978; 1983; 1985; 1987) who called 
for accounting research to go beyond the technological aspects of measurement and 
calculation and be considered for its organisational and social impact. Fundholding 
placed accounting in new territory, with a new purpose, recording and measuring new 
forms of financial activities and opening up accountability and visibility. 
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The implications of accounting, the roles and technologies, and how that might be 
implicated in change had been extensively debated and summarised in a seminal 
paper on the archaeology of accounting systems (Hopwood, 1987). A paper reviewing 
existing perspectives of accounting change created a useful framework for 
establishing how the role of accounting might be considered in fundholding because 
fundholding was “putting accounting where accounting was not” (Hopwood, 1985, 
p.214). This was not only a case of accounting going to a lower denomination and 
smaller unit for accountability purposes but to a brand new organisational setting to 
be used to make persons accountable beyond their organisational boundary. 
Previously, general practice was effectively a small business independently contracted 
to the state. Thus accounting and budgets for GPs could be studied as a „lived 
experience‟, unlike Hopwood, who had to resort to the history of Wedgwood from the 
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 century, to “witness the birth pains of newly emergent accounting” (p.214). Table 
2.1 summarises the four perspectives on accounting change, as opposed to accounting 
being static, the features of accounting change and the paradigm strengths and 
weaknesses. It is presented here to “enable a more dynamic understanding of the 
accounting craft” (p.209) and will be used as a frame to consider the role of 
accounting in fundholding. 
 
The four perspectives (Table 2.1) show what might be expected that the role of 
accounting change could be in an organisation. It suggest that accounting; can be a 
technique to facilitate organisational improvement, that it can enable and improve in 
an organisational performance for example, assisting decision making and goal 
congruence in the NHS at large;  that accounting practice implements change to 
construct organisational order, for example, implementing budgets, with the 
associated tensions and possible dysfunctional consequences; that accounting  can be 
a practice that creates social order, for example, enabling more governance and 
control; accounting can be in motion, when in action it can transform organisations.  
 
Figure 2.1 describes the process of accounting in „experiments‟ such as fundholding. 
The role of accounting is to assist in improving the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness as knowledge would not stand outside of accounting. The practice is 
given a budget and purchases or designs accounting technology to meet the 
requirements of being a fundholder.   
21 
 
Perspective Features of Accounting Change Paradigm Strengths and Weaknesses 
Accounting and 
Organisational 
Improvement 
Organisational change and 
improvement. Accounting more than 
a technique, it is concerned with what 
accounting should be and conceptions 
of the potential of accounting. 
Accounting as part of the process of 
direction, planning, decision making, 
control and the management of 
motivation. Accounting as enhancing 
organisational performance such that 
economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness can be improved by 
accounting. “Knowledge does not 
stand outside of accounting” (p. 210). 
Recognises accounting is more than a 
technique and its capabilities. On the other 
hand, presents a history of inadequacy of 
accounting with a focus on what it should be. 
Ignores the development of accounting and 
the duality of the interactions; accounting 
needs to be recognised more for creating 
rather than enabling. 
Accounting and 
the 
Construction of 
an 
Organisational 
Order 
Research focussed on accounting 
practice. The analysis and 
understanding of accounting practice 
recording organisational tensions, 
resistance and dysfunction. An 
advance in research in that 
“accounting has at least been 
grounded in the organisational 
context in which it operates” (p.212) 
thus a growing understanding of 
practices of accounting. 
Not enough focus on accounting change. 
Dysfunction recorded but not re-appraised in 
order to change the craft of accounting. 
Accounting as imposed with little recognition 
of „management discretion and choice‟.  
Comparative studies, “accounting seen as it 
was and as it is rather than in the process of 
becoming” (p.212). Lack of recognition for 
shaping organisational affairs. A negative 
account rather than a positive process so that 
it becomes what it was not. 
Accounting and 
the 
Construction of 
a Social Order 
Accounting creating economic 
visibility. Visibility enables 
governance and control of the 
organisation. Accounting as an 
“artefact residing in the domain of the 
social rather than the narrow 
organisational” (p.213). Purposive 
and purposeful; “making real by the 
active construction of the 
organisation as we know it, interests 
which are independent of both the 
accounting and the organisational 
representation of them,” (p.213). 
Accounting no longer seen as passive and 
neutral, not merely a technical instrument of 
administration. Early beginnings for 
recognising accounting practice as in motion. 
Towards a view 
of Accounting 
in Motion 
Accounting in action. Precise 
mechanisms of accounting change. 
Accounting playing a role in 
transformation in organisation. 
Would recognise the organisational and the 
social and “appreciate how accounting might 
enable the concerns of the social to pass 
through and thereby transform the 
organisation and, in turn, to create 
organisational practices which can be 
influential in the construction of the world of 
the social” (p.214). 
Table 2.1 Four Perspectives of Accounting Change Source: Hopwood (1987) 
 
Therefore questions arise about the role of accounting in that new situation and the 
implications for the fundholders themselves. There are expectations about what the 
structure and mechanism of accounting as part of fundholding will achieve in this new 
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setting that cannot be explained with reference to other applications of accounting. It 
is presented to construct organisational order as part of the internal market but it is not 
imposed and hence there is choice. 
 
Implement the Accounting Technology 
 
 
 
Accounting in Practice 
 
Figure 2.1 The Role of Accounting in Fundholding – at the simplest level 
 
 
2.2.3 NPM: The Implications for Accounting 
The purpose of this research is to investigate why practices chose to go fundholding 
(research question 1) and what the implications of accounting are for the management 
of fundholding. Fundholding is an application of NPM with accounting technologies 
central to achieving the objectives of fundholding and there are implications of 
accounting in this context of change. Hood (1991, 1995) summarised the possible 
accounting implications for NPM: more cost centre units; more identification of costs 
and understanding of cost structures; cost data becoming increasingly commercially 
confidential; private sector accounting norms; fewer general procedural constraints 
and more use of financial data for management accountability; more stress on the 
bottom line; performance indicators and audit; broader cost centre accounting; 
blurring of funds for pay and activity. However, these are practical implications for 
accounting. All of these implications are about the structure and mechanism of 
accounting before it is applied in the accountable context of the organisation and 
whereby it then becomes a lived experience by the individuals. NPM‟s aspiration for 
accounting was for organisational improvement at the level of the NHS, and as an 
enabler to construct organisational order at practice level. It is important to explicate 
that experience in order to understand if, and how, the role of accounting might be 
important in fundholding with possible practical implications; what was the role of 
accounting in the management of fundholding (research question 2)?  NPM as 
accountable management seeks organisational improvement; economy; efficiency; 
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effectiveness in public service bodies, reducing the gap between the public and 
private. NPM has a universal assumption that it will improve the organisation, in this 
case the NHS. The improvement sought could not be achieved without the accounting 
function therefore what role does accounting actually have for those involved? The 
aspirations for fundholding, the knowledge required to make its purpose successful 
could not be achieved without accounting – it enables the process of fundholding. 
 
2.2.4 Implementing Accounting in the NHS 
Accounting implications of NPM emerged in the literature, for example, Glynn et al., 
1992; Humphrey et al., 1993; Humphrey, 1994; Laughlin et al., 1992; 1994; 
Llewellyn, 1998. The findings of those studies were commensurate with the second 
perspective, summarised in Table 2.1 as accounting and the construction of 
organisational order. Studies examined the organisational context e.g. police, social 
services, health service. Thus while the motivation may have been organisational 
improvement at public service level (NHS) the accounting change brought about 
organisational tensions, resistance and dysfunction in smaller units within the 
hierarchy. This was observed and written about in different organisational settings. It 
seemed that financial control and budgets brought about negative accounts of the 
implementation of accounting in practice. 
 
Accountable management reforms (for example, Humphrey et al, 1993; Glynn et al., 
1992)  suggests that the research outcomes reflected Hopwood‟s (1987) second 
perspective of accounting change and the construction of an organisational order (see 
Table 2.1). Studies focussed on the dysfunctional consequences of such practical 
applications on organisational life. They questioned if the missions, goals and 
objectives of the organisation to which they were applied can be changed (Laughlin, 
1991a) or whether any benefits are derived for the „consumer‟ (Mayston, 1993).  
 
Laughlin and Broadbent (1991) and Laughlin et al. (1992; 1994) investigated the 
„financial management initiative‟ (FMI) within the NHS. They described “devolution 
of financial responsibility to allow freedom of financial management yet at the same 
time a heightened intrusion into defining objectives to be achieved and detailed 
requirements of an accountability nature with a particular emphasis, wherever 
possible, on the measurability of outputs” (Laughlin et al.,1992). These studies found 
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that the accounting change initiatives involved tensions such that the changes could 
cause damage and danger for the profession of general practice and involved 
compulsory changes within the 1990 contract rather than voluntary changes. Laughlin 
et al. (1992; 1994) generally took a wide view of accounting with the study of the 
organisational changes for both non-fundholding and fundholding practices viewing 
financial and administrative changes as accounting led whilst choosing not to 
concentrate on the largest accounting led change to general practice – fundholding. 
 
Lapsley (1991) forecast the potential for accounting in the NHS broadly; the future 
extent of accounting (increasing); the resultant need for research in the NHS in the 
context of potential conflict of accounting with the values and norms of medical 
services. Research on healthcare and budgeting has  frequented the literature in the 
context of NPM reforms, mainly in the setting of hospitals for example, Lapsley 
(1994), Kurunmaki (1999),  Doolin (2001), Nylan and Pettersen (2004), Macinati 
(2010). Lapsley‟s (1991) premonition on future research potential was pertinent for 
the implications of NPM led reforms for general practice as he agreed with Bevan 
(1989) that the GP would be a pivotal element in NHS reform and the creation of the 
internal market. Fundholding was there to make the market work with purchaser 
(GP)/ provider (hospital) split. For that aspect of reform to work GPs had to be 
encouraged to take on the role of purchaser of services rather than a service instigator 
who had unlimited access and funds, uncontrolled referral behaviour and no 
mechanism for monitoring. Broadbent (1992) observed the accounting implications in 
the NHS suggesting that accounting had a central role in the changes in the NHS as 
part of the design archetype, “the tangible manifestation of the interpretive schemes” 
(p.347). Could the interpretive schemes (norms, beliefs and missions) of traditional 
general practice be changed and given more order?  Could accounting construct that 
social order (beyond organisational order) and might it become important in the 
organisation as a key contributor to NPM „philosophy‟ for efficiency and 
effectiveness? Thus taking all of these views on board, Hood‟s (1991, 1995) NPM 
implications for accounting and the perspectives of Hopwood (Table 2.1)  it is 
suggested here that professionals in the public sector could no longer assume that 
financial and accounting systems were principally passive and a bureaucratic means 
of recording financial consequence of their professional judgement ( Ezzamel and 
Willmot, 1993). Accounting change was implemented to create accountability which 
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also meant visibility and needed to be studied and interpreted in the fundholding 
context.  NPM change was about creating accounting in a new context as part of the 
internal market and the researcher here contends that accounting may not be passive 
and requires investigation in this institutional context. Accounting was introduced 
where accounting and budgets across organisational boundaries had not existed 
before, because of the internal market. Therefore questions need to be asked and 
analysed in the context of the role of accounting in going fundholding. 
 
This section has introduced the broad concept of NPM and justified the need for an 
investigation of fundholding as an example of an accountable management reform. 
Hopwood‟s (1987) perspectives of the possibility of accounting  change raise 
questions, not least because fundholding puts accounting where it was not, making it 
purposive where it has not been before and opening up the possibility for accounting 
change. The perspectives will help the analysis and debate. This study is justified in 
bringing fundholding in focus, as an experiment of NPM, for three reasons: firstly, the 
GP is an independent contractor and not an employee of a public service unlike the 
police, social and probation services; secondly, accounting was being introduced 
where it had not been before – across organisational boundaries; thirdly, fundholding 
and the accounting implication of the reforms was not compulsory – it was voluntary. 
With these three key features of general practice in mind, the introduction of 
fundholding needs to be set in some historical context of GPs because they have 
independent contractor status and it being voluntary. The significance is amplified 
because it appears that GPs, as patients‟ advocate for NHS resource consumption, had 
previously been left alone by successive accountable management reforms at least in 
terms of visibility and consequences across the practice boundary. Fundholding has 
more threads to it than other vehicles for NPM and as such the study in this new 
situation is justified because it will add to the literature on all of those counts, may 
have implications for accounting change and perhaps for accounting in motion and 
possible transformation of the organisation of general practice as part of the grander 
NHS.  
 
Thus this next section places GPs in the contextual history of the NHS. It does not 
seek to present a full history of general practice but does present how GPs have fared 
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in order to set the scene and support the explication of the emerging empirical 
literature on the phenomenon of fundholding.  
 
2.3 GPs and the NHS: A Short Contextual History 
The second aim of this chapter is to explore the GPs relationship to the NHS in order 
to set fundholding into a historic context. This section is an important element of the 
thesis because one cannot discuss primary-led care and resource management without 
considering the history of GPs within the NHS. Fundholding was based on choices for 
partners in general practice. It was a NPM reform but it was not explicitly forced on 
general practice and as such the decision to go fundholding relative to previous NHS 
reforms for GPs is an important element of the research. 
 
The section demonstrates that since the birth of the NHS in 1948 the relationship of 
GPs to the NHS has been somewhat fraught and less straightforward than that of other 
members of the health service, for example, hospital doctors or nurses. The role and 
professional standing and the independence of GPs can be contrasted to the doctors in 
secondary care (hospitals). Why GPs are different to hospital doctors in the grand 
scheme of the NHS requires attention if we are to understand why the decision to go 
fundholding was so significant to general practice. Three key features of the 
institutional context of fundholding are deemed important considerations; GPs as 
independent contractors to the NHS; new accountability across the general practice 
boundary; and a voluntary scheme. This section sheds light on why GPs had a choice 
in this NPM reform, which was absent from other institutional contexts where it had 
been compulsory. More recently administrative structures have once again become 
available that enable GPs to commission services. This section will explain how the 
profession of general practice has been funded within the NHS prior to the first 
opportunity to commission care through fundholding. It will show how over time GPs 
have sought to retain professional status and autonomy throughout the various policy 
changes they have been subject to - through bargaining with the funding mechanism, 
and how in more recent times, to varying degrees, have become involved with 
resource management.  
 
The reason fundholding was shaped the way it was lies deep in the history of the NHS 
(Glennerster et al., 1993).  However, summaries of events that influence GPs prior to 
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1989 and the onset of fundholding are often confined to an introductory paragraph in 
the larger NHS literature. Basically, not much attention had been paid to GPs in the 
NHS reforms until fundholding.  Successive governments had based reforms around 
secondary care until the creation of the internal market necessitated the 
purchaser/provider split. However, how the profession of general practice and the 
degree to which doctors engage in reforms is influenced by the previous attempts at 
reform and the profession‟s reaction to them. Through this section of the thesis, by 
reviewing how primary care evolved prior to fundholding, tracing the tumultuous 
journey of the GP through a wide range of NHS reforms, one can grasp why GPs have 
striven for and retained independent contractor status and why fundholding looked 
like it did. Therefore it is important to devote some time to revealing the history. It 
aims to set the scene to investigate the attempts at managing GPs as agents used to 
control the resources allocated to the NHS.  
 
2.3.1 GPs: Before the NHS 
Table 2.2 is a constructed chronological representation of key milestones that 
contextualise the study up to the demise of fundholding. Prior to the creation of the 
National Health Service in 1948 the majority of the population in the UK were unable 
to access a health care system on a par with middle and upper classes that were 
catered for by local suburban hospitals. Access to a doctor was by payment. This 
raised inequalities in the access to health care in the UK. There was some 
improvement in the access to doctors through the 1911 National Insurance Bill when 
single-handed GPs could be seen by accessing a panel of doctors by the patient paying 
a „stamp‟. The Dawson Report (1920) advocated health centres as a good place to site 
GPs, rather than private places, giving a good central access point to doctors and other 
allied medical services. The government favoured health centres as a location for 
general practice. 
 
2.3.2 GPs and the Creation of the NHS (1948) 
National Insurance Contributions, insuring contributors against sickness, evolved 
from the 1942 Beveridge report which introduced the notion of a National Health 
Service for everyone. The creation of a central fund for health services was accessible 
to all. The Beveridge report had been a focus for social security reforms but it had an 
inherent assumption „B‟ (Webster, 1998) of an existing NHS. 
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Document/Event Year Key Feature relative to GPs 
National Health 
Insurance 1911 
1911 Voluntary Contributions to insure against sickness. GPs core 
role of certifying sickness rather than demand led patient care. 
GPs paid on a capitation basis. 
Dawson Report 1920 Recommendation on administrative system. Suggested the 
creation of Health Centres. 
White Paper A 
National Health 
Service". 
1944 Compulsory purchase of hospitals. Hospital consultants become 
salaried. GPs self-employed, contracted to NHS. Demand led 
culture for primary care. BMA reluctant. 
 
Birth of NHS 1948 General Practice responsible for all personal medical services. 
Capitation Basis 1951 Capitation funding is based on number of GPs and not number 
of patients. 
Porrit 
 
1962 Recommendations on administration. Criticised separation of 
hospitals, general practice and health authority. 
GPs demand new 
contract and get one 
1966 Contract changes demanded included better funding, including 
funding premises. Demanded more autonomy. Capitation based 
on number of patients, a practice allowance and fees for services. 
BMAs GPs Charter 1965 Demanded right to provide good service ahead of demand for 
pay. 
Cogwheel report 1967 Encouraged clinicians to get involved management. 
Griffiths Report 1983 Introduction of general management at all levels of the NHS as a 
result of the Griffith‟s NHS Management Enquiry. 
Working for Patients 1989 Purchaser/Provider split. Creation of internal market. 
Income Generation 
Paper 
1989 Department of Health issues guidelines on scope for income 
generation. Potential for entrepreneurship. 
New GP Contract 1990 Linked more to performance. GPs “treated as independent 
contractors more in the sense of business entrepreneurs” (Lewis, 
1997). Less of a „gentleman‟s‟ agreement and more targets. 
Fundholders 1991 First Fundholding GPs. 
Revised New GP 
Contract 
1994 GPs allowed to deliver more specialist services which had been 
the preserve of hospitals e.g. diabetes clinics in GP practices. 
White Paper: Choice 
and Opportunity 
1996 Introduced salaried option for GPs. 
Management of 
District Health 
Authorities and 
Family Health 
Authorities joined 
together 
April 
1996 
Move towards primary led care. Introduced the option of 
salaried GP. 
White Paper 1997 Labour government elected and announces they will abolish GP 
fundholding. 
Table 2.2 Milestones for General Practice 
 
Although the Beveridge report introduced the NHS ideology it was left to Bevan to 
implement it. Central funding of the NHS implied central control of the medical 
profession as a whole with salaried staff working in centrally funded and specially 
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built environments. Salaried hospital consultants would be housed in hospitals and 
GPs were to be contracted to NHS and located in health centres. Importantly, 
particularly for GPs, the creation of healthcare for all abolished the possibility of 
lucrative private work at the „generalist level‟ whilst consultants as specialist could 
still be paid privately if the demand was there. 
 
Thus the concept of an NHS as one large administrative structure with limited 
resources, controlled by government involving free health care for all should have 
included access to GPs in health centres. Health centres became a focus of the NHS 
and were used as a way of controlling the distribution of GPs, controlled centrally by 
government to give parity of service. However, there were unintended consequences 
of the attempt to centralise health care control. GPs were resistant to a perceived loss 
of autonomy and were unhappy about losing private work (which was preserved for 
hospital consultants). Bevan became known as an „ally‟ of the GP, being 
uncomfortable with a wholly centralised control mechanism for a NHS and an 
advocate of primary led care. Thus some of the divide between the employment status 
of being a hospital doctor and GP can be attributed to Bevan. Hence the 1944 White 
Paper, „A National Health Service‟, set out to provide healthcare which was free at the 
point of delivery and funded by taxation.  Even at this early stage of the development 
of a national health care system the primary health care providers had been vociferous 
about not being consulted enough, strengthened by an allergy to centralised control. 
They were “objecting to the administration and the lack of negotiation and 
consultation of the proposed Act with its subsequent effects on the livelihood of 
practitioners”, (BMA, 2005). From that professional resistance was born independent 
contractor status, albeit reporting to regional health boards. Independent contractor 
service gave GPs some freedom after losing the opportunity for private work but also 
set them free from being a salaried employee of the NHS. 
 
The system that emerged was characterised by three tiers of control through different 
administration systems for hospitals, public health services and general practice. Such 
decentralisation did not force GPs into centrally administered health centres and 
therefore placated a profession resistant to centralised government control. This early 
battle for independence is important in the context of this study since professional 
autonomy versus state control has been a core feature of the relationship between GPs 
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and government, with a long history of resistance to change. This study of 
fundholding, a voluntary scheme, must be seen  within that historical context of  a 
medical profession resistant to change and where politicians in the past, in Bevans‟ 
own words, had  „stuffed the mouths of doctors with gold‟ (Allen, 1995).  
 
2.3.3 GPs: Private Work and Funding 
Private hospitals, known as voluntary hospitals, underwent compulsory purchase and 
employees (doctors, nurses, porters etc.) became salaried NHS employees. GPs at that 
time were typically single-handed, self-employed practitioners serving their 
community by the award of a contract with the NHS. The GP became a supplier of 
services to the NHS. Over time the form and content of the contract, the conditions 
and monitoring mechanisms have been varied. 
 
 The nature of the contract and free access to GPs meant that GP services were 
determined by patient demand. Patients registered with a practice and made 
appointments freely, therefore demand was a function of accessibility, patient‟s 
choice and how informed a patient was. Cost was not a consideration. The NHS 
budget seemed limitless in the hands of patient demand - a demand led culture for 
NHS services in the primary care sector.  
 
Although GPs achieved independent contractor status, hence autonomy, the 
relationship between primary care and secondary care doctors did result in a 
differential position for GPs relative to the hospital doctors in terms of prestige: 
 
“…it was no longer possible to combine hospital specialization and 
general practice; the high flyers took command of the hospital 
specialties, regarding general practice as the province of the failure… 
an ageing remnant left over… satisfied to play an ancillary role as 
„gatekeepers‟…” (Webster, 1998, p.52). 
 
Hospital doctors had a lucrative source of income providing services to voluntary 
hospitals, then part of the nationalized hospital scheme, where once they had provided 
services for free and subsidized by their private work. Moreover, the hospital doctors 
were allowed to continue with that private work in return for a reduction in salary 
which would have been more than doubly compensated for by private fees. The GPs, 
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not wishing to see their profession further diminished in prestige sought further 
demands on their administrative structure. As part of the separation from central 
control the GPs, through large representation on the BMA, had a steely determination 
to preserve professional autonomy, which was formidable enough to put at risk and 
possibly scupper the creation of a NHS. As a result of their demands the GPs gained 
further autonomy in other business affairs (Webster, 1989); 
 
(i)  for goodwill being part of the sale/purchase of practices, 
(ii)  payment solely by capitation under the GP contract 
(iii) abandonment of controls over the distribution of GPs and, 
(iv) ministers being the final source of appeal if a GP contract were to be 
terminated. 
 
Later, these administrative structures were investigated in the Porritt Report (1962) 
which criticized the three tiers of administration and advocated a single tier. The 
report was a catalyst for a reorganization of the NHS (Webster, 1998) resulting in the 
remuneration of GPs by a peculiar capitation formula. The target income for a GP was 
multiplied by the number of GPs which then was the „budget‟ that GPs could claim 
for under the capitation formula. The claims under the capitation system depended on 
the list size of the GP or partnership. Claims on the „pool‟ were also reduced 
according to the amount of private work. This reduction was in direct contrast to 
hospital doctors who could enhance their NHS salary without condition with private 
work. Lewis (1998) performed a useful evaluation of the conflict between general 
practitioners and the state in the mid-1960s noting that the capitation worked 
favourably for GPs until the population increased dramatically through the „baby 
boom‟. Essentially the number of GPs relative to the population was decreasing and 
given how the large „pool‟ was calculated the income of GPs was falling as funds 
were spread across a larger total capitation. The concentration of funds in the pool 
was being diluted by the expanding population as pounds per capita decreased. 
Meanwhile hospital doctors could still increase personal income through private work 
– the divide in status grew. 
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Consequently, GP esteem and morale was low in the mid-1960s which led to re-
negotiation of the contract after the successful intervention with the GPs Charter 
(1965), authored by the BMA: 
  
The four principles of the Charter were the right to practise good 
medicine in up-to date, well-staffed accommodation; the right to 
practise medicine with the least possible intrusion by the state; the 
right to enjoy proper payment for the services rendered; and the right 
to financial security. The demand for the means to deliver a good 
service was thus put before pay. BMA Council members stressed that 
the Charter was as much a patients' as a doctors' Charter. (Lewis, 
1998). 
 
Thus, GPs had to put „service‟ to the patient at the forefront of their work while 
securing a better pay and reward system from a GP perspective. 
 
2.3.4 GPs in the 1980s: the Griffiths Report  
GPs have traditionally been independent contractors to the NHS with their 
professional and financial destiny tightly bound up in a contract. In terms of 
performance and service quality it was GPs that encouraged the quality of service to 
patients to be at the forefront of contract negotiations via the BMA Charter (1965). 
Butler (1993) reflected on four harbingers of the future of the NHS: the Griffiths 
Report (1983) which prescribed  general management at all levels of the NHS; 
Department of Health (1989) guidelines on Income Generation that introduced 
entrepreneurialism into the equation; contracting out through competitive tendering in 
the NHS; the growth of internal markets derived from  the purchaser/provider split. 
The Griffiths report also introduced customer influence which impacted on GPs 
through changes in the contract by linking targets to patients on the list size and also 
fundholding itself (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). Linking health performance targets to 
list size increased the variability of practice income as less income was paid per 
practice and more per head of patient (tied up to contracts). 
 
There were three main elements of the Griffiths recommendations: decentralization of 
responsibility; creation (1991) of self-governing NHS Trusts; and introduction of the 
purchaser/provider split. Griffiths (1983) introduced general management and 
alongside it words of „efficiency‟ and „quality‟. General management posts would be 
33 
 
created forthwith at all levels, posts charged with accountability. Management units 
would hold budgets which would assist decision making enabling performance 
assessment and control (see Table 2.1) and accounting would enable organisational 
improvement in the NHS. For doctors in hospitals (clinicians) the process introduced 
clinical management budgets which: 
 
“… involve the assumption that (at least eventually) all clinicians will 
be willing to assume responsibility for expenditure on those resources 
whose volume they control, and also take an active interest in 
influencing costs and efficiency of use of indirect resources and 
overheads which they do not directly control,” (Perrin,1988). 
 
In a succession of reforms intended to cure the perceived ills of the UK‟s National 
Health Service (NHS), management has thus been the prescribed medicine, 
particularly since Griffiths promoted the introduction of a commercial business 
approach (Kelleher et al., 1994).  “Strengthening management, raising its profile and 
status, developing management skills and competencies, investing in management 
information systems and so on are seen as crucial to the success of policies directed 
towards securing value for money and improved quality of care for a given budget” 
(Hunter, 1994, p.2).  These reforms included accounting a part of the process of 
management control for planning, decision making and performance management e.g. 
through targets. 
 
2.3.5 Primary Led Care and Professional Autonomy 
From the 1990s onwards „a primary care-led NHS‟ became pivotal and the GP was 
soon positioned at the forefront of NHS change. Liddell (1996) questioned what 
primary led care actually means and found three main attributes. Firstly, primary led 
care is about decision making and moving it as close to the patient as possible. 
Secondly, it is about the process of delivering and managing care with the „GP as 
Coordinator‟ of the whole health care system as opposed to only managing the 
primary care team in situ – a common analogy was the GP as „gatekeeper‟. Thirdly, 
he identified that it is about strengthened relationships. The GP was not just a feeder 
of referrals to secondary care but about being in the right location for care with the 
right local knowledge. Thus the GP was the agent of the patient and the hospital, an 
advocate for the patient in an informed and professional position. 
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Ham (1997) further emphasised the features of primary led care, emphasising the 
setting of general practice for a „different‟ care service. There would be shared care 
between specialists and GPs of conditions such as diabetes; outpatient clinics in GP 
surgeries including GPs joining specialist clinics as professional development; 
diagnostic testing in the surgery; additional medical staff from chiropodists to 
physiotherapists. However, few studies of NHS reform had addressed the impact of 
the practice as more than just a setting for „care‟ or paid attention to the actors in the 
social setting of the practice throughout these changes. The concept of the 
professional in these changing organisations has been considered. Harrison and Pollitt 
(1994) describe three notions of professionalism in welfare state organisations, in this 
instance, for doctors and their patient. They describe the notions as: 
 
1.  Functionality of professional arrangements: A patient places trust in the 
professional and two conditions must exist for that trust not to be exploited: firstly, 
the professional is free from outside interferences in exercising their judgment; and 
secondly, the profession must be largely self-regulating as only that profession has the 
technical capability. 
 
2. Occupational Control: Professions and workers pursue „occupational control‟, 
that is “more congenial conditions of work for themselves” (p.2) which may 
contradict the first notion as it is self-interest. 
 
3. The Illusion of Autonomy: The contention that autonomy is partly an illusion 
because judgments are heavily influenced by the training and professions. Further, 
that an illness is an individual pathology and the GP takes away the visibility of 
rationality. Thus a GP faced with an illness brought on  by lifestyle has operating 
autonomy but not full autonomy which may have been fostered through his/her 
training and therefore been socially created. 
 
The April 1990 GP contract brought increased managerialism, accountability and 
control over GPs (Warwicker, 1998). Lewis (1997) described the 1966 contract as 
there to protect GP autonomy but that the 1990 contract began to treat GPs more as 
business entrepreneurs.  The 1990 contract would give GPs a stronger hand in 
preventing illness in addition to treating it and because it was more business like the 
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debate began about the need for a management role for the general practitioner 
(Greenfield and Nayak, 1996). Family Health Service Authorities adopted a 
monitoring role with the advent of targets and were charged with inciting behavioural 
change among GPs (Laughlin et al., 1994). Such changes had to be without harming 
the first of the three notions, that is, not harming the functionality of the professional 
arrangements of the GP (Harrison and Pollit, 1994). These targets were intended to 
encourage GP behaviour so that GPs assumed more responsibility for expenditure by 
early intervention with resources that they had control of, consequentially avoiding 
more expensive referrals. The targets did not include financial budgets but were 
clearly a form of performance management. Arguably the autonomy of GPs was 
being reduced as they were directed by targets and protocols that were much more 
detailed than under the previous contract.  
 
It seems that the degree of occupational control and actual working arrangements 
were becoming less congenial. The new contract did add (Chambers & Belcher, 1993; 
Laughlin et al., 1992, 1994) to the management burden, causing some resentment on 
the part of GPs who did not see the use of business and management methods as part 
of their professional role (Greenfield & Nayak, 1996).  Some thought that the design 
of the new contract was without good scientific basis and was a way of increasing the 
workload of GPs (Warwicker, 1998). There was apparent resistance to impingement 
on professional autonomy with performance management. These contracts provide 
evidence of a move towards a more business like NHS using contracts but also early 
indications that GPs did not take a keen interest in their primary care led role of 
contributing to the management of the NHS, preferring to get on with their primary 
and autonomous professional role. Therefore why, later, would they volunteer for 
fundholding? 
 
 
To encourage GPs to take on budgets a change in funding was sought to harness and 
direct GPs without harming perceived occupational control and retaining the illusion 
of autonomy. GPs were driving costs through decision making. Some costs might be 
reduced by delivery in the practice but GPs needed an incentive to be active in 
„improved‟ primary led care. The solution was for funds to be allocated to general 
practice as a group of self-employed doctors outside the „employed‟ boundary of the 
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NHS. However, with that allocation of funds came accountability and a need to 
encourage GPs to engage in the process, hence the allocation of budgets and the 
concepts of a profit, tactfully named „savings‟ – fundholding was the proffered 
solution. 
 
Figure 2.2 is constructed to show the factors thus far that have been discussed here as 
influencing the design of fundholding policy. NPM brought budgets and 
accountability. The historical context of the GP in  relation to the NHS brought 
independent contractor status and notions of professionalism including the illusion of 
autonomy. GPs had fought to retain independent status (see Table 2.2) and if 
fundholding was to succeed then these elements needed to be retained. Bringing the 
principles of NPM and GP context together warranted accounting measurement and 
accountability across the practice boundary, hence budgets. Aligned with budgets the 
GPs were able to retain occupational control, part of the notion of professionalism, 
with the introduction of financial incentive – savings on budgets to spend on 
infrastructure. Choice was important since GPs were independent and historically 
resistant to central control then fundholding was voluntary and encouragement to go 
fundholding came with choice, the ability to be in control of purchasing from 
hospitals, hence shifting power away from consultants and financial incentive within 
the fundholding scheme. 
 
Thus, Harrison and Pollitt‟s (1994) notions of professionalism are reflected in the 
model in Figure 2.2; retaining functionality of professional arrangements as 
independent contractor; occupational control, for example, able to make use of 
financial incentives ; and, increasing the potential illusion of autonomy by shifting the 
balance of power away from the consultants. 
 
This chapter so far has aimed to distinguish fundholding from other state 
organisations to which NPM applied by explaining what contributed to fundholding 
being designed the way it was.  One of the features for fundholding was the GP 
entered it in a voluntary capacity, as an independent contractor rather than employee. 
Further, this section has introduced the notions of professionalism in order to set the 
flavour of the uniqueness of fundholding as part of the reforms, hand in hand with  
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Figure 2.2 Factors Influencing the Design of Fundholding 
 
 
independent contractor status, accountability across boundaries and its voluntary 
nature. 
 
Figure 2.2 summarises the factors discussed here that contributed to the design of 
fundholding in order to inform the research into why practices chose to go 
fundholding. Given that background why did the practice choose to go fundholding? 
What was the implication of accounting in the management of fundholding? 
Essentially, given the context of fundholding and the history of GPs relative to the 
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NHS there may be additional consequences of quantification by accounting in helping 
to construct organisational order as part of improvements in the management of the 
NHS. As a NPM „experiment‟,  in context,  the consequences may be determined by 
the actors within fundholding. 
 
2.4 Fundholding 
Working for Patients (1989) contained the first formal proposal for GPs to be given 
the choice to hold their own budgets with which to purchase a range of defined 
services, for example, outpatient treatment, elective surgery, diagnostic tests, 
investigations, drugs and appliances. The paper did not expressly comment on 
concerns about the demand led culture but argued that GPs were “uniquely placed to 
improve patients‟ choice of good quality services” (section 2). The introduction of GP 
fundholding was a necessary part of the purchaser and provider split in the 1990s 
reforms and required each practice applying for the scheme to nominate a „lead 
partner‟ for the initiative.  Thus a decision to „go fundholding‟ was simultaneously a 
commitment for a doctor in that practice to choose a lead role and, by implication 
possibly become more involved in accountability of the practice than other partners 
and possibly adopt a more managerial role. Alongside the changes for GP, some 
practices appointed fund managers or extended the roles of the practice manager to 
incorporate fundholding duties. 
 
The first fundholders took responsibility for their budgets on 1 April 1990. The 
scheme expanded rapidly in a series of „waves‟ with 2,200 funds serving almost half 
the population of England and Wales by 1995/96 (Audit Commission, 1996a). Over 
time the criteria of the list size for eligibility reduced and similarly, smaller practices 
that were ineligible alone formed multi- funds to enable participation in the scheme. 
Early indications were that funds following the patient under fundholding were being 
used to speed up the system, reducing waiting lists and paying private health care 
providers to treat NHS patients. All of these factors aimed towards a better patient 
/customer service.  
 
Once a practice could demonstrate through list size and other criteria that they were 
capable of administering and managing fundholding then the practice was allocated a 
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budget for five main areas; in-patient care for selected operations; outpatient visits; 
diagnostic test as outpatients; drugs prescribed by the practice; practice staff 
(management allowance). Any savings in one area could be vired into another. Thus 
practices, headed by a lead GP, had to demonstrate fundholding management 
capability in order to duly receive a fund allocation and budget. The budget was core 
to fundholding and this can be concluded relative to the factors influencing the design 
of fundholding (Figure 2.2). Fundholding, via budgets, presented a structure which 
placed the GP at the heart of accountability with the strong incentive of financial 
savings, choice and power to influence purchasing in secondary care. All of this 
supported the retention of the notions of professionalism whilst apparently increasing 
power relative to hospital consultants whose service GPs were now purchasing. 
 
The literature on fundholding predominantly concentrates on the initial impact of the 
NHS reforms, based in earlier waves, and how they were implemented (for example,  
Audit Commission, 1996a; Audit Commission, 1996b; Ellwood, 1996; Glennerster et 
al., 1992; 1994). Thus, broad debates about NPM aside, - for example, about 
economic policy, accounting, measurement and management, in an attempt to create 
market efficiencies -  it is clear that the accounting implications for fundholding as 
part of NPM were worthy of investigation as so little attention had been paid to it. A 
lot was said in the name of accounting under the broad mantle of NPM, and indeed 
hoped for, as budgets were devolved within public sector organisations in the name of 
organisational improvement.  Pollitt (1993) described NPM as having four elements. 
Table 2.3 takes those four elements and illustrates them with the fundholding 
initiative. 
 
The elements of NPM shown in Table 2.3 catapulted GPs into contract negotiation, 
budgets and monitoring of activity as a sacrifice for apparent autonomy in improving 
patient service. Thus on the one hand it can be seen as GPs taking power from the 
hospitals and on the other, it could be seen as the government exerting more power 
over GPs and the possibility that they would lose some of their independence and 
autonomy. 
 
All of this, given the history of the GP as independent contractor, was contentious and 
inflammatory, if you were a GP but less so for the patient. Alongside decentralisation 
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and budget allocation this performance monitoring and setting of targets might be 
perceived as a form of control which further implies that the introduction of 
accounting of the scheme might be important and have some social impact for GPs, 
hence supporting the study. In terms of motivation to go fundholding the rhetoric of 
quality might be important, as advocates of the patient, purchasing services they could 
choose based on quality rather than only having one provider. However as the fourth 
element, consumerism, might encourage a more demanding customer, one might 
balance the other. 
 
Four Elements of NPM Pollitt (1993) Application to Fundholding 
Elements Features 
Quasi- markets Bolder and large scale use 
of market-like mechanisms 
that could not be 
privatized. 
The purchaser/provider split 
and allocation of budgets to 
GPs.  
Decentralistion Organisational and spatial 
decentralization of 
management and services 
Allocation of budget to GPs. 
Creation of lead partner. 
Allocation of management 
allowances to practices. Ability 
to use savings to develop in 
house services. 
Language of Quality Rhetorical emphasis on 
need to improve service 
quality 
Increased patient choice as 
services decentralized and GPs 
could purchase services beyond 
local provider. Implications of 
patient as „customer‟ and GP as 
service provider. 
Consumer Relentless insistence that 
individual was the service 
user/consumer 
Patient as customer with 
choice. Quasi-market itself. For 
example, patients no longer 
having to seek GP permission 
to „move‟ practices. 
Table 2.3 NPM Applied to Fundholding 
 
Thus, it is argued that accounting was central to the quasi-markets structure and 
control over the elements caused by the decentralization of funds (See Table 2.3). A 
further layer of analysis explaining the application of NPM to fundholding can be 
combined with Hood‟s (1991; 1995) implications for accounting which were 
introduced earlier in the chapter. 
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The early part of the chapter has identified the broader issues of the NPM and 
considered GPs position to the NHS. This section has applied the NPM broad package 
(Pollitt, 1993) and Hood‟s implications for accounting in order to explain fundholding 
(See Table 2.4). The next section identifies the literature on why practices went 
fundholding and the organisational impact of the reforms in the context of accounting 
for the reforms.  
 
Hood‟s Implications for 
Accounting (1991;1995) 
Fundholding Attribute 
More cost centre units. Clear 
identification of costs and 
understanding of cost 
structures and behaviours. 
New and multiple cost centres within each budget 
allocated to each individual practice e.g. management 
allowance, diagnostic testing, drug budgets. 
Cost data becoming 
increasingly commercially 
confidential. 
Purchaser provider/split and contract negotiations 
within the internal market. Competition for contract 
and multiple suppliers. GP practices vying for the best 
price and services e.g. what to include in block 
contracts with providers. 
Private sector accounting 
norms.  
Introduction of budgets and „savings‟ – mock term for 
profits. 
Fewer general procedural 
constraints. More financial 
data for more management 
accountability. 
Symbolized by cost centres, delegation of budgets as a 
whole. 
More stress on bottom line The „savings‟. 
Performance indicators and 
audit. 
Fundholding practices were subject to individual audit 
by providers of funds – more scrutiny. 
Blurring of funds for pay 
and activity. 
Savings could be utilised for capital and/or patient 
care activity. 
 
Table 2.4 Assigning Hood‟s NPM Implications for Accounting to 
Fundholding Attributes 
 
2.4.1 Going Fundholding: Early Studies 
The design of fundholding alongside notions of professionalism seem a recipe for 
encouraging GPs to go fundholding. One year after the start of fundholding there were 
two key studies published, Glennerster et al. (1992) and Glynn et al. (1992). 
Glennerster et al. (1992) had a broad remit on the introduction of fundholding and the 
impact of the NHS reforms and how they were implemented and found a number of 
weaknesses in fundholding making suggestions for improvement: the need for support 
for practices in poorer areas to join the scheme; safeguards to protect smaller practices 
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in the scheme and encouragement of sharing contracting and managerial skills; better 
administration and management support; increased accountability at practice level 
when monitoring value for money; the development of budgeting activities to increase 
flexibility and provide incentives about savings. They concluded that overall the first 
fundholders were a success and that the scheme should continue. The study implied 
that accounting and budgeting could be improved and hence the fundholding 
organisation could be improved, concurrent with accounting changing and improving 
the organisation.  
 
On the other hand, Glynn et al. (1992) concentrated more on the accounting and noted 
misconceptions about what how comprehensive the services were that were covered 
by the budgets. Further, Glynn et al. (1992) noted that district health authorities and 
fundholders were developing ploys around budgeting to take advantage of the system 
yet concluded there was no evidence, despite rumour, that GPs might fund services 
with no direct patient benefit. They did conclude that if fundholding were to continue 
that there would need to be considerable development of “skills and managerial 
capabilities of the practices and it may be time for the new GP practice manager to 
come of age” (p.160). When going fundholding they observed that it was younger 
GPs taking lead partner roles, that none had sought external professional advice and 
reported only one instance where the lead partner and practice manager acted as a 
team. 
 
Sometimes the practice manager took full control of fundholding and sometimes it 
was the lead partner. Glynn et al. (1992) were more concerned about the individual in 
fundholding and the way those actors were getting involved at practice level in 
contrast to the broader policy and level of NHS reforms in Glennerster et al.‟s (1992) 
study. However, both of the studies from 1992 take a „reform‟ view of fundholding 
using questionnaire and interviews based on a practice perspective. Both did provide 
insight into why practice chose to go fundholding and drew similar conclusions (see 
Table 2.5).  
 
Both of the studies gave a brief mention to the imposition of the new accounting 
technology as part of fundholding and its role in fundholding. In the Glennerster study  
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Glennerster et al.(1992) Glynn et al. ( 1992) 
 
Desire to do something for patient care Improvement in patient care 
Referral freedom Referral freedom  
Service development Better to be in at the start than join later 
Budgetary freedom: savings and staff Fairer allocation of resources 
Independence and Control over their 
Professional lives 
Improved financial management 
Money and incentives Better use of resources 
Changing hospitals for patient good  
 
Table 2.5 A Summary of Reasons for Going Fundholding 
 
there were suggestions accounting could be improved, implying it could contribute to 
fundholding, and in the Glynn study that there were indications of using accounting to 
improve financial management. These are both key indicators of accounting change 
for organisational improvement (Hopwood, 1987), and what accounting might do. 
However, the treatment of accounting as part of the technology of fundholding in the 
studies was very superficial.  Studies touched on the inadequacy of accounting and 
what it should and could be, therefore what it might create e.g. budgetary freedom and 
improved financial management. Although superficial, the studies were useful in 
beginning to understand why practices chose fundholding and that accounting was 
implicated and a factor in fundholding. 
 
The studies were also useful in indicating who does what in the practice, which was 
further investigated by Newton et al. (1993) who  noted that fundholders were given 
permission to fundhold based on ability to manage budgets but little prediction on 
how that would manifest itself in practice. The judgement to be able to manage was 
based on the administrative support and computer capacity for information systems. 
The ability to manage was founded on the assumption that technology and 
mechanisms could indicate the potential for management. However,  Newton et al. 
(1993) further recognised that the reality of managing the budget hinged on those 
people in the practice and chose to concentrate on „roles‟ within the practice. Newton 
et al. (1993) chose to study 10 first wave practices looking at the process of going 
fundholding and work roles: there was variability on the level of involvement of GPs, 
from practice managers being solely in charge to being mere „administrators‟; GPs 
clinician role remained unchanged; GPs were influential in the decision to go 
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fundholding but then less involved in day-to-day tasks and contract negotiations. 
There were indications that some GPs were more involved than others. A practice 
wide analysis concluded that structure of authority within the practice remained 
unchanged, that there were few conflicts and tensions between partners and the 
profession and management domains and the “core professional had little involvement 
in the mechanics of the scheme”. This means that lead partners were seemingly not 
active in the accounting for the scheme as a mechanism. However, Newton et al. 
(1994) continued to emphasise the role of the practice manager, perhaps confusing 
with a fund manager role whereas many studies show they may not be one and the 
same. This may have arisen because they were early studies when fund manager roles 
had been less obvious or developed, and also the reliance on questionnaires which 
limit the examination of the reality of the situation. Further, by focusing on practice 
managers it can be argued that they are likely to be protective of their role and be less 
likely to acknowledge the involvement of GPs.  
 
These early studies of fundholding revealed broad issues for early wave fundholders 
who chose fundholding for multiple reasons. The studies had also begun to consider 
accounting change and there were insights into the role of accounting and the roles of 
actors within the fundholding practice. However, some studies were more firmly 
situated in NPM, accountability and accountable management reforms and these will 
be considered in the next section of this chapter. 
 
2.4.2 Beginning to think about Fundholding and Accounting Change: Gaps in 
the Literature 
None of the three early studies considered the accounting technology of budgets in 
any depth and the implications of accounting in practice (Figure 2.1) nor did they 
consider the concept of being more business-like in general practice (Cowton and 
Drake, 2000). They did address why the practice went fundholding and some role 
implications for actors within existing general practice. There had been little attention 
paid to the context of accountable management within the GP fundholding practice 
and the impact of associated budgets in the research literature. This prompted the case 
studies in this study. As documented earlier in this chapter, prior to the start of 
fundholding in 1991, GPs had been subject to the 1990 GP contract and were under an 
apparent illusion of autonomy (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). Laughlin et al. (1994)  
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observed that through the contract  the government was seeking “to exert a new 
controlling influence over the behaviour of GPs, requiring them to perform certain 
defined tasks and opening them up to new forms of accountability aligned to these 
requirements,” (p.112). With fundholding it seems that what dare not be placed in the 
GP contract could be introduced via a voluntary scheme which designed in incentives 
(see Figure 2.2) and be part of accountable management reforms. Yet why would 
practices choose to go fundholding and choose to be accountable given the historic 
fight for autonomy (research question 1)? 
 
Llewellyn and Grant (1996) did choose to focus on fundholding and its micro-impact 
on prescribing, consultations and referral and broader macro issues of resource 
management on six case study practices in Scotland. Whereas Newton et al. (1993; 
1994) concentrated on the practice managers, Llewellyn and Grant (1996) took the 
view that the lead partner account of fundholding was key, as the head of a collective 
of fundholders with any one practice. The study skimmed the issue for resources 
management finding that GPs, holding budgets “perceive beneficial consequences for 
primary health care processes” (p.134). The study noted GPs‟ ability to take on an 
enhanced management role, and they did so, without impact on their clinical practice 
time and were enthusiastic rather than resistant, delegating administration to other 
such as the practice manager. This enthusiasm for the management role was without 
precedent in the literature and there was some indication of differing degrees of 
enthusiasm in the published journal articles in this study (Cowton and Drake, 1999a, 
1999b, 2000). 
 
Thus far there was still little empirical attention being paid to why practices went 
fundholding and the accounting implications or the aspirations for a more business-
like approach in the literature (Cowton and Drake, 2000). Ennew et al. (1998) had 
addressed that gap to some extent by examining the nature and characteristic of 
entrepreneurship demonstrated by fundholders. This approach is consistent with the 
introduction of the entrepreneurship theme as one of the milestone in general practice 
(Table 2.2). A more business-like approach for the NHS was reflected in the Income 
Generation Paper in 1989 which suggested scope for entrepreneurship. Ennew et al.‟s 
(1998) study concluded that not all fundholding GPs wished to adopt an 
entrepreneurial role. There was some variety noted in enthusiasm and what GP 
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individual motivations were but there was no in depth analysis of why they went 
fundholding, possible accounting implications or who took lead roles and why. 
 
The literature on fundholding was not extensive and there were gaps to be addressed. 
Firstly, the literature concentrated on early waves and how they were implemented. 
Secondly, despite accounting, budgets and accountability being the mechanism for 
fundholding, the accounting change did not feature in the literature. The lack of 
attention to the mechanism was surprising because it had been recognised and 
researched in other accountable management reforms. Further, recommendations to 
improve fundholding were often underpinned by the potential of accounting 
(Glennerster et al., 1992). Thirdly, empirical studies focussed on practice 
management aspects and often the practice manager (Newton et al. 1993; 1994), 
largely ignoring GPs. There were further limitations to the understanding of 
fundholding by concentrating on the practice perspectives rather than the GPs 
themselves. The role of practice managers seems to meld with the fund manager and 
their views taken as fund managers but they were not always one and the same, 
particularly as fundholding became operational in the practice and fund managers 
were appointed. Fourthly, few studies investigated the practice reasons for going 
fundholding in the context of accountable management representing both a gap in the 
NPM literature and the lack of consideration of the accounting mechanism that 
underpinned fundholding. Thus there was a need for studies to consider and take 
account of the accountable management reforms from the perspective of the key 
players; the GPs and the fund manager, more so, when there were early indications of 
a management role for the lead partner. 
 
The reasons for going fundholding had begun to be explored but often at a broad 
practice level; studies were few and there was scope to add to the numbers of studies. 
Despite the accounting change to general practice, surprisingly little attention had 
been paid to the mechanism and the actors. The implications of accounting were 
under explored but emerging as part of some of the reasons for going fundholding 
(Table 2.5). Fundholding was also studied by research evidence from the traditional 
players of general practice (GPs and practice managers) and hence the actors 
interviewed were part of the old general practice regime with no account of new roles 
and personnel. Consequently, little differentiation of the role of the fund manager was 
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evident nor was there focus on the fund manager as a separate role and function to the 
practice manager. 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
NPM was applied across different public services. These „experiments‟ have been 
observed by researchers, including, prior to this study, fundholding, to a small degree. 
Fundholding is clearly a child of NPM, and a prodigious one at that. It was an element 
of an attempt for broad organisational improvement of the NHS through the internal 
market. Integrating the contextual history of GPs to NHS enabled the reasons for the 
design of fundholding to become clear (summarised in Figure 2.2). Hood (1991, 
1995) states that accounting had implications in practice but the lived experience may 
have a number of possibilities as suggested by Hopwood‟s (1987) perspectives on 
accounting change. This sets the scene for phase one of the data collection and 
informs the design of the method to study the fundholding initiative.  
 
Fundholding is a special case of NPM applied to the broader aspiration for the internal 
market in the NHS. It is underpinned by notions of accountability alongside notions of 
professionalism. When the two were merged the studies in other contexts focussed on 
the measurement of accounting for organisational improvement and did not consider 
the social aspects. The implications of accounting and any possible bearing in the 
management of fundholding had yet to be investigated. 
 
The forthcoming chapters avoid the universalist approach, through an investigation of 
the why the practice chose to go fundholding and how accounting is implicated in the 
management of fundholding. It is evident that GPs have fought for their professional 
status as independent contractors yet volunteered for fundholding and accountability 
and that in itself warranted further investigation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Research Strategy 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the research strategy for this thesis about fundholding. The 
strategy comprises two phases of data collection that are presented in three stages of 
analysis arising from a qualitative and inductive approach to the study of fundholding 
in 12 GP practices.  It explains how the thesis adds to three published refereed papers 
by a second analysis of phase one data to contribute to a more recent developed 
literature which is presented here for the first time. In meeting that objective the 
researcher presents a confessional account; the researcher in a reflective position in 
time and social space (Bryman and Bell, 2011) and confessional through the „natural 
history‟ of the project (Seale, 1999).  
 
The research approach was essentially qualitative (Britten and Fisher, 1993). This 
chapter describes how the subject and research problem were „chosen‟, the overall 
conduct of the research, research choices made and the time horizon (Saunders et al., 
2009), and reflections on the longitudinal nature and trustworthiness of the strategy. 
The study was initiated “with as few preconceptions as possible, relying on the 
accumulation of impressions which, with the aid of a facilitative human mind, 
eventually speak for themselves, so that new theories emerge from the real world,” 
(Seale, 1999, p.23). This longitudinal design involves taking a sample of GP practices 
(cases) in the first phase as the unit of analysis and  GPs from within those practices 
in the second phase, consistent with a longitudinal design known as a panel study with 
data collected from the same people (Maddox, 1999; Bryman and Bell, 2007). A 
description of the data collection exercise for phase one is included in this chapter. 
The research journey begins with the research questions:  
 
RQ 1    Why did the practice choose to go fundholding? 
RQ 2    How was accounting implicated in the management of fundholding?  
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The data collection exercise for phase two and fieldwork is described in Chapter 
Seven as part of the inductive approach, as new understandings of the fundholding 
legacy emerge and further research questions emerge. 
 
This section has introduced the chapter. The first section explains the qualitative 
nature of the study and confessional approach. The second section introduces the 
research time horizon and considers the trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of 
the research. The third section provides some assumptions that inform the 
methodology. The fourth section explains the research choices: method; choice of 
sample practices and choice of questions. The fifth section explains the researcher as a 
bricoleur (Becker, 1988, cited in Denzin and Lincoln, 2005), a „quilt maker‟, 
interpreting the data and the process of the emerging research questions. 
 
3.2 Qualitative Research 
This section introduces the qualitative approach to the study. It does not enter the 
debate of explaining and validating the broad qualitative research approach, nor does 
it contrast it to the quantitative approach, since the qualitative approach is now a 
fundamental element of business research. However, a good place to start the chapter 
is in a definition of qualitative research: 
 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in 
the world. It consists of a set of material interpretive practices that 
make the world visible. These practices transform the world. It consists 
of a set of material interpretive practices that make the world into a 
series of representations, including field notes, interviews and 
conversations…an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the 
world…study things in their natural setting, attempting to make sense 
of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them. (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.3) 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) comment that for qualitative researchers there are “few 
shared canons of how our studies should be reported” (p.299). The first phase and 
analysis of this study has already been reported in three published articles. 
Furthermore, there are contributions to be made as a part of the research journey of 
the researcher, through an inductive approach to present the legacy of fundholding. 
This qualitative study begins by making the practice of fundholding visible by 
interpreting why the practice chose to go fundholding and considering the 
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implications of accounting in the management of fundholding. As the research 
journey unfolds the interaction of the researcher with the world cannot be divorced 
from the study and its trajectory. The actors in fundholding cannot be divorced from 
that experience which means that not only is it an interpretation, presented as the 
work of the „bricoleur‟ making sense of the data and the meanings people bring to 
them, but it is also a response to emergent questions.  
 
Cowton (2000) suggests in his description of an emergent approach to research 
strategy, that the purpose is “to provide a reasoned justification for the conduct of the 
research” (p.76). This chapter explains the events and procedures that began with two 
research questions about fundholding. Why did practices go fundholding? How was 
accounting implicated in the management of fundholding, not simply for purposes of 
measurement, but in the application of fundholding in an organisation by key players? 
Key players are found to reveal more private accounts (Cornwell: 1984; 1988, cited in 
Seale, 1999) which brought about emergent research questions. Further, this account 
of the research strategy becomes confessional (Oakely, 1981) as it seeks to present a 
frank and honest description to capture why and how the phenomenon was studied. 
However, there is a challenge for the researcher in not being able to reveal too much 
of the findings from the first set of research questions too early. Thus, the thesis is not 
in a conventional format but does present the research journey through to the legacy 
of fundholding which is interpreted from accounts of those who lived the experience. 
 
One of the key factors that impacted the research process was the demise of 
fundholding and the personal/professional/career changes for the researcher, albeit 
punctuated by successful publication of three refereed journal articles. Encouraged by 
Oakley‟s (1981) confessional approach, cited in Seale (1999), the art would be to 
identify further contributions of the fundholding research and justify unconventional 
reporting of the research experience for the thesis. By recognising the stops and starts 
that could have as much of a methodological and literature contribution as the 
anodyne accounts of methods – admitting to the choices and difficulties because it is a 
response to the emerging literature and the interaction of the researcher with the 
world. This is resonant of the qualitative researcher as the “bricoleur, or maker of 
quilts…deploying whatever strategies, methods and empirical materials are at hand” 
(Becker, 1988, p.2 cited in Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.5). Therefore from the 
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creation of the case studies, as the chapter progresses, the researcher admits to the 
twists and turns in the way the research developed. It is described as a process of 
analytic induction whereby causal links between observations in the data are 
synthesised to interpret and form an explanation and present new research questions. 
This account aims to give clarity and structure to the remainder of the thesis not as 
two separate studies of two data collection periods but as part of research journey in 
the collection of data, interpretation of data, its conceptualisation, formulation of new 
research questions and more data collection. 
 
3.3 Research Time Horizon 
The aim in this section is for a holistic perspective to the research strategy, without 
revealing too much too soon of the interpretations and meaning emerging from the 
account, in order to explain the time horizon of the research. The timeline (figure 3.1) 
gives an audit trial to support the assessment of the trustworthiness and credibility of 
the research, leaving analysis and contributions for later chapters as one would find in 
a conventional thesis. 
 
3.3.1 The Timeline of the Study 
The timeline of the study shows the key events in general practice, and the data 
collection exercise, the research journey, including publications and the chapters in 
the thesis. It extends the milestones identified in Table 2.2 for general practice and 
situates the analysis of the phase one data, punctuated by publications. The 
publications contributed to the developing literature of doctors in management 
(indicated by shaded area in Figure 3.1 and reviewed in Chapter 5). This more 
developed literature of doctors in management, from 2000 onwards, presents 
emergent questions for the original data (Cowton and Drake, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), 
through the response to research questions 1 and 2.  A literature review identifies 
what has been done, found and any gaps in the doctors in management literature 
(Chapter 5). In Chapter 6, the further analysis of the data from phase one interviews 
contributes to the doctors in management literature, specifically in primary care. 
Finally, phase two data collection concludes the study by examining how doctors‟ 
careers fare after fundholding.   
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EVENT YEAR RESEARCH THESIS SECTION 
Working for Patients: Birth of 
internal market and fundholding  
1989   
Community Care Act introduces 
fundholding 
1990   
First fundholders  1991   
Second wave 1992   
Third Wave 1993   
Fourth Wave 1994   
Fifth Wave 1995   
Sixth and final wave of 
fundholding 
1996   
Labour government elected 1997 Phase One data: January 
1997-January 1998 
Chapter 4: phase one   data 
findings and analysis: went 
fundholding and choosing 
the lead partner (published 
paper 2); emerging 
significance of the lead 
partner (published paper 1 – 
Taking the lead) 
 1998   
Fundholding abolished 
(voluntary) and PCGs 
announced (compulsory) 
1999 Published Paper No. 1 
(Cowton and Drake, 
1999a) 
 
Published Paper No. 2 
(Cowton and Drake, 
1999b) 
 
 
 2000 Published(Cowton and 
Drake, 2000) 
 Paper No. 3  
 
 
 2001   
 2002   
 2003 INCREASE 
IN 
DOCTORS 
IN 
MANAGEMENT 
LITERATURE  
Chapter 5: literature 
 2004  
 2005  
 2006      
 2007 Chapter 6: phase one   data  
findings and further 
analysis:  
 2008  
 2009 Phase Two data: 
December 2008-March 
2009 
Chapter 7: new data (phase 
two), findings and analysis 
Conservative government 
elected GP Commissioning 
plans announced 
2010   
 
Figure 3.1 The timeline of the study 
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3.3.2 Longitudinal Investigation and Trustworthiness  
 
STAGE COLLECTION TIME 
PERIOD 
PRACTICES/
GPS 
Phase One Interviews: Stage 1 Analysis January 1997 – January 1998 12 Practices 
Phase One Interviews: Stage 2 Analysis January 1997 – January 1998  
12 GPs 
Phase Two Interviews December 2008 – March 
2009 
6 GPs 
Table 3.1 Data Collection Periods 
 
The phase one interview data is historical (see Table 3.1) and has been published from 
but it has further value as a repository of data of a moment in the history of general 
practice. As a bricoleur the challenge in the thesis is to present a “collage or montage 
– a set of fluid, interconnected images and representations” (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005 p.5) to make sense of the data and make it valuable. It is true to say that at the 
time of phase one data collection the original research propositions were formed 
because of the regulatory framework (Burrell and Morgan, 1982) developing around 
fundholding. There were important questions about NPM experiments and for the 
researcher; there was the belief that there were implications of the role of accounting. 
The archive of interviews will be shown to transcend the time in which fundholding 
operated as a trusted source for further analysis of the implications of fundholding. 
 
Fundholding ceased when it was inconsistent with the „new‟ labour government who 
amended the regulatory framework. The research concluded with publications. Just as 
the change in government had consequences for GPs, changing the landscape of 
general practice, so did the researcher‟s career change as new opportunities emerged 
in the management of higher education. Although the possibilities for GPs‟ prospects 
of involvement in practice management of resources changed there were further 
developments in the doctors in management literature. As the literature grew it 
seemed that phase one data could further contribute to the emerging literature through 
additional analysis. Thus a further set of research questions and the collection of 
phase two data began in December 2008 (see Table 3.2). 
 
54 
 
The decade between the phases of data collection raised question about the quality of 
the research and the value of the contribution. The trustworthiness is important for the 
purpose of analysis, evaluation and recommendations. Denzin and Lincoln ( 2005), 
derived from Lincoln and Guba (1985) devised trustworthy criteria for qualitative 
research: credibility; transferability; dependability and confirmability. In extending 
the contribution of this study to make full use of the data “oriented to the contextual 
uniqueness” (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.413). This thesis can contribute to the 
emergent literature and make a valid contribution according to the criteria in Table 
3.2.   
 
Trustworthiness Criteria for Ascertaining the 
Quality of Qualitative Research 
Source: Lincoln and Guba, 1985 
Parallels with Quantitative 
Research (Bryman and Bell, 
2007, p. 411) 
Credible: Is the research believable? 
 
Internal Validity: Causal 
relationship between two 
variables is sound 
Transferability: Could it be applied in another 
context? 
External Validity: 
Generalisability beyond 
specific research context 
Dependability: Could it be applied at other times? 
 
Reliability: Degree to which 
concept of organizing 
observations  is stable 
Confirmability: Did the researcher act in good 
faith? 
 
Objectivity: 
Table 3.2 Comparing Traditional Measures with Trustworthiness 
   
Findings are credible because: the research is conducted with the GPs and fund 
managers who acted out fundholding rather than observers or proxies for those 
engaging in the phenomenon; they are enhanced by interpretation based on two 
sources of evidence (lead partner and fund manager); interviews are across 12 practice 
cases; and, in both phases the same GPs are interviewed. Transferability is achieved at 
a number of levels from both the method and findings: why organisations and 
individuals in the „public sector‟ might  volunteer to engage in NPM type  initiatives, 
for example, in the current decade NHS trusts, schools and academies; to other 
professions that operate in partnership for example, lawyers and accountants and elect 
for a management role; relative to doctors in management going forward for example, 
across primary and secondary care (as considered in this thesis and an existing debate) 
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such as commissioning models of the current decade. The latter point also supports 
the dependability of the research – the issue of engaging doctors in management has 
not diminished and while that is a stable condition, the policies that present 
opportunities for engagement fluctuate with government. Did the researcher act in 
good faith? The researcher acted in good faith and the notion is supported by the 
confessional account. Therefore although the research is longitudinal it is trustworthy 
and the unconventional approach to the thesis helps support a trustworthy account.  
 
3.4. Research Strategy 
The fourth section provides some assumptions that inform the methodology for 
investigating fundholding in GP practices. It presents the research strategy in more 
depth, addressing the ontological and epistemological perspective and the practical 
execution of the qualitative strategy. 
 
3.4.1  Ontological Perspective: Fundholding and GPs 
From an ontological perspective the research on volunteering for practice budgets is 
based in subjectivism, that the choices made for the practice and the shape of 
fundholding are not independent of the social actors, that is the GPs. Fundholding is 
viewed as being inseparable from those that volunteered for it and would not exist in 
its own right – it is not enforced. 
 
The study aims to understand the reality of why the practice chose to go fundholding 
based on the interpretations of the interviews with GPs, with lead partner as proxy for 
the organisation hence subjective, but corroborated by interviews with the fund 
manager. This is of particular significance in considering the implications of 
accounting in fundholding at first hand with proximity to the actors. Accounting 
enabled the creation of a fundholding entity based on NPM propositions and adds 
complexities to the world of general practice. The choice for an organisation to be 
fundholding, made by a partnership, a group of individuals, means that a fundholding 
practice is not an objective entity. It can be measured as an objective entity e.g. list 
size, number of partners, practice demographics but it should not be evaluated along 
that criteria alone and in isolation it does not give fundholding a meaning or 
explanation. One can learn why the practice went fundholding based on the decision 
made by the partnership, made up of individual actors. In this study, the lead partner 
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is assumed to be the spokesperson for that collective group of partners who choose to 
go fundholding and is interviewed as the „lead‟ of that group. How the lead partner 
comes into the role may be an important consideration as a representation of the 
practice in going fundholding and as such is part of the interview (see Appendix A). 
The lead partner and fund manager together are the proxy for the practice in 
explicating why the practice went fundholding and the implications of accounting in 
the management of the fundholding process.  
 
3.4.2 Epistemology: Interpretivism 
The way the knowledge is created in this thesis is through interpretation. General 
practice is an organisational structure that does not exist separately from the 
individuals who work within it thus the study interprets the views of GPs and fund 
manager acting out fundholding. GPs form practices and the practice collective may 
represent a diverse bunch of individuals constructing a social world of general 
practice. Therefore a researcher asking the question of why practices go fundholding 
is likely to discover a complex and subjective series of cases. The interview method 
based on a number of practices of differing sizes and differing waves will reflect some 
of the expected diversity of fundholding in the general practice „world‟ to be studied. 
The interpretivist approach is in alignment with the important and complex 
background which GPs come into fundholding with (see chapter 2). Further it avoids 
assumptions and boundaries for accounting change as the actors reveal their own 
reality. A historical perspective of the independent contractor status in chapter 2 
enabled sufficient exploration of the complex history of general practice to interpret 
the „change‟ that volunteering fundholding brought about. The interviews enable 
examination of how the administrative and management structure of general practice 
might be affected in order to enable the researcher to address the research questions. 
This approach enables the motives of actors to be investigated. Both lead partner and 
the fund manager are expected to have a role and engagement with the accounting 
function as budgets are fundamental to fundholding. 
 
In order to understand the approach to empirical research, Saunders et al. (2009) 
summarised Burrell and Morgans‟s (1982) four paradigms for the analysis of social 
theory (see Figure 3.1).  In section 3.4.1 the subjectivist ontological position of this 
research study is explained by simplifying the assumptions under which a researcher 
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conducts their work. The Burrell and Morgan (1982) analysis is used here (see Figure 
3.2) to allow explanation of the interpretivist approach and contrast it to the radical 
humanist paradigm as a comparative paradigm. This research does not have its roots 
in the radical humanist paradigm, which is also subjectivist, because it does not 
divorce actors from the social phenomenon. This research is not radical in that it does 
not concern itself with changing the status quo, that is, it does not concern itself with 
questioning fundholding in its potential to redress inequalities and injustice brought 
about by the reform. Such studies in the radical humanist paradigm would for 
example, examine the relationship between going fundholding and the variable of 
deprivation perhaps hypothesising that more practices go fundholding in order to 
redress inequalities in healthcare within a geographical location.  
 
 
Radical Change 
 
 
 
 
Subjectivist 
 
Radical  
Humanist 
 
Radical  
Structuralist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objectivist 
 
 
Interpretive 
 
 
 
 
Functionalist 
 
Regulation 
 
Figure 3.2 Burrell and Morgans‟s (1982) four paradigms for the 
analysis of social theory 
 
 
Therefore fundholding and the implication of accounting as a constituent part of its 
management of the phenomenon do have implications depending on the paradigm 
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selected by the researcher. Here the ontological position is subjective and it is 
acceptable to obtain knowledge from the situation held by practices in choosing to go 
fundholding, and the actor‟s motivations for doing so. The role of the researcher is to 
interpret the impact of fundholding rather than state cause and effect, this is 
particularly resonant given the context of GPs and why fundholding took the form it 
did. As GPs have been resistant to any change that reduced their autonomy by 
electing for fundholding they appear explicitly to do so, although any autonomy may 
be an illusion. Practices may chose fundholding to improve quality for their patients 
but that effect is not measured by this study. It does seek to investigate and explain 
why the practice chose to be fundholders. For example the aim is to provide 
explanation through sufficient conditions for going fundholding, using interviews and 
interpreting the subjective experience with the ultimate aim of having more cases, 
more interviews and more phases than other studies. 
 
3.5 Research Strategy and Choices 
This section is concerned with research choices: choice of topic; choice of method; 
choice of sample practices, choice of questions. In the first instance the choices are 
consistent with the subjective nature of reality; choices and subsequent actions are 
those of the actors in leading and changing (if it does indeed change, and if so, to 
what degree) the practice to a fundholding practice. Hence, the study is not about 
precision and measurement such that it merits a quantitative approach. The research 
design needs to accommodate the decision to go fundholding and the role of 
accounting in the practice and management of fundholding thus; the method chosen to 
study fundholding would need to capture the response to deciding to go fundholding 
and the factors influencing the decision to „go‟. Thus , this section highlights the 
research questions and the method chosen by which to answer them much as Seale 
(1999) referred to Cornwell (1988) as being in three stages; firstly, learning about 
how the research problem was formulated; secondly, describing some choices and 
difficulties; and thirdly;  some reflections on the analysis and interpretation of the 
data. 
 
3.5.1 The Evolution of the Subject Matter of the Thesis: Choice  
Part of the confessional account is that fundholding as the subject of research was first 
presented to the researcher, fresh to a first academic post, by a doctor in one of the 
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practices in the study. The researcher had taken an accountancy degree incorporating 
„Accounting and Human Behaviour‟ (Hopwood, 1976) as a set text within the 
organisational behaviour module which became a favourite topic, later qualifying as a 
Chartered Accountant. The researcher began an academic career in 1992, appointed to 
a teaching post with the requirement to develop a research profile. A GP suggested 
that since their practice was going fundholding (third wave) they would welcome an 
accountant to share ideas with in the process of going and being fundholding, and that 
the relationship might be symbiotic. As a new academic employed to teach and 
research, and being more interested in the human and practical aspects and 
consequences of accounting than the technical, there was a possible fit between the 
proposed subject and the researcher. Thus a major factor in the decision to adopt 
fundholding as the subject of research was opportunity and access. Whilst fellow new 
academics were struggling for access and planning on the use of secondary data, it 
seemed that ease of access to primary and original data was a very good argument for 
pursuing the topic towards successful publication as an early career researcher. The 
combination of access to users of accounting in new territory in one of the most 
highly regarded professions, who were faced with significant organisational change, 
was a research topic with significant potential - thus the journey began. 
 
3.5.2 Choice of Method 
Initially the researcher visited the practice on a regular basis to observe fundholding 
and how the accounting of the scheme was being implemented and developed. This 
involved discussion with a number of the GPs in the practice where upon it was quite 
clear that most had no interest in the fundholding activity itself; key players that were 
emerging were lead partner and fund manager. The researcher was allowed to move 
„around‟ the practice freely discussing the scheme informally with GPs, nurses, 
practice manager, administrative staff. This familiarisation with fundholding included 
observation of the accounting of fundholding and the interaction of people with it. It 
became the starting point of the journey in order to design the strategy to investigate 
fundholding and how accounting was implicated in the management of it. The unit of 
analysis was the practice as it was the practice that went fundholding. The „pilot‟ 
practice was the opportunity for access to fundholding practices (Practice A – third 
wave) and knowledge from that practice, through a  number of visits and discussions 
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with GPs, practice manager, fund manager and consultants employed by the practice 
enabled the researcher to construct a strategy for execution of the research. 
 
Other practices were recruited using a mixture of methods, some responded to an 
invitation and leaflet posted to fundholders on health authority lists with geographical 
proximity to the researcher. Others became involved as a result of recommendations 
or introductions from existing participants or some other „champion‟ (Murphy et al., 
1992). This resulted in twelve practice case studies and a reasonable spread across 
different waves of fundholding and also different health authorities (see Table 3.3). 
 
 
Practice* 
 
Wave 
Health 
Authority 
Approx. Patient 
List Size 
No. of 
Partners 
A 3rd W 10,000 6 
B 3rd X 11,500 8 
D 3rd W 12,400 7 
E 1st W 12,800 7 
F 2nd W 11,900 7 
H 1st Y n/a 7 
I 3rd Z 8,000 5 
J 1st Y n/a 6 
L 4th W 9,300 4 
M 6th Z 6,000 4 
N 6th Z 5,500 4 
O 6th Z 8,400 3 
 
n/a = not available  
*Practices C, G and K are missing from the table because there is insufficient appropriate research material for 
them to be included.  
Table 3.3 Practices Participating in the Study 
 
The practices have been allocated letters (A to O) and the four Health Authorities 
have been allocated letters from the end of the alphabet (W to Z) to help maintain 
anonymity.  Some of the elements of the practice profiles in Table 3.1 were collected 
by means of a pre-interview questionnaire (PIQ) which sought a number of pieces of 
factual information, including staffing, structure and list size.  
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3.5.2.1 The Pre-Interview Questionnaire (PIQ) 
Given the diversity in the way fundholding was practically implemented, largely due 
to the absence of any national or regional guidelines, the health authority information 
was limited to list size, lead GP, senior partner and wave. The primary purpose of the 
PIQ was to collect factual information, such as list size (Table 3.3) but its completion 
was also indicative of practice commitment to the study. Further, the PIQ was useful 
in the collation of basic information that was absent from publicly available 
information from the health authority. The PIQ helped to reduce the time pressure at 
interview hence allowed more scope for less structured questions and discussion at 
interview.  It was also thought that the act of completing the PIQ might increase 
subjects‟ commitment to the interview-stage of the study, since they had already 
invested something in the project. 
 
3.5.2.2 Choosing Method: the Semi-Structured Active Interview 
The chosen strategy to answer the research questions was the semi-structured 
interview to build individual general practice case studies. The instrumental people in 
fundholding were assumed to be the lead partner and the fund manager. Denzin 
(2001) summarised the interview as a way of “writing the world, a way of bringing 
the world into play: it is not a mirror of the external world; it is not a window on the 
inner life of the person; it is a miniature and coherent world in itself; it is an active 
text, where meaning is created and performed”. The phase one questions are located 
in Appendix 1. Although the interviews were much less structured than the PIQ, there 
was a skeleton of basic questions (see Appendix A) addressing issues such as: 
 the process of deciding to go fundholding; 
 choosing the lead partner; 
 personal views of GP fundholding; 
 the recruitment, employment background and role of the fund manager; 
 general trends in the development of the practice pre- and post-fundholding; 
 training and other individual development undertaken to implement fundholding; 
 the production, availability and use of financial information; 
 use of external advisers. 
62 
 
  
The interviews were recorded on a voice recorder and transcribed in full to “give 
insight into people‟s subjective states” (Silverman, 2004, p.361). Further the method 
of interview technique used in this study can be described as „active‟ (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 2004) where a standard set of questions are used to structure the interview 
but at necessary points, at the judgement of the interviewer, the interviewer chooses to 
„dig‟. The approach enables the respondent to make a  point clearer or is asked to 
expand an answer to give depth to the interview. This type of semi-structured 
interview was adopted because although there was a clear focus in the research 
questions 1 and 2, it allowed more specific emergent issues to be addressed (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007). There is flexibility and an opportunity for the interviewer to react and 
encourage the interviewee to elaborate on emergent points of the interview. Studies 
before had concentrated on the advances of NPM in the differing  context of subject 
(economics, accounting , management) but little attention had been paid to the actors 
who were playing out these changes. As Pollitt (1993) recognized, “reforms did not 
merely alter lines on organisation charts: huge changes of role and skill were involved 
for those groups of staff concerned” (p.181). He asserted that many professionals in 
those new roles were not trained for them, nor did they relish them. This early 
observation for the impact on individuals involved in the reforms gives credence to 
the interview method, the ontological and interpretive stance, as it overcomes the 
direct questioning of questionnaires, with their closed and narrow questions. 
 
The groups of questions sought, amongst other things, to contextualize the role of 
accounting through the views of the GP and the fund managers to see if it was 
important. The aim was to elucidate (see Appendix 1) the picture of fundholding and 
then explore why practices were going fundholding and the role of accounting 
(research questions 1 and 2) through interpretation and analysis. When designing the 
interviews there was a conscious decision not to constrain the format and content of 
questions. The aim of the interview was to outline with raised questions then „dig‟ 
rather than steer the interview too much in order to allow the interviewee to embellish 
the point they wish to make. This approach was consistent with avoiding the creation 
of boundaries to the investigation of new the phenomenon. 
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 This type of semi-structured interview conflicts with a more structured approach to 
interviewing where interaction is dismissed for the perceived belief that it will bias 
the interview evidence. In this instance, in such an under researched and little 
documented subject area, it was considered a necessity in order to reveal the 
individual experience of GPs in their lead partner roles during fundholding (and later 
career moves as a doctor involved in management) and fund manager. The active 
interview techniques is increasingly useful after phase one, when used in phase two, 
as it expresses the  individual career trajectories of GPs which could not be 
anticipated. It captures and makes visible the transitions made in the GPs in their 
activity in management and careers post fundholding. 
 
3.5.2.3 Selecting the Sample and Collecting the Data: Phase One 
The selection of practices was opportunistic and not random, but there is a reasonable 
spread across different „waves‟ - three 1st, one 2nd, five 3rd, one 4th and three 6th2, 
suggesting that many relevant issues are likely to have been picked up from the 
interviews (Table 3.3). There was also a spread across four health authorities. The 
opportunistic and random approach enabled more cases and thus more interviews 
because both lead partner and fund manager were interviewed which was an 
advantage over studies that had examined fundholding before, for example, Newton et 
al., (1993; 1994) and Llewellyn and Grant (1996). This contributed to one of the 
striking features of the findings, which was the range of experience and opinion 
found, in spite of the limited sample size.  The research thus identified many points of 
significance, even if it is not possible to estimate how representative participants‟ 
views are of the wider population of fundholding practices or to claim that we have 
exhausted all possible issues and perspectives. 
 
3.6 Interpreting the Data 
This fifth section explains the researcher as a bricoleur (Becker, 1988, cited in Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2005), a „quilt maker‟, interpreting the data and the process of the 
                                                     
2
 Beginning on 1st April 1991, the implementation of fundholding proceeded in a 
series of annual „waves‟.  The first wave set a minimum patient list size for 
fundholding applicants of 9,000, but subsequent waves gradually reduced that 
requirement. 
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emerging research questions. A case study was constructed from each practice, based 
on the PIQ and interviews to present a vignette (research questions 1 and 2) of why 
the practice chose to go fundholding and the role of accounting in the management of 
the practice (presented in chapter four). The vignette tells the story from the 
interviews for each question in order to start to summarise emergent themes, similar 
to Doolin (2001). 
 
3.6.1 Analytical Induction: Coping with Emergent Themes 
The multiple case studies are recorded and analysed in Chapter 4. The role of the case 
study of each practice, using the interviews, was to present a set of substantive cases 
for the purpose of interpretation of each practice going fundholding. Fundholding 
cannot have a reality beyond the social actors within it as it is born of choice by 
partners in the general practice that is eligible for fundholding at a point in time. 
However, one of the challenges for the qualitative researcher is deciding how to 
interpret and analyse the interview data. The researcher sought themes from the data 
with which to address the research questions.  Seale (1999) states that “if a research 
account makes claims about the nature of the social realm that it seeks to describe or 
explain, then readers should expect to find evidence in support of these claims… 
Seeking for evidence within a fallibilistic framework that at no point claims ultimate 
truth, but regards claims as always subject to possible revision by new evidence, 
should be the central preoccupation for qualitative researchers…”, (p.52). Thus the 
qualitative researcher must be open to new evidence and is not seeking absolute truth. 
In seeking such evidence, qualitative researchers have tried various methods including 
triangulation, member validation, and analytic induction and searching for negative 
instances. These methods of seeking evidence are mentioned briefly here and have 
been reviewed in various method texts, for example see Bryman and Bell (2007), but 
also Seale (1999) for a comprehensive summary of various critiques.   
 
The interviews were analysed through analytic induction (AI). The data were mined 
for evidence so that analysis will generate categories and labels for some 
conceptualization. Bryman and Bell (2007) define AI “as an approach to the analysis 
of data in which the researcher seeks universal explanations of phenomena by 
pursuing the collection of data until no cases that are inconsistent with a hypothetical 
explanation (deviant or negative cases) of a phenomenon are found”, (p.583). Seale 
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(1999) suggests that such a process of AI locates itself closely to a positivist ontology 
in order for rules and theory to be generated yet recognises that one does not have to 
subscribe to the positivistic ambitions in order to use AI to good effect: 
  
This is because it involves active seeking out of evidence to extend the 
scope and sophistication of theories. (Seale, 1999, p. 86) 
 
However, given the diversity experienced in the 12 practices the researcher can 
present evidence of sufficient multiple occurrences within the data to represent a 
condition/ theme. This promotes credibility without purporting to represent all the 
condition there might be were the whole population examined. While this research 
does not present hypotheses it does present interpreted themes. Thus the AI approach 
is not intended to be positivistic but is qualitative, used here as a framework for 
interpretive process, collecting data from, and thus analysing the interviews.  It is 
useful to explain how qualitative interpretations are constructed from the data where 
the triangulation method, associated with seeking positive relationships and 
corroboration, does not seem suitable. Triangulation, relative to the method used, 
rather than seeking positivistic results, is the use of one method or source of data to 
study social phenomenon so that findings can be cross checked (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Triangulation therefore suggests a right or wrong answer rather than a scale 
and appears inconsistent with the way knowledge is emerging here, the subjectivist 
approach and assumptions about fundholding as constructed by the actors. Nor is 
seeking a right or wrong answer consistent with the diversity of the practices coming 
into fundholding and those selected in this study (see Table 3.1). Accounting for the 
methodology in this way also embraces the challenge in mining the phase one data for 
a second time and the researcher as bricoleur (Becker, 1988, p.2 cited in Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005), to provide a sensical finding in the absence of a single interpretive 
truth. – taking the analogy further, no thesis using the same data would be the same. 
The analysis is used later to enable the collection of further personal (and hence 
private rather than organisational) accounts adding to those when the  GP became 
active in the role of lead partner and the choices made in enacting that role.  
 
To explicate this process, Table 3.4 documents Seale‟s (1999) five steps for analytic 
induction in the second column based on the positivist strategy.  The third column  
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Step Objective (Seale, 1999) 
 
Practical Implementation 
1 Roughly define the problem. In the spirit of NPM GPs were able to 
volunteer to manage their own budgets 
with which to purchase secondary care.  
GPs were able to choose fundholding 
which presented a role for accounting and 
a new accountability. There were multiple 
reasons why practices chose to go 
fundholding. There are implications for 
accounting change. 
2 Construct a hypothetical 
explanation i.e. a hypothesis. 
That there would be implication of 
accounting in the management of 
fundholding. Accounting would be 
important and there would be observations 
that would explain the significance of 
accounting in that context.  
3 Examine a case to see if it fits the 
hypothesis. 
Twelve cases were examined. (Chapter 4: 
Going Fundholding – Practice 
Perspectives). Cases examined, knowledge 
extracted from the observations – 
construction of knowledge. Hypothetical 
explanation (stage 2) not confirmed. 
Emergence of unanticipated findings and 
patterns.  
4 If the case does not fit, either 
reformulate the hypothesis, or 
redefine the problem to exclude 
the negative case.  After a few 
cases a reasonable degree of 
certainty about the truth will 
have built up. 
Reformulate the problem/question. 
Examine each case under new emergent 
findings (see Research questions 3 and 4). 
Inform reformulation with review of 
existing literature in the context of 
emergent findings (Chapter 5 – Doctors in 
Management). 
5 Continue to search through 
several cases until negatives are 
no longer found. Some early 
theorist using AI suggest that a 
universal generalization will 
have been established. 
RQ 3    Why did they become the lead 
partner? 
RQ 4   How did they enact the 
management role; what did they do and 
how did they do it? 
 
 
Table 3.4 Five steps of analytic induction adapted to obtain research 
evidence in this study for phase one data 
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demonstrates the transition in this study through the steps in the second column; a 
subtle transformation of the AI steps from a positivistic towards a more subjectivist 
approach. Steps 1 and 2 reflect the creation of research questions 1 and 2, that is, 
where the research began. Step 3 demonstrates that the original hypothetical 
assumption, that accounting would be implicated in the management of fundholding, 
was proved not as important as anticipated. However, other new findings did emerge, 
research questions were formulated and evidence was collated.  
 
In Step 4, the distinctive feature of the qualitative strategy here is that the 
interpretivist approach does not seek to eliminate negatives. The researcher creates 
new research questions (3 and 4) induced from the emergent findings in order to 
interpret and make sense of the visibility that the interviews have provided. Bryman 
and Bell (2011) comment that researchers analysing data as part of an inductive 
research strategy find it difficult to cope with emergent themes. The purpose of Table 
3.2 is to explicate the iterative process in this study which seeks to resolve that 
difficulty and contain the risk of covering too many themes by isolating the emergent 
themes into new and specific research questions. The dilemma of too many emergent 
themes is also contained by the format of this non-conventional thesis in its challenge 
to use the archive of the original data and move forward from published contributions 
as part of the inductive approach.  There were lots of ways in which fundholding 
could be investigated but this study sought to examine emergent rather than other 
themes, but may be informed by them. The findings from original questions inform 
the new questions and will inform the subsequent analysis of the new questions as 
themes and patterns emerge. However, it is not to say that universal trends are sought 
but rather there will be interpretations on factors that influence particular outcomes. 
 
3.6.2 Conceptualising the Reasons for Being Lead Partner: Responding to an 
Emerging Research Question 
The emergent questions from an analysis of the phase one data necessitated a further 
interrogation of the interview data and subsequent analysis of the data to interpret 
emerging issues – in this instance: 
 
RQ 3    Why did the lead partner undertake that role? 
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RQ 4   How did the lead partner enact the management role; what did they do 
and how did they do it? 
 
The results of this second analysis of phase one are found in Chapter 6, informed by 
the literature review of doctors in management in the preceding chapter (Chapter 5).  
 
3.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter sets the scene for the remainder of the thesis. The timeline present the 
longitudinal nature and explains the research as trustworthy and contextually unique. 
The account of the research strategy identifies how the research problem was 
formulated as the result of taking an offer to examine fundholding in situ and the 
relationship of the researcher to the study and the timeline. The choices made reflect 
the difficulties of the exploratory study, the need for the selection of semi-structured 
interviews and the presentation of vignettes. These vignettes are then reflected upon 
as it is explained how emergent themes are incorporated into the research strategy. 
 
The process of analytic induction explains and justifies how the emergent themes 
from the initial questions are contained as the study moves from the organisation of 
general practice and the unit of analysis becomes the lead partner. This is consistent 
with the qualitative paradigm responding to “…how events and patterns unfold over 
time” (p.412. Bryman and Bell, 2011). It is argued that the choice of the second 
analysis of phase one data was to complete the picture of the subjective experiences of 
the emergent key players of the research project, the GPs, providing new contribution 
presented in this thesis, beyond the publications. Moreover, later in this thesis, further 
contributions answer a third set of emergent research questions, to conclude the 
demise of fundholding, through recognising the legacy of fundholding for GPs who 
engaged in the management of it. That third and final phase (including the second 
stage of data collection) is reserved for the pen-ultimate chapter to the thesis, part of 
the inductive approach, as new understandings of the fundholding legacy emerge. 
 
The value in this research strategy is the production of a study of fundholding that has 
more case of practices and more private accounts of key actors (lead partner and fund 
manager) than any published study of fundholding at that time. The research design 
facilitates a study that has more phases of  study of fundholding than any known 
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study, certainly no study allows lead partners to reflect on their time as fundholders 
after experiencing other models for general practice, and as such presents  the 
possibility to contribute on a number of levels beyond the era of fundholding – let the 
journey begin. 
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Chapter 4 
Going Fundholding: Practice Perspectives 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the cases and analysis for research questions one and two: why 
did the practice choose to go fundholding? How was accounting implicated in the 
management of fundholding?  The analysis investigates why practices chose to go and 
the possible importance of accounting as a linchpin and embodiment of NPM reforms 
in general practice. Firstly a case study of each practice is presented describing: the 
nature of the practice; the reasons for going fundholding; the objectives that the 
practice seeks to achieve through fundholding status. Secondly, the role of accounting 
in the management of fundholding is analysed. Responses to both questions are taken 
from the lead partner and corroborated from the fund manager‟s perspective. This was 
the first incidence of a study of fundholding that focused on both the lead partner and 
fund manager and the findings were successfully published (Cowton and Drake, 
1999a; 1999b), adding to the literature that focuses on practice perspectives (chapter 
2). The forthcoming interpretations in this chapter include the findings that were 
published (Cowton and Drake, 1999a, 1999b, 2000) but further interpretations add to 
the publications and are presented here in the thesis for the first time. The aim is to 
acknowledge the potentially complex lived experience of going fundholding and 
avoid the one person-one practice view adopted by selecting only one person to 
represent the view of actors in the practice who take on fundholding. The cases 
presented here are based on phase one interviews (see Chapter 3) with lead partners 
and fund managers. 
 
4.2 The Practices 
This section presents the case studies which are summaries of the PIQ and the 
interviews with the lead partner and fund manager. The practices are allocated a letter 
according to the order in which they engaged in the study thus Practice A was the first 
set of interviews. 
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4.2.1 Practice A 
This third wave growing practice would have gone fundholding earlier but it was too 
small for the first wave and suffered partnership changes which scuppered going in 
the second wave.  One partner in Practice A was vehemently anti-fundholding and the 
elected lead partner was originally against it too until he saw the potential. 
Fundholding was seen as a method by which the practice could be developed within 
NHS funding constraints.  The computer allowance would allow the practice to 
develop its systems and there was perceived potential for budget savings to develop 
the practice‟s modern but cramped facilities.  There was also a wish to protect the 
practice and its patients from a potential two-tier system and to take the practice 
patients‟ share of the fundholding financial „pot‟, in spite of ethical concerns about 
fundholding on the part of the partners. There was a genuine belief that the scheme 
would support the practice ethos of looking after the patient interest:  
I think we thought that it was in our interests to look after our patients 
better… some people around who say that you should write the referral letter 
and then you should leave the system to deal with it…Some people never ever 
phone up about their patients and others do! (LPA)
 
The partner who subsequently became the Lead Partner had been the first partner to 
suggest that the practice should go fundholding and had taken on board the paperwork 
involved in completing the process.  Two other partners had expressed an interest in 
the role but withdrew at the meeting where the decision was made:  
…several partners were interested … a specific partner had done a lot of 
groundwork and was very interested in it and put pressure on others for that 
partner to be allowed to continue as lead partner.(FMA) 
The Lead Partner recognised that he was a manager and seemed to enjoy the role.  He 
enjoyed reading and thinking about what the practice should have been doing.  He 
was active in fundholding in the HA in which his practice is located and prior to 
fundholding was active in health authority committees. 
 
4.2.2 Practice B 
This third wave practice was the first practice to go fundholding in a health authority 
with relatively few fundholders.  Earlier attempts to be fundholders had failed because 
of in-partnership disagreement about whether they should participate in fundholding. 
According to the Practice Manager, who became the fund manager, the practice was 
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technologically advanced before fundholding and computerised, further because of his 
financial background, it had strong management systems.  There was little financial 
incentive to go fundholding in order to improve those facets of the practice. The joint 
lead partner agreed that „much of the structure was already there and it was really just 
a case of employing people to do the donkey work to administer it, so management 
systems were in place already… no sudden need for management change… actually 
an administrative change‟ (LPB). On that basis the „lead management partners‟ 
became Lead Partners in fundholding by default. 
The financially astute Practice Manager was interested in going fundholding but 
partners were wary as they had a collective view that some GPs were using 
fundholding for personal financial gain: „we thought that fundholders were essentially 
being bribed with management money to line their own pockets‟ (LPB). The partners 
felt that the decision to go fundholding was, in effect, forced upon them.  The Practice 
Manager commented: 
It became more urgent.  Everything we tried to do with the Health Authority 
was blocked by, if you were fundholding, you could do this and that, and 
we‟ve always been a fairly innovative practice....  Then as a bigger practice, 
we had 11,000 patients or so, we were up to do it, very few other people were, 
so we got all the pressure....  It was an urgent decision in the end....  We felt 
we‟d got our arms up our backs, really…it just became impossible for us to do 
any development work and to pursue any of our interests in the provision of 
health without doing it.  (LPB) 
Given this background, it is perhaps not surprising that the Lead Partner of Practice B 
was reluctant to take on the role, not least because he had „no idea how the money 
works in a practice at all, not a clue‟ (LPB).  However, the practice had already 
developed small management teams, prior to fundholding, where each partner headed 
a small group, for example in the area of staff or clinical protocols.  The Lead Partner 
had worked jointly with another partner and the Practice Manager on technical 
development in the practice and they decided to take on the lead partner role together. 
…both of us reluctantly took it on – me particularly reluctantly. I had 
absolutely no desire to be involved in the commissioning of care and the 
negotiating of contracts and talking to consultants (LPB). 
However, although the practice was a reluctant recruit to fundholding, its subsequent 
experience proved to be much more positive than anticipated.  The partners had not 
realised, initially, that fundholding could be a good „tool‟: „we found our own way of 
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using fundholding for our purposes to try and influence provision of care in a broader 
sense‟ (LPB).  They also thought it helped them regain some control after the advent 
of the new GP contract (Chambers and Belcher, 1993; Laughlin et al., 1992, 1994). 
Such was the enthusiasm that the practice became a Total Purchasing Pilot (TPP) 
practice, and the Lead Partner - an articulate man with strong, well thought-out views 
- now plays a much more significant part than he did at first.  The way he regards his 
contribution is revealed in the following comment: 
I am more concerned with the strategy, rather than the mechanics, the 
management rather than the administration. 
 
4.2.3 Practice D 
This third wave practice from HAW differed from Practice A (also HAW) as it was 
situated in dilapidated Health Authority premises whereas Practice A had a relatively 
new build. There had been a number of partnership changes in previous years. The 
senior partner who was renowned for his autocratic style had retired shortly after the 
current Lead Partner joined the practice.  Prior to that retirement, „partners all felt 
suppressed … there was quite a lot of change … became more democratic, tried to be 
more forward thinking … up to and perhaps fundholding,‟ (LPD). There was a 
window for change but there was no distinct strategy in the reason for going 
fundholding; the Lead Partner described partners‟ views as „ambivalent‟: 
The Practice felt as if it ought to go into fundholding rather than wanted to, 
that it would be the only opportunity to get updates on computerisation and 
access to advances in health care, and we also felt that we would get left 
behind if we didn‟t go in.  (LPD) 
The fund manager was an external appointment after the decision to go fundholding 
and had perceived that there was a general feeling of a need to go fundholding 
because „they had seen other practices in the area going third wave‟ (FMD). 
 
Two partners volunteered for the lead partner role, including a new partner 
(interviewee) who had joined in the preparatory year and they worked together for a 
while. The new partner gradually took on increasing responsibility for fundholding as 
the scheme progressed.  He saw himself, as least in part, as an „entrepreneur‟ who was 
trying to organise good deals for the practice, both financially and clinically.  Thus he 
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seemed to enjoy the activity associated with the role, which suited his energetic 
personality.  He also saw himself as an „adviser‟ to the partnership on the financial 
administrative aspects of fundholding. Further he viewed his role to a certain extent as 
a „policeman‟, ensuring that fellow partners did not overspend or refer where they 
should not. 
 
4.2.4 Practice E 
Practice E (largest list size at almost 13,000) went fundholding in the first wave at the 
suggestion of the partner who became Lead Partner. Prior to fundholding the 
partnership had redeveloped three surgeries and extended another by using 
government initiatives such as the „cost-rent‟ scheme for general practices. The 
practice was not averse to tapping in to government funding schemes to develop the 
organization. It seemed that fundholding would enable developments beyond 
partnership infrastructure, through computerization and increased human resource. 
Prior to fundholding it was neither computerized nor was employing a practice 
manager and on that basis was originally refused fundholding status. The practice 
acquired sufficient funding to improve the computer systems which then allowed the 
fundholding application to succeed. 
 
A particular feature of this fundholding practice was the personality and influence of 
the Lead Partner who took that role as no other partner in the practice wished to take 
it.  A „larger-than-life‟ figure with enormous enthusiasm for innovation and practice 
development, he saw fundholding as „an opportunity that we didn‟t know we wanted, 
but having seen what it could offer, gave us the opportunity to do most of the things 
that we wanted to do with General Practice‟.  However, he was faced with fellow 
partners who were lukewarm about fundholding and required much persuasion and 
bargaining. 
They finally agreed when it was decided that I would do all the work, and as 
long as it didn‟t interfere with them, we could go fundholding.  (LPE) 
He saw himself as a „motivator, an innovator and perpetrator‟ and admitted that 
adopting the Lead Partner role had relieved him of the boredom of general practice. 
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4.2.5 Practice F
3
 
Initially this second wave practice would have joined the first wave of fundholders 
but, having followed the preparatory procedures for that year, the partners decided 
against due to the practice‟s lack of computerisation and poor management structure.  
Thus after two preparatory years the practice succeeded in going fundholding, despite 
the Fund Manager - who is also the Practice Manager - describing the partners, 
including the original Lead Partner, as „reluctant fundholders‟.  According to the fund 
manager, the single reason for going fundholding was to protect the local hospital 
which was under serious threat of closure. The Fund Manager stated that the practice 
has not obtained as much patient benefit from fundholding as other practices, 
primarily because much of the contracting was to be directed at the local hospital 
rather than from a selection of secondary care providers. 
 
Finding a lead partner was not easy: 
I‟d like to say that there were volunteers, but I think it was more or less 
volunteered by other people saying they didn‟t want to do it.  The senior 
partner said he would do it and one of the junior partners agreed to do it with 
him, so we‟ve always had two and that‟s more or less how it was agreed 
initially, by default rather than enthusiasm.  (FMF) 
The Lead Partner changed after two years, ostensibly to enable different people to 
experience the role (FMF).  However, in this practice, it was clear that much of the 
responsibility that came with fundholding was carried by the Fund Manager. The 
Fund Manger had a strong NHS background, including at executive level. In the 
absence of an interview from the Lead Partner it is difficult to say whether this 
significant role assumed by the fund manager was a product of the practice stance on 
fundholding i.e. he was appointed into that role to meet the partners‟ expectations of 
fundholding, keeping it away from the professional doctor role. It may have been that, 
quite simply, because the Fund Manager was from an NHS management background 
with strong negotiating skills for secondary care contracts, that once in place no one 
GP saw reason for a significant Lead Partner role. However, the interview data hints 
at the former, that is, he was appointed to minimize the impact of fundholding on the 
                                                     
3
 It was not possible to interview the Lead Partner, but the PIQ and fund/practice 
manager‟s interview had been completed and provide some useful insights to warrant 
inclusion of Practice E in phase one data.  The difficulty of gaining access to the Lead 
Partner also said something about how the practice is run. 
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doctors in the practice enabling GPs to attend to their „day job‟ without engaging in 
the politics and administration of the particular health authority antics: 
… one of the things they wanted me to do was to sort of look into the 
fundholding for them… it all boiled down to one thing in the end…purely to 
try and do the best we could for WG hospital because it was under threat of 
closure  (FMF) 
 
4.2.6 Practice H 
This first wave practice went fundholding under the auspices of the now retired senior 
partner but without unanimous support. It was approached by the Health Authority to 
go fundholding which was taken to partnership vote with a majority in favour but with 
one partner dissenting.  Even those partners who voted for fundholding did not seem 
to have been particularly positive about it: 
We knew it was something the government was going to pursue ardently. If we 
were going to get anything out of it, the goodies were going to come in the 
first few years. (LP
H
) 
Their approach appeared to have been partly tactical, believing that the government 
would be offering incentives in the early years and that the alternatives for them were 
worse.  However, at that time, there was also a sense in which applying for 
fundholding status at an early stage fitted with its more general profile as a training 
practice and was consistent with the practice as an innovator: 
The main reason was that, they were not always positive reasons, it was the 
fact that, it wasn‟t that they wanted to be fundholding…it‟s that the 
alternatives were worse... they were one of the practices that would do things 
first (FMJ) 
 
A further reason for joining was to improve the levels of management throughout the 
practice. 
..improve patient care, there was a desperate need to improve management at 
all levels. (LP
H
) 
The senior partner, retired at time of practice interviews, had originally suggested that 
the practice should go fundholding after approach by the Health Authority (as in 
Practice D). The Lead Partner joined the practice just prior to the decision to go 
fundholding and acted as understudy to the senior partner.  The Lead Partner had, by 
his own admission, a leaning towards the business side, possibly because of his 
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family‟s commercial background, and he had already adopted tasks such as 
monitoring prescribing practice.  His manner was business-like and he had a 
command of detail.  Yet he also has strong views about the larger picture of NHS 
management, which he would like to see undergo significant change - „like my views 
or not, I‟m sticking to them‟.  This seems to have been a motivating factor in his 
adoption of the Lead Partner role. 
 
4.2.7 Practice I 
The partners of this practice originally considered applying for fundholding status at 
the inception of the scheme, but it was concluded that a „wait and see‟ approach was 
appropriate in order to evaluate developments, particularly in the light of the 
impending 1992 General Election.  The practice went fundholding as part of the third 
wave mainly because of the opportunity to influence health care, although all the 
partners except the Lead Partner were sceptical about the scheme‟s potential. The 
Fund Manager describing the partners views as „totally ambivalent‟:                                                                                                                            
GPs that were anti-fundholding didn‟t want to see it making any difference to 
the way they had to work … the NHS is about people, it‟s not about business 
or finance to a great degree apart from the fact that a financial number has 
been allocated to XYZ operations. (FMI) 
 
Both Lead Partner and Fund Manager referred to the departure of a practice general 
manager who left for „various reasons‟. It was intimated that the general manager left 
after being somewhat frustrated and thwarted in embedding the financial aspects of 
fundholding into the culture of the practice. On his departure the Fund Manager 
interviewed was promoted into that role from the IT role in the practice where he 
reported to the departed general manager. 
The opinion was not one of being reluctant fundholders but rather being 
sceptical fundholders and going in, I suppose, for the perceived benefits 
without genuinely believing that it was the right way to go. (LPI) 
 
The Lead Partner adopted the role because there was no competition from any of the 
other partners in the practice. 
I‟d always had an interest in the business side of the practice anyway and as 
this was seen as being mainly a business venture, it fell to me and nobody else 
was particularly interested in challenging that.  (LPI) 
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4.2.8 Practice J 
The decision for this practice to go fundholding was inseparable from the Lead 
Partner‟s active external role in fundholding.  The partner, who had strong views 
about things such as information technology and rationing in the NHS, was a member 
of the fundholding management advisory group and active in the NHS region in 
setting up the fundholding initiative.  The suggestion that the practice should be 
fundholding was born at the same time as the fundholding concept, before any of the 
mechanics of the scheme were announced and the Lead Partner even wrote his own 
fundholding software. 
 
Although the Lead Partner emphasised that the decision to go fundholding was a 
democratic one, the Fund Manager pointed out that some of the partners were still 
„ardent anti-fundholders‟, but that „one or two strong partners ... can push things 
through the other partners‟.  
He felt, that the practice felt, particularly he felt, he pushed it through the 
practice as I‟m aware. He felt that the health authority had not performed 
well in the past…it was not for savings…they thought they could purchase 
better for their patients than anybody else.  (FMJ) 
It was assumed that the Lead Partner would undertake the role because of his support 
for fundholding and his knowledge of the scheme, developed in his capacity as 
adviser to the Health Authority. 
 
The dominant influence of the Lead Partner does not mean that the practice went 
fundholding for that individual‟s own selfish reasons for at the  heart of the decision 
was the objective of taking advantage of the early benefits of the scheme based on 
wisdom, having experienced a sequence of Department of Health policies: 
Because we felt that if we didn‟t get in at the start we wouldn‟t get the 
benefits, things would have whittled down by the time we got through. We‟re 
quite used to the government, the health department, changing things as they 
go along, moving the goalposts. So thought if we got in at the ground we 
would be able to make a change and move with a change of our own accord 
rather than be changed against our will.  (LPJ) 
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Additionally, as the latter part of the above extract shows there some element of 
striving for independence rather than being dictated to by the government albeit 
within the context of a government initiative. 
 
4.2.9 Practice L 
Practice L was the last one to go fundholding in their health authority area. The 
fundholding scheme was a way for the practice to fulfil the desire to develop in-house 
services. The Fund Manager acknowledged that the partners „felt they were in a 
position to be able to do some development on the practice‟ which it did, with the 
creation of a minor operating suite and various in-house clinics.  Moreover, as a result 
of the local hospital pointing out to patients the potential for speedier treatment of 
fundholding patients, the decision was sealed for the partners in practice L. The 
partners did not wish their patients to be at a disadvantage compared to local 
practices. (The local hospital is the same as that for Practice F, which had gone 
fundholding to help keep it open.)  However, to go fundholding the practice did have 
to join forces with another practice, outside the immediate vicinity, to meet the 
minimum list size criterion. That practice also happened to be the single-handed GP 
practice owned by LPL‟s  wife. 
 
Support for fundholding had originated with the senior partner, but his colleagues 
were „sceptical‟ about the whole idea.  The senior partner subsequently took on the 
role of Lead Partner: 
The idea was entirely mine. It originated with me…The others did not have 
much enthusiasm and the practice we joined up with is a single handed 
practice so the ball was left with me to start playing with it as I wanted.  (LPL) 
Thus he had, at least to some extent, been able to pursue his own agenda, and he had 
taken satisfaction from the ability to influence the provision of services. 
 
4.2.10 Practice M 
This sixth wave practice operates from health authority-owned premises shared with 
Practice N in a deprived area.  Sharing of premises gave impetus to practice M going 
fundholding alongside practice N. Both practices became eligible due to the criterion 
for the minimum list size being reduced; 
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Our practice did not want to go fundholding because at the time we had 
ethical objections because we didn‟t see it was a fair system....  The other 
practice in this building announced they were going fundholding sixth wave.  
We were given three days to make up our minds whether we were going or 
not.  So we felt it would be absolutely impossible in a building where we share 
staff and management for one to go fundholding and one not to.  (LPM) 
 
Under these circumstances the practice saw a non-fundholding practice as untenable 
and became accidental fundholders. The Fund Manger pointed out that, „they didn‟t 
actually think of it‟.  Essentially this practice was an accidental fundholder without 
strategic practice motivation to be fundholders. 
 
However, overall the Lead Partner took „a completely different view‟ of fundholding, 
because she had found that „being in control of your own budget and your own 
destiny gives you an awful lot of power‟ to deal with problems that arise in relation to 
the provision of secondary care.  She therefore feels that instead of taking the „moral 
high ground‟: 
Perhaps if I‟d gone and seen what you can do with fundholding and the things 
you can bring in, the services you can attract, perhaps I would have 
persuaded my partners to have gone sooner and ... we could have made huge 
savings ... and we could have been out of this place [premises] a lot sooner 
than we‟re going to be.  (LPM) 
The Lead Partner felt that there was little choice but for her to take on the role, for the 
other two partners were not interested: 
I‟ve got two male partners who are just not interested in any way, shape or 
form in management, money, that type of budgeting, or going to meetings.  So 
basically I decided if we wanted to do it properly that I would have to do it.  
So I took it on.   (LPM) 
Although she had enjoyed developing practice services, she did not really see herself 
as a manager but rather a doctor who had picked up certain skills. 
 
4.2.11 Practice N 
The Lead Partner decided that the practice, which shared health authority premises 
with practice M, should go fundholding as soon as it was eligible under the reduced 
list size criterion which applied for the sixth wave, that is, a list size drop to 5,000: 
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He didn‟t tell anyone until almost the eleventh hour.  Both [M and N] went 
sixth wave.  There was quite a big push from the Health Authority to get as 
many people as possible ... managers in the Health Authority trying to 
persuade practices.  (FMLM+N) 
 
One partner was „dead against it‟, but the Lead Partner was supported by two other 
partners. The reason for going fundholding was explicit, having monitored the 
expansion of fundholding as the scheme was opened up to smaller practices, it was 
about seizing the opportunity as soon as the list size criterion was reduced. The 
practice itself was constrained by its size before fundholding from delivering the 
patient services desired by its partners. Fundholding gave the practice the money to 
develop further services so that the small practice could develop in terms of patient 
services through delivering a number of outreach clinics on the practice premises and 
other in-house services (e.g. minor surgery, chiropody, physiotherapy etc.). 
 
The Lead Partner claimed that he was „conned‟ into taking on the role, but the Fund 
Manager believes that the partner‟s personality is such that he prefers to be in control, 
which is consistent with his account of the decision to go fundholding. 
 
4.2.12 Practice O 
This practice, with some coercion from the Health Authority, chose to go fundholding 
at the sixth wave in order to develop facilities and services in recently refurbished 
partner-owned premises: 
It was really the FHSA - came round and twisted our arm and then we 
decided that while all the other bigger practices in the area were going 
fundholding then we ought to…None of the partners were totally against 
fundholding, I suppose there was no opinion really. I think if it had to be it 
had to be.  (LPO) 
Thus, none of the partners was totally against fundholding, but there was a sense of 
inevitability about it. The practice was developing quickly having moved from „grotty 
premises‟ and was expanding in-house services such as counselling and physiotherapy 
to new areas such as cryo-surgery. 
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The Lead Partner volunteered for the role but had few strong views about it - or kept 
them to himself. 
 
4.3 Going Fundholding: Practice Overview and Analysis 
This section identifies major factors for the practice in going fundholding. The Lead 
Partner and Fund Manager in each case articulated at varying length their reasons, 
from both the practice, their own and the lead partner perspectives, for participating in 
fundholding.  Their comments are summarized with an increasing level of depth of 
analysis through Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
The decision to go fundholding was implicitly about a partnership taking on the 
management of a budget that was financially incentivised by a management 
allowance and the potential to make, and retain, a saving on the budget. GPs chose to 
do this within the notion of professionalism (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). The patient 
places trust in them and taking on board such financial accountability would not cause 
such trust to be exploited but would help in the allocation of NHS resources. GPs 
remained self-regulated and exercised professional medical judgment. However, 
given the contextual history of GPs within the NHS, striving for the retention of 
independent contractor status and professional autonomy, there are question about 
why they chose to be fundholding and hence be accountable across the practice 
boundary through the mechanism of budgets. The following section aims to capture 
the reasons for going fundholding and the back ground to becoming the lead partner, 
integrating the literature on fundholding although it was confined to studies of the 
earlier waves. 
 
The partnership was the contracting body that went fundholding. However, studies 
such Llewellyn and Grant (1996), Cowton and Drake (1999a; 1999b) concentrated on 
the lead partner despite also interviewing the practice manager. Further, they assumed 
that the GP is “the person taking fundholding forward…most active in developing 
fundholding and in articulating its aims and achievements”, (p.126). They did not 
evaluate fundholding in the context of the views of any other players than the GP, as a 
key player driving the fundholding vehicle. Thus one of the contributions to the 
83 
 
trustworthiness of the research is the corroboration of the data from more than one 
source. 
 
4.3.1 Who Went Fundholding and Dominant Reason for Going Fundholding 
The dominant reason for each practice going fundholding is summarised in Table 4.1 
and is the simplest level of analysis of the data. Moreover, in contrast to published 
studies such as Llewellyn and Grant (1996) and Cowton and Drake (1999a; 1999b) it  
emphasises both the Lead Partner and Fund Manager interviews in order to obtain and 
corroborate data from both sources. This provides a larger and clearer window with 
which to view the collective decision of the partnership (Table 4.1). The case studies 
of the practices do not reveal a single common principal reason for going 
fundholding, rather a variety of reasons. This simple analysis is a starting point to set 
the scene for a deeper analysis that was lacking in other studies.  
 
Practice Principal Reason 
A Develop and improve the practice 
B Actively seeking financial gains from the scheme 
D Avoid being left behind 
E Actively seeking financial gains for practice development 
F Protect the local hospital 
H Encouragement by health authority 
I Influence health care 
J Domination of Lead Partners‟ desire to be a fundholder 
L Develop in-house services 
M Accidentally by virtue of shared premises with another practice 
N Develop further services 
O Encouragement by Health Authority 
 
Table 4.1 Principal Reasons for the Practice Going Fundholding 
 
There is, as one might expect, similarity and variety in the reasons for participating in 
a voluntary arrangement. There is some degree of commonality in the motives for 
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going fundholding and most address some need or needs of the key stakeholders: 
practice; patients; partner (s); health authority. Some of the principal reasons may be 
viewed as more positive for the practice, hence partnership, itself such as developing 
in-house services. Other principal reasons are more positively focused for patients 
such as preserving the local hospital. There is also a case of individual Lead Partner‟s 
reason in the personal desire to be fundholders indicating that fundholding might 
proffer more congenial conditions for the partner concerned, reflecting more self 
interest in terms of occupational control as defined by Harrison and Pollitt (1994). 
However, not too much can be inferred from these principal reasons as they are not 
mutually exclusive and what may be positive for one stakeholder may be viewed as 
negative for another. Therefore there is a need to investigate the complexity behind 
the apparent dominant reason for going fundholding (see 4.3.3). 
 
Before progressing the analysis it is useful to compare the principal reasons for going 
fundholding (Table 4.1) with the literature that also identified principal reasons.  This 
study adds to that literature, see Glennerster et al. (1992) and Glynn et al. (1992) 
shown in Table 2.5 by revealing reasons beyond those previously disclosed in the 
literature: some practice went fundholding because of a dominant lead partner 
(Practice J); and, one practice went accidentally because of shared infrastructure 
(Practice M). These principal reasons (Table 4.1) are also less generic than those 
described in Table 2.5 perhaps because this study had case studies form five of the six 
waves rather than just the early waves. Nonetheless, these findings add to the 
diversity and complexity of the principal reasons for going fundholding. Generalising 
provides a good summary to compare with the literature but it does discount some of 
the variety. It is important to explore the richness in this variety. Dominant reasons 
may also be vague such as „influencing health care‟ and other reasons are defensive, 
for example, avoiding being left behind and protecting the local hospital. Moreover, 
the early analysis suggests that not all reasons for going fundholding could be 
presented in an attractive and positive light which suggest that choice and preference 
for going fundholding may be an aversion for the alternative rather than a predilection 
for fundholding itself. 
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Thus far, though general practice was empowered with the choice of fundholding this 
early part of the study shows it was not always viewed as an overall positive 
opportunity. In Table 4.1, Practice A, for example, is described as going fundholding 
with an overall view to developing and improving the practice, a broad description 
and beneficial to all stakeholders. For some, developing and improving the practice is 
more defined by a particular route such as Practice L seeking in-house service 
improvement, or Practice E focusing on financial gains to develop the practice 
organisationally, through increased management and human resource. This expands 
on Llewellyn and Grant (1996) who identified the broader incentive of „savings‟. 
They recognised that GPs wished to raise the standard of care for their patients by 
achieving and utilising the saving but not how those savings might be utilised. They 
did not report any less positive aspects at practice level on reasons for going 
fundholding as they focused very much on the introduction of the reform and the 
financial incentive to participate.  
 
4.3.2 Measuring the Impact of Fundholding: Incentive and Waves 
Studies had tended to concentrate on early waves and initial impact (for example, 
Glennerster et al., 1992; 1994; Audit Commission, 1996a; Audit Commission, 1996b; 
Ellwood, 1996; Llewellyn and Grant, 1996). It was widely reported that practices 
were motivated to volunteer early on in order to take advantage of any early 
incentives that might diminish for later waves or be lost if fundholding were to 
become compulsory. This pre-occupation with early waves and financial incentive 
may have contributed to the lack of in depth consideration of broader and more 
convoluted reasons why the practices went fundholding. Studies concentrated on hard 
data such as list size and practice demographic in the earlier years of fundholding and 
research on the phenomena reduced in frequency as fundholding became more 
widespread and implementation was less of a novelty. Some studies confined their 
data to specific waves such as Glennerster et al. (1993) comparing first wavers to 
third wavers. It can be concluded that more studies involved early waves than across 
or towards the closing years of fundholding. 
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Thus, conclusions about reasons for going fundholding were largely based on the 
simple aspects of the reforms, that is, incentive and waves. The impact of the incisive 
change that fundholding brought to the operation and accountability of general 
practice may have been obscured by what is easily measured. However, caution was 
suggested due to anticipated measurement difficulties (Moon et al., 2002), including 
the practice demographic, wave, health authority policies. The more simplistic 
research avoided the many variables contributing to the decision to go fundholding 
and those factors which could not be measured which is, perhaps, not surprising given 
the multiple factors behind fundholding (see Figure 2.1).  Nevertheless, fundholding 
studies emerged in the health policy and new public management literature (see Iliffe 
and Munroe, 1993; Ellwood, 1996; Ellwood, 1997; Glennerster et al., 1994; Laughlin 
et al., 1994). Some later reflections suggested caution on relying on those early 
fundholding research findings at the risk of over generalising from common 
unsubstantiated observations, for example, from allegations that fundholding was 
more dominant in affluent communities, or was inversely related to deprivation 
factors. Therefore, whilst the easiest variable to isolate and measure was the wave that 
each practice went fundholding, taking such a positivist approach may have actually 
constrained fundholding studies and encouraged less adventurous research that 
admitted to the diversity and social implications of the scheme. 
 
The phase one evidence suggests waves were only important to these GPs in that they 
were a barrier to accessing the reforms and therefore financial incentives and benefits. 
Waves had differing criteria that eased wave by wave to encourage more to take up 
fundholding.  Some studies have looked at the dimension of the historical geography 
of uptake across the waves, (e.g. Moon et al., 2002) and found that there had been an 
overall exaggeration of cause and effect, such as in relation to the inverse relationship 
between fundholding and population deprivation and no evidence of stereotypical 
affluence amongst fundholding practices. Indeed, Moon et al. (2002) argued for 
further analysis of individual GP behaviour and consideration of practice innovation 
history, demonstrating the rich tapestry behind each practice‟s choice.  Within this 
study‟s group of practices there is at least one instance, prima facie, of a dominant GP 
and that perhaps that could be investigated further to address Moon et al.‟s (2002) 
concerns and also by considering the context of the decision. It is now important to 
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investigate the multiple reasons within the cases through further data analysis to try to 
expose the richer reason for going fundholding beyond incentive and waves. 
 
4.3.3 Multiple Practice Reasons for Going Fundholding 
On further analysis of the case studies multiple major factors for individual practices 
in deciding to go fundholding are revealed. Table 4.2 shows a complex mix of reasons 
for going fundholding and enables comparison between practice and warrants further 
investigation and analysis. For some practices there was one clear, overriding aim, 
whereas in others there appear to have been several factors at work. In this study, 
having interviewed both lead partner and fund manager there is some assurance that 
the reasons for going fundholding are not the biased view of one individual player 
notwithstanding the case where the lead partner is dominant, for example, practices E 
and J. It can be seen that whilst financial incentive is broad there are multiple factors 
contributing to the financial incentive. There was financial capability to do more 
within the practice boundary, for example by improving premises, and beyond it, in 
the case of protecting hospitals through contracting. However,  there were other areas 
of focus, such as an aversion to the alternatives of not being fundholders.  
 
4.3.4 Positive and Negative Reasons for Going Fundholding 
Glynn et al. (1992) briefly indicated that there might be negative reasons for going 
fundholding as well as positive because some practices thought it was better to be in 
the scheme earlier than later. Some studies of fundholding did recognize diversity in 
practices for going fundholding (see Table 2.4) but did not consider multiple reasons 
at practice detail level. Ennew et al. (1998) classified the motives for going 
fundholding as either positive (recognizing the opportunities fundholding brought), or 
negative (aligned to reluctant participation by practices) and provides a framework for 
thinking about the broader range of reasons described in Table 4.2 in this study. 
Ennew et al. (1998) focused on the nature and context of entrepreneurship 
demonstrated by GPs. The study defined entrepreneurship as the exhibition of 
behaviours associated with reducing inefficiency, price-quality arbitrage and 
innovation. It was seeking defined behaviours, according to the role and actions of an 
entrepreneur, rather than an exploratory study. Bearing in mind the pre- conceived 
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framework of that study the negative/positive categorisation in the study is still a 
useful tool to analyse the multiple factors that emerged from the interviews in this 
study. Each practice reason in Table 4.2 has been assigned a positive or negative 
symbol according to category created by Ennew et al. (1998). The caveat of relying 
on the study is its focus on the premise that fundholding reforms create opportunity 
and caused entrepreneurial behaviour and activity by GPs. It concluded that 
fundholders in the positive camp were behaving as true entrepreneurs, grasping 
fundholding as an opportunity whilst those in the negative camp were reluctant 
entrepreneurs entering fundholding. The measure of entrepreneurship was also 
restricted to the narrow fundholding behaviours of x efficiency, price arbitrage and 
innovation. Although GPs were behaving entrepreneurially there are other factors that 
require exposition which were evident in earlier studies (Table 2.2) and found in this 
study (Table 4.2). Further, entrepreneurship in the private and social sector may not 
be a relevant analysis in the context of GPs. 
 
What is deemed negative for one GP in terms of defined entrepreneurship may be 
positive for another GP. Entrepreneurship is not a required characteristic for 
volunteering for fundholding as Table 4.1 and 4.2 begin to demonstrate. For example, 
the non-IT literate GP in Practice A who welcomed the ability to develop IT may be 
entrepreneurial yet another may have perceived IT and the associated management 
information system as reducing autonomy through the transparency of accounting and 
information technologies, for example, recording referral activity. Ennew et al. (1998) 
classified the development of IT as a negative reason for going fundholding compared 
to the positive entrepreneurial activity of developing patient services as part of 
innovation. While the entrepreneurship model may have been a good tool to analyse 
why GPs go fundholding in the early stage of fundholding research it is too limited 
when the factors in Table 2.2 and 4.2 are considered. For example, developing IT can 
be part of the strategic development of the practice and hence not a „bad‟ thing. There 
is also some question of whether taking financial incentive can be associated with 
entrepreneurship and indeed might be confused with entrepreneurship.  
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Practice 
 
Wave 
Practice: Major Factors in Going Fundholding 
Positive (+ve) and Negative (-ve) per Ennew et al. 
A 3rd Use savings to develop facilities. (+ve) 
Improve computer systems.  (-ve) 
Protect patients from effects of two-tier system (-ve) 
  
B 3rd HA pressure. (-ve) 
Protect local cottage hospital. (-ve) 
 
D 3rd Practice partnership felt it ought to go fundholding (-ve) 
Updated computer systems. (-ve) 
Access to advances in health care. (+ve) 
 
E 1st Develop computer systems. (-ve) 
Develop the organization by increasing human resource. (+ve) 
Enthusiastic individual. (+ve) 
 
F 2nd Protect local hospital. (-ve) 
Direct funds to local hospital. (-ve) 
 
H 1st Early benefits. (-ve) 
Usually innovative. (+ve) 
Alternatives worse. (-ve) 
Improve practice management. (+ve) 
 
I 3rd Influence health care but overall ambivalent. (neither +ve or -ve) 
 
J 1st Committed individual. (+ve) 
 
L 4th Develop in-house services. (+ve) 
Speedier treatment of patients. (+ve) 
 
M 6th Shares premises with fundholding practice. (-ve) 
Non-fundholders‟ patients suffering. (-ve) 
 
N 6th Keen individual (but small practice). (+ve) 
Develop patient services. (+ve) 
 
O 6th HA pressure. (-ve) 
Develop services and facilities. (+ve) 
 
Table 4.2 Major Factors in Going Fundholding for the Practice 
 
Indeed the financial incentive is recognized as reduced in the older waves. For 
example, it could also be viewed that financial incentive aligns more with Harrison 
and Pollitt‟s (1994) seeking of occupational control a one of the three notions of 
professionalism in the welfare state because in this study the budget and possibility of 
savings was not an end in itself but facilitated other things. 
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Ennew et al.‟s (1998) positive reasons for going fundholding included the opportunity 
to improve patient services, for example through the development of outreach clinics, 
the improvement of physical amenities or the reduction of waiting lists.  Negative 
reasons included peer, practice and/or health authority pressure, computerisation and 
the availability of early financial inducements which are clearly at „odds‟ when 
contrasted to entrepreneurial behaviour hence deemed negative elements in the study.  
In fact, incentives and real management tools for better general practice when deemed 
as negative ignored how GPs themselves went about fundholding because 
fundholding does not fit the narrow investigative view of entrepreneurial activity. 
This substantiates the assertion made from the literature that the factors behind 
fundholding as a NPM reform (Figure 2.1) are important in the context of NPM 
application and justifies the necessity to approach the study from an interpretivist 
paradigm, and with as little pre-conceived assumptions as possible.  
 
The interviews reveal that the fundholders, allowed to talk freely about the scheme 
through open questions, actually found those „negative‟ motives as positives in the 
going fundholding, for example Practice A viewed computerisation as positive. The 
analysis into the positive and negative classification can be summarised by plotting 
relative positions of the practices in this study on an axis according to the exhibition 
of negatives and positives within each practice. For example, Practice H has two 
positive and two negative factors while Practice L has two positives and is therefore, 
more positive according to the Ennew et al. (1998) classification. There is no weight 
allocated to the positive negative factor but is it useful in conceptualizing the 
observations in Table 4.2. To help the allocation the reasons themselves are also 
considered in terms of ambience, either protecting or developing the practice, a 
contrast marked for example between practice F (protecting) and practice E 
(developing). 
 
Thus in Figure 4.1 the practice reasons are broadly plotted into relative qualitative 
positions rather than just a numerical addition of positives and negatives, for example 
Practice H and O are neutral but the descriptions in Table 4.2 when compared indicate 
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Practice O presents a more negative position than H because they had the added 
external HA pressure.  
  
F3 B3 A3   M6  D3 I3 O6  H1   N6 L4 J1  E1 
 
Negative    Neutral                    Positive 
Protecting      Developing         
Figure 4.1 Going Fundholding: Practice Reasons and Waves 
 
The negative reasons, represented as reluctance, by Ennew et al. (1998) are evident in 
this study where there are practices who were forced into fundholding as they 
protected either the practice, for example Practices D and M, or the local hospital, in 
the case of Practice F.  Some practices were encouraged into fundholding by the 
health authority (Practices H and O) and thus received a push. On the other hand an 
enthusiastic GP, such as in Practice J and E, drags the practice into the scheme 
through their enthusiasm and drive, leading the practice when there are often less 
committed partners within the practice.  
 
Just briefly returning to waves and the contention here that much of the earlier 
research focused too much, firstly, on the nature of the reforms and, secondly, the 
assumption of entrepreneurship, it is notable that all first wavers in the study are on 
the positive side (E, H, and J) in Figure 4.1. Practice positivity in terms of 
entrepreneurship was indeed strong for these pioneers. This suggests that early wave 
fundholders exhibited more entrepreneurial characteristics than later waves, but not 
exclusively so (Figure 4.1 practices L and N). Later wave practices in the study reveal 
a more protective than entrepreneurial stance possibly based on an evaluation of 
predecessors e.g. going to preserve local hospital position. Early waves were heavily 
incentivised by better financial packages and therefore those who wished to develop 
saw the new funding as a way to secure development.  A frank comment from a first 
wave fundholder depicted the generosity of the management fee in the early stages as 
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„a bribe to get doctors into the fundholding system‟ (LPI).
4
  Not all early fundholding 
practices may have been bribed or may not have even recognized the bribe. Intending 
to do the best for the patient is a clear factor in the practices as part of the 
functionality of the GPs professional arrangements (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). For 
some GP practices the bribe was acceptable, even if it was linked to infrastructure 
benefits and thus more remote from direct patient impact, such as Practice E, 
demonstrating occupational control. Generally across all waves, it seems perceiving 
patients might suffer relative to other practices‟ patients and externals pressure was 
not a price worth paying by not being part of fundholding. 
 
4.3.5 The Significance of the Lead Partner: Choice 
None of the case studies showed unanimity across the collective partnership for 
agreement to going fundholding and there is evidence of significant influence by 
some lead partners in the decision. This study has shown that existing models of 
entrepreneurship on the public sector scheme of fundholding, have taken theory and 
applied it with pre-conceptions of the private sector, a more deductive approach may 
be inappropriate. Studies were taking a theory and applying it to a new context, an 
„outside‟ theory looking 'in‟ on the application to managerial matters in primary care. 
That is an interesting perspective and does contribute to understanding why practices 
became involved in fundholding but it does not do justice to the choices facing the 
practice: there are other issues in this study such as who adopted the lead partner role 
and why. It seems the literature either looked at the „practice‟ choosing a financially 
incentivised scheme or the individual GP views of the practice, as spokesperson for 
the practice, without addressing the key players and drivers that allowed a practice to 
enact the scheme.  The evidence here shows that studies thus far ignored the bridging 
role of key players between going fundholding and actually being a practice of 
fundholders; a mission undertaken by adopting the role of lead partner. It raises a 
third research question: 
RQ 3 Why did the lead partner undertake that role? 
 
                                                     
4
 LPI refers to the Lead Partner from Practice I, and so on. 
93 
 
Early studies did not examine why the lead partner undertook the role, although there 
was some research on roles taken (Newton et al., 1993). This is further evidence that 
with hindsight too much research at the time focused on the reforms and mechanics of 
that change to general practice. Further, studies focused on the practice itself rather 
than key players.  
 
4.3.6 Motives for Going Fundholding: Internal; External and Personal 
The practices in this study are not an objective entity but are made up of individuals 
constructing a social world. Policies change quickly in the NHS, usually when there is 
a change in government or a reshuffle of ministers and as a consequence generate 
interest from researchers. Fundholding, as one such policy was researched for early 
impact with little analysis to inform the future. Moreover, small regard was given to 
the individual bringing those policies to life: who were they; why did they get 
involved?  This „lived experience‟ (Silverman, 2004) of the actors in fundholding 
implies that labelling of the  phenomenon into one category or the other, in this case, 
of reluctance and/or entrepreneurial activity; positive or negative reasons may 
oversimplify it. Published but evidently limited research of why GPs went 
fundholding was useful because it began to show the reality of why GPs go 
fundholding, however the studies lack depth of analysis in order to conceptualise why 
a member of this profession chose to be active as lead partner in the process of the 
reforms. 
 
In order to add to the understanding of fundholding and the factors that influenced the 
decision to be fundholding it is useful to analyse at a more detailed level (Table 4.2). 
However, there are three clear categories of reasons for going fundholding revealed in 
the interviews relative to the practice which help put that „lived experience‟ of choice 
in context. In Table 4.3 the reasons for the practice going fundholding can be 
allocated to one of three categories: internal practice factors; external factors 
pertaining to the practice and, thirdly, personal type reasons such as a committed 
individual within the practice itself. These „grounds‟ for going fundholding enable a  
cursory categorisation that sets the scene to investigate further the multiple factors 
that inter played during this initiative in primary care. 
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Internal to the Practice External to the Practice Personality 
Develop 
facilities/infrastructure 
Protecting Patients from 
two-tier system 
Committed individual 
Improve computer systems Pressure from Health 
Authority 
 
Get early benefits/savings Access advances in 
healthcare 
 
Improve practice 
management 
Influence healthcare  
Protecting patients on the 
list generally 
Speedier treatment for 
patients 
 
Develop in-house services   
Table 4.3 Conditions for Going Fundholding: Internal, External and Personal 
 
Further, this analysis, setting aside the simple allocation of  the negative and positive 
elements, begins to shine some light on the „murkiness‟ in Figure 4.1 as the practices 
have been allocated along a continuum. Commensurate with Glennerster et al. (1993) 
choosing fundholding is based on a number of key reasons: improving quality of 
service; referral freedom; service development; budgetary freedom; money and 
computing. However, for the first time under the umbrella of fundholding research 
there is a recognition of the personal, private, aspect to choosing to be fundholding.  
Glennerster et al. (1993) referred to this as the „next mountain‟ for GPs often 
reflecting  a GP who was “bored with general practice” but that study concluded that 
it was a phenomenon limited to younger doctors in their thirties. Similarly Ennew et 
al. (1998) had concluded that the reluctant entrepreneurs were often junior partners 
allocated the tasks of fundholding and managing it on an ad hoc basis. Though ages 
were not recorded of GPs in this study the majority were mid-career and beyond and 
there was clear evidence of different levels of involvement in terms of scope, depth 
and allocation of the resource of time to fundholding. Thus where other studies have 
stopped at a dualistic framing of positive and negative reasons for practices the data 
here reveals an opportunity to contribute to the literature through recognizing that 
reasons are more intricate through a third element, being the personal aspects of the 
GP in its own right. One extreme from the data is the „committed, even dominant 
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individual‟ which emerges from the data in this study. Crucially, if one of the 
categories is a committed individual it raises the key question of why do some GPs 
become lead partners and do they get involved in management as lead partners? That 
Glennerster et al. (1993) refer to the „next mountain‟ confirms that personal aspects 
are influential.  
 
Some lead partners are emerging as instrumental within the practice choice for 
fundholding but exclusively as there are internal and external factors that influence 
the decision. Drawing attention to the lead partner motivations will enhance our 
understanding of fundholding and new management initiatives in the NHS. 
Fundholding brought a new managerial aspect to an established professional with 
existing functionality of professional arrangements, which required a lead partner to 
step into an additional role and therefore requires some attention. 
 
4.4 Going Fundholding: Becoming Lead Partner 
The emergent finding that the lead partner was a significant factor in going 
fundholding will be examined before investigating the role of accounting addressing 
research question 3. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 shows there are multiple reasons for going 
fundholding and the indications that the mix is complex. Table 4.1 shows that 
practices in the study vary in their overall reason for going fundholding. Table 4.2 
introduces positive and negative reasons and enabled Figure 4.1 to show how 
practices go fundholding to protect and develop, the latter usually combined with an 
enthusiastic and committed GP in the lead partner role. Whynes et al. (1999) 
suggested that not all entrepreneurial GPs were fundholders and not all fundholders 
were entrepreneurial. Thus, if not entrepreneurial, what were the characteristics of 
these pioneering GPs that made them active in fundholding? It may be that they were 
exhibiting occupational control. If not driven through entrepreneurship there must be 
something else contributing to the choices they were making and why they were 
making them? These questions need addressing in order to add and compare to 
existing claims about entrepreneurial GPs and identifying the background to 
becoming lead partner is important. 
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Table 4.4 summarises the background to becoming lead partner and enables the 
identification of a number of themes. Lead partners in practice A (LPA) and L (LPL) 
were involved in proposing to go fundholding, or the preparation of the papers for 
application, thus suggesting that the role followed on from their early involvement. A 
significant number of practices (B, E, N and O) had partners who were traditionally 
active in practice development, either in technical innovation e.g. IT systems or other 
initiatives and hence came into the role on those strengths. Partners from practices D, 
H and I referred to coming from the „business side‟ of general practice either 
explicitly or stating they enjoyed organizing deals. Only one future lead partner, in 
practice J, explicitly stated support for the policy as a reason for taking the role on. 
Three partners contended they were in the role by default (F, I and M) although the 
partner from practice I somewhat guiltily confessed an interest in the „business side‟. 
There is some negativity and reluctance surrounding some of the partners about being 
in the role of lead partner. Partners in practices I, F and M did not show enthusiasm 
about the role, although LPI did have an interest and enthusiasm to be involved in the 
business side. Lack of enthusiasm about being lead partner in these may arise from 
the negativity in the practice going fundholding (see Figure 4.2). Not all partners with 
a lack of enthusiasm were in practices that were protecting, for example LPI was 
ambivalent in a neutral practice.  LPF, on the other hand, was in that role by default in 
order to protect the local hospital. Some of the positive reasons for going fundholding 
through utilising the incentives  were for both the good of the patient and to influence 
health with a visionary lead partner, for example in practice L. However, the 
interviews indicated that GPs were not always behaving altruistically for the practice 
or other partners‟ perspective. The widespread presence of „negative‟ reasons 
suggests a lack of enthusiasm on the part of many fundholders, although there were 
some who saw positive features (e.g. LPE, LPJ).  It should also be noted that others 
admitted that their initial negative views of fundholding had been mollified with 
experience (e.g. LPB, LPM). 
 
Newton et al. (1993) studied first wave fundholders and concluded that GP‟s were 
influential in the decision to go fundholding but the GPs contribution was less so in 
the day to day task and contract regulation. This implies that GPs, once fundholding, 
did not get involved in the management of it on a day to day basis at operational level 
or contracting which is a more strategic level. There are instances from the interviews  
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Pract-
ice 
Wave Major Factors in Going Fundholding Background to Becoming 
Lead Partner 
A 3rd Use savings to develop facilities. (+ve) 
Improve computer systems.  (-ve) 
Protect patients from effects of two-tier 
system (-ve) 
 
Had done paperwork for 
application process. 
B 3rd HA pressure and force. (-ve) 
Protect local cottage hospital. (-ve) 
 
Previously involved in 
technical development. 
D 3rd Practice partnership felt it ought to go 
fundholding (-ve) 
Update computer systems. (-ve) 
Access to advances in health care. (+ve) 
Develop dilapidated facilities (+ve) 
 
Enjoys organizing deals. 
E 1st Develop computer systems. (-ve) 
Develop the organization by increasing 
human resource. (+ve) Enthusiastic 
individual. (+ve) 
 
Enthusiast for innovation and 
practice development. 
F 2nd Protect local hospital. (-ve) 
Direct funds to local hospital. (-ve) 
 
By default. 
H 1st Early benefits. (-ve) 
Usually innovative. (+ve) 
Alternatives worse. (-ve) 
Improve practice management. (+ve) 
 
Leanings towards business 
side. 
I 3rd Influence health care but overall 
ambivalent. (neither +ve or -ve) 
 
Interested in business side, and 
no other volunteers. 
J 1st Committed individual. (+ve) 
 
Support for GP fundholding. 
L 4th Develop in-house services. (+ve) 
Speedier treatment of patients. (+ve) 
 
Originally proposed. 
M 6th Shares premises with fundholding practice. 
(-ve) 
Non-fundholders‟ patients suffering. (-ve) 
 
Others not interested. 
N 6th Keen individual (but small practice). (+ve) 
Develop patient services. (+ve) 
 
Took initiative. 
O 6th HA pressure. (-ve) 
Develop services and facilities. (+ve) 
Volunteered. 
 
Table 4.4 Major Factors in Going Fundholding and the Background 
to Becoming Lead Partner 
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of doctors whose practices continued to participate in fundholding, but only with 
reluctance, because of some overriding tactical reason (for example see Practice F) or 
the commitment of the lead partner.     
 
It is becoming clearer that the conduit between the partnership and fundholding is the 
lead partner and it is clear from the analysis so far that not all lead partners were 
positive about starting or continuing in that role adopting the linking-pin behaviour 
(Likert, cited in Newton et al., 1993). Once the practice had gone fundholding there is 
scope for the lead partner to enact that role as he/she sees fit and initial reasons for 
taking on the role may have influenced how the lead partner shaped their role. This 
requires further consideration. Therefore in order to answer why the practice chose to 
go fundholding the lead partner role needs some explication. However, in the first 
instance it is necessary to incorporate the lead partner into the positive/negative 
analysis of why the practices went fundholding because it has emerged as an 
important, and previously, an unaddressed variable in the decision to go fundholding 
in other studies. 
 
4.4.1 Lead Partner Enthusiasm  
Table 4.4 is a valuable extension of Table 4.2 as it identifies the background to 
becoming lead partner for each practice therefore it brings in the personal element 
(see Table 4.3) and can start to explore the „next mountain‟ factor introduced by 
Glennerster et al. (1993). The reasons for going fundholding and the role of those 
adopting lead partner positions may be intertwined; there is early evidence in at least 
one case, that of practice J. The variety in the background to becoming lead partner 
suggests a need to move on from single dimensional analysis. The single-dimension 
of positive-negative in the practice context does not capture the richness of the 
reasons for going fundholding and getting involved in the NPM experiment. In Figure 
4.3, lead partners are allocated along the axis according to their relative enthusiasm 
for the role and generally how they embraced it based on the initial analysis in Table 
4.4 and case studies. Enthusiastic individuals are allocated that label when they tended 
to express a self interest in a leadership role, practice „business‟ development and in 
more managerial things, including for example LPI. Lead partners in practice F and J 
are the extremes. Lead partner F arrives in the role by default and hence is 
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unenthusiastic. The word unenthusiastic is deemed here to be better in the analysis 
than „not interested‟ which fits less well as they are in the role already.  LPF is classed 
as the most unenthusiastic, being in a default position characterized by the fund 
manager realistically being the „lead‟ in the practice, the role for the GP in fact a non-
event evidenced by choosing not to be interviewed as he did not have anything to add 
to what the fund manager would say. LPM was also in the role by default being placed 
in an untenable position of not being able to stay as non-fundholders whilst sharing 
premises with a practice that was but enthusiastic to do the job properly having had to 
take the job on. LPB is also at the unenthusiastic end, despite being active in practice 
development and arriving in the role based on past history for getting involved in 
developmental things, he categorically stated he was reluctant to do so, having no 
interest in it. 
 
F M  B    O I  N H  A D E L J  
Unenthusiastic        Enthusiastic 
Figure 4.2 Lead Partner Enthusiasm for Taking on That Role 
 
Lead partners in practice N and H were neutral relative to the other practices in terms 
of fundholding but did not express a particular distaste for it or resistance to taking the 
role on. Lead partners in practice O and I can be described as absolutely neutral in the 
context of lack of challenge for the role and overall „no opinion‟. Ambivalence (LPO 
and LPI) is characterized by the volunteers who were neither in that position by 
default or demonstrating enthusiasm for the role. Thus, the central position represents 
a neutral partner such as that in Practice I who wanted the role above others in the 
partnership but without a keen appetite for fundholding itself.  
 
Partner J supports fundholding unreservedly and hence is the most enthusiastic on the 
continuum, harnessing the policy of fundholding and as the fund manager stated 
„pushing‟ it through the practice. LPL is less enthusiastic as he is not driven by the 
essence of fundholding but was highly committed in order to use the vehicle of 
fundholding to develop in-house services. LPL is classed as more enthusiastic than 
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LPE as fundholding was another innovation he chose to grasp in addition to 
cumulative opportunities for GPs to develop their practices. LPD was in a similar 
position of enthusiasm to LPE but less expressive of the benefits of fundholding itself 
and more keen on the opportunity to do more „deals‟ for the practice. On the other 
hand, LPA can be attributed as less enthusiastic as the role was followed on from the 
administrative paperwork task completion and lacked the verve of the lead partners 
allocated to the right of him on the continuum. 
 
Figure 4.2 goes beyond practice reasons recognizing the influence and the potential 
impact of the person adopting the role of Lead Partner. This is a vitally important 
contribution because of the  importance of human actions that were creating 
fundholding as it unfolded. It is this lead partner role that is the vessel between the 
practice and the individual partnership. GPs all of whom are classed as fundholders, 
in the majority of literature may not all be fundholders at all, other than by being a 
partner in a  partnership that had signed up for fundholding. The possible variability 
in significance of the lead partner has emerged in the study and raises questions about 
how fundholding is lived.  
 
4.4.2 GPs as a Unit of Analysis 
The lead partner dimension in fundholding needed bringing to the fore to aid the 
interpretation of why a practice which is socially constructed chose to be fundholding. 
Therefore to present a two-dimensional analysis the two figures are assimilated in 
Figure 4.3 as part of qualitative analysis. The relative positions from Figure 4.1 and 
4.2 were plotted as the reasons for going fundholding by the practice were deemed 
important (Figure 4.1) and the relative enthusiasm for going fundholding by the GPs 
within the practices in this study (Figure 4.3). The practice position is found on the x 
axis and the GP position on the y axis.  
 
LPF, the most unenthusiastic, is in a practice that went fundholding in order to protect 
whilst LPJ, the most enthusiastic is in a practice that chose fundholding for 
developmental reasons. The diagram seeks to merge the practice reasons for going 
fundholding and the enthusiasm of the lead partner as one cannot be divorced from  
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Enthusiastic GP 
 
                                          D3 
                   A3      
 
 
                                                           I3 
                                                          J1 
                                               L4            E1 
 
                 H1 
                              N6                             
                                                              O6 
 
 
        B3 
                                M6 
F3 
 
Unenthusiastic    GP 
               Negative                    Neutral                Positive 
     Protecting the Practice    Developing the Practice 
 
Figure 4.3 Going Fundholding: Practice and GP Orientation – 
taking on the lead partner role 
 
the other and enhances the study by investigating why the lead partner took the role. 
Prima facie, in Figure 4.3, there is some correlation between the practice reasons for 
going fundholding and the enthusiasm of the lead partner. 
 
This is reinforced by the absence of any practice in the right bottom corner where a 
practice might have positive reasons for going fundholding but an unenthusiastic Lead 
Partner. However, there is also an apparent anomaly in the top left hand corner 
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(Practices A and D). Both practices A and D are third wave practices and on further 
investigation of the data went in that wave for differing reasons: Practice A being 
ready, previously being too small for the first wave, and too unsettled in terms of 
partnership changes for the second wave; Practice D being eligible from the first wave 
onwards but in some partnership turmoil up to the decision to go and being 
ambivalent about it. Both practices did appear to have enthusiastic GPs and negative 
reasons overall for going fundholding, it appears that they were third wave, is mere 
coincidence. However both have the practice context of some in-house distractor that 
constrains the decision to go earlier in order not to upset the practice equilibrium 
further before the third wave. These practices may have been more enthusiastic about 
fundholding than it first appears. 
 
The positive correlation between the degree of lead partner enthusiasm and positive 
versus negative reason for going fundholding challenges the value of any two-
dimensional analysis. It seems that the reasons for the practice having gone 
fundholding and lead partner enthusiasm are linked, that is, practices going 
fundholding for negative reasons were led by unenthusiastic GPs and practices going 
fundholding for positive reasons were led by enthusiastic GPs. That would seem 
logical but that conclusion is too simple.    Firstly, this analysis shows that GP 
practices may be fundholders but not all GPs are committed fundholders as the lead 
partner role takes varying degrees of commitment. Even lead partners may not be 
committed fundholders which has implications for the ambitions of accountability 
under NPM and the aims it seeks to achieve. Further, GPs did not have to become 
lead partners so why did they? Why was the lead partner role taken? The evidence 
thus far contradicts the study that found junior partners took lead partner roles on the 
basis no other partner would. Crucially, why would an unenthusiastic professional 
adopt a role in the management of fundholding and hence involvement in the 
management of secondary care via the internal market mechanism? The reasons for 
going fundholding are broadly consistent with the functionality of professional 
arrangements but there seems to be some element of occupational control at play, 
seeking congenial working conditions and perhaps autonomy. Such differing degrees 
of enthusiasm are evident from Figure 4.3. The lead partner role is about choice and 
for that reason there is extra justification for thinking more about the GPs. However, 
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before venturing further into the GP in a lead partner role as possibly being more 
important than it first seems, how they got there and how they enacted the role as a 
result of being in that position, it is worth reflecting on the two-dimensional analysis 
before rejecting it.  
 
4.4.3 Exploring a Two-Dimensional analysis: Summarising the analysis 
Thus far, the analysis indicates that: 
 Some practices went fundholding for positive reasons and tended to be led by 
enthusiastic GPs. GPs appeared to be opportunistic and in an entrepreneurial 
mode in the context of developing the practice in a number of ways (see x 
axis on Figure 4.3) either technically or managerially, „pulling‟ the practice 
(and possibly reluctant fellow partners) along with the momentum created by 
their enthusiasm. 
 Some practices went fundholding for negative reasons but were led by 
enthusiastic GPs. GPs in such cases appear to be guardians and „push‟ the 
practice along in the face of opposition from fellow partners and a negative 
set of factors for going fundholding. 
 Some practices went fundholding for negative reasons and may be led by 
unenthusiastic GPs. GPs appear to reluctantly innovate while being 
ambivalent about the process itself. 
 Some practices went fundholding for positive reasons and may be led by 
unenthusiastic GPs. Unenthusiastic GPs do not lead practices into 
fundholding for positive reasons; hence no practice is in the quadrant that 
might be termed unenthusiastic leaders. They may exist but the study did not 
find any. 
 
4.5 Naming the Types of Lead Partner 
Figure 4.3 is divided into quadrants to enhance and explain the mapping in order to 
present Figure 4.4. Figure 4.4 is a two-dimensional analysis summarised by a two-by-
two grid as a means of exposition of thought (Cowton, 1992) on the relative positions 
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of practices and lead partner combined. The grid structure enables the allocation of a 
lead partner type to assist in the interpretation and explanation of patterns emerging 
from the data about the importance of the lead partner.  
 
 
 
 
Enthusiastic GP 
 
Guardian 
 
(A, D, I) 
 
Opportunist 
 
(H, N, L ,J, E) 
 
 
Unenthusiastic GP 
 
Reluctant 
Innovator 
(B, F, M, O) 
 
Unenthusiastic 
Leader 
 
  Negative Positive   
 Reasons for Practice going Fundholding  
Figure 4.4 The Lead Partner and Practice Positions 
 
4.5.1 Lead Partners: Guardians; Opportunists; Reluctant Innovators 
Each quadrant in Figure 4.4 can be investigated by looking at the partners in each and 
summarised in Table 4.5. Practices A, D and E had a clear desire to improve the 
practice infrastructure through computerisation and increasing capacity of the estate to 
meet the needs of the practice. Along the vertical axis, LPA was very much focused on 
the contracting, data and computerisation (see Table 4.2) and the influence it might 
have on secondary care, protecting the practice and its patients as a microcosm of the 
NHS – being a guardian. This contrasts to LPE who it emerged  was confident and 
adept in using government policy, working on a macro scale, organizing schemes to 
develop the organization for his own pleasure; he did not emphasize secondary care 
and protection of patients but did have a dominant personality in the „lead partner‟ 
role. Practice E had a lead partner who was keen to influence primary health care and 
avoid the ennui suffered on a personal level by general practice and was opportunistic 
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in using policy for gain – being opportunistic. This contrasts with LPB who adopted a 
more strategic and managerial stance towards what fundholding could achieve by the 
practice joining the scheme. For practice B, with their perceived strong management 
systems, they sought to influence provision of care through commissioning to the 
extent of becoming a Total Purchasing Pilot, a reluctant innovator in order to protect 
the cottage hospital. Hence in Practice B the lead partner protected practice and 
patients with a more outward and external view compared to Practice A and thus 
exhibited behaviour of a reluctant innovator within the fundholding scheme of things. 
However, Practice B also had a strong practice manager/fund manager which may 
also contribute to a less of a need for an enthusiastic role. LPB could not be described 
as entrepreneurial though he supported practice innovation as he actually stated he 
was a reluctant adopter of the lead partner role and liked organizing deals.  
 
4.5.2 Exposing Reasons for Taking on that Role 
Table 4.5 organises the lead partners by classification alongside the major factors for 
the practice going fundholding for deeper consideration of why the lead partner took 
on the role and the context of the practice. By being a lead partner the domain of the 
GP as a professional may change as he/she chooses the lead partner role. In the first 
instance he/she is positioning to lead his fellow GPs in fundholding and secondly, 
may get involved in the change in the organisational nature of the practice, for 
example, by engaging with the role of accounting and budgeting, hence accountability 
to improve organisational performance at practice. In some cases, taking the lead role 
was accepted with some reluctance and viewed as something of a chore, to be 
undertaken because the partnership had identified some reason(s), positive or 
negative, to apply for fundholding status.  Even when the challenge was an interesting 
one, and the GP was enthusiastic, it has carried an opportunity cost: 
It does inhibit me pursuing my other interests which I had hoped to do in my 
career.  In some ways it‟s a side-track with me, some ways it‟s been a 
learning opportunity, it has changed me.  In many respects it‟s changed me 
for the worse, there‟s no doubt, in some ways it‟s changed me for the better 
because I see a broader spectrum of things.  (LPH) 
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Class Practice Major Factors in Going Fundholding Background to 
Becoming Lead Partner  
 
 
 
Guardians 
A Use savings develop facilities. 
Improve computer systems. 
Protect patients from effects of two-tier 
system 
 
Had done paperwork for 
application process. 
D Practice partnership felt it ought to go 
fundholding 
Updated computer systems. 
Access to advances in health care. 
 
Enjoys organizing deals. 
 I Influence health care. Ambivalent. A „wait 
and see‟ approach. 
 
 
Interested in business 
side, and no other 
volunteers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Opportunists 
E Develop computer systems. Develop the 
organization by increasing human resource. 
Enthusiastic individual. 
 
Enthusiast for innovation 
and practice 
development. 
H Early benefits. 
Usually innovative. 
Alternatives worse. 
Improve practice management. 
 
Leanings towards 
business side. 
L Develop in-house services. 
Speedier treatment of patients. 
 
Originally proposed. 
J Committed individual. Support for GP 
fundholding. 
 N Keen individual (but small practice). 
Develop patient services 
 
 
Took initiative. 
 
 
 
Reluctant 
Innovators 
B HA pressure. 
Protect local cottage hospital. 
 
Previously involved in 
technical development. 
F Protect local hospital. 
Direct funds to local hospital. 
 
By default. 
M Shares premises with fundholding practice. 
Non-fundholders‟ patients suffering. 
 
Others not interested. 
An accidental fundholder 
 O HA pressure.  
Develop services and facilities.  
 
 
Volunteered. 
 
Table 4.5 Major Factors in Going Fundholding and the Background to 
Becoming Lead Partner (reconfiguring Table 4.4) 
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Thus the general impression from the qualitative interpretation of the research is that 
both practices and individual lead partners can differ in their reasons for having 
become involved with fundholding.  Some responded to the scheme very positively 
while many, even though they „volunteered‟ to become involved, viewed it somewhat 
pragmatically, even negatively, at the beginning, though in some cases becoming 
more positive with experience.  Even where there was not active resistance, then, 
there was sometimes considerable reluctance. 
The third research question asks why did the lead partner take on that role and the 
classification provides some summary of the characteristics of the lead partner. It is 
now time to approach the original and second research question; how was accounting 
implicated in the management of fundholding? What did the key players do with the 
new mechanism of accountability? 
 
4.6 The Role of Accounting in the Management of Fundholding 
The second research question sought to address NPM implications of accounting 
(Chapter 3) for the management of fundholding. It was assumed that it would play a 
significant role in achieving the aims of fundholding by creating calculable spaces and 
accountability for organisational performance. Osborne‟s (2010) summary of NPM is 
a useful framework to consider how NPM‟s features were embodied in the design of 
fundholding in order to show the link to the implications of accounting. To that end 
Table 4.6 summarises the main finding for research questions 1 and 3. 
 
This section focuses on questions from phase one interviews relative to and about 
accounting. Lapsley (1991) argued for research of financial control in the NHS. The 
second research question aimed to uncover what the financial and accounting systems 
were creating and achieving in fundholding through views of the actors who made 
fundholding live: were they principally passive; might they be more than a 
bureaucratic means of recording financial consequence of professional judgment 
(Ezzamel and Willmot, 1993) hence enable; did Hood‟s (1991; 1995) possible 
accounting implications of the doctrinal components of new pubic management have 
influence and impact in the management of fundholding such as more stress on cost  
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Osborne‟s (2010) Summary of NPM Fundholding 
Lessons from private-sector management. Budgets, contracts, accountability. 
Management. 
Hands on management. Devolvement of management to GP 
practice as a cost centre. Involvement of 
GPs in management of the NHS. Creation 
of calculable space and accountability. 
Focus on entrepreneurial leadership. Some GPs exhibited entrepreneurial 
behaviour but that is a simplistic 
assumption. Evidence in this study found 
GPs were complex as lead partners and 
classified them as reluctant innovators, 
guardians and opportunists. 
Emphasis on inputs/output control, 
evaluation and performance. Markets, 
competition, contracts. 
Creation of internal market. Establishing 
contracts across the practice boundary 
with secondary care provider. 
Management and audit. Lead partner and fund manager roles. A 
management allowance. Audit of 
fundholding practices by health authority. 
 
Table 4.6 Implications of NPM for Fundholding 
 
identification and the bottom line, more use of financial data for management 
accountability and generation of more performance indicators? 
 
The lead partner role was found to be significant in the earlier sections of this chapter 
in going fundholding but how would GPs organise and take to hands on management 
of funds across the practice boundary, and given that accounting is placed where it 
had not been before, what was the role of accounting in that management? 
Hopwood‟s (1986) perspectives demonstrate that accounting change does have 
potential and trajectories. Hood‟s implications for accounting set the potential for 
accounting in organisational improvement of the NHS and it is justified to explore in 
the context of fundholding to see how the role of accounting is manifested in the new 
domain with new purposes. Despite the technology of accounting being fundamental 
to the creation of the fundholding scheme through the creation of budgets, studies had 
not investigated the potential of accounting change. Moreover, for GPs the „newness‟ 
of accounting fell across the boundary of the organisations of primary and secondary 
care. The response to funds being delegated to GP practices for the first time might 
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create visibility into the inner cabal of general practice to outsiders. How would the 
tool of accounting be formed and used by the fundholders and how would the key 
actors identify with the role of accounting? 
In the next section the data is interpreted for each of the cases to explain the role of 
accounting. Both lead partner and fund manager interviews are analysed to 
corroborate an overall view for each practice, rather than one broad independent view 
of what accounting and accountability might contribute to fundholding.  
 
4.6.1 Questions about the Role of Accounting 
In this section the fund manager responses to the interview questions are summarised 
(Table 4.7). The lead partner and role of accounting information are then explored and 
discussed, practice by practice. Thus to add richness to the response to research 
question two, the fund manager responses in Table 4.7 inform the discussion of the 
information relationship between fund manager and lead partner and the role of 
accounting information in the management of fundholding. 
 
It is important to note that this study does not assume fund managers are the existing 
practice managers in situ before fundholding. It was found that five of the eight fund 
managers interviewed from the twelve practices were recruited externally. External 
recruits tended to come from business rather than NHS backgrounds (only two of the 
five recruited externally were from the NHS). These data are incorporated in the 
Table 4.7. and is an important factor. They show that to achieve the objectives of 
fundholding, in some practices, that private sector skills were sought form outside the 
practice, consistent with NPM. 
 
4.6.2 The Fund Manager: Role of Accounting 
The questions for the fund manager, in addition to employment background, were in 
two broad categories: 
(i) Information sharing relationship between lead partner and fund manager: 
 
 What financial information do you pass on to the lead partner on a regular 
basis? How do you pass that information on? 
 What does the lead partner do with the information you give him? 
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 Practice and 
Background 
Advisors Critical Aspects Most time spent on 
A (third wave) 
Recruited externally: 
Senior Manager in Food 
and Drink Industry 
Fellow 
Fund 
Manager; 
IT 
personnel 
Fair funding; 
Contracting; IT 
systems; Budget 
reconciliation 
Data processing (at 
outset); Monitoring 
and planning; 
Payments on 
contracts 
B (third wave) 
Recruited internally: 
Tax Inspector; Education; 
Accountant; Practice 
Manager 
Fellow 
Fund 
Manager 
Contracting and 
Risk 
Management 
Expense 
management (first 
two year); 
Monitoring of 
Budgets 
D (third wave) 
Recruited externally : 
Retail 
Fund-
holding 
Group 
Be well 
organised, 
forward looking 
and cope with 
change. Good 
negotiation. Day 
to day running. 
Invoicing 
E (first wave) Recruited 
internally: NHS 
including  IT and practice 
management 
Fund and 
practice 
managers; 
Health 
Authority; 
Year-end 
Auditor 
Workable 
systems; Regular 
partner 
meetings; 
Communication 
Accounts; Patient 
queries; Contracting 
F (second wave) 
Recruited internally: 
NHS including senior 
positions 
Colleagues Monitoring 
contracts and 
getting the 
contracts right in 
the first instance 
Administration 
H (first wave), I (third 
wave) and J (first wave). 
Recruited externally. : 
Construction industry, 
purchasing and supply 
Pioneer, 
thus nobody 
“.. only learn 
with reality”; 
networking; 
getting the data 
on the computer 
Question omitted in 
error during a 
complex interview 
L (fourth wave), M 
(sixth wave), N (sixth 
wave), O (sixth wave) 
Recruited externally: 
Local authority, Health 
service. Hospital 
Management 
Health 
Authority 
Working in 
alliance with 
other practices 
Financial side but 
not data input. 
 
Table 4.7 Summary of Fund Manager Responses 
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(ii) The fund manager and fundholding: 
 
 Who has advised you during fundholding? 
 What are the critical aspects for fund management? 
 What aspect of fund management do you spend most of your time on? 
 
The questions were designed slightly differently according to the expected role of the 
fund manager and lead partner. The employment background of the fund manager 
was deemed important relative to how the role of accounting would develop, for 
example, an accountant in that role would be expected to emphasise accounting more 
than say, an IT person appointed to that role. Similarly, the lead partner perception of 
accounting and its importance may be dependent on the information he receives and 
does not receive. By asking both about the information and what they did with it, the 
researcher obtains a more accurate picture. The lead partner is also assumed to be the 
superior to the fund manager in the management hierarchy of fundholding, that is, he 
is reported to, at least to some extent, by the fund manager. 
 
There is diversity in the role of the fund manager from the 7 respondents, from the 12 
practices in the study. Two of the fund managers work for more than one practice, 
employed by 3 and 4 practices respectively. Only three of the seven fund managers 
were already employed by the practices when they came into the role. All internal 
recruits to the fund manager role were in the first three. External recruits were 
employed by all practice waves that were part of the sample (waves one through to 
four and six, but excluding five). Four of the practices were managed by one fund 
manage covering the fourth and six waves which was a characteristics of fundholding 
where smaller practices such as L,M,N and O (see Table 3.1) pool fund manager 
resources in order for breadth of knowledge and financial efficiencies, albeit creating 
a much larger administrative volume for fundholding purposes in terms of list size. 
The fund managers use advisors from the social and inner circle of fundholding with 
the exception of FM (L,M,N,O)  who was appointed for his commercial contracting 
prowess to manage a large fundholding list size. It is notable that there are few 
external professional advisors e.g. management consultants cited as advisors. 
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4.6.3 The Fund Manager and Lead Partner: Role of Accounting 
The lead partner was asked four open questions focusing on three main areas in order 
to build a picture of the role of accounting: critical aspects; information; time spent on 
activities: 
 
 What are the critical aspects of successful fund management? 
 What do you do with the information received from the fund manager? And how 
do you receive that information? 
 Is there any information that you do not receive that you would like to receive? 
 What aspect of fund management do you spend most of your time on? 
 
The forthcoming sections summarise the findings of each case. 
 
4.6.3.1 Practice A 
The lead partner delegated data collection and information gathering to the fund 
manager. The critical aspects of successful fund management were “good manager, 
good reliable data, and mistake free, ability to know exactly where you are at any time 
in the year” (LPA). Most of his time was spent on “strategy, individual problems, and 
individual cases” (LPA), very much a patient centric answer. Thus although he did not 
talk about accounting and budgets directly it was clear that he used the information 
from the fund manager, received on a month end basis, including the budgets, to 
assess the position of the practice. The desire for more detail by speciality, something 
he would have liked to help with negotiation and contracting, is an indicator of being 
active in the management of fundholding. It suggests that should the data show 
information that needed acting upon that some action would be taken. Further, he did 
not immerse himself in the data but had meetings „to talk it through‟ with the fund 
manager. 
 
The use of the financial information by the lead partner was corroborated by the fund 
manager who gives him “that information so he should be able to see where we are on 
a monthly basis….where we are going to be at year end” (FMA). However, the lead 
partners‟ comments suggest that he was active on more than a monthly basis and is 
summarised as such in Table 4.8. 
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4.6.3.2 Practice B 
This lead partner looks at the information and describes it as  “an awful lot of 
accounting gobbledy gook - but you can looking at bottom lines and things, which is 
perhaps most interesting to us, or month on month, to stuff, budgets and how it‟s 
going…I hope we see most of it”. He did not wish for any other information and was 
only worried about having „one man running the thing‟ – and cited that as the critical 
aspect to successful fund management, ultimately “doctors are not management 
animals” (LPB). However, this lead partner does not seem to like the loss of control by 
having a fund manager clearly in charge of fundholding yet chooses to trust the fund 
manager. The comment of the fund manager support this interpretation who passed 
“very little” financial information on to the lead partner who only wished to know 
when something went dramatically wrong. 
 
4.6.3.3 Practice D 
For this lead partner the critical aspects of fund management were about change, 
using fundholding to change things for the patients. The fund manager passes lots of 
information on to the lead partner who is “very hands on… gets to know all the levels 
of contracts, where we are, sort of in relation to the performance of the hospitals”. Yet 
information is passed on “with a natter,” The lead partner also referred to these 
discussions, or „natters‟, in relation to what he does with the information  and did not 
describe any concrete activities. He either did not engage in fundholding activities or 
chose not to admit to it. However, there is some interest and discussion of contracting. 
When pushed by the interviewer he thought he spent most of his time on contracting 
and did not desire any further information. He categorically stated that he saw little 
point in being a partner in general practice and doing the accounts. Whilst the lead 
partner suggested he was involved in contracting he was clearly not involved in the 
management of fundholding within the practice through the use of data or day to day 
activities. 
 
4.6.3.4 Practice E                
According to the fund manager (known as the „Boss‟) the lead partner does not ask 
for and therefore does not get any financial information at all, with one exception, 
when he asks the question „how many savings have we got left?‟ The lead partner 
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confessed to relying on the practice/fund manager to keep him up to date. No 
evidence from the interviews suggested formal reporting mechanisms e.g. monthly 
reports – “if I need it I ask for it” (LPE ). The critical aspects of fund management for 
the lead partner are “invisibility” but that any time he did spend was on negotiations 
and contract performance management. 
 
4.3.6.3.5 Practice F 
The lead partner of practice F did not want to be interviewed. The fund manager 
described all the partners as reluctant fundholders without enthusiasm and named a 
contrasting lead partner from another practice as an exemplar of an enthusiast. The 
lead partner does receive information on request – “we just keep in regular contact, 
whether we‟re above or below what we anticipate.” 
 
4.3.6.3.6 Practice H  
The fund manager in practice H was also the fund manager in practice I and J. In 
respect of the financial information passed on: 
I run a very complex spreadsheet monitoring totally separate to 
fundholding software…fundholding software does not predict the complex 
contracts we have… it is double entry book-keeping…I do a monthly 
spreadsheet package…I do a two sheet hand written memo that gives you 
the keep principles and points…passed on in written format …practice 
meetings each month… (FM, H,J) 
 
The lead partner from practice H uses the „matrix‟ prepared by the fund manager, 
considering it adequate, and looks for under activity to see how the practice is doing.  
This fund manager was from a commercial contracting background and handled the 
fundholding process in a similar way – impartial from the medical aspects. The lead 
partner liked the data presented in this way, in order to spot trends, as the critical 
factor in fund management, supported by a good relationship with the fund manager. 
Most of the lead partner time is “just checking” and reading – “one sheet 
management”. However, the fund manager may be the same for practices I and J but 
the engagement with the fund manager and the management of fundholding is 
different. 
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4.3.6.3.7 Practice I 
The fund manager passes everything on to the lead partner in the form of a 
spreadsheet and “he asks more questions, than the auditors do…” (FMI) – a sharp 
contrast to the lead partner in practice H. The lead partner also takes an interest and 
summarises the information for quarterly reporting to fellow partners. Finances were 
deemed straight forward, something the lead partner concurred with, “I look through 
and sign basically and I don‟t get involved in the day to day figures, so basically I‟m 
trusting – relying on him and the system” (LPI). The lead partner would have liked 
more information on waiting times as part of the information system, presumably to 
manage the fund better. The critical aspects for the lead partner were good contracts 
and negotiations. 
 
4.3.6.3.8 Practice J 
The lead partner in practice J receives the same information as that received by 
practice H and I but was elusive in describing what he did with it. Asked about critical 
aspects of fund management he said „go and ask the fund manager‟ – “he does the 
entire contract monitoring for us”. However the lead partner did, earlier on in 
fundholding, spend the largest amount of his fundholding time looking individually at 
contracts but “now basically just read the excellent summaries”. It seems activity by 
this GP and lead partner has changed over time. As the fund manager does such a 
„good job‟ the lead partner has stepped back from being active in the management of 
fundholding. 
 
4.6.3.9 Practice L, M, N, O – The Fund Manager 
Practices L, M, N and O share a fund manager as the practice worked in an alliance. 
At the month end the fund manager gives a full breakdown of the financial position, 
waiting list and breakdown of costs supported by regular meeting. The lead partner in 
practice L has a more formal relationship with the fund manager via a formal monthly 
meeting than for lead partners in practice M and N (a daily basis) and lead partner of 
whom he meets on a weekly basis. Lead partner M and N read the information and 
pass it back while lead partners L and O read it and keep it. 
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Practice L 
This lead partner systematically reads the report and needs no further information. On 
questions of successful fund management the researcher was directed straight to the 
fund manager. The fund manager was in control of all things fundholding other than 
the lead partner keeping a watchful eye on the management of the lists to make sure 
they were not overspending. 
 
Practice M 
On seeing the information from the fund manager this lead partner will check for 
overspend. She has demanded other information on detailed referral activity and the 
fund manager has been able to provide that. On critical aspects of fund management it 
was the „right manager‟ – “I am not a manager, I‟m a doctor, and I wasn‟t trained as a 
manager…let him get on with it”. On time spend on fund management – “I don‟t 
actually manage the fund…I get reported to”. 
 
Practice N 
Critical to successful fund management was an enthusiastic lead (fund manager) who 
has imagination and dedication. The lead partner referred the researcher to the fund 
manager. He said that he „passed‟ the monthly information and discussed it with the 
fund manager. He received all the information he asked for. On time spent – “I don‟t 
spend much time, once a year OK, when the contracting process is in progress”. 
 
Practice O 
This lead partner separated the work out of the contract manager and the fund 
manager, regarding work with the contract manager as nothing clinical and not 
requiring any further information. Hence, the person this lead partner calls the fund 
manager is actually the practice manager “an interface between the accounting and 
medical side” with a separate contracts manager. Critical to both supporting roles to 
the fund manager was having the right knowledgeable person in place. He thought 
that he spends most of his time “signing invoices. It sounds very boring doesn‟t it 
really?” 
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4.6.4 Making Sense of the Data: the Role of Accounting 
NPM has accounting implications with operational significance and accounting 
change would be important in studying where accounting had not been before. 
Accordingly it is sensible to consider the accounting implications of fundholding 
using Hood‟s (1991; 1995) selection based on the doctrinal components of NPM. 
Table 4.8 shows an analysis that suggests that most of the day to day accounting, the 
recording and measurement, is in the hands of the fund manager. The fund manager 
creates the accounting of the scheme and makes it visible to the lead partner through 
the monthly and annual account reporting function but not all the lead partners 
interacted with that data or data that has been translated into information. Table 4.8 
summarises and identifies the activities between fund manager and lead partner in 
order to later interpret the accounting implications from the data with implications for 
accounting and Hood‟s components as a framework. This analysis is an indicator of 
what the GP does as a professional taking a lead partner role (see Table 4.6) as a 
result of what accounting for the scheme measures. This will be further analysed in 
Table 4.9. 
 
Practice and LP Type  AG DG IG BRI FRI MRI ORI EO HO JO LO NO 
Day to day activities:             
Strategy X            
Contracting/Performance 
Management 
X X X     X    X 
List Management           X  
Individual Patient Fundholding 
Cases 
X            
Frequency of Interaction with 
data 
            
Daily             
Intermittently within the Month X     X       
Monthly X  X X     X X X X 
Quarterly   X          
Annually    X X   X    X 
 
Table 4.8 Preliminary evidence of lead partner activity  
beyond inception of fundholding 
 
 
118 
 
The role of accounting in the management of fundholding can be interpreted through 
the actions of the lead partner. The blank cells show no activity but even the shaded 
areas in the table highlight negligible involvement in fundholding after accepting a 
lead partner role for the themes that have emerged and been summarised in Table 4.8. 
LPO is determined as not active in fundholding as opposed to going fundholding 
which is consistent with the concept of being a reluctant innovator. But the remaining 
lead partners are active in the management of fundholding after inception of the 
scheme but how significant is the role of accounting? The themes interpreted and the 
categorisation is a help in analysing the data. 
 
4.6.5 What was the Role of Accounting in the Management of Fundholding? 
Overall it can be said that some of the lead partners are significant in going 
fundholding but may choose not to engage in any activity into the management of the 
lived experience. They delegate it to the fund manager, either actively or by ignoring 
fundholding. Table 4.8 shows that the role of accounting in the management of 
fundholding is different between lead partners and that the interaction with the fund 
manager varies. These activities are argued to be indicative of involvement in 
fundholding beyond taking the lead partner role and a further factor to consider is that 
GPs take on the role as guardian, reluctant innovator or opportunist. 
 
At one extreme LPO, a reluctant innovator, is not active in fundholding and has a 
blocked column in Table 4.8. Notably, none of the reluctant innovators have a day to 
day role in this analysis. As group, reluctant innovators engage less frequently with 
the data and information from the fund manager on a monthly basis and are more 
likely to do something on an annual basis than an opportunist or guardian. 
 
Opportunists lead partners are less likely to engage intermittently within the month 
than guardians and reluctant innovators with fundholding activities and management, 
but did monthly, largely on contracting and list management, hence outward facing 
fundholding activity. Guardians are more active in the management of fundholding on 
that outward facing basis and one guardian more so on internal matters, that is, 
individual patient cases. However, one guardian though involved in fundholding 
leaves all the data management to a fund manager. 
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Although accounting is in place in the practice for fundholding in accordance with 
improving organisational performance, consistent with NPM overall it does not loom 
large as part of the management of fundholding by lead partners who take on that role 
as „gatekeepers‟. However, lead partners do take on different activities a part of the 
lead partner role which raises a more detailed fourth research question: how did the 
lead partner enact the management role; what did they do and how did they do it?  
 
4.6.6 Accounting Itself Does not Loom Large 
Accounting per se does not loom large in the management of fundholding by the key 
player in general practice, the lead partner, the professional in the practice. However, 
it does provide insights into how the fundholding pair of lead partner and fund 
manager work together. Table 4.7 considers Hood‟s accounting implications to the 
summaries of interview data thus far. There is evidence of a stress on costs, their 
identification and relationship to the bottom line i.e. making savings or not. These 
GPs use the accountability information to varying degrees. Further although the role 
of accounting explicitly as a part of management accountability does not loom large 
the varying degree of lead partner involvement indicated by use of that information 
for varying degrees of hands on management does. Table 4.9 considers the role of 
accounting in the management of fundholding and its operational significance. 
 
Given that nomenclature of „lead‟ role it raises questions about what the lead partner 
does, how they are executing the management role? To some extent we have already 
seen what they do and how they do it through the analysis of the interview data 
providing insights and findings relative to research question 2, that is, about the role 
of accounting in managing fundholding. There were direct questions e.g. the fund 
manager was specifically asked what financial information he gave the lead partner 
and the lead partner asked what he did with it. There was frequently a mention of the 
budget and bottom line but lead partners were not actively engaging with or 
developing the information supplied through the accounting mechanism of budgets. 
Thus far a major finding is the significance of the lead partner but that the role of 
accounting was not significant for that player in fundholding and that lead partners 
chose to be involved in management in varying degrees once the practice was living 
fundholding. 
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Hood‟s NPM: 
possible 
accounting 
implications 
Hood‟s 
operational 
significance 
Interpretation for Fundholding from the Data: Role of 
Accounting 
More cost centre 
units 
Devolved 
budgets 
Allocation of budget to GPs. Budgets are the accounting tool for 
NPM reform. Some GPs use budgets in management more than 
other GPs. The accounting is important to the fund manager to a 
certain degree. The budget is devolved to the practice and 
responsibility is devolved to the fund manager to varying 
degrees who produces summaries of day to day activities which 
are used to varying degrees by some GPs. Some GPs do not 
engage in fundholding activity despite being the lead partner. 
More stress on 
cost 
identification 
Distinction 
between primary 
and secondary 
public service 
Clear evidence of contracting process being more important than 
accounting and costs themselves. However, the contract is part 
of the budget and accountability process. Cost within contracts 
do not receive much attention yet the contracting process does 
by the lead partners. Some lead partners talk about looking at the 
data and using it for contracting and negotiating. 
Private Sector 
Accounting 
Norms 
End of job for 
life, unmonetized 
rewards. 
No apparent penetration from this research. 
More stress on 
bottom line 
Less job security Many of the GPs did mention looking at the bottom line as part 
of the financial information received from fund manager but did 
not link to job security. This may be because the GP remained as 
independent contractor. 
Fewer 
procedural 
constraints; 
More use of 
traditional data 
for management 
accountability 
Freedom to 
management by 
discretionary 
power 
Doctor‟s procedural constraints were not internal before. In fact, 
fundholding potentially increased constraints through visibility 
to those beyond practice boundary via budgets – exposed the 
internal workings of general practice. 
More 
performance 
indicators and 
audit 
Erosion of self-
management 
Yes. Fundholders were audited. Lead partners actually acting as 
auditors of the accounting information to see if „where they [the 
practice] were at‟. Some evidence from data of partners 
constraining referral behaviour of GPs that was out of line with 
practice policy. 
Broader cost 
centres; blurring 
of pay and 
activity funds 
Resource and 
pay based on 
performance 
The creation and subsequent aspiration for savings to improve 
the practice and service to patients. 
Table 4.9 Consideration of Hood‟s accounting implications to  
the summaries of interview data 
 
4.7 Doctors Getting Involved in Management 
There are differences in how lead partners engage in the management of fundholding 
after the initial phase of „going‟. From the very start for some lead partners, within 
practices, there was ambivalence and even negative attitude towards fundholding but 
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it was neither universal nor consistent – yet significantly they were in a position of 
management relative to other partners in their practices. This finding reflects the 
conclusions of Ennew et al. (1998) and Whynes et al. (1999) that not all fundholders 
could be viewed as „true entrepreneurs‟ although there were clear enthusiasts.  
However lead partners are not all „entrepreneurs‟ which has been interpreted as too 
narrow a view but they may be guardians, opportunists or reluctant innovators in 
going fundholding as lead partner. The emerging question is what happens beyond 
that point. How is the management role enacted? There was more to discover.  
 
One of the clear influencing factors in the way fundholding evolved may be the 
personalities of some of those taking on the lead partner role.  The Audit Commission 
(1996) found that practices differ dramatically in the extent to which they threw 
themselves into the fundholding initiative, that is, how things were enacted beyond 
implementation. Studies did not investigate how the lead partner enacted the role: 
what they did and how they did beyond the „going‟. The case studies show that there 
are instances where there is an enthusiastic individual carrying fundholding and, in 
contrast, those reluctant volunteers that having being assigned the task cannot muster 
enthusiasm for the role itself. There may also be differing degrees to which these 
necessary „volunteers‟ fulfil their role to the full, immersing themselves in the role of 
managing or treating it as an administrative burden and nothing more. Thus 
fundholdings‟ documented and researched  impact goes beyond  primary health care 
management and practices as organizations. The evidence from the case studies 
suggests there is some meaning for the doctors themselves and consequently there 
may be things to discover about the way the doctors get involved in management and 
how their careers evolves as a consequence. 
 
4.7.1 A Role in Management 
The evidence in this study presents the case for moving away from an organizational 
perspective on policy application and paying attention to the professionals, the GPs 
themselves. It becomes apparent that GPs themselves warranted more attention 
because of what fundholding enabled them to do. The data needs to be further 
interrogated to see how those lead partners enacted the role of lead partner. GPs in the 
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management role will be faced with more choices – new initiatives, constraints, 
pressures and opportunities. One choice is taking an active lead partner role, a 
management role in addition to the professional role. 
 
Initial appraisals of fundholding, in the quasi-market setting of the NHS took a 
somewhat simplistic view that for GPs fundholding released the inner entrepreneur 
(Ennew et al., 1998; Whynes et al., 1999) and at least facilitated innovative ways to 
save costs and new ways of working (Lapsley et al., 1997). This research indicates 
there are factors at play that engage GPs in management roles and to behave in a 
managerial way. The lead partners are volunteering for a significant role that takes 
them away from the „day job‟ and changes their career, which is an “evolving 
sequence of a person‟s work experience over time,” (Arthur et al., 1989). 
Fundholding was the first major opportunity to move away from the surgery desk into 
a managerial role and to do so legitimately (funded and with partnership approval) for 
the good of the practice, frequently under the assumption that it would improve some 
aspect of patient services and be consistent with the functionality of the professional. 
It was a justified role for doctors to manage primary health care without being 
dictated to, empowering them to influence secondary care as demonstrated by LPH : 
I think all general practitioners are now beginning to appreciate that they 
have an important role to play in the planning of secondary care for their 
patients.  Experience has shown, to be honest, the health authority does not 
have the knowledge.  While they consult on public health, they‟re not 
clinicians.  They do not know what‟s going on in the front line, therefore they 
need our experience. 
The value of the primary care clinician managing the commissioning of health care 
services was noted by LPH, very graphically, that fundholding gave family doctors 
power over consultants, but although some of the interviewees were fundholding 
enthusiasts, there was little evidence of a widespread, overt strategic motivation 
towards a primary care-led NHS.  Even if they approved of the notion, it does not 
seem to be what moved most of them to action in the fundholding era. So what was 
motivating individual GPs? The shift in power was noted by FMD, who also remarked 
that the larger groupings represented by PCGs would „give us more power over the 
hospitals, an awful lot more power‟.  However, size also has its disadvantages, and 
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LPD expressed the view that commissioning units should ideally remain small because 
they give a great deal more flexibility, as in fundholding. 
 
One lesson learned here is that the GP is more than a single entrepreneur as they are 
in partnership within the organization of a practice.  The interviews reveal a 
complexity that may not be understood by super-imposing traditional explanations 
such as entrepreneurship and practices emulating small businesses (Cowton and 
Drake, 2000). It seems there are some other factors at work. One such factor that 
emerges is that the fundholding team can be derived and formed from differing 
sources: sometimes the practice manager became the fund manager; sometimes the 
fund manager was recruited from outside; sometimes the GP continued to take an 
interest in the accounting through mechanisms that produced reports that he/she could 
use – sometimes they did not (see table 4.8). All in all, how the lead partner as a 
doctor gets involved in management appears complex and worthy of empirical study.  
Stewart (1982) suggests that any identification of the managerial roles adopted by 
individuals, in this research the case of  GPs taking on the role of Lead Partner, can be 
usefully gleaned from original interview questions whose first intention was not to 
identify managerial roles and that those questions can be a useful source of 
interpreting the roles acted out by  individuals . Essentially, if you ask managers about 
their jobs then they will give dissimilar answers for many reasons, “comments on 
relative role importance may reflect cultural perceptions of the right answers rather 
than the job itself or the manager‟s behaviour,” (Stewart, 1982, p.8). Therefore the 
emergence from the data of the reasons GP become Lead Partners suggests that it is 
also important to see how they enact that role. Secondly, Stewart (1982) recognised 
the importance of flexibility as a key characteristic of managerial jobs, that over 
generalization was unwise and that any analysis needs to consider “the variations in 
behaviour and the differences in jobs before attempting to generalise about 
managerial work” and ultimately that difference itself is important. The model 
purports to be realistic and useful way of thinking about managerial jobs and how 
managers do them. GPs in this study in the main found themselves in roles with no 
job description and thus no formal benchmark or idealistic model of management. 
The important question to investigate is what happened under those circumstances? 
To do so it will be necessary to consider the literature on doctors in management roles 
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to move from the study of fundholding as part of NPM reforms to the role of doctors 
in management. This does not mean that the assumptions made under NPM were 
inappropriate but rather there are other emergent factors that need studying from a 
different perspective; there is a shift from accounting and creating order and visibility 
to accounting contributing to the motion and the lived experience of individuals 
(Humphrey et al., 1993). This will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
There are a number of conclusions relative to fundholding, the emerging importance 
of the lead professional in fundholding and the implications for accounting in the 
management of fundholding. 
 
In respect of fundholding itself, firstly, previous studies had simplified the reasons for 
going fundholding by concentrating on early waves, using frameworks such as 
entrepreneurship to analyse fundholding and over emphasising what could be 
measured easily e.g. demographics. This study has used more cases and more waves 
and presented multiple factors for going fundholding, identifying more reasons. It 
therefore contributes to a better understanding of fundholding as part of NPM in the 
context of general practice. Secondly, the early wave fundholders exhibited more 
entrepreneurship than later waves, possibly because they had access to greater 
financial incentives as later „bribes‟ for going fundholding diminished over time. 
Some practices chose fundholding in order to protect the practice and avoid 
undesirable consequences of not being fundholders rather than because of a 
predilection for it. Consequently, the entrepreneurship model used to consider 
fundholding, and engagement of professionals, may have been more suited to early 
wave research of this and similar schemes. A more inductive approach of multiple 
case studies has revealed the complexities that engage professionals in changes in 
organisations, not least the important of the context of the organisation and the 
profession.  
 
In respect of the lead partner, the lead professional, most significantly emerges as a 
major factor in going fundholding and acknowledging that factor in the interpretation 
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of fundholding makes for more trustworthy research. Fundholding was unlike other 
NPM experiments because of the GP; as advocate of the patient; traditionally seeking 
to retain the functionality of professional arrangements; taking advantage and 
occupational control by improving conditions of working; and, taking advantage of 
potential to increase professional autonomy. Lead partners have been categorised as 
guardians, opportunists, or reluctant innovators having chosen to engage in the lead 
partner role. Further, the degree to which they engaged once the scheme is live varies. 
This links with the implications of accounting as how they engage with it and its 
outputs and is an indicator of what they do and how they execute their lead partner 
role and warrants further investigation.  Further there are early indications that GPs 
may influence and be influenced by the relationship with the fund manager in what 
they do and how they do it. 
 
In respect of accounting, per se it does not loom large although it is instrumental to 
the design of fundholding and what it sought to achieve. The examination of 
accounting as part of fundholding has given insights into its contribution as part of an 
accounting change, what its presence enabled, and gives visibility for governance and 
control by lead partners. Lead partners do not get involved in the mechanics and 
measurement but accounting did have a bearing in the initial analysis of what they did 
once they had gone fundholding. Therefore accounting seems implicated in the 
construction of social order rather than intrinsically important or needing to be 
understood for its reported dysfunctional consequences.  
 
Studies have paid little attention to what the lead partner does once fundholding is 
„live‟ and it requires exposition. This study contributes to the literature by 
incorporating the social element of the lead partner and while accounting per se is not 
important it has implications for accounting change.  Hence this chapter has described 
why practices went fundholding, why the lead partner took on that role and 
implications of accounting. It makes a contribution to our developing understanding 
of the fundholding „episode‟ in the NHS, but it also goes a stage further by raising 
several issues. It is time to pay attention to the GPs and their role in management. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Doctors in Management 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature about doctors in management to 
inform a further set of research questions: How did the lead partner enact the 
management role; what did they do; and how did they do it? The adoption of 
management roles by doctors grew as a research topic in secondary care from the mid 
1990s but there was little development in the primary care sector. The literature 
developed most significantly after the conclusion of phase one of this study, and 
publication of those results, and its development  presents the case for considering 
emergent research questions to interpret the significance role of the lead partner once 
fundholding is „live‟ as a doctor in management. It justifies a second analysis of phase 
one data in the context of doctors in management, getting involved in governance and 
control of the organisation in order to add to the literature. Prior to 2000 there was 
little empirical evidence observing the phenomenon of doctors engaging in 
management. The literature enables this study to transcend the fundholding moment. 
Although the opportunities for doctors in primary care to volunteer for management 
roles were reduced after fundholding ended the policy of engaging doctors in 
management has returned in primary care, and continued in secondary care, as part of 
government strategy for the management of the NHS. 
 
This chapter is a literature review of empirical studies of doctors in management in 
both the hospital and primary care setting. The first section explains how the literature 
review was conducted and summarised (see Appendix 3). The second section 
critically evaluates the literature in secondary care, the hospital setting, followed by a 
third section in the general practice. The two settings are compared and the gaps in the 
literature identified to inform the questions to be asked of phase one data and to 
design a second phase of data collection. Like the doctors themselves this thesis takes 
a managerial turn born of accounting led change in the form of fundholding. Phase 
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one evidence revealed that GPs who „chose‟ to take the lead are unlikely to represent 
a group of likeminded partners. Other partners do not always take a supportive role. It 
seems GPs can be a difficult bunch! Thus taking the lead was a potentially 
challenging role for a professional if they chose to be active. It added to a personal 
career domain by taking a lead role in parallel to the demands of a primary profession. 
With varying levels of enthusiasm those who adopted the role were seen to vary from 
enthusiastic to unenthusiastic about becoming lead partner. These „leads‟ were not a 
„skewed group‟ of doctors as reported by Fitzgerald, (1994), but might be interpreted 
as a „type‟: guardian; reluctant innovator; opportunist, but how did they operate in 
management? 
 
 5.1 Doctors in Management  
In Chapter 2, through the short contextual history, it is apparent that the place for GPs 
in the Griffiths (1983) vision for a performance managed NHS was for general 
management at all levels with an implicit assumption that doctors who did choose to 
be involved would be natural managers (Buchan et al., 1997). Clinical general 
managers were thought to have a “better chance of curbing the power of the medical 
profession but it was hoped clinicians, especially doctors, would take up, general 
management posts” (Dopson 2009, p.40). This implied that clinicians in resource 
management would manage the NHS resource better; it would be politically correct 
for them to be involved as part of the functionality of their professional arrangement 
that is to maintain patient trust and be the advocate for the uninformed. It also 
assumed that should doctors choose a management role that they would be active and 
good managers. At this stage of development in the NHS there was no question of all 
doctors being forced into management roles.  
 
The literature of empirical studies of doctors in management is summarised 
(Appendix 3). The table shows the author, date, title of the research, the key themes 
and findings. The third column shows the country and organisation setting for the 
research. The fourth and fifth columns show the method used to collect the data and 
the sample size. The final column elaborates on the title of each paper, drawing out 
key themes and findings. The criterion for the literature review was empirical studies 
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of doctors in management. It excluded commentary papers included in the British 
Medical Journal (BMJ) on the grounds they were not based on observation of doctors 
in management. Some discussion papers and historical reviews that were not 
empirical were incorporated where they support and add value to the discussion of the 
empirical studies and tend to be early in the chronology. The literature does not 
include other medical professionals who were engaging in management as a result of 
the reforms, for example, Bolton (1995) studied nurses. The tabulation does not 
include the literature, for example, relative to the GP contract and fundholding, 
already documented in Chapter 2. The literature does include studies in secondary 
care, since that is where doctors were first experiencing management roles.  
 
The aim of this literature survey was:  
 to summarise the developing phenomena of doctors in management 
experienced by those engaging in it; 
  to identify if doctors engaged in management,  why did they and how?  
 to identify if there was evidence of doctors in management in primary care and 
if so why did they engage in management and how; 
  to compare the literature on doctors in management in secondary and primary 
care to establish similarities and differences.  
 
The literature review revealed other „pockets‟ of literature which are judged to be on 
the periphery of the debate on doctors engaging in management. Those broader 
categories (i to iii below) are not incorporated into the table as a feature of doctors in 
management because the themes of those studies, while providing evidence and 
context for doctors in management, were not central to the individual doctors in 
management debate and were broadly concerned with why doctors as a profession do 
and do not engage in management. Indeed these themes from the literature on doctors 
working lives may hinder the exploratory nature of the secondary analysis with pre-
conceived notions by focusing on negatives (like many fundholding studies) rather 
than the positive connotation from phase one of this research about why doctors got 
involved in management roles.  Those three established themes that are omitted from 
this literature review of doctors in management can be categorized as follows: 
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(i) Doctors operating across organisational boundaries and engaging with those 
organisations. Such studies concentrated on the practice as an organisation rather 
than professionals, for example, Currie and Suhomlinova (2006) investigating the 
extent of knowledge sharing and power differentials in the NHS based in medical 
centres attached to higher education institutes. The thesis at this stage is seeking to 
make sense of individual professional roles in management rather than attached to 
organisations. 
 
(ii) Relationships between doctors and managers rather than doctors as 
managers - their engagement and activity in management: Studies such as a 
literature review by Bruce and Hill (1994) concluded generally that doctors are 
„lukewarm‟ about management. Rundall et al.‟s. (2004) comparative study looking at 
the strained relationships between doctor and managers in hospitals rather than 
doctors as managers and recommended doctors should become more involved in 
decision making especially resource related decision. However, Neogy and 
Kirkpatrick (2009), for example, more recently looked at engaging professionals in 
the management agenda rather than management itself to overcome the „them and 
us‟/doctors versus managers and are incorporated in the tabulation (Appendix 3). 
 
(iii) Debates solely about profession and power in the NHS. These include studies 
such as Ong (1999) and later Russell et al. (2010) who concluded that medical 
professions associated roles in management with powerlessness and lack of respect. 
These studies inform any debate about doctors in management as a profession and 
justify the contextual analysis of GPs in the NHS. Such a literature would be more 
pertinent to the study of doctors who chose not to be lead partners or clinicians in 
management role. However, although worth a mention here, the GPs in this study do 
not appear to suffer from perceptions of powerlessness and lack of respect, therefore 
contributing to the literature. As volunteers in one of the three groups they have 
sought a management role, even if, in one case it appears no more than nomenclature. 
More recent comparative studies suggest that in the hospital sector the 
accommodation between management and medicine and degree of enthusiasm can be 
nation- specific (Kirkpatrick et al., 2009) but change and reform a consistent factor 
between nations. These perceived tensions between medicine and management have, 
directly or indirectly, been the subject of a number of studies carried out since the 
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mid-1990s (Ong, 1998), and several possible reasons for the tensions between the two 
have been identified. The power and autonomy debate is founded in the historical 
position of GPs relative to hospital doctors (see Chapter 2). While it may inform the 
debate these categories and debates above can be contrasted to the three themes 
emerging from the NPM literature (Morris and Farrell, 2003). They recognized that 
the NPM literature had brought forward debate about professionals: in the interaction 
and tensions between professionals and managers (not professionals in a 
management role) as professions strove to retain autonomy; “that managers 
themselves are imbued with managerialism and have bought into the ideology of 
NPM” (p.137); that there are „winners‟ and „losers‟ under NPM. Morris and Farrell 
(2003) criticized the literature for using the crude measure of the pursuit of personal 
autonomy; perhaps suggesting research focused too much on power relationships and 
is therefore under developed and biased. Indeed the research in this study indicates 
that GPs were selecting a role in management in a broader context than simply 
seeking or retaining personal autonomy which according to Harrison and Pollitt 
(1994) may well be an illusion. Further, Morris and Farrell (2003) were critical of the 
conclusion that holding a budget made GPs a winner in the battle for personal 
autonomy as their own study found that it “assumes that such professionals are 
desirous of such autonomy, a contentious assumption,” (p.138). All of these studies 
contribute to the debate on engaging doctors as a profession in management providing 
background but do not consider managers who have chosen it and what they did in 
that role and how they did it. The focus was not on those living the management role 
experience. Therefore the literature review focuses on doctors in management at a 
unique point in time as relative to lead partners in fundholding – a period of 
precedence of doctors in management that had not been studied in such a context 
perhaps because of the focus on three themes outlined here. 
 
It seems that the tendency to measure what is easily measured, or readily compared to 
the private sector, such as entrepreneurship,  and the „simpler‟ debate of the battle for 
autonomy - can bring pre-conceived ideas, thus suppressing emerging and richer 
debates.  This study of doctors in management presents a new approach and strategy 
for analysing doctors in management which acknowledges the context of other 
debates in the literature but is not constrained by them. Where studies from primary 
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and secondary care are useful to the doctors in management context  and do contribute 
to the doctors in management literature they have been incorporated into the table in 
order to give focus to this under explored area to assist in a secondary analysis of 
phase one data.  
 
5. 2 Doctors in Management: at the hospital 
This section identifies the literature on doctors in management and its beginnings in 
the hospital setting. It identifies themes, findings and recommendations. 
 
5.2.1 Reluctance to Engage in Management  
The attempt to engage health professionals in managing, or with the management of, 
the NHS has been brought about through successive policies targeted at different 
professions within the NHS. Hospital doctors were targeted before GPs. Bolton, 
(2005) argued that when professions are perceived as difficult to manage the solution 
has been to create managers from the profession requiring managing. These 
professionals as managers may inform future efforts at engaging professionals with 
management within the same setting such as the NHS (Kitchener, 2000), and future 
reforms. Perhaps rather than having management done to them by professional 
managers the professionals in their primary domain, their first profession, will be 
better at doing it, perhaps better at doing it to their peers, and possibly more accepted 
by the peer group than a professional manager. Consequently those professionals in 
healthcare may be better managed as a whole if managed by the peer group. The 
implications for the NHS are a more resource effective, efficient and hence economic 
NHS.  
 
As health reforms were rolled out, some doctors took management roles. Early 
research in secondary care indicates that doctors did not take well to management 
(Hunter, 1992; Buchanan et al., 1997), some exhibited a reluctance to accepting 
management roles (Brazell, 1987), some even describing it not as a cure but as a 
„disease‟ (Dopson, 1994; 1996). Doctors have continued to dislike management; 
Witman et al. (2010) reported reluctance and Russell et al. (2010) negativity arising 
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from a perceived lack of respect of doctors in management roles. Gatrell and White 
(1996) thought “many doctors employed in the NHS regarded „management‟ as an 
alien process, which acts to the detriment of good health care”, (p.6) whilst others 
embraced the notion (Walker and Morgan, 1996).  
 
Fitzgerald (1994) recognised that not all doctors were averse to or reluctantly engaged 
in management and categorized reasons for adopting management roles in secondary 
care identifying three dimensions that drew doctors into management in secondary 
care: making assessments and judgments about the changes in health care; attraction 
of a part-time role rather than giving up primary profession; the challenge of 
management. The multiple factors of changing health care, attraction of multi –career 
and seeking a challenge suggest there may be political interest, a personal career 
choice and elimination of ennui involved and that these may have not been mutually 
exclusive. Certainly, the data analysis from phase one concurs that doctors going into 
a management role in primary care do so for multiple reasons and the activities and 
levels that they operate at once they are in that role may vary. The evidence from 
Chapter 4 in primary care is consistent with Fitzgerald‟s (1994) conclusion that not all 
doctors are reluctant to be involved in management. However, few studies have 
examined that aspect of doctors in management. 
 
5.2.2 Curing Reluctance with Education 
One of the early themes emerging from the literature is that educating doctors in 
business and management (Newman and Cowling, 1993) would increase the 
confidence of doctors who were involved in management and with managers. The 
suggestion that doctors need educating in management is incongruent with Griffith‟s 
assumption that doctors are natural and therefore appropriate managers. However, 
education by management development was prescribed in order to make doctors 
better managers (Newman and Cowling, 1993; 1994: Allen, 1995; Owen and Phillips, 
2000) regardless of the increasing evidence that most doctors just did not wish to be 
managers.  Mark (1994) concurred with the idea of management training for doctors 
even if at the very least it merely identified those doctors that did not want to be a 
doctor also involved in management alongside the primary professional career. 
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Prior to a study by Buchanan et al. (1997) most of the studies of doctors in 
management concentrated on getting doctors involved in management and resolved 
with a „deficit‟ model, linked to a deficient  skill set in management by doctors (Mark, 
1991). There are strong indications in the empirical literature that doctors were not 
keen on management and also lacked management skills. Perhaps education in 
management might encourage them into management and may increase the possibility 
of turning a specialist/professional into a generalist in the art of management. This 
seems to suggest that education would be the easy way to excite doctors about 
management, as if there was a fear of, or incapability, to execute management. 
Leopold et al., (1996) debated the role of general manager as opposed to a specialized 
professional – if professionals cannot be encourage into management then put a 
general manager in place. With that scenario, given that existing research reports on 
tension between doctors and managers then alongside power play it seems doctors 
may be forced into management roles when faced with a general manger being the 
alternative. 
 
5.2.3 Doing Management in Secondary Care: How? 
Of the few empirical studies of doctors in management there was frustration (Dopson, 
1996) that the debate at a conceptual level meant that there was little work “exploring 
the doctors‟ role in the management of health services and even less work has been 
done exploring the implications of recent moves to involve doctors more closely in 
the management process” (p.173). There was much about attempting to engage 
doctors in management in secondary care and why doctors did not but not a lot on 
what they did when they were in that role. Dopson (1996) recognized modelling 
doctors on general management roles for the management of secondary care was 
problematic arguing that researchers needed to look at career interest, “…unless more 
empirical work is done looking at the complexity of the issues surrounding doctors in 
management roles, then the debate is unlikely to get beyond definition mongering” 
(p.186). Career interest was also a consideration in other studies in secondary care 
(Mark, 1991; Gattrell and White, 1996). 
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Crucially the doctors in management literature shifted beyond the normative for 
doctors in management, from what it ought to be like to how it was being done in 
secondary care.  Buchanan et al. (1997) considered how doctors were engaging in the 
management process in secondary care and the evidence for how they fared in that 
role. The empirical findings of the study are summarised in Table 5.1 categorised as a 
good indicator of the issues that arise when doctors engage in management and are 
notable for continuing negativity when actually in the role. Though the elements in 
the table are consistent with Fitzgerald‟s (1994) evidence of being involved in 
assessment and judgment of healthcare and problem solving, challenge and 
enthusiasm are not apparent. 
 
The doctors in management literature in secondary care had shifted from reflections 
on policy, what that management ought to be like and how the rationale of the policy 
might be achieved through education to the start of how management was conducted. 
First and foremost it identifies the doctor in management as reluctant and resolution 
by education in general management. Therefore the approach to resolving the problem 
of getting doctors involved in management was focussed on the deficit model, 
perhaps in the absence of success in getting doctors to volunteer in secondary care.  
 
Evidence 
Tensions develop between professionally representing colleagues and managing 
colleagues. Tensions arise when those engaged in management override colleagues. 
Defensive engagement: doctors engage with no sense of purpose or ambition for 
management. 
Lack of clear definition of the role and lack of management training. 
Management as a necessary burden; a position to be handed on at available 
opportunities rather than sustaining the individual in management. 
Influence on the hospital management process was limited for hospital managers 
Satisfier elements: access to information; problem solving; contribution to service 
development 
Key elements of dissatisfaction: unrealistic targets; paperwork; time pressures 
Advice to others: Don‟t do it; understand the time pressure; have prior management  
training; delegate; get good support; establish voice on hospital board 
Table 5.1 Doctors Engaging in Management the Evidence from Secondary Care 
Source: Buchanan et al. (1997) 
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This in turn means there was a lack of individuals to study and, of those in 
management, they might not wish to appear to have the „disease‟, hence few studies 
of how they act in those management roles. It suggests that the gap in understanding 
getting doctors involved in management is because the focus is on general 
management principles applied to doctors rather than studying those who do it, what 
happens when they do it, how they do it and consideration of the implications of those 
who have engaged in management.  
 
5.2.4 Reluctant Manager to Roles for Hybrid Managers in Healthcare 
The next stage in the doctors in management of secondary care literature paid more 
attention to how the manager role developed for those committing to it. Power 
struggles in the NHS featured in this tranche of research. Before Griffiths (1994) 
managers - or „administrators‟ - were traditionally viewed as being responsible for 
„sorting things out‟ without impinging upon doctors‟ clinical freedom (Brazell, 1987). 
The promotion of management as a feature of the NHS threatened to establish a rival 
professional group with a different set of values and assumptions (Willcocks, 1998).  
If the doctors weren‟t taking to management then they would be managed by general 
managers as management was embedded as part of the future of the NHS. As Hunter 
(1994, p.1) commented, a „principal feature of the evolution of management in the 
National Health Service (NHS) has been the struggle between doctors and managers 
for control of the health policy agenda and its implications for resource allocation‟ 
and now the new enemy appeared to be managers. However, first analysis of phase 
one data does not show a predominance of: comments on power struggles with 
consultants and the secondary care sector as a significant reason for going 
fundholding; tensions between fund manager and lead partner. The absence of a 
doctor versus manager conflict in phase one analysis can to some extent be explained 
by the fact that fundholding was voluntary. Also lead partners appointed their fund 
managers from within or outside the practice and the person was not imposed on 
them.  
 
Studies were published in secondary care (Fitzgerald and Ferlie; 2000: Kitchener, 
2000) that examined the notion of the hybrid manager as doctors took on management 
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roles. At last, attention turned away from what management ought to look like for 
doctors and moved on from the education of professionals in management. Fitzgerald 
and Ferlie (2000) studied the impact of the internal market on power and autonomy 
issues and the creation of a hybrid manager but focused on negative issues for getting 
involved in management. Kitchener (2000) addressed the professional role change in 
secondary care and possible de-professionalisation of doctors from the main 
professional domain through involvement in management. 
 
Prima facie, a hybrid manager was a description for a role, a research approach 
criticised by Dopson (1996) because the emerging descriptive empirical data did not 
identify what that role might be like: what did these managers do and how did they do 
it? This suggests that research may still have been focussed on the policy agenda of 
the profession rather than the evidence of doctors in management. Nevertheless, this 
new professional group, described as hybrid managers continued to be reported as 
reluctant – there was a persistent aura of negativity about the doctors in management 
in a secondary care setting: 
Involvement is a way of preventing an erosion of discretion by 
professional managers. “Fear of being managed” by others is thus a 
key motivator. Doctors are not comfortable with the notion of 
decisions affecting patient care being taken by non-medically trained 
personnel. A hospital consultant may remain in the same job for 25 
years; a move into management post may offer additional challenge 
and variety, even if it is temporary. (Buchanan et al., 1997 p.133) 
 
Mark (1991) argued that whilst ever doctors in secondary care are questioning  what 
is in it for them in by getting involved in management, there is an error in an assumed 
„willingness‟ by those adopting the role. The doctors aren‟t choosing management at 
all but are getting involved for other reasons. Rather like Griffith‟s misconception of 
„natural managers‟ there is a problem. It seems there was not enough empirical 
evidence to explain the factors contributing to why doctors got involved in 
management. Even with the description of a hybrid manager the evidence of what 
they did and how was lacking. This gap in understanding may arise from pre-
conceived ideas and assumptions about the importance of the fight for autonomy and 
power within the NHS and all of the assumptions about not wanting to be in that 
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position. Similarly faced with a description of a hybrid manager role, Fitzgerald and 
Ferlie (2000) appear to assume that it is an active management role rather than 
passive, a title designate. If they are reluctant mangers, what do they actually do in the 
name of management?   
 
Marks (1991) is the only author to consider the lack of research and attach importance 
of the doctors‟ (in primary and secondary care) individual needs and choices in 
management. This was surprisingly early on in the doctors and management literature 
but has not been taken forward conceptually as part of the research agenda. One 
wonders what may have caused such an oversight and if it is a more important factor 
than the literature suggests.  Perhaps there is some indication of the reason for this 
oversight in the peripheral literature noted earlier in this chapter which focuses on 
boundaries, relationships and power rather than the individual pursuing their own 
career. Nevertheless, one way in which the literature does consider the individual is 
their personal role as a hybrid manager which may or not be shaped by the 
boundaries, relationships and power struggles surrounding a foray of clinician into 
management. Therefore this section has introduced the concept of the hybrid 
manager, the hybrid doctor in management. It is merely a concept. The next section 
expands the literature beyond describing the existence of a hybrid manager to 
examine how the role was enacted. 
 
5.2.5 Managers and Roles: Hybridisation, Polarisation and Accounting 
Doctors were described as hybrid managers in some of the literature because they did 
not relinquish the primary professional role.  Fitzgerald and Ferlie (2000) and 
Kitchener (2000) also reported a preference for part-time roles. Thus the evidence 
shows that those in management keep the original specialised role and that education 
in management to create an enthusiasm for a management role was the remedy to 
getting doctors into management roles.  Later, Jacobs (2005) found that management 
education in the curricula may not always be successful in creating hybrid managers, 
suggesting that the level of hybridisation depends on other actors that is, what people 
around the doctor-manager do. That supports Dopson‟s (1996) suggestion that 
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researchers need to confront different people and groups to understand more about 
doctors in management rather than only doctors themselves.  
 
Indeed the study by Jacobs (2005) takes the literature of doctors in management and 
hybrid roles to consider accounting as one of the mechanism that supports the role of 
doctor in management, as part of accountable management reforms. Accounting gave 
visibility in the organisation touched by NPM creating a domain of economic activity, 
capturing data for decision making. Thus after phase one of this study, researchers 
began to consider the role and involvement of accounting and linking it to 
management activity. The studies contend that accounting and its use by players in 
argument was an indicator of the profession getting involved in some job activity that 
involved management – a form of hybridisation. Kurunmaki (2004) had found that the 
intrusion of accounting practices in Finland in the context of the medical profession 
based in hospitals was successful. She examined the calculative practices of 
managerial accounting in the context of Finnish NPM reforms. Doctors accepted 
accounting practice as part of their hybrid role demonstrated by financial 
argumentation (i.e. a capability to talk about the „financials‟ to support decisions in 
management). Therefore how that role was executed as a manager involved use of 
accounting. However the study recognized that the growth in financial knowledge and 
capability by the hospital doctors was largely due to the lack of a formalised 
accounting profession to defend their domain in the hospital setting (unlike the UK 
where accountants were frequently in management roles) and the incorporation of 
financial knowledge into the curricula for the doctors. Therefore when Jacobs (2005) 
extended the Kurunmaki study to Germany, Italy and the UK it was found that 
accounting did not feature in playing out the hybrid manager role because others were 
taking care of the „financials‟. Rather, the medical managers (not doctors) absorbed 
the accounting and financial argumentation to such an extent that she used the term 
polarization to contrast to the term hybridization of medical and management roles. 
Doctors were not becoming hybrid managers because medical managers, similar to 
the post of fund manager in fundholding, were taking those roles. 
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In this study, phase one analysis in primary care shows accounting clearly not to be 
important per se for GPs in their new found management role: they were not taught 
about it; they did not have an interest in it. Accounting did not feature significantly as 
part of their entrance into the management role but it did facilitate some of their 
sustained management actions beyond going fundholding (See Table 4.8). In the 
context of Jacobs‟ work logically if accounting is fundamental to fundholding and its 
management then the findings in this study would indicate polarization because of the 
fundholding manager role, that is, accounting and its associated financial 
argumentation might be absorbed by the fund manager. This then raises the question 
of what was the GP as lead partner doing and how were they doing it? How were the 
lead partners engaging in management if they sustained the role beyond actually 
going fundholding? Was the significance of GPs in management in primary care also 
characterized by hybridization or polarization? 
 
The Jacobs (2005) study added to the debate by conceptualising the potential for 
different levels of hybridization because she defined hybridization as “deep and 
fundamental change such as the offspring of two animals, plants or species and a 
lasting change to the DNA of these species” (p. 135) and she presented the concept of 
polarization as an alternative being “the separation of a group into sub-elements on 
the basis of class, gender, or some other characteristics”. The former terminology is 
taken from the natural world and the second from social analysis. Polarization may be 
apparent as non-medical professionals are a feature of the NHS such as hospital 
administrators and managers in secondary care and practice managers in primary care 
who are conducting the management activity. Thus are we in fact looking at different 
levels of hybridization with the extreme being polarisation? Can the types of doctor as 
manager help us identify the real roles that doctors take on as managers and/or help 
the analysis? Can what doctors do and how they do it present different levels of  
hybridization? These emergent questions arise and support the case for re-analysis of 
the phase one data based on the post-phase one development of the literature of 
doctors in management in secondary care. 
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Ostergren (2009) did take Jacobs‟ (2005) classification forward and decided that 
Llewellyn‟s (2001) study of hospital doctors indicated hybridization rather than 
polarization. However although the earlier study, relative to Jacob‟s (2005) study, had 
the primary role of looking at the medical-management interface the results can also 
be argued here to suggest polarization and hence contradicts Ostergren (2009). The 
2001 study had sought to understand the aspirations and activities of doctors with 
management responsibility in the context of the „new‟ area of expertise of medical- 
management using the metaphor of a „two-way window‟. Although it recognized the 
notion/concept of a hybrid professional it also identified that, firstly,  when 
professionals held budgets but lacked expertise (to control information on which 
budgets are founded and to  interpret their messages) they were able to „devolve 
financial responsibility‟ without transferring financial control. Indeed it is contended 
here that Ostergren (2009) may be incorrect to assume that devolving responsibility 
means less potential for hybridization towards a management role. This is because 
Ostergren‟s (2009) argument focused on the proximity of accounting to the 
management role rather than accounting change. Perhaps hybridization should be 
construed as a feature based on what is done with the information that comes back 
from those that the data is delegated to. Indeed that change to the makeup of the 
doctors in management role could be hybridization as it depend on how doctors 
engage. It is not about what they do with the accounting itself but how it engages 
them in the end itself that accounting change creates. Accounting and budgets become 
a means to an end for the doctors in a management role and therefore a feature of 
levels of hybridisation. 
 
Llewellyn (2001) also identified that doctors may risk losing clinical visibility and 
respect and will therefore present the management tasks as supplementary thus 
avoiding crossing the divide into the domain of management. No studies have 
addressed, in any depth, what they do and how they do it through the lived experience 
to corroborate it or dismiss the representation of it being supplementary. Doctors may 
say one thing but do another. The presentation of management as supplementary may 
be a façade - a way for doctors who like management to hide their guilty secret of 
being involved and enjoying management. The way they engage may be presented as 
supplementary but it is important to investigate the way management is acted out by 
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clinicians once they have chosen to be involved in it. One wonders if the allocation of 
doctors to either position is unhelpful because too much attention is paid to the 
process by which accounting and/or management occurs, that is what is done, rather 
than how it is done. This suggest that studies should look at the human actions of the 
actors within a profession rather than the process, that is how they go about doing 
what they do,  rather than what they do. Tasks may be presented as supplementary but 
how do they engage? This is particularly important in a profession as professionals 
work within their organisation and often beyond the boundary, representing the 
practice, as in the lead partner role, and suggests that Marks (1991) concept of the 
individual needs and choices should be revisited in order to understand the doctor in 
management. Can that engagement in management be more than bureaucratic 
(Kitchener, 2000) and represent more than the concept of and option of a hybrid role? 
This section has introduced the debate of hybridization/ polarisation for doctors in 
management in secondary care and therefore suggests the need to consider the 
implications of phase one of the research for developing a better understanding of 
doctors in management and degree of engagement. 
 
5.2.6 Hybrid Managers: Volunteering for Management for Negative Reasons 
In secondary care the establishment of clinical directorates had both decentralised 
management and meant that clinicians can continue in their speciality while carrying 
out a management role (Fitzgerald, 1994) though they may be hostile to that role 
(Cavenagh, 2003).  Dopson and Fitzgerald (2006) continued to refer to clinicians in 
the acute sector and general practitioners as hybrid managers in a middle manager‟s 
role. Although such posts were found to be more attractive than full-time management 
responsibilities, as Buchanan et al. (1997) remark, it is striking how many of the 
reported reasons for taking on a management role tend to be negative or defensive, 
with little sense of doctors becoming engaged with a sense of purpose or ambition, 
unlike some of the GPs in the period of fundholding in this study who were evidently 
more enthusiastic.  For example, Dopson (1994) reports that the most frequently 
mentioned reason was the fear of being managed, that is, suffering as a consequence 
of being managed by another.  Most consultants „are reluctant managers‟ (Dopson, 
1996, p.185).  This negative view tended to be confirmed by Buchanan et al.‟s (1997) 
own fieldwork.  Of six clinical directors interviewed, five said that some form of 
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pressure, from colleagues or the chief executive, had persuaded them to serve.  They 
were not positions which had been sought with enthusiasm, and the clinicians wanted 
to return to their medical specialty. A desire to return suggest that once involved in 
management it did not become embedded in the professional life of the clinician and 
just as they had „chosen‟ to opt in they also chose to opt out. This suggests that the 
hybrid manager role, whatever it may look like, for many, may have been a transient 
or temporary role. The role may be transient in that it leads to a move into something 
else. Few studies  provide the opportunity to see the impact of the experience of being 
involved in management as a doctor on the longer term careers and activities of 
doctors and the subsequent choices they make through a second phase. Thus, the 
literature in this section suggests that reluctant hybrid managers breeds transient 
hybrid managers and the research does not address if it is regressive (away from 
management) or progressive (further into management). 
 
Thus the evidence from secondary care has been considered and the notion of a hybrid 
manager (Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000; Kitchener, 2000; Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2006) 
is explored and extended through Jacobs (2005) study. In secondary care: doctors 
dislike management; are reluctant to engage in management; view management as an 
alien process; may consider management as detrimental to good health care; are seen 
to be hybrid managers in a  narrow sense of the definition; are attributed to 
involvement in management by involvement in accounting and financial 
argumentation; doctors seek to delegate management; doctors seek to polarize 
management from doctoring; doctors who engage are satisfied by access to 
information, problem solving and ability to develop services; doctors do not choose to 
continue a career in management. 
 
5.3     Doctors in Management: in Primary Care 
5.3.1  A Different Starting Point 
Traditionally, GPs could choose a role in management within the scope of their 
profession through being a „senior partner‟ heading up a partnership. However, the 
designation of „senior partner‟ was usually titular, for example as witnessed in 
Practice A, D and F, arising from seniority and did not necessarily mean active 
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engagement in a management role. Practice managers were appointed for the 
management and administrative burden of running the practice. There were no 
management guidelines nor a prescription of what the fundholding practice should 
look like and therefore not only was there choice in whether to go and decisions about 
the role of lead partner but there was choice in how fundholding would be manifested 
in the management of the practice. Consequently GPs within a partnership could 
choose a lead partner role. 
The literature in Appendix 3 shows commonality between primary and secondary care 
in the widespread reluctance for GPs to be involved in management before 
(Greenfield and Nayak, 1996; Cowton and Drake, 1999) and during fundholding 
(Table 5.4). Few could predict how getting involved in the management in primary 
care would work and who would be involved as the capability to be fundholders was 
determined by administrative and IT capability (Newton et al., 1993). Further, 
Newton et al. (1993), found that in the process of fundholding the practice 
management structures did not change and decision making remained the domain of 
the doctors. Thus, early indications were that management of the business 
environment in primary care differs from the secondary care setting and management 
roles already existed. It seems that fundholding may not alter the status quo of 
managing a practice and doctors „doctoring‟ given existing management structures. In 
the context of hybridization and polarization (Jacobs, 2005) the management and 
administrative role could be polarized by the employment and work given to a 
practice manager. Despite fundholding involving choice in being lead partner there 
was still reluctance (Cowton and Drake, 1999a) just like secondary care. 
 
The fundholding period did not make much of an impact in the literature of doctors in 
management but it did at least start the consideration of doctors in management 
beyond secondary care (Newton et al., 1993, Greenfield and Nayak, 1996; Llewellyn 
and Grant, 1996; Cowton and Drake, 1999a; 1999b). Table 5.2 shows a short time 
period of fundholding studies within the overall literature. While the doctors in 
management literature itself begins in 1987 the first study in the GP context came in 
1993 based on fundholding, two years after the scheme began in 1991. The demise of 
the scheme came when approvals for fundholding ceased in 1997 and it ended in 
1999. 
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The Goldie and Sheffield (2001) study was based on the follow up to fundholding, GP 
commissioning, finding little managerial domain for GPs and continued reluctance 
with fundholders missing fundholding. The Morrison and Farrell (2003) study 
returned to NPM for its theoretical foundation with a broad perspective on schools, 
social workers and GPs therefore did not consider doctors in management roles 
specifically. Therefore, as concluded from the literature in Chapter 2 and the analysis 
in Chapter 4 there has been very little published empirical research in the context of 
GPs as doctors in management. Goldie and Sheffield (2001) demonstrated that the 
benefits of fundholding for GPs getting involved in management and commissioning 
did continue as new policies emerged. That study also stands out as one of the very 
few studies that did consider the future research implications of doctors in 
management initiatives as identified by Dopson (1996); GPs were desirous of 
collaboration arising from the initiatives but did not wish to manage their peers. 
 
Year Author 
1993 Newton et al.  
1994 Gattrell and White 
Greenfield and Nayak 
Llewellyn and Grant 
1999 Cowton and Drake 
2001 Goldie and Sheffield 
2003  Morrison and Farrell 
 
Table 5.2 Incidence of GPs in Primary Care as the Subject in the Doctors in 
Management literature 
 
Whilst one study returned to NPM  foundations (Morris and Farrell, 2003), and part of 
the sample included GPs, there continued to be much more on hospitals managers 
(e.g. Kurunmaki, 2004) and more in the context of other countries (e.g. Kirkpatrick et 
al. 2009) perhaps reflecting research following health reform trends across the globe 
that involve doctors in management. In the UK as the government, in coalition, is 
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more Conservative than Liberal Democrat and may well send signals and return to 
policies based on managerialisation parallel to other professions in the public sector 
(Warwicker, 1998). However, managerialisation is critiqued as unhelpful terminology 
as it is rarely defined with precision and “embraces a range of quite different changes” 
(Fitzgerald and Ferlie, 2000, p.717) but is used here in its widest sense as we begin to 
explore the involvement of GPs in management. 
 
5.3.2 Hybridization or Polarisation: A Gap in the Literature  
GPs are unlike doctors who engaged in management through clinical directorates for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, they have functioned as part of a partnership and 
effectively operated as a small business (Cowton and Drake, 2000). Secondly there 
are sub-groups within GP practices already to whom GPs have historically delegated 
tasks as indicated by Newton et al., (1993), delegation to fellow GPs and 
administrative personnel. Some GPs take on leadership of a certain aspect, as part of 
the functioning of a professional partnership, and also through managing the practice 
managers. Newton et al. (1993) studied three aspects of first wave fundholders: the 
process of becoming fundholders; changes in practice management; and organisation 
as a consequence of fundholding. They identified that structures did not change and 
decision making was by the „clinical partners‟ in line with continuation of traditional 
approaches. This early study of fundholding and how the roles were enacted 
concluded that practice managers were like managing directors and that the GPs, as 
clinicians,  regarded the practice merely as “shared premises, clerical and ancillary 
services – only as a convenience: a base on and from which they are free to practice 
their craft”, (p.73). That convenience is consistent with Harrison and Pollitt‟s (1994) 
notion of occupational control seeking congenial working conditions. Further, GPs 
were not involved in the mechanics of the scheme and there was little organisational 
disturbance hence little involvement in management. It seems polarization between 
doctor and manager role was embedded in the organisation of general practice.  
However, this conflicts with the evidence in this study of the emerging significance of 
the lead partner and therefore the manager role might become more important in the 
context of general practice. There is no exploration in the literature of GPs as hybrid 
managers unlike the literature in secondary care.  
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5.3.3 Contrasting the Experience of Doctors in Management: Primary Care 
versus Secondary Care 
The existing small scale studies in the context of primary care are compared to the 
findings of Buchanan et al. (1997) in Table 5.3. Newton et al. (1993) reported that 
lead partners who had assumed or been given the role saw little impact on their pre-
fundholding role. They retained day to day decision making hence clinical autonomy 
which implies a polarized hybrid manager. However, it recognized that role of 
monitoring of clinical activity had to be managed somehow but there was no evidence 
  
 Evidence from Buchanan et al. (1997): 
A study in secondary care 
Existing Primary Care Evidence: 
Summary from the literature Review 
Tensions develop between professionally 
representing colleagues and managing 
(overriding them). 
No evidence but lead GPs worried about 
it (Newton et al, 1993). Lead partner 
practice role did not differ to the pre-
fundholding role. 
Defensive engagement: no sense of 
purpose or ambition for management 
Common that it was not purposeful 
engagement  Ennew et al., (1998) and 
Newton et al., (1993) 
Lack of clear definition of the role and 
lack of management training 
Fundamental characteristic of the 
implementation of the scheme. 
Management as a necessary burden; a 
position to be handed on 
Disgruntled at management role e.g.  
Greenfield and Nayak (1996). Concept of 
the „next mountain‟ Glennerster et al., 
(1993). Some enthusiastic GPs later 
became more keen on the management 
role (Cowton and Drake, 1999a) 
Influence on the hospital management 
process was limited 
No evidence of driving the other partners 
decision making process either clinically 
or managerially. 
Satisfier elements: access to information; 
problem solving; contribution to service 
development 
No analysis or indicators. 
Dissatisfier elements: unrealistic targets; 
paperwork; time pressures 
No analysis or indicators. 
Advice to other: Don‟t do it; understand 
the time pressure; have prior management  
training; delegate; get good support; 
establish voice on hospital board 
No analysis or indicators. 
Table 5.3 Comparing Primary Care Evidence form the Literature to Secondary 
Care: early indicators of the impact of doctors involved in management 
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from Newton et al. (1993) that the lead partner worried about tensions developing 
between fellow professionals as management roles were acted out if they were acted 
out. Partners said they did not „drive‟ the other partners in their new found 
„management‟ role, “for many clinicians fundholding was an administrative change 
which no more impinged on their role as doctors than any other administrative 
change”, (Newton et al.,1993, p.72). Therefore the study findings imply that doctors 
did not enact a management role despite being in that position. 
 
Greenfield and Nayak (1996) reported disgruntled GPs who did not see the use of 
business and management methods as part of their professional role. The recurrent 
theme is that doctors were adopting a management role that was defensive and with 
lack of purpose, even delegated down to junior GPs (Glennerster et al., 1993). 
However, there is no sensation of what doctors in these roles did, what they delegated 
and how. The cumulative evidence so far is that with no clear definition of the lead 
partner role, or how fundholding in the practice might work that it could and did 
evolve as each practice and or lead partner saw fit therefore there were choices being 
made by lead partners about what to do and how to do it. 
 
Table 5.3 identifies the gaps in the evidence from primary care compared to 
secondary care using Buchanan et al. (1997) to frame the issues observed in 
secondary care. There are similarities in the top half of the table (highlighted in bold) 
but not in the bottom. The empirical evidence does not consider the challenges nor 
satisfiers and dissatisfiers in primary care although fundholding was an ideal 
opportunity to examine them. What is clear is that the emphasis on reluctance is 
mollified with „satisfiers‟ as the literature considers the actual role doctors take in 
management compared to broadly reported reluctance in other studies.  
 
Fitzgerald (1994, p.36) observed that the „stimulation and interest of a new challenge 
is a powerful motivator to doctors‟; or, as Dopson (1994, p.32) puts it, reporting on 
her own fieldwork, “about a quarter of the sample admitted they took up the role 
because they were bored”, consistent with Glennerster et al.'s (1993) „next mountain‟ 
for fundholders. Willcocks (1998) meanwhile identified some enthusiasts in  
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5.3.4 Primary Versus Secondary Care: Themes Reveal Gaps in the Literature 
Observation Profession 
„as a whole‟ 
Secondary Care Primary Care 
Perceived need for role for doctors 
as managers 
 Brazell (1987) 
Dopson (1994) 
Rundall et al., (2004) 
Newton et al (1993) 
Management should have high level 
of reality for their work i.e. 
assessment and judgment about 
healthcare 
 Brazell (1987) 
Fitzgerald (1994) 
 
Some doctors are motivated into 
management 
 Fitzgerald (1994) Llewellyn and Grant 
(1996) 
Cowton and Drake 
(1999a, 199b) 
Doctors as reluctant managers  Dopson (1996) 
Fitzgerald and Ferlie 
(2000) 
Doolin (2001) 
Witman et al (2010) 
Greenfield and 
Nayak (1996) 
Cowton and Drake 
(1999a, 199b) 
Goldie and  
Sheffield (2001) 
Morris and Farrell 
(2003) 
Individual development of doctors in 
management roles through career 
paths. Engagement in the 
management encouraged rather than 
prescribed. No average 
doctor/manager. 
Mark (1991) 
Gattrell and 
White (1996) 
Dopson (1996) 
 
Buchanan et al. (1997) 
Greenfield and 
Nayak (1996) 
Llewellyn and Grant 
(1996) 
Educating Doctors in Management is 
key 
Gattrell and 
White (1996) 
Owen and 
Phillips (2000) 
Clark and Armit 
(2008) 
Mark (1991; 1994) 
Hunter (1992) 
Newman and Cowling 
(1993) 
Allen (1995) 
 
Allen (1995) 
Llewellyn and Grant 
(1996 
Important to look at management in 
context of role and activity  
 Fitzgerald (1994)  
Management is preferred as a 
secondary /part-time role. Notion of 
hybrid manager role. 
 Fitzgerald (1994) 
Dopson (1994) 
Fitzgerald and Ferlie 
(2000) 
Kitchener (2000) 
Llewellyn (2001) 
Kurunmaki (2004) 
Ostergren (2009) 
 
Management is liked/desired for the 
challenge – stimulation and interest 
i.e. relative to primary role  
 Fitzgerald (1994) 
Walker and Morgan 
(1996) 
 
Doctors missed management when 
budgets were withdrawn 
  Goldie and Sheffield 
(2001) 
Clinicians that hold budgets who 
lack expertise devolve financial 
responsibility but retain financial 
control. 
 Llewellyn (2001) 
Jacobs (2005) 
Hannah et al (2005) 
Table 5.4 Profession, Secondary Care and Primary Care:  
Themes from the Literature 
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secondary care, often from the less „glamorous‟ areas of clinical practice, who 
positively wanted to do management.  Management seems like an alternative and 
therapy to a catalogue of symptoms indicating dissatisfaction and/or boredom.  Thus, 
while the medical profession as a whole may continue to question its role in 
management, „individual doctors from the profession may have differing needs and 
perspectives on what a management post will give them at a personal level‟ (Mark, 
1991, p.7).  
However, without guidance on what a management role may involve, being free from 
a preconceived notion of management then fundholding gave opportunity to observe 
what they choose to do and how to do it. However, one of the difficulties of this 
analysis of a small literature is that the methodology in these studies does not lend 
itself to extracting meaning of individual GPs in management. The focus on practice 
views rather than GP views was exposed in the initial analysis of phase one data and it 
appears again here as the individual in the management role is not addressed in any 
depth. 
Table 5.4 summarises key themes from the summary of literature (Appendix 3). It 
removes some of the peripheral literature to focus on emerging questions of 
enactment of the role. It demonstrates the gaps in the primary care setting which this 
study may address some evidence for based on a second analysis of phase one data in 
order to interpret relative to the evidence from secondary care in order to add to the 
literature on doctors in management. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The doctor in management literature follows trends in health policies and is strongest 
in secondary care with some studies in primary care because of fundholding. In both 
settings the doctor in management has a role that is relevant to making assessments 
and judgments about healthcare. Similarly, both sectors identify doctors as reluctant 
managers with some evidence that there are enthusiasts. There is little prescription for 
what a doctor/manager should do when they take up management roles. Studies 
propone the individual should be developed as a doctor in management alongside 
management in the curriculum. However, there are choices for the doctor in a 
management role as not all doctors will take, or see the role, as an opportunity. The 
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first part of the thesis has identified how doctors in primary care took up lead partner 
roles. There is a gap in the literature in primary care of how doctors enacted the role 
once they were in that position. Fundholding and the phase one data can contribute 
insights through an examination of the enacted management role; what did they do 
and how did they do it. This chapter has reviewed the doctor in management literature 
and will inform the secondary analysis of the data in order to identify how the 
management role is enacted, contributing to a gap in the literature in both secondary 
and primary care. 
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Chapter 6 
 
GPs in Management: What They Do and How They Do It 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how the lead partner enacted the management role to answer 
the fourth research question: what the lead partner did and how they did it, in order to 
inform our understanding of doctors in a management role.  The chapter returns to the 
phase one interviews and re-analyses the empirical evidence. The main aim is to 
interpret how the role was enacted in order to contribute to the doctors in management 
literature. This focus upon doctors in general practice being involved in management 
will complement the  findings on reasons why practices go fundholding, extends an 
understanding of the role of accounting in NPM initiatives, and investigates if doctors 
who choose management as guardians, reluctant innovators or opportunists, are active 
in that role or a lead partner in name only. The latter is important relative to  the 
literature in both primary and secondary care yet most studies of doctors in 
management have not investigated a role in management though have debated those 
taking, and why they do not take,  management roles - primarily so in the secondary 
care sector. Further, this study contributes to the literature by looking at doctors in 
management in primary care to consider the factors that contribute to levels of 
engagement, where policy has recently re-focused. 
 
The first section of the chapter will present a framework for the analysis of phase one 
data to identify what the doctors did and how they did it. The second section presents 
the analysis of the phase one interview data and considers hybridization/ polarisation 
extending the debate to primary care and the possibility of levels of hybridisation. The 
third section discusses the implications for doctors in management.  
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6.2 GPs in Management: From Taking a Role to Being Involved  
The study began with practices going fundholding but has found that GPs who took 
on the lead partner role were a more significant phenomenon as part of the process of 
the practice going fundholding and that the role of accounting as part of that 
development was not significant in itself. The development in the doctors in 
management literature has large gaps that do not present evidence of doctors in 
management in primary care. Volunteering for fundholding was a lead partner choice, 
conducted with varying levels of enthusiasm or not (Glynn et al., 1992; Llewellyn and 
Grant, 1996; Ennew et al., 1998, Cowton and Drake, 1999a; 1999b; 2000). There 
were indications in both primary and secondary care that a management role did not 
necessarily gain favour and doctors did not continue in management. Therefore there 
were further choices about the format and levels of the role –on the one hand it could 
be borne out as management role and manifest itself with the creation of a hybrid 
manager or not be enacted at all  – a polarisation of the primary and management role, 
often through a process of delegation. Fundholding is an excellent vehicle for 
exploring choice by doctors about getting involved in management because it was free 
from any policy prescriptions or constraints; it was neither compulsory for the 
practice nor the lead partner and the latter had no guidelines and requirements for 
management. Further, earlier analysis in the study found that the notions of power and 
autonomy were not that significant in taking a lead partner role – rather a multitude of 
factors beyond traditional notions of doctors in management. Now this study has 
contributed to why doctors in primary care get involved in management it can be 
taken to the next stage. Therefore research question four asks how did the lead partner 
enact the management role; what did they do and how did they do it – how did the  
doctor engage? 
 
6.2.1 What Did Lead Partners State their Role Was? 
The lead partners in phase one had been asked what was their role in fundholding and 
these are documented in Table 6.1. The length, detail and nature of the response were 
varied. There was a great deal of variety across the twelve practices about what the 
roles was involving deferral to the fund manager (LPB) and the practice as a 
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partnership, for example, LPA, LPI, LPL– so what were these lead partners actually 
doing in management?  
 
Lead 
Partner 
Class Direct question: What is your role? 
A 
 
 
Guardian “…what our activity was, ensuring contracts that look after patients and not take too many 
risks…extension of role of lead partner in city GP fundholding organisation”. 
B 
 
Reluctant 
Innovator 
Refers to fund manager … “keen to be fairly aggressive, the accountancy background, get 
the money right, get the contracts right…”  
D 
 
 
Guardian “As an advisor to the partnership on the financial and administrative aspects of fundholding, 
to some extent a policeman… I think as an entrepreneur to try and organize good deals.”  
E Opportunist “A motivator , an innovator and perpetrator”. 
 
F  Lead Partner Not Interviewed. 
H 
 
Opportunist “Several functions, first of all my legal responsibilities to manage the funds correctly, to 
ensure everything is running smoothly through the office…We have a very very skeleton 
view for that, very lean and mean and that‟s good. Then there is my other function which is 
to liaise with our fund manager who we share with other practices in town… I collate and 
put reports to the partners.” 
I 
 
Guardian “Two main areas, one area is the financial responsibility in checking budgets and ensuring 
that the plan for the budget is OK, that we can live with the budget and checking that it runs 
smooth at the end of the year. Then there is the area of trying to service development…think 
about service development…and plan how we might do that and feed it back to partners.” 
J Opportunist “Somebody to ensure that fundholding moves properly within the practice…we are a 
democratic practice, there‟s no autocracy in our practice at all, you try to set yourself up as a 
leader…any moves forward that we make within this practice have to be made by 
consensus.” 
L Opportunist Did not really answer the question: “Largely we set out a policy as to what role we could 
play in it. We decided as a team. All of us together that the aim should be not to profit out of 
it…aim should be to have influence on the services…better… and we will have more 
satisfaction as well.” 
M Reluctant 
innovator 
“… to be quite honest…I do allow my fund manager, contract manager to largely get on with 
things because I have every faith in him…what he will do is report to me”. 
N Opportunist “…to try to make a broad policy to handle the day to day running of the fund…about leading 
quite a lot of our fundholding, checking finance. It is a very big role, but at the end of the day 
you can tailor it…I can delegate a lot of things, this is what I do…to the contract manager.” 
O Reluctant 
innovator 
“I suppose really to keep the clinical and the money side meshed together” 
Table 6.1 Lead Partners‟ Views on their Role in Fundholding 
 
The challenge for the researcher is how to interpret and make sense of the interviews 
as historical data to illuminate the enactment of the management role. The legacy of 
                                                     
 Further analysis of the in depth response to the direct questions reveals the actual; 
complexity of this GPs‟ role 
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fundholding is seen as important but the researcher did not conduct participant 
observation as part of data collection which would be consistent with an 
ethnographical approach often used when looking at managerial jobs (Hale, 1986). If 
insights are to be obtained from the interviews a framework is needed to analyse the 
data - what did they do and how did they do it - but taking into consideration that the 
role taken is undefined. Stewart (1982) suggested that asking managers about their 
jobs directly can lead to answers that are perceived as right (by respondents) as 
opposed to the truth sought by the researcher. This is something to be considered in 
the responses in Table 6.1. Therefore Stewart (1982) presented a practical model for 
improving management performance through identifying what the jobs are in terms of 
tasks initiated, emphasised or neglected – essentially  „choices for the manager‟. The 
model, recognized as a leading conceptualization of the individual in a managerial job 
(Hales, 1986; Carroll and Gillen; 1987; Noordegraaf and Stewart; 2000; Tengblad; 
2006; Pilbeam and Jamieson; 2010) recognized flexibility, choice and personal ways 
arising from individuals being able to choose. Here it will be used to re-analyse the 
phase one interview data and organise it to help explain what the GPs did and how 
they did it, rather than for improving management performance. 
 
The technique proposed by Stewart (1992) is introduced here and adapted for the 
purpose of understanding the management role taken by GPs. It is relevant and 
reliable because Stewart (1992) devised a model for understanding managerial jobs 
and behaviour that accommodated the „variety‟ and „flexibility‟ which “explores both 
the flexibility in the job and the variations in the jobholder‟s behaviour”, (p.8).  It is a 
frame of reference in this new context, of GPs in management roles and is helpful in 
explaining and structuring the observations within the interviews to examine the 
notion from the doctors in management literature of the possibility of a hybrid 
manager role which has been explored in secondary care but not in primary care. 
Thus, the doctor becomes the unit of analysis rather than the general practice 
organisation itself.  
 
 
 
155 
 
6.3 Stewart Model: Understanding Managerial Jobs and Behaviour 
The original model aims to understand managerial jobs and behaviour: 
 It can be helpful in understanding the general nature of managerial 
jobs and the differences between them, and can be used to analyse a 
particular job and to consider how an individual does it…The 
framework has three categories demands, constraints and choices… 
Stewart (1982a, p.2) 
 
 
Category Definition Explanation Kinds 
Demands What anyone in 
the job has to do 
comprising such 
elements as 
having to do 
certain kinds of 
work and 
satisfying criteria. 
It is only what 
must be done (as 
opposed to 
chosen). 
What managers 
ought to do, 
because they are in 
the job description 
or because their 
boss thinks the 
tasks important. 
Demands are only 
what should be 
done. They are an 
inner core. 
1. Overall minimum criteria 
for performance 
 2. Doing certain kinds of 
work as determined by:  
personal involvement; who 
must be contacted and 
difficulty of work 
relationship; contacts‟ power 
to enforce their expectations; 
bureaucratic procedures that 
cannot be ignored or 
delegated; meetings that 
must be attended. 
Constraints Internal and 
external factors to 
the organization 
that limit what the 
jobholder can do. 
Represent an outer 
boundary. Limit a 
manager‟s choices. 
Resource limitations; legal 
and other trade; 
technological; physical 
location; organisational; 
attitudes of other people to 
changes in systems, 
procedures, conditions, good 
or services produced and 
work outside the unit. 
Choices Activities that the 
jobholder can do, 
but does not have 
to. Opportunities 
for a jobholder to 
do something 
different from a 
colleague. 
Opportunities for 
one jobholder to do 
work different from 
another and to do it 
in different ways. 
Choices are the in- 
between area 
between the inner 
core of demands 
and the outer 
boundary of 
constraints. 
1.In How the work is done 
2. In What work is done  
Adapted from Stewart (1982a) 
Table 6.2 A Model for Understanding Managerial Jobs and Behaviour 
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Table 6.2 summarises the three main elements of the model. For GPs there were no 
job descriptions or guidelines, it was a nomination to be pursued and acted on in any 
way they saw fit. There were no defined boundaries to the role of lead partner, but 
such „managers‟ enactment would be subject to internal and external constraints that 
may arise, in this context partly as a consequence of working in partnership, partly the 
relationship of a management role to a primary professional role.  Thus faced with 
such choices the GPs are likely to have tackled the „job‟ in a variety of ways which 
may or may not be influenced by how they came into the role, the reasons for the 
practice going fundholding and that role description: 
 
“There is not a great deal of training out there from a GP side of being a 
Lead Partner. I think you rely on picking bits out from inappropriate 
courses…learning on your feet.” (LPD) 
 
Stewart (1992) states that “one way of describing a job is the sum of all the 
behaviours that are possible in it”. Through a second analysis of the data the aim is to 
investigate and make sense of that „sum‟. The „sum‟ may be defined as the hybrid 
manager but the formula of that hybrid manager role has not been explored in this 
context of secondary care. The limitation is that with the sample size here, not all the 
components of the sum may be found but different components are expected to be 
discovered. 
 
6.3.1 Demands and Constraints 
Figure 6.1 shows how the demands constraints and choices are bounded: demands are 
core and the constraints bound the choices available to managers. There are many 
things that a manager ought to do but only certain things that must be done both the 
work to be done and having to satisfy criteria, criteria such as the functionality of the 
professional arrangement for doctors (the inner core).  In terms of work that has to be 
done, for the GP, this is interpreted as consultation time, home visits, paper work 
completion and partnership meetings – all of these things belonging to independent 
contractor status and role of patient advocate. Constraints on the other hand would be 
factors that limit what the jobholder can do and may be about resource limitation. The 
GP may have time constraints on the ability to get involved in other work (say as a 
specialist), technological constraints such as the restriction on purchase of in-house 
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equipment where cost is prohibitive and the constraint of other people‟s attitudes such 
as individual external work being seen as distracting form the unit‟s domain. 
 
The size of the bands (Figure 6.1) will depend on how large the demands are and the 
impact of constraints. The band and scope for choice depends on individual core as a 
professional and the constraints on that individual. The GP cannot escape from the 
core demand of being a GP but the notion of professionalism in a welfare 
organisation, subject to constraints, means he can make choices, for example to 
become a lead partner and/or to volunteer for committees. Those activities the GP 
chooses to do and hence to distinguish him/herself from colleagues such as becoming 
involved in management mean that for this study, the degree of involvement in 
management as a lead partner may vary.  
 
6.3.2 Choices 
Choices are central to the framework and make it useful to interpret the managerial 
work engaged in by lead partners; what work is done and how the work is done. The 
width of the central band in Figure 6.1 will be determined by the interplay of the inner 
core, constraints and choices made. The framework is used to incorporate the hybrid 
manager, what they do and how they do it. The adaption in its simple form can also 
incorporate the concept of polarisation:  
There are two basic options. One can either do the job as an engineer or 
as an administrator. [Production Engineer] Stewart (1982a, p.13) 
 
The parallel in the adaption is that the doctor may choose to do the job as a doctor or 
as a manager – at one pole the doctor at another the manager. It is choice that allows 
people to do their work differently from one another and those choices are bounded 
by the demands and constraints. It is expected that there will be variety with which 
GPs enact a management role. The Stewart model enables some consideration of 
choices available to the GPs by applying 1-6 below, to interpret and analyse 
observations of what they do and how they do it: 
 
1. Choice exists in managerial jobs: choice in what is done and how .There is 
choice of emphasis of tasks and degree and orientation of liaison, inside or 
outside, fostering co-operative relationships with people and organisations that 
are useful. 
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Figure 6.1 Demands, Constraints and Choices 
Source: Stewart (1982) 
 
2. Managers can choose boundary management, predicting disturbances and 
taking preventative action: planning - hence preventative maintenance such as 
network building; some become politicians, influencing those they need to. 
3. Choice of domain for one‟s unit: involving strategic thinking; choice of 
domain may also be relevant to career development such as moving on to 
more senior posts. Choice of domain can be limited by demands and 
constraints. There is the organisational domain (the unit) and the personal 
domain. 
4. Choice of domain outside one‟s unit: what is it important for the person to do 
– personal domain (see Figure 6.2). 
5. Choice about work sharing; upwards; downwards; sideways. 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEMANDS 
Being a GP – 
the Inner 
Core 
Constraints 
Choices 
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6. Choice about becoming an expert beyond the expert as a function of the job – 
in this case a GP. In the context of choices, expertise is about going beyond 
the functional arrangements of being a GP and linked to the personal domain. 
The development of expertise may arise from co-operation with others or it 
may be individualistic.  
 
6.3.3 Unit Domain 
The unit domain is a useful concept in this study and is determined to be the practice 
domain because whilst the unit of analysis may be the GP the forthcoming analysis 
does not, and it should not, ignore the context of the practice. Thus the choices in the 
Stewart (1982) model represent the many variables that GPs in a fundholding lead 
partner role are faced with at all three models levels: choices within a defined area; 
choices within boundary management; choices to change the area of work. At the 
broadest level there is the manager‟s choice to change the area of work and that might 
be at the level of either changing the unit‟s domain (e.g. developing the practice) or 
developing a personal domain (e.g. personal expertise) or both. The model describes 
changing the personal domain as having three distinct routes for development as 
shown diagrammatically in Figure 6.2. The choice of personal domain takes two 
forms: the involvement in the organisation beyond the GPs own unit; getting involved 
in activities outside the organisation. A GP may become an internal and/or external 
expert as a consequence of being the lead partner. 
 
The unit domain is about what work should be done within the unit, the activities of 
the unit in its operations. In the context of GPs the unit domain would be the 
traditional services they provide to patients as part of the practice partnership under 
the GP contract. By going fundholding that unit domain has an addition – fundholding 
but the work to be done has not been prescribed – hence choice squeezed in between 
demands and constraints. 
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Figure 6.2 Choices to change the area of work: Adapted from Stewart (1982) 
 
Fundholding becomes a choice for the unit domain and indeed fundholding work is 
what should be done once the choice to be fundholding has been made, but studies 
have not addressed how the GP did that and what they did. The choice for GPs in 
going fundholding was also about the changing the personal domain which emerged 
as important from chapter 4. Only once fundholding was decided upon could the lead 
partner role be created starting with a „blank canvas‟ which, it is argued here, may be 
informed by not only why the practice went fundholding but why the lead partner 
adopted that role. Thus, a lead GP is responsible as a member of the partnership to 
execute the task within the unit domain that they have agreed as per the GP contract 
and in addition by going fundholding. 
 
 
By actually agreeing to the lead partner role the GP has already taken “that wider 
involvement in the organisation beyond the requirements of one‟s own unit”, 
(Stewart, 1982, p.42). Further data analysis will reveal what and how the work is 
done, shared or not,  in order to interpret the level of hybridization, the width of the 
choices band in Figure 6.1, if any, and the development of personal domain. 
Therefore, one pervading demand from the primary role of the GP regardless of the 
GP role is the demands of the core values of GPs: commitment; integrity; 
confidentiality; caring; competence; responsibility; compassion; spirit of enquiry; 
advocacy, (BMA, 1995). This is commensurate with the concept of the hybrid 
manager, the „day job‟ being the profession of general practitioner and the second 
element being the management role.  
Personal 
Domain 
Become  
an Expert 
To share work. Especially  
with colleagues within  
organisation 
 
 
To take part in organisational 
And public activities outside  
organisation 
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6.3.4 Boundary Management 
Boundary management occurs when managers think “about how those outside their 
unit could affect its work and what they could do to avert such disturbances and 
constraints”(Stewart, 1982, p.25).  Stewart found that those active in boundary 
management often sought to predict disturbances and take preventative action. This is 
typical of the context of the reasons why GPs went into fundholding rather than being 
one of the reasons for going into management (Chapter 4) especially for the 
guardians. It is argued here that boundary management has in fact already been 
evidenced in the qualitative data. It is represented by the labels in Figure 4.2. If 
boundary management is about ensuring operations within ones unit are not disrupted 
(Stewart 1982) then the conceptualization of the GP as guardian is an illustration – 
they choose to be involved in management to protect the practice and patients from 
disturbance. However, this does not explain the characteristics of a reluctant innovator 
or opportunist and indeed it might be too narrow a view to assume that all guardians 
were really engaged in boundary management. Ironically, the suggestion that GPs are 
largely reluctant to be in a lead partner role suggest that other GPs (non-lead partners) 
are boundary managing their personal domain by letting an individual step into the 
role as categorized (guardian, opportunist or reluctant innovator). Already the 
guardians can be seen to be protecting the unit domain, preserving the traditions of the 
NHS and protecting their patients but how does the lead partner manage the new role: 
expand the traditional unit domain; create a new unit domain; to what degree does that 
impact on the lead partner‟s personal domain; does the lead partner become an 
expert? 
 
The Stewart model is used for further analysis of GPs as managers; its suitability lies 
in its flexibility to accommodate the data. This is reflected in the views of fund 
manager in Practice H: 
…practices are still individuals with a complex partnership agreement 
and relationships that goes through the whole practice and there is no one 
model of primary care management and there is no one model for 
managing fundholding primary care, it‟s what‟s best for you. (FMH) 
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Further the use of the flexible model is consistent with the contention from earlier 
conclusions within this study that taking one theoretical stance such as the 
entrepreneur framework is insufficient for the purpose of the study of GPs taking on 
management roles. In the context of this original study, it is useful to use the Stewart 
model to cope with this in order to enrich the previous analysis in Chapter 4 and 
contribute to the literature in Chapter 5 without too many assumptions in the tradition 
of an interpretive approach.  
 
 
6.3.5 Using the Model: Choices and Flexible Jobs  
This section on the model has describes it and is used to clarify the work done by a 
group of doctors in management (Carroll and Gillen, 1987). It is applied where the 
role of the lead partner is not defined and is proved useful because it can cope with 
choice and flexibility in the role carved out by the doctor.  
 
Hale (1986) following on from Stewart‟s work looked at what managers do rather 
than debated who they are, the time spent on work elements, who they interact with, 
what else they did and the themes and qualities. Hale (1986) used self-recorded 
diaries, critical incident reporting, essays and participant observation in a number of 
studies. Noordegraaf and Stewart (2000) reflected on individuals in managerial roles 
on a day to day basis seeking to develop categories, concepts and theories on the basis 
of empirical evidence but not such that “the approach is atheoretical: it is about social 
nature”. Both sets of work are based on day to day activity which in the case of this 
study cannot be captured retrospectively but a secondary analysis with the model as a 
framework will provide insights to fill the gap in the literature (see Table 5.4). It is not 
a study of managerial behaviour per se but of doctors who may be engaging in 
management. 
 
The value in this second analysis links to Hale (1986) who recognised that there is no 
such thing as the managerial job, and supported avoidance of pre-formed categories 
and variety of research instruments. Hale (1986) also described the interview method 
as covert, allowing more informal activities to be revealed. Thus interviews are 
consistent with the choices available to GPs and a way of perceiving and interpreting 
jobs in personal ways (Stewart, 1982; Tengblaad, 2006) and with different methods 
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(Hales, 1986). Pilbeam and Jamieson (2010) have used the Stewart model more 
recently in the educational setting examining the role of the Pro Vice Chancellor in 
universities as a manager.  
 
6.4 GPs in Management: Being Lead Partner 
The preceding sections have introduced the framework (Stewart, 1992) which will be 
used to analyse the data from the first phase of interviews to identify demands, 
constraints and choices pertaining to the adopted lead partner role. It provides 
structure which will enable identification, organisation and subsequent analysis of 
each lead partner case in order to make observations and inferences from the cases.  
The model (Table 6.3) is presented with themed headings for the analysis of each 
interview (see Appendix 4) and each lead partner has a vignette, a case study, in this 
chapter based on their own and the fund manager interview. Table 6.4 show the 
questions used to ask the data about demands, constraints and choices. This enabled a 
structured approach to the further analysis and  interpretation of the interview data.  
 
 
Demands Constraints  Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to 
the Practice 
External to 
the Practice 
How the 
work is 
done 
What work 
is done 
Table 6.3 Categorisation for secondary analysis of the interviews 
 
What aspects of the job are emphasized during the interviews? 
What tasks are selected? 
Which tasks are ignored or delegated? 
Is there evidence of boundary management i.e. evidence of 
disturbances and constraints from outside the unit being minimised? 
Does the lead partner develop personally and/or seek further 
expertise? 
Is work shared with colleagues? If so, who? Peer professional or 
administrative or „other‟? 
What other activities are engaged in as a result of adopting the lead 
partner role? Are these largely outside the practice and in the public 
domain? 
 
Table 6.4 Choices: key questions asked of the data 
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The interview data will be used to assess the emphasis of work by considering the 
evidence from GP and fund manager interviews. Rather than quantify levels of 
contribution to tasks numerically, each (lead partner and fund manager) can 
corroborate the relative levels of emphasis on the work done. Secondly, the interview 
data will be used to analyse what work is selected in order to consider the 
hybridization/ polarization mix as it is expected that lead partners will make different 
choices. This will identify how GPs in management engage along the dimension of 
hybridization and polarisation as choices mean “that some aspects of the job can be 
given considerable time and attention and others be ignored or delegated”, (Stewart, 
1982a, p. 16).  
 
The framework may reveal other choices and constraints as it recognizes the selection 
of work by individuals which includes maintenance or innovation. Crudely, GPs may 
maintain their first profession but choose management in order to innovate. The labels 
(Figure 4.2) enable a way of thinking and linking how the individuals selected their 
role and how that might link to how they take the management role forward. The 
literature also identifies the risk of engaging in management and for example, creating 
partnership tensions (Newton et al., 1993) or personal challenges when balancing 
between powerlessness and lack of respect (Ong, 1988; Russell et al., 2010).  
 
6.4.1 Proximity to fundholding task: Lead Partner Views 
The direct question of „what is your role‟ is summarised in Table 6.3 and it is worth 
noting that when asked directly there is evidence of GPs developing personal domain 
of expertise and engagement in management. For example LPH prepared reports for 
the other partners based on what he received from his fund manager and LPD 
described himself as the policeman and entrepreneur organizing good deals. On the 
other hand, LPM lets his team get on with it, suggesting little purposive role and at 
another extreme LPL refers to a team approach. The framework enables the direct 
responses to be classified according to the sub-categories from figure 6.2 summarised 
as „expert‟ and „work share‟ and „organisational activities‟ in Table 6.5.  
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Lead 
Partner 
Class Direct question: What is your role? Early indications: 
Development of 
Personal Domain  
A 
 
 
Guardian “…what our activity was, ensuring contracts that look after 
patients and not take too many risks…extension of role of 
lead partner in city GP fundholding organisation”  
Expert 
 
Public Activities 
D 
 
 
Guardian “As an advisor to the partnership on the financial and 
administrative aspects of fundholding, to some extent a 
policeman… I think as an entrepreneur to try and organize 
good deals.”  
Expert 
I 
 
Guardian “Two main areas, one area is the financial responsibility in 
checking budgets and ensuring that the plan for the budget is 
OK, that we can live with the budget and checking that it 
runs smooth at the end of the year. Then there is the area of 
trying to service development…think about service 
development…and plan how we might do that and feed it 
back to partners.” 
Expert 
E Opportunist “A motivator , an innovator and perpetrator”  
 
Expert 
F  Lead Partner Not Interviewed Not Applicable 
H 
 
Opportunist “Several functions, first of all my legal responsibilities to 
manage the funds correctly, to ensure everything is running 
smoothly through the office…We have a very very skeleton 
view for that, very lean and mean and that‟s good. Then there 
is my other function which is to liaise with our fund manager 
who we share with other practices in town… I collate and put 
reports to the partners.” 
Expert 
 
 
Work Share 
J Opportunist “Somebody to ensure that fundholding moves properly 
within the practice…we are a democratic practice, there‟s no 
autocracy in our practice at all, you try to set yourself up as a 
leader…any moves forward that we make within this practice 
have to be made by consensus.” 
Work Share 
L Opportunist Did not really answer the question: “Largely we set out a 
policy as to what role we could play in it. We decided as a 
team. All of us together that the aim should be not to profit 
out of it…aim should be to have influence on the 
services…better… and we will have more satisfaction as 
well.” 
Work Share 
N Opportunist “…to try to make a broad policy to handle the day to day 
running of the fund…about leading quite a lot of our 
fundholding, checking finance. It is a very big role, but at the 
end of the day you can tailor it…I can delegate a lot of 
things, this is what I do…to the contract manager.” 
Expert 
 
Work Share 
B 
 
Reluctant 
Innovator 
Refers to fund manager … “keen to be fairly aggressive, the 
accountancy background, get the money right, get the 
contracts right…”  
Work Share 
M Reluctant 
innovator 
“… to be quite honest…I do allow my fund manager, 
contract manager to largely get on with things because I have 
every faith in him…what he will do is report to me”. 
Work Share 
O Reluctant 
innovator 
“I suppose really to keep the clinical and the money side 
meshed together” 
Expert 
Table 6.5 Personal View on Role and Personal Domain: A cursory allocation 
 
                                                     
 Further analysis of the in depth response to the direct questions reveals the actual; 
complexity of this GPs‟ role 
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Some of the GPs appeared closer to fundholding through the activities they described 
by referring to tasks such as contracting (LPA)  and service development (LPI and LPL) 
which can be deemed as developing an expert role in fundholding activities. Some 
GPs referred to liaising with the fund and contracts managers (LPH and LPN) 
suggesting they slightly more removed from the tasks associated with fund managing 
and willing to share work, especially with colleagues within the practice. At one 
extreme some GPs implied or categorically stated that they just left it all to fund 
and/or contract managers (LPB and LPM) which arguably is neither work share nor 
expertise development. Such partners were insulating themselves against the role 
becoming any part of their personal domain, suggesting a lead partner role as titular 
only and could not even be described as polarisation. 
 
The remaining GPs responded in a much more self-centered way, bordering on 
narcissistic in two cases (LPD and LPE). However LPD did refer to making good deals 
and therefore appear close to fundholding and developing expertise.  LPE said nothing 
more than the succinct comment in Table 6.3. However the vocabulary of LPE does 
suggest some closeness to the tasks associated with managing the fund and similarly 
so for LPJ and LPO. In that context the dimension of proximity can be mapped (Figure 
6.3). Figure 6.3 attempts to present GPs view on the lead partner role and articulate 
their proximity to fundholding activities based on what they said their role was. 
 
 
A    I L O D                         N  H    E J      M B Lead 
Partner 
G G O R G          O  O    O O      R R Type 
Close          Remote 
Key: G= Guardian, O= Opportunist, R= Reluctant Innovator 
Figure 6.3 GPs‟ view on the lead partner role to fundholding activity: 
Preliminary articulation of proximity of lead partner role 
to fundholding activities. 
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There is variety in the lead partners‟ subjective account of how they viewed the role. 
The closeness of the guardian hinges upon key words such as „ensuring‟, „organising‟, 
and „financial responsibility‟. This contrasts to the remoteness of the reluctant 
innovator letting other get on with „things‟ and deferring to the fund manager. Three 
generalisation can be made: some reluctant innovators did not report an active role in 
fundholding; some opportunist reported shared work and did so more than some of the 
opportunist who considered they were leading but were not very close to the 
fundholding activity (e.g. LPJ); all guardians reported some feature that put them 
close to fundholding management activities such as contracting and in-house service 
development. These guardians were reporting some form of development as an 
expert. Similarly so, one of the reluctant innovators and one of the opportunists also 
reported a role that exhibited some form of expertise. Thus, guardians kept close to 
fundholding activities whilst most of the reluctant innovators did not. Opportunists 
were half way between reluctant innovators and guardians perhaps because they were 
also concerned with self – the personal domain but they also reported some element of 
work share in their own description of their role. Thus there is some indication of a 
continued role in the management once fundholding went live. Thus from a direct 
question these are the inferences from the data: 
 
1. Guardian lead partners (enthusiastic GPs who lead a practice going 
fundholding for negative reasons) perceive their role in fundholding as an expert 
which includes various activities: contracting for patient benefit; developing 
services; not taking too many risk; advisor to the partnership; taking on board 
financial responsibility. 
 
2. Opportunist lead partners (enthusiastic GPs who lead a practice going 
fundholding for positive reasons) perceive their role in fundholding as: a 
motivator; an innovator; an overseer; a liaison point between the fund manager 
and partners; team working and work share; broad policy maker; delegator to the 
fund management team. 
 
3. Reluctant innovators (unenthusiastic GPs who lead a practice going 
fundholding for negative reasons) perceive their role in fundholding as „hands off‟ 
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they are remote from the lead partner role. The title of lead partner is a misnomer 
as they describe their role as taking work share to the extreme with a high degree 
of delegation. 
 
6.4.2 Doctors in Management: Case Studies 
The section considers the lead partners enacting a management role in more depth: 
what did they do and how did they do it using the interviews covertly (Hale, 1986) 
and making sense of them with the framework. The individual lead partner cases are 
based on the themes emerging from the analysis (Appendix 4) and present the new 
themes from the data for the first time. 
 
6.4.2.1. Lead Partner A: Guardian 
 
LPA was a guardian and therefore enthusiastic in order to protect the practice. He was 
active in strategy, contracting and performance management of contracts on a 
monthly basis (see Table 4.8). He admitted his continued dominance in his 
participation in fundholding which suggested few peer internal constraints through the 
attitudes of other partners, or none that bothered him enough to restrain his lead 
partner activities: 
…had done a lot of ground work and was very interested in it, and put 
pressure on the others for that [chosen] partner to be allowed to continue 
as lead partner. (FMA) 
 However there was some evidence of the demands of the real job time constraints as 
a result of taking on the role of lead partner due to „doctoring‟ activities: 
…I need a day and half with fund manager every week. I get half a day 
uninterrupted.” (LPA) 
The lead partner was driven by enthusiasm for the scheme and was both inward and 
outward looking of the organisation. This GP did not work share with fellow partners 
but did so with non-partners, that is the fund manager. There is evidence of 
developing a personal domain outside the unit domain. He became involved in the 
public participation in fundholding groups, taking part in activities outside the 
organisation hence became an expert. In terms of how the work was done, the fund 
manager adopted a data collection role and the lead partner used the information in 
negotiations thus there is a hierarchical structure; information passes up and is used at 
a higher level. This is indicative of work share in the management role embedded in 
169 
 
the practice sharing the management role with the sub-ordinate fund manager but not 
with fellow GPs. 
 
The lead partner recognized that he was a manager as lead partner but not that he has 
been „trained‟ to that role:  
To be honest that [to go on a management course] would do me an 
enormous amount of good…to go and learn where all the holes are. Yes, 
to learn what my weaknesses are, what my strengths are, how to rein in 
my strengths and not to dominate. (LPA) 
The Lead Partner enjoyed that role, despite the extra work it has created: 
What happened since we went fundholding is now I work harder and 
harder and harder and I am tired and I get resentful of the fact that I work 
so hard I spend a lot of my time thinking about fundholding…I just get on 
with it…I went on a few courses on negotiation skills… but there were 
things I set up myself… we get nothing for sitting on health authority 
committees and stuff like that, you do it because you are interested. (LPA) 
He enjoys reading and thinking about what the practice should be doing and the role 
seemed to have given some creative licence enabling him to become an expert in that 
area. He admits to „spending a lot of time thinking about fundholding‟ but constrained 
by the lack of detailed activity in management information which he could use to 
predict trends and costs over time. Thus, at this point in management he is constrained 
by technology and frustrated by the computer package when compared to what he can 
do with Microsoft packages. Further, he was frustrated by the financial constraints of 
the fundholding management allowance, which restricted the type of fund manager he 
would have ideally appointed in order to share the work. This lead partner operates as 
part of the fundholding team but delegates the task of data and collection and 
information gathering to the fund manager. He exhibits the role of decision maker and 
external negotiator. He suggest  that he spends most of his time on strategy and 
individual patient problems indicating BMA core values are still strong in his hybrid 
manager role and consistent with the role of guardian. In terms of demands, this lead 
partner chose to allocate specific time to fundholding management as indicated by the 
earlier remark on the reality of desiring one and a half days and getting only half. 
The earlier fundholding budgets allocations had some slack and were an incentive for 
partners to encourage their practices to go fundholding:  
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…the big screwdriver…now we do not have much room to manoeuvre… 
you need that amount of room just to be able to sit across the table and 
actually negotiate with somebody…. (LPA) 
The incentive of budgets‟ and lack of prescriptive protocols seemed to spell „freedom‟ 
as articulated by LPA
 
on his thoughts of if they had not been accepted after his hard 
work on preparation for fundholding: 
…[if] this doesn‟t get through, I will go back to what I used to do 
before…If somebody said would you like to do general practice again I 
would say no I don‟t like it. It‟s not fair. We are meant to set all these 
targets in terms of helping people, initiating change in people‟s lives 
today to make them healthy and to keep them healthy…and I have not lost 
any of the wanting to do that sort of thing.(LPA) 
 
LPA had moaned in the first instance about the amount of time he spends and yet it is 
clear that he has been sitting on external committees which develops his personal 
domain. Stewart (1982) classifies networking as a common method of boundary 
management indeed LPA commented that through involvement on committees he is 
able to obtain advice. Thus, this guardian continues to protect the practice partnership 
unit domain. 
 
6.4.2.2 Lead Partner B: Reluctant Innovator 
LPB was a reluctant innovator: 
I had absolutely no desire to be involved in the commissioning of care and 
the negotiating of contracts and talking to consultants…It just became 
impossible for us to do any development work and to pursue any of our 
interests in health without doing it…It wasn‟t a financial decision. Both of 
us reluctantly took it on – me particularly…I found myself doing it and 
now we are so deep in to it … it‟s going to be difficult to pass it on, so 
we[LP] are lumbered with it, to be blunt (LPB). 
Although „lumbered with it‟, he was not active in day to day activities and interacted 
with the data on a monthly basis (see Table 4.8). 
 
Management teams were in place, each headed by a partner. The lead partner had 
worked jointly with another partner before (referred to „screwed down management 
systems,” LPB) and the Practice Manager on technical development in the practice 
and the two partners decided to take on the lead partner role together. Thus the 
171 
 
personal domain of the partner was already developed in expertise in some 
management role and given the small management teams headed by partners there 
was evidence of work share with partners. The existing practice manager took on 
fundholding: 
We already had two partners in place doing technical management of the 
practice with the manager… you can‟t separate practice management 
from fundholding…each affect the other. There was no question of 
needing to get anybody else. (LPB). 
Essentially the work was done by the practice manager, a case of “employing people 
to do the donkey work to administer it” (LPB). In terms of work done the lead partner 
is merely tempering the aggressive business and finance minded practice manager – 
overseeing rather than being operational, “to temper some of that, and also bring it 
back down to the level of the patients”. Thus the lead partner used the demands of the 
primary role of being a GP as a constraint on the fund manager who was effectively 
leading the show. Some practices in this study had employed fund managers from a 
non-NHS background to delegate some of the fundholding management to, for 
example, Practice A, H, J. However, in Practice B they were somewhat pioneering in 
that their practice manager who also became fund manager was already strongly 
private sector. He became the link between management of fundholding and keeping 
the patient at the heart of the „business‟ delivered through a bureaucratic meeting 
structure. Though reluctant, over time the partners found fundholding to be a good 
tool but the Lead Partner was forthright about his role in management: 
I am more concerned with the strategy, rather than the mechanics, the 
management rather than the administration… I mean I hate the thought of 
being involved even more with responsibility for accountancy, if you like, 
and management of the practice. (LPB).  
 
LPB had his personal domain clear in his own mind on reflecting on what he spent 
most of his time on: 
 It‟s really about policy decisions, about general trends, like are we going 
to move into the private sector? (LPB). 
 
In summary, not only was the unit of the practice partnership well developed but also 
the personal domain of the GP who took the role of lead partner. Boundary 
management, intentional or not was key. The focus for this lead partner was the 
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personal domain of being a GP and not the professional personal domain development 
which would have been demonstrated by activity external to the practice. 
 
6.4.2.3 Lead Partner D: Guardian 
LPD is classified in an „ambivalent‟ partnership. He was one of the GPs that had little 
involvement in the running of fundholding according to the analysis in Table 4.8 
(shaded area) for frequency of interaction with data. Basically, he had set the practice 
fundholding and that was that: 
…I think as an entrepreneur to try and organize good deals for the 
practice…to try to generate some fund savings.  Certainly to bring in 
ideas. (LPD) 
Two partners had volunteered for the lead partner role as the scheme began, including 
himself as the new partner when he joined in the preparatory year of the scheme.  He 
refers neither to internal or external constraints nor any reluctance on his part in 
taking the role. He does not appear to network beyond the practice and seems to „fly 
solo‟ in fundholding. He briefly commented on the constraint of the lack of training 
available to the role, that reflects the undefined nature of it, and the lack of accurate 
data. He sees himself, as least in part, as an „entrepreneur‟ seeking good services at a 
good price but divorces himself from concerns with the data processing and concerns 
himself with negotiation and planning. A new member of practice staff was appointed 
to the computer related type work as computerisation was one of the reasons to join 
the fundholding scheme and the appointment became fund manager. The day to day 
administration is away from the lead partner role as evidenced by the compliance role 
of the lead partner, almost auditing and review of the work that is done: 
…important that you look at what you‟re doing and analyse it and be 
willing to change… trying to observe broad guidelines that we put down 
on referral patterns and prescribing.  (LPD) 
 
In terms of personal development and seeking additional expertise, not only was 
participation in the computing of the scheme ruled out, he was very clear about what 
aspects of fundholding were not for him, with reference to two other aspect of the 
scheme and his involvement: 
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Some lead partners really just sign invoices I think and not much more 
than that. Other lead partners do do the accounting side. I can‟t see much 
point in being a partner in a practice and doing the accounts really. And I 
think the role I have here is about right but yes, I have not found a course 
that has been a reflection of the type of job I do.” (LPD) 
The partner implies that he does not get involved with the scheme within the practice. 
Thus he does not work share with either the partners or the fund manager and does not 
purport to seek expertise in fundholding but does like the outward facing deal making 
activities. Thus public activities may be limited to co-operation and deal making, which 
is contracting. 
 
6.4.2.4 Lead Partner E: Opportunist 
Practice E has a lead partner who is an opportunist. From the start of first wave 
fundholding he led with enormous enthusiasm and flair. He was active in contracting 
and performance management on an annual basis (see Table 4.8).  In his own words 
„motivator, an innovator and perpetrator‟ seeking relief from the boredom of general 
practice. This lead partner refers to the demands of the role: 
…all the extra paper work and for the first few years instead of getting 
less, it got more and we got bogged down in preparing business plans 
which were never read.. I think somebody actually put „we are going to 
introduce Popeye and Olive Oil in as counsellors‟… a complete waste of 
time and they were there to conform to some mythical civil servants idea 
how this should be run. (LPE) 
 
He did not work share with fellow partners and was the fundholding expert. Further, 
there were possibilities for internal constraints to the way that the work might have 
been done as the other partners wanted to leave the scheme: 
…because they don‟t like x spending time at meetings and away from the 
practice. They want him to see patients and not go away from the 
surgery.” (FME) 
The lead partner leaves the management of the fund to the fund manager, there is 
no evidence of being hands on which is summarized by the fund manager: 
Oh actually that‟s not true – there‟s one thing he asks for on a regular 
basis and that‟s „how many savings have we got left? ...I‟m affectionately 
known as the boss… (FME) 
And also by the lead partner himself: 
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I don‟t need regular check-ups because I have a reliable team and I have 
to rely on them so if you like the 4Ds apply –decide something‟s got to be 
done; do it yourself; delegate it and if you can‟t do any – dump it. (LPE) 
 
For this lead partner the role is a means to an end. Therefore the evidence from the 
interviews suggest that  he is interested in outputs rather than the processes of 
fundholding and at first it seem there is no interest in the means of  achieving the 
outputs. However, that would be the wrong conclusion as he did negotiate and 
contract with providers. There was also membership of the city fundholders group, 
being on the executive committee with some aim of influencing policy within the 
region and like LPA the personal domain by getting involved in activities outside the 
organisation. Therefore there is an element of boundary management. 
 
6.4.2.5 Lead Partner F: Reluctant Innovator 
In Practice F the lead partner was not keen to be interviewed; in fact on approaching 
this practice the fund manager suggested that his GPs were reluctant fundholders. He 
was not active in day to day activities and interacted with data provided by the fund 
manager on an annual basis only (see Table 4.8). The partners were not interested in 
fundholding and did not have the enthusiasm. Nevertheless, using the fund manager 
interview as proxy there is evidence of how the work is done and what work is done 
by the lead partner.  
 
The role was shared out, between partners as explored in Chapter 4. No one Lead 
Partner took a dominant role and could if they had wished to. At first, meetings were 
convened by the Fund Manager at regular intervals, but these petered out to quarterly 
events. The Fund Manager was left to a dominant role with over 30 years NHS 
experience and seemed very much left to his own devices. When asked what the Lead 
Partner did with the information the evidence suggests that one of the Lead Partners 
took a role in negotiation with parties external to the practice and that was far as he 
took the role: 
Hopefully he absorbs the blessed stuff and remembers it! But basically he 
will save that for when is in a meeting with providers and when there is 
any negotiation with providers, and for discussing matters with other 
members of the partnership who are obviously not lead partners. (FMF) 
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And on fundholding itself: 
I take a broad view of the whole lot… I had the umbrella view, it wasn‟t a 
problem it was just like another segment added on. (FMF) 
 
6.4.2.6 Lead Partner H: Opportunist 
The Lead Partner joined the practice just before the practice decided to go 
fundholding, acting as understudy to the senior partner in preparation for the role. He 
did not take an active role in day to day activities and interacted with data provided by 
the fund manager on a monthly basis (see Table 4.8). He may have taken the job with 
a view that he would be getting involved in management and operate beyond the 
medical in a practice that had a „modern structure of practice management‟ (FMH). He 
had strong views about the larger picture of management in the NHS, an apparent 
factor in his adoption of the lead partner role. He was quite clear on what his role was 
(see table 6.2). These circumstances infer that work share was not really part of his 
lead partner role. Prior to the incumbent lead partner taking on the role the then 
practice manager took a dominant role in fundholding but was relieved of that duty as 
things became more complex. The lead partner reflected on his naivety in what he 
thought his involvement would be like: 
 
…now seems like it would just be a tea party. It would be beautiful to go 
back in some ways, some simple ways, some innocent ways… (LPH) 
 
In terms of how the work was done, this lead partner is hands on and this is 
demonstrated by what was done and leadership from the „front‟ and across the 
practice boundary, including networking with other fundholders: 
 
…put it all together for reports to the partners meeting where I have to 
sadly, more often than not, just pull them up on their advent ways, tell 
them how badly we‟re doing…checking everything is going along 
smoothly…Reading various documents that come my way, binning quite  a 
few of them and preparing my own reports. I‟m a great believer in one 
sheet management. (LPH) 
 
It seems that there were some internal constraints placed on this partner which he 
resolved in his managerial role, however at the later interview with the fund manager 
that person recognised that „there was still some strain within the practice‟: 
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There was  a bit of  a problem a little while ago perhaps, where it was me 
versus the partner, but that has been resolved now after a couple of 
vibrant partners meetings where I put to them the problem which the 
partnership has and we, as a partnership, are going to solve it.” (LPH) 
 
For practice H an external constraint of having one key major provider who the 
practice contracted with, impacted on the execution of the managerial role which 
impacted on the management of fundholding by the particular health authority. 
Similar practices in the locality were also contracting with one main provider and the 
lead partner „saw advantages of several practices being linked together and being able 
to share experiences…increasing power when dealing with providers…rather than 
risk being bowled over by them‟.  This influenced how the work was done by the lead 
partner in that he appointed a fund manager who was shared amongst six practices. 
The lack of dedicated fund manager may also mean that more work came to the lead 
partner and thus more work share in the problem solving across the other GPs in the 
practice.  
 
How the lead partner conducted his role in management is indicated by what work 
was delegated to the fund manager and the nature of the appointment, taking a recruit 
from a purchasing background to align with the need of „monitoring performance of 
contracts‟. For this lead partner the work to be done involved control by monitoring 
activity on contracts based on contract matrices produced by the fund manager: 
 
The problem we have with the computers, they are accountancy tools, and 
they‟re not management tools, so they give final month closure but they 
assume activity is the same 12 months of the year. (LPH) 
 
Further, whilst this lead partner was fully conversant with fundholding and arguably 
uses it to assert power and authority within the practice and externally with providers, 
he distinguishes between contracting and record keeping as an administrator „does all 
the compilations and reports and deals with the auditors‟. There is a clear internal role 
of the administrator within the boundary of the practices and an obvious out of the 
practice role for the fund manager concentrating on the contracting. All of this was 
under the watchful eye of the lead partner.  
 
The lead partner also refers to core values and the demands since as far as he is 
concerned, a „GP sitting in his consulting chair with a patient, the fact that we are 
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fundholders should not affect his clinical decision‟. Therefore similar to practice A, 
there appears to be a hybrid domain developing as well as a hybrid manager: 
 
I will talk to you now but I know that in an hours time I‟m seeing patients 
again…I‟ll see Alice with a severe osteoarthritis. I have that. I‟m always 
drawn back to the thing at the end of the day. (LPH) 
 
Core values also emerge in the way the lead partner chooses to manage with a 
practice ethical principle that the person in charge of fundholding cannot be involved 
in other practice finance, „demarcation very clearly because that is good management 
practice‟. The fundholding domain developed as the lead partner‟s personal domain. 
 
The lead partner engaged in other activities including being secretary of the city‟s 
fundholders group. The lead partner and fund manager both concluded on 
management in the practice and how it was enacted: 
 
…become more streamline, more efficient and we‟re getting better at. I 
mean I‟m getting better at saying not to useless meetings, being much 
more direct…what‟s that thing about you get data, then you get 
knowledge then you get wisdom... the Health Authority does not have the 
knowledge…they‟re not clinicians, they do not know what is going on in 
the front line, therefore they need our experience. I think there has always 
been a need for a partner to be involved in some form of commissioning 
activity. (LPH) 
 
 
…they were the first fundholders that I worked with that started to 
prioritize or ration elective care, tinker with it to stay in budget and that‟s 
a managerial, a practice principle from GPs (FMH) 
 
6.4.2.7 Lead Partner I: Guardian 
The lead partner in Practice I was a guardian. He was active in contracting and 
performance management interacting with the data on a monthly and quarterly basis 
(see Table 4.8). With an interest in the business side of general practice, he adopted 
the role in the absence of others wishing to be involved since it was viewed as a 
„business venture‟. Once operational, under the original non-NHS background general 
practice manager, fundholding was executed as much as it could be as separate from 
the general practice domain.  
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…it was felt we could just run fundholding in the background with very little 
change in the clinical experience [initially]…prior general manager from 
non-medical background…great difficulty adapting to NHS culture… (LPI) 
 
with as little disruption to the normal running of the practice as possible, 
primarily because the GPs that were anti-fundholding didn‟t want to see it 
making a difference (FMI) 
However: 
...cannot be done despite initial enthusiasm to do so…It very quickly 
became thought of as a central theme of the practice, we were a 
fundholding practice and this is what the practice was about (LPI) 
 
It seems early resistance to fundholding becoming an important element of the 
practice domain was futile. Indeed, certain work was deemed to be necessary by the 
lead partner; financial responsibility and service development. The role of financial 
responsibility was as an independent individual, acting as lead partner, within 
fundholding. There was shared communication between the fundholding domain and 
the general domain in the enactment of service development by taking matters to 
partners and taking matters they raised into account, an element of formal planning. 
Thus non-lead partner work share was in the form of consultation, more overtly than 
LPH. 
 
The lead partner had chosen what work to do. He settled into that work alongside the 
fund manager who had been appointed by the non-NHS general manager (who later 
left as the role did not work out, attributed partly to the non-NHS background). 
I think accountants are the worst people to actually run a fund to be 
honest… tried to run everything like a business … NHS is about people, 
it‟s not about business or finance… led to him leaving in end…, (FMI).  
 
Therein the Fund manager grew into his role and adopted “fuller aspects of fund 
managing i.e. negotiations and control”.  
[I am] the odd job man. Basically I do everything to do with any kind of 
finance…IT, maintenance, commissioning, all the lot (FMI) 
 
With regular half day meetings between lead partner and fund manager the work done 
included signing off invoices and looking through month end accounts “basically I 
don‟t get involved in any of the day to day figures… I‟m trusting, relying on him and 
the system.” When necessary the lead partner would  request working list information 
179 
 
to manage the waiting list and financial updates when required to support service 
development in the context of  clinical development which he explained as fund 
management meaning service development i.e. how are going to provide a service. 
Despite describing this trust and lack of involvement the Fund Manager in Practice I 
described how he give the Lead Partner „everything‟ form spreadsheets and written 
reports but that “if there‟s a person who has gone to a weird and wonderful hospital 
for a weird and wonderful operation he might question the partner‟s judgment more 
on a peer review than judgment of the case”. This indicates that the lead partner 
would not interfere with clinical decisions. Further the fund manager reveals that the 
Lead partner writes reports to other partners while the Fund Manager writes the 
annual business plan, seemingly Lead Partner acting as the cross over between the 
boundary management by other GPs. 
 
Thus the fundholding unit grew organically but with hindsight the Lead Partner would 
not have let that occur: 
 
Critical aspects were deemed to be good contracting, good negotiating 
and a cornerstone really, keeping your priorities clinical, having a view to 
quality as well as cost. I would have identified those people [being key 
staff] much more clearly and identified their tasks much more clearly 
instead of letting it grow in this sort of organic way that it did (LPI) 
 
There were little internal constraint in this practice or indeed any indication of 
external constraints; however growth by organic means left the practice isolated when 
they stepped away from being part of informal consortia. This led to them being 
“isolated” from developments that would have been beneficial to the practice. In this 
case the lead partner purposefully seemed to have not engaged in the public activities, 
even with fellow consortia members themselves. 
 
6.4.2.8 Lead Partner J: Opportunist 
The Lead Partner took an active external role in fundholding before it was adopted in 
the county in which the study took place. He undertook the role because of his support 
for fundholding and his knowledge of the scheme also advising the Health Authority. 
He was not active in day to day activities and interacted with data provided by the 
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fund manager on a monthly basis (see Table 4.8). He was constrained internally 
through the democratic partnership style (no senior partner structure in this practice, 
all equal) as his leadership role aspirations were held back “as I say we are a 
democratic practice, there‟s no autocracy in our practice at all, you try to set yourself 
up as leader… {long pause}”. There was little reference to demands as the 
fundholding path seemed to have been smoothed by the recruitment of a high „calibre‟ 
fund manager that was shared with other practices. Each locality within the Health 
Authority had a shared fund manager and each practice within the locality retained its 
own fundholding budget. It seems fundholding could be isolated from the practice 
domain through recruitment and fundholding organisation so that any development of 
the fundholding domain was restricted, if the lead partner chose that. 
I think fundholding helped them to come to terms that they needed a 
proper manager…and to let go of those traditional roles that each GP 
had…they‟ve a more structured management team and really the 
management skills they lacked as GPs, their responsibility has been 
passed on to the managers to manage rather than them doing it. (FMJ) 
In terms of how the work was done there was little hardship in being fundholding: 
Data collection…it just slid in very gently and what we did was we 
shielded the partners as much as possible…minimal amount of change 
imposed on the practice by fundholding. (LPJ) 
 
…totally separate in the early days (FMJ) 
 
However the work that was done is simplistic to the lead partner because of the 
choices in what work is done. This is embodied in the response when asked about 
critical aspects of fund management to which there was a shriek of laughter and “what 
do you mean by fund management? It depends on your philosophy doesn‟t it really?” 
Digging deeper the interviewer gave examples e.g. contract negotiation but the lead 
partner suggest “ask the fund manager because he‟s the one who‟s done all that for us 
…. We get information every month”. Indeed LPJ receives reports “as often as I can 
and the fund manager will tell me whether we‟re over or under in any particular area”.  
 
I used to spend time looking at individual contracts, I now basically just 
read the excellent summaries…exactly the position where we are… 
delegation is the name of the game…I just give a touch every now and 
then just to make sure things are going right…clinical stuff comes first 
then the other stuff comes later. (LPJ) 
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This implies that he does not even interpret the data and has it done for him although, 
“if there‟s a problem area then I‟ll look even deeper detail than that”. In the past a 
previous fundholding computer package had enabled him to produce trends but that 
package had since been replaced. The lead partner was focused on data and its 
collection for transparency as “fundholding as an ideal opportunity for general 
practitioners to measure precisely the needs of their patients for secondary care”. This 
focus on data and lack of use of the information suggest that the lead partner was not 
active in management or acting out a leadership role, nor did he develop his 
professional/personal domain with involvement in external activities. Indeed, he 
became more introverted as the opportunity to become an „expert‟ in and develops a 
personal domain in IT; this GP‟s next mountain (Glennerster et al., 1992; Fitzgerald; 
1994).When he could not link that expertise in that personal domain to fundholding 
his interest in fundholding waned. LPJ was apparently trying to make fundholding fit 
into his extant personal domain and failed. 
 
6.4.2.9 Lead Partner L: Opportunist 
LPL was an opportunist with a keen desire to develop in-house services.  At first it 
seemed that the lead partner was involved in list management on a day to day activity 
basis as well as with the interaction with data produced by the fund manager on a 
monthly basis (see Table 4.8). Demands and constraints were unlikely to evolve as he 
had seemingly limitless choices in how and what work was to be done in this role: 
…ball was left with me to start playing with it as I wanted.  (LPL) 
However, the interview was short relative to other lead partners and very focused on 
achievements with infrastructure and services with little comment or opportunity to 
discuss what work was done and how the work was done. This lead partner was very 
difficult to interview and did not have a great deal to say but on reflection it may be 
that he really did not have much to say as he delegated to the fund manager in a 
collective „we‟: 
We analyse, at the end of each month, when the accounts have been 
closed we go through the financial statements, we go through our waiting 
list, we go through the priority list…a batch of reports…I am very 
pleasantly encouraged with the information that I have been receiving 
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through my contracts manager…spend most of time on management of 
lists and make sure that we are not overspending. 
 
Similarly on the critical aspects of fund management, “I think you‟re better asking the 
fund manager but I certainly think you have to define your aims first and work 
towards those.” There was no indication of the development of any expertise or public 
activities internal or external to the organization. 
 
6.4.2.10 Lead Partner M: Reluctant Innovator 
LPM was a reluctant innovator whose views were mollified as fundholding 
progressed, having taken a „completely different view‟ of fundholding, because she 
had found that „being in control of your own budget and your own destiny gives you 
an awful lot of power‟ to deal with problems that arise in relation to the provision of 
secondary care.  On the face of it she had little involvement in fundholding according 
to the analysis in Table 4.6 (shaded area). However, a sense of commitment to do the 
job properly emerged with few demands and constraints imposed by apathetic 
partners (“apprehensive…still are and don‟t get as involved in fundholding…”FMM), 
she allowed the fund manager to concentrate on a contracting function leaving the 
GPs (and especially herself) to get on with clinical. However over time she increased 
the scope of the work of the fund manager. LPM became more trusting and was able to 
hand over aspects of the task of fundholding to the fund manager: 
…there‟s no point me wasting time entering referrals and messing about 
with reports and things……to be quite honest and say that I do allow my 
fund manager. Contract manager to largely get on with things… he looks 
at budgets and things. What he will do is report to me, so I monitor what‟s 
going on… some GPs are much more into contracting side which I‟m not 
 
Thus the more mundane administrative tasks were left to the fund manager but there 
was some strong self- denial of management activity by the lead partner. It was clear 
that the lead partner in practice M had an increasing professional portfolio and was 
instrumental in the site expansion in terms of unique services in secondary care, 
which the fund described as development being „dramatic‟. Thus the personal domain 
for LPM burgeoned as, for example, she indicated her relationship management role 
on behalf of the practice with external bodies, including  the Community Health Trust 
and sorting out project areas such as in-house counselling, prescribing, emphasizing 
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that it was  “clinical work not only to save money, but to improve patient care”. She 
adopted a distinctive gatekeeper role, by using the information from the fund manager 
for strategic decision making: 
I look at it (laughter), look at all these figure  and, no what we do is if 
we‟re looking as though we‟re going to overspend which happened last 
year, we‟ll deliberately stop the hospital operating…keep an eye on 
prescribing budget… so I‟ve done the referral analysis by partner and 
speciality” – looks at service implications 
 
Yet asked directly about the aspects of management:  
Critical? I think you‟ve got to have the right manager in my view. I am not 
a manager, I‟m a doctor, I wasn‟t trained as a manager… have a fund 
manager that you can trust…liaising with Health Authority… keeping you 
informed 
Though in denial she does meet with the fund manager, reviews monitoring reports 
and attends performance review meetings, being “reported to and we do the waiting 
list management”. This was supported by the fund manager who described the two 
types of reports he produced as the „print-outs and the monitoring forms‟ which he 
then hands over and they discuss in a Wednesday morning briefing, thus a clear 
bounded meeting time. Although she has enjoyed developing practice services, she 
does not really see herself as a manager but rather a doctor who has picked up certain 
skills, commensurate with the lack of defined role in the lead partner role and the 
choices faced. For GPs it is evident that the skills acquired as a result of being lead 
partner will be skills of choice rather than being imposed. If not imposed they were 
already developed within their professional domain and in some cases fundholding 
was increasing that domain through either  work share, development of expertise or 
increase public activities beyond the practice boundary. 
 
6.4.2.11 Lead Partner N: Opportunist 
LPN went into the role knowing he could „tailor it‟ particularly in respect of 
contracting. He was an opportunist and despite being „conned‟ into taking on the role 
he facilitated a structure that left him with control over „broad financial affairs‟. He 
was active in contracting and performance management interacting with the data on a 
monthly basis (see Table 4.8) but did not indicate public activity because he only 
made grand policies and had a contracts manager. This was a difficult interview with 
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the lead partner being emphatic on every point and being quite clear that there was no 
more to be said once he had delivered his precise answer. A clear fundholding team 
was in place, across three practices, with a contracts manager and fund manager 
dedicated to the fundholding initiative: 
I don‟t spend too much time, once a year when the contracting process is 
in progress…I give them advice yes, we will have to take the contract with 
this provider, but not that provider. I know what my patients want… they 
like to go to a nearer hospital. I only make the grand policies and then I 
will leave it for the contract manager and the fund manager to make the 
final negotiations on my behalf (LPN) 
 
As an opportunist he was a keen fundholder: 
…In the long term it is good for patients, it is good for the GP and it is 
good for the Department of Health because in the long term it will save 
them a lot of money. It is incentive for the doctor, not financially for 
themselves but for the practice, it is better. It is the incentive for the 
doctor to control the finances in her practice, it is hard work, but at the 
end of the day it pays dividends and it will be a great shame if 
fundholding is cancelled altogether. (LPN) 
 
There was some internal constraint in the tensions exhibited by GMS staff thinking 
“that the fundholding people are treated differently, but they are not… [because] now 
our attention is divided between GMS and fundholding so they think that we are 
giving them a bit more attention”. This is indicative of the divorce between the 
practice unit domain and fundholding domain as they were separate at first. There was 
further evidence of their distinctiveness by recruiting an external person as nobody 
was deemed qualified from within the practice. Therefore with a separate 
management structure for practice and for fundholding there was a “dedicated staff” 
supported by “specialist training”.  
 
In terms of how the work was done the lead partner received information from the 
fund manager which he goes through “and pass them in my usual monthly meeting 
with my partners, and of course he [fund manager] has to write a report at the end of 
the year”. He discusses the information with the fund manager and with the contracts 
manager. Further: 
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I don‟t involve myself with the software, people upstairs do…We saved on 
drugs, we taught ourselves the discipline of prescribing… of referring 
people to hospital… (LPN) 
 
Indeed, in respect of targets the fund manager described LPN‟s targets as „extreme‟ 
relative to the other practices he worked for perhaps reflected in this section of the 
interview: 
At the end of the day fund management is about prudent financing, if you 
have got a good contract manager, a good fund manager who is going to 
negotiate good contract for you… make some saving… plough the savings 
next year for the service of the patients and this is very important. (FMN) 
 
The lead partner talks collectively. He was adamant he would not go for big 
commissioning beyond a practice base budget. 
 
6.4.2.12 Lead Partner O: Reluctant Innovator 
The lead partner was a reluctant innovator with little involvement in fundholding 
according to the analysis in Table 4.8 (shaded area).He volunteered for the role but 
had few strong views about it - or kept them to himself. His answers during the 
interview were closed and almost dismissive with an undercurrent of inevitability and 
tang of disinterest in the pertinence of the questions. There were a lot of „supposes‟, 
for example: 
I suppose I volunteered myself [laughs]. (LPO) 
 
I suppose information from the contract manager is more to do with 
figures. Nothing much clinical…we think about it and report back. 
There‟s no formal written things going backwards and forwards… I 
suppose it‟s looking at and signing invoices. It sounds very boring doesn‟t 
it really? I think that probably the main [thing I do]. (LPO) 
 
…the attitude is more laid back…practice itself is quite 
tranquil…everything developed slower (FMO) 
 
The divorce between the doctor here and the scheme itself was very pronounced but 
the fund manager confirmed that was the nature of the practice. There was no 
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indication of LPO developing a distinct personal domain either before or during 
fundholding. However: 
I think they didn‟t realize what was required…to be honest I don‟t think 
any practice fully understands what they need to do to make fundholding 
work…a lot went in with their eyes closed… to be honest to make it work 
you don‟t need to be a GP and you don‟t need to be a practice 
manager…what you do need it a wide range of management experience 
and you need experience of working in the hospitals (FMO) 
 
I think the fund manager, who is also the practice manager, is really an 
interface between the medical side and the accounting side. (LPO) 
 
There was a contracts manager and a fund manager plus the original practice 
manager indicating the separation between practice and fund management but 
also the separation of the different management activities. Throughout the 
interview with this doctor it was clear that fundholding was about data and 
numbers and little reference to management issues of the scheme for him or his 
partners. This latter comment was an instance where accounting was indeed only 
a technique for organisational order (Table 2.1). 
 
6.5 Doctors Engaged in a Management Role 
The previous section has analysed the interviews by adapting the Stewart (1982a) 
framework and applying it to interviews to reveal some of the choices about what the 
lead partner did and how they did it. The analysis summarised (Table 6.6) gives 
insight relative to the type of lead partner (Chapter 4). This will enable consideration 
of the factors that contribute to engagement in management by doctors in primary 
care based on the choices they made.  
 
6.5.1 Demands and Constraints 
From Appendix 4 it is evident that demands and constraints did not feature strongly as 
the columns are not populated when the framework is applied to the interviews. 
Demands are only what should be done and with no clear description, the main 
demand is the primary role of being a GP. It is the practice that has chosen 
fundholding and there has to be a lead partner, although there is evidence that fellow  
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Lead 
Partner 
Framework Relationship with Fundholding:  
What they did and how they did it 
A 
 
Guardian 
Internal 
Expert 
 
External 
Expert 
 
Public 
Activities 
Dominant in fundholding. Monthly activity with contracts 
and performance management. Strategic. Time constrained. 
Develops personal domain becoming an internal expert (not 
work sharing) within the doctors‟  partnership in fundholding 
but also an expert beyond practice boundary engaging in 
public activities (external expert). Work shares the 
management role with fund manager. Decision maker and 
external negotiator. Boundary management via networking . 
LPA is an expert (internal and external fundholder) and a 
strong hybrid manager. 
B 
Reluctant 
Innovator 
Nil Work shared lead partner role going into fundholding. 
Delegates everything but clinical decisions relating to 
fundholding to fund manager. Makes policy decisions based 
on external policy hence boundary management and protects 
himself from a management role with a strong fund manager. 
LPB is not a hybrid manager nor an expert. 
D 
Guardian 
Internal 
Expert 
 
External 
expert 
 
Delegates all things administrative/managerial that relate to 
the internal working of fundholding to the fund manager. 
Does not work share with partners hence become the 
fundholding expert within the practice. Does not work share 
with fund manager. Engages in contracts and getting good 
deals outside the practice hence exhibits boundary 
management. LPD is a weak hybrid manager and an 
internal and external expert. 
E 
Opportunist 
Internal 
Expert 
 
External 
Expert 
 
Public 
Activities  
Does not work share with fellow partners. Delegates all 
fundholding to his reliable team. Develops personal domain 
becoming expert (not work sharing) within the doctors‟ 
partnership in fundholding but also an expert beyond practice 
boundary engaging in public activities. Boundary 
management via networking. LPE is a weak hybrid 
manager and expert (internal and external). 
F 
Reluctant 
Innovator 
Nil Work share across all fundholders hence no internal expert. 
Dominant fund manager role with no work share with any of 
the doctors. LPF is not a hybrid manager or expert. 
H 
Opportunist 
Internal 
Expert 
 
External 
Expert 
 
Public 
Activities 
Not overtly work sharing hence becoming expert within the 
practice. Some internal constraint from other partners. Work 
share with the fund manager. Delegation of more financial 
aspects to fund manager. Development of hybrid domain as a 
well as hybrid manager. Engagement in public activities 
related to fundholding. LPH is an expert (internal and 
external fundholder) and a strong hybrid manager. 
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Lead 
Partner 
Framework Relationship with Fundholding:  
What they did and how they did it 
I 
Guardian 
Internal Expert 
 
External Expert 
 
 
Some evidence of work share of lead partner role with 
other GPs – they were „in the loop‟ but no evidence of 
other doctors developing personal domain of expertise 
in fundholding.  Work shares the management role with 
fund manager. Decision maker and external negotiator. 
Boundary management via networking. LPI is an 
expert (internal and external fundholder) and a 
strong hybrid manager. 
J 
Opportunist 
Public Activities External expert before internal expert in IT. Partnership 
constrained his aspirations for a leadership role. 
Delegation of financial aspects and contracting to fund 
manager – does not work share with fund manager. 
Tried to make fundholding fit into his extant personal 
domain and expertise in IT and failed. LPJ is not a 
hybrid manager nor an expert in this analysis. 
 
L 
Opportunist 
Nil No indication of the development of any expertise or 
public activities internal or external to the organization. 
Delegates all fundholding to his fund/contract manager. 
LPL is not a hybrid manager nor an expert 
M 
Reluctant 
Innovator 
Internal Expert 
 
External Expert 
 
Public Activities 
No indication of constraints. Delegates all fundholding 
to her fund/contract manager. Does not work share with 
colleague partners or fund manager but does monitor 
contracts. Develops personal domain becoming an 
internal expert (not work sharing) within the doctors 
partnership in fundholding but also an expert beyond 
practice boundary engaging in public activities (external 
expert). Boundary management via networking .LPm is 
a weak hybrid manager and expert (internal and 
external).  
N 
Opportunist 
Internal Expert 
 
 
Does not work share with colleague partners or fund 
manager but does get slightly involved in annual 
contract process as well as monthly monitoring. Internal 
constraints and tensions between staff. He is the internal 
expert for fundholding. LPN is a weak hybrid manager 
and an internal expert. 
O 
Reluctant 
Innovator 
Nil Lead partner in name only. Delegates everything but 
clinical decision relating to fundholding tot fund 
manager. LPO is not a hybrid manager nor an expert. 
 
Table 6.6 What doctors do in their management role 
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partners do limit the lead partner choices in some cases; indirectly with limited time 
for the role (e.g. LPA); more explicitly by expressing unhappiness by them not being 
„in surgery‟ seeing patients (LPE); and , in partnership conflict (LPH). Although 
demands and constraints do not present themselves as a strong factor that in itself 
indicates that the model is flexible enough to address the choices about being a doctor 
in management but recognises the limitations. It does provide an opportunity to look 
at management in the context and in relation to the activity in primary care rather than 
secondary care as noted in Table 5.4 (Fitzgerald, 1994).  
 
6.5.2 A Hybrid Manager Role for Some and Not for Others 
All doctors in the study continue to be doctors but some combine that with a lead 
partner in management role while some do not. The explanation of the management 
role includes choices: the degree to which they are experts, internal or external; the 
work share with fellow partners; the work share with the fund manager. Each practice 
case is examined and summarised in Table 6.6 and a new set of generalized statement 
about how they enact the management role can be made: 
 
 Strong hybrid managers work share with the fund manager and engage in 
boundary management with involvement in contracting (for example, LPA, 
LPI) and develop activities related to fundholding outside the organisation. 
They are truly active in the management of fundholding and are a 
doctor/manager. Some strong hybrid managers work share by consultation 
with other partners (LPH and LPI) but do not actively share the role. 
 Strong hybrid managers enact their role by work sharing with the fund 
manager and being the expert in the practice (internal) and an external expert. 
Three of the four strong hybrid managers develop the personal domain by 
getting involved in activities outside the organisation and in doing so are 
involved in boundary management to ensure operations within the practice 
are not disrupted, or rather, operations run smoothly and the practice is 
protected. 
 
 Weak hybrid manager gets involved beyond the unit domain and some get 
involved in contracting (LPD, LPE, LPN) but do not work share with the fund 
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manager. A key characteristic is that they delegate work to the fund manager. 
In some of the existing research (Chapter 5), the delegation would have been 
recognized as polarisation (Jacobs, 2005), the creation of a dichotomy 
between the management role and the profession of doctoring through 
delegation of tasks. However, the analysis of actual enactment of the role 
provides evidence that it is more complex than that for doctors in 
management. It supports the earlier suggestion that Ostergren (2009) was 
wrong in assuming that devolving responsibility means less hybridisation. It 
depends on what is devolved and the relationship choices made relative to 
developing the personal domain (Figure 6.2) hence the possibility of strong 
hybrids and weak hybrid managers. They are still engaged in management 
working with fund managers, for example to achieve the objectives of 
fundholding for the practice. These doctors are engaged in management 
across the practice boundary rather than inside fundholding itself. 
 
Further, weak hybrid managers may take two forms: 
 
 They delegate everything bar the medical internally (the functionality of their 
professional arrangement) but engage in contracting and become internal and 
external experts. They are seen to be key figures both within and outside the 
practice in fundholding; or 
 They do not become experts in any form and get involved for the „high‟ 
created by some facet of fundholding e.g. contract and deal making and use 
fundholding solely for the development of their own personal domain and 
appear intrinsically selfish . 
 
6.5.3 Links between Reasons for Going Fundholding (Lead Partner Types) and 
the Hybrid Manager Roles 
There is only one doctor (LPO) who continues as lead partner in name only. The other 
GPs all continue in some management role. This section will consider if the three 
types of lead partner influence the type of hybrid manager in management. The aim is 
try to identify the factors that are part of the level of engagement. It may not present 
cause and effect but it will provide insight into engagement in management. 
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6.5.3.1 Guardians 
Each guardian retained their expertise when fundholding went live and were experts 
within the practice. Two of the three were strong hybrid managers who work shared 
within the practice with the fund manager. Work share was an indicator that the 
doctors were managing inside and outside: inside with day to activities with the fund 
manager rather than just interacting with data (Table 4.8); and outside, beyond the 
boundary of the practice, engaging in contract negotiations and boundary managing to 
protect the practice. 
 
All three guardians do not refer to any partnership constraints (fellow GPs) internal or 
external which might impact on what they did and how they did it. Generic 
constraints of time and information systems did warrant a mention though particularly 
for LPA who presented a sense of wanting to do more in the new management role but 
not having the tools to do it.  LPA and LPD showed no reluctance, indeed the former 
confessed he liked being involved in management as lead partner. LPD and LPI  were 
also exhibiting a keenness for entrepreneurship and the business side thus whilst not 
necessarily keen on fundholding it did enable them to act out their desire to be 
involved in the business side of general practice, rather than being merely a doctor. 
Thus guardians were not reluctant managers which is a key finding to add to the 
literature (Table 5.4). 
 
The three guardians also extended the personal domain of being an expert and sharing 
work by engaging in activities relative to fundholding outside the organisation. 
Particularly for Practice I, fundholding became embedded in the practice unit domain 
(Appendix 4 key quote 4) and the lead partners‟ personal domain but not through a 
personal domain developing via engagement in public activities. Unlike LPA  it seems 
LPI was engaged in maintenance of the practice and his personal domain rather than 
innovation. This contrasts to LPA who sought innovation but was constrained by 
systems and LPD who innovated through deal making activities. 
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Lead 
Partner 
 
Class 
 
Type of Hybrid manager 
 
Public Activities 
A 
 
 
Guardian Strong hybrid manager and an 
expert (internal and external 
fundholder).  
Yes 
D 
 
 
Guardian A weak hybrid manager and 
an internal and external 
expert. 
No 
I 
 
Guardian Strong hybrid manager and an 
expert (internal and external 
fundholder).  
No 
B 
 
Reluctant 
Innovator 
Not a hybrid manager not an 
expert. 
No 
F Reluctant 
Innovator 
Not a hybrid manager not an 
expert. 
No 
M Reluctant 
innovator 
A weak hybrid manager and 
expert (internal and external) 
but originally not a hybrid 
manager. 
Yes 
O Reluctant 
innovator 
Not a hybrid manager not an 
expert. 
No 
E Opportunist A weak hybrid manager and 
expert (internal and external). 
Yes 
H 
 
Opportunist Strong hybrid manager and an 
expert (internal and external 
fundholder) and a  
Yes 
J Opportunist Not a hybrid manager nor an 
expert in this analysis. 
Yes 
L Opportunist Not a hybrid manager nor an 
expert  
No 
N Opportunist A weak hybrid manager and 
an internal expert. 
No 
Table 6.7 Lead Partner types and hybrid manager roles 
 
Notably LPD was classed as a weak hybrid manager. What LPD sees himself as (Table 
6.5) and what he actually does is in conflict and is reflected in a comment that implies 
a lack of concrete behaviours and the communication between the lead partner and 
fund manager as a „natter‟. He presents himself as an expert but engages in boundary 
management without sharing work with the fund manager. 
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Overall guardians, negative going fundholding, and with little fellow partner 
competition for the role become experts and are less likely to work share with fellow 
partners. They become internal and external experts as they boundary manage to 
protect the practice. Some, not all, engage in public activities that strengthens their 
personal domain. The guardians that work share with the fund manager are classed as 
stronger hybrids because the lead partner activity indicated by interaction with data 
means a stronger internal practice role in management. They may delegate but they 
also use the information in their new expert role. 
 
6.5.3.2 Reluctant Innovators  
The reluctant innovators were lead partners from practice B, F, M and O. All of the 
reluctant innovators did not engage in day to day activities beyond going fundholding 
(Table 4.8) and only LPB interacted with the data from the fund manager (monthly) – 
the rest less frequent, even annually. From this analysis using the framework (Table 
6.3)  LPO was the most remote from any function of fundholding, administrative or 
management based, yet in the perception of his own role he was close to fundholding 
(see Table 6.3).  
 
Three of the four reluctant innovators were not hybrid managers in fundholding. 
Based on the criteria in the framework of analysis they did not engage in management 
but polarized by delegation. There are differences in how that polarisation emerges 
and may be explained. LPB  was work sharing with other partners before fundholding 
and had a strong practice manager/fund manager which may have influenced 
engagement in management (see Figure 6.5); that is, deterred engagement. Indeed a 
dominant fund manager is also identified in the case of LPF. However, one cannot 
conclude if the fund managers were selected to avoid engagement in management by 
GPs or were a factor that influenced its failure to happen. One can say it is likely that 
fund managers would not encourage engagement in management by GPs if it was 
their expertise, consistent with Kurunmaki (2004) who observed in hospitals that 
doctors were more likely to engage in financial argumentation in the absence of the 
expertise of an accountant. On the other hand, LPM moved from not being a hybrid 
manager to a weak hybrid managers as her views of management were mollified, 
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perhaps influenced by her external expert activity and increasing development of the 
personal domain. However, it is notable that this doctor engaged in public activities as 
part of expanding her personal domain and that those activities were not confined to 
fundholding. Public activity does seem to contribute to engagement in management or 
the engagement in the public could be part of the transition to as stronger hybrid 
manager as the individual becomes more expert. 
 
All four of the reluctant innovators were keen delegators to the person charged with 
the fund manager role, later LPM for other reasons,  the interview indicated that as she 
gained confidence she delegated not because she was reluctant but because of the 
confidence in the fund manager. These lead partners, other than LPM were delegating 
the expertise that they might have chosen to develop their personal domain. They did 
not choose to develop personal expertise in fundholding and chose not to engage in 
public activities. The exception was LPM who was already career building a personal 
portfolio of expertise and being lead partner was only one element of that external 
portfolio. 
 
For those not choosing a hybrid manager role there is further explanation of why they 
had no role at all in fundholding. LPM  concerned herself with thoughts on health 
policy, whilst at first denying any engagement in the management of fundholding. 
However, the level of concern with policy did take LPM into a more external public 
activity role, for example, with the Community Health Trust.  Two of the three 
reluctant innovators ventured into some sort of engagement with policy (LPB debated 
the public/private sector; LPM a strong contracting function for the locality, that is 
beyond the practice boundary). Reluctant innovators were typically from practices 
that went fundholding for negative reasons and they headed up the initiative to protect 
the practice from policy initiatives with no intention of working on fundholding as 
part of the reform to a positive end. Thus reluctant innovators did not engage in 
management but were concerned with policy and sought to use policy to protect the 
practice and maintain it rather than to develop it. They did not actively engage in 
protecting the practice. 
 
195 
 
6.5.3.3 Opportunists  
Opportunists present a full range of hybrid manager: strong (LPH -one incidence); 
weak (two incidences); not a hybrid manager (two incidences). LPE and LPN are weak 
hybrid managers. LPE is involved in public activity rather than being  an expert or 
work sharing. Both LPE and LPN have, and place, total trust in the fund manager 
demonstrated through the role of accounting described in chapter 4. The over reliance 
and lack of interaction with the fund manager reduces the strength of the hybrid 
manager role as they work share less with the fund manager. 
 
The analysis reveals that LPH was a strong hybrid manager who executes his role by 
working across the practice boundary, networking with other fundholders, in the 
interest of power relationships because of a strong single provider in the locality but 
work sharing with the fund manager. He was co-operating with those outside the 
organisation that were useful to the practice and becoming an internal and external 
expert. LPH also expressed a preference not to become a fundholding expert but to 
concentrate on his primary career as the doctor – this came across strongly in the 
interview but is contradicted by his own personal description of what his role is which 
suggested he was developing as an expert in a management role. Thus he did not wish 
to present himself as active in management, perhaps associating it with powerlessness  
and lack of respects like hospital doctors (Russell et al., 2010).This was achieved by 
delegating some tasks to practice and fund manager hence corroborates the initial 
analysis that he was not active in day to day activities (See Table 6.6), however the 
combination of evidence of public activity and reporting to the partners suggest a 
more internal management role as he worked with the fund manager. 
 
LPN (weak hybrid), on initial analysis, differs only from LPH (strong hybrid) in 
apparent contracts and performance management activity. However, he  argued that 
he only entertained involvement in the „grand policies‟ yet the evidence from the 
initial analysis of phase one data shows that he engaged with the fund manager on 
data issues on a monthly basis. Much like LPH he attributed good fund management to 
good contracting and fund management and that he did not get involved in it. There 
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was no indication of public activities to add to or enhance his personal domain but he 
did keep abreast of policies, hence deemed weak rather than strong. 
 
LPJ and LPL were not hybrid managers, neither indicating work share in the 
description of their role, neither suggested expertise in their lead partner role, both 
engaged monthly with the data. The concept of work share in his LPL
‟
s opinion 
stemmed from the „we‟ rather than any evidence from the interview of personal 
activity in sharing the work. LPJ did not identify any expertise on being questioned 
about his role but he was at the vanguard of fundholding in his locality, advising the 
health authority and therefore engaged in public activities. Like LPL the work share 
articulation was a myth as the tasks had been delegated to the contracts and fund 
manager but unlike LPL left  LPJ to develop his personal domain of expertise in IT and 
combine it with public activity. Both these partners were essentially relatively selfish 
individuals with personal agendas compared to other lead partners.  
 
6.5.4 Factors that Influence the Degree to Which Doctors Engaged in 
Management 
Figure 6.4 shows the factors interpreted from the analysis of the data and the direction 
of those factors that influence the strength of engagement in management by doctors 
in primary care. By analysing what they do and how they do it insights are gained on 
how they engage in management and the factors that influence. The strength and 
combination of the hybrid manager role will vary according to the strength of each 
„arrow‟. Weaker managers are more likely to share work with fellow doctors in the 
practice, be pre-occupied with broaden NHS policy and be selfish individuals. 
Stronger managers, share work in the management team, probably understanding it 
better – becoming expert and engage more freely in pubic activities, enhancing an 
expert role both inside and outside the practice while maintaining the notion of 
professionalism through focus in the unit domain rather than NHS policy at large.   
There may also be a transient stage when engagement in public activities make 
doctors in primary care better, more engaged, managers at practice level, indicated by 
some evidence of shifts from not being a reluctant innovator to a weak manager, for 
example, LPM. The exertion of each of these arrows may also determine the width of 
the bands of choice and constraints (Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.4 The Factors and Direction of the Factors that Influence  
Engagement in Management 
 
The literature of doctors in management is clear in the perception that there is a need 
for doctors in management in both primary and secondary care (Table 5.4) and that it 
should have a high level of relevance for the reality of the work of the doctors in 
secondary care (Brazell, 19870; Fitzgerald 1994). Here in primary care relevance and 
reality is important as there is stronger engagement in management by guardians who 
protect the practice domain and notion of professionalism. Management is preferred 
as a secondary/part-time role as in secondary care (Table 5.4). Even reluctant 
innovators in primary care engage more in management when certain factors are 
combined, protecting the practice and being less concerned with policy and more with 
Adopt an Internal Expert Role 
 
Focus on Health Policy: NHS domain 
Adopt an External Expert Role 
 
Work Share with Fund Manager 
 
Focus on Unit Domain: the Practice 
 
Partner Selfishness 
 
Engage in Public Activities 
 
Delegation to Fund Manager 
Weak 
Engagement in 
Management 
Strong 
Engagement in 
Management 
Work Share with Partners 
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the reality of management for their practice. In both sectors there is an extensive 
literature on doctors‟ reluctance to be engaged in management (Table 5.4) and less so 
on how they are motivated or engage in management in both sectors. This study has 
given insights into the hybrid manager role of doctors in primary care for the first 
time and extended the notion of the hybrid manager by considering the factors that 
influence strong and weaker engagement which might be applied in both sectors in 
the current NHS models for engaging doctors in management. It may also be 
investigated for its application in other semi-public sector organisations (Noordegraaf 
and Stewart, 2000) such as schools. Further it has looked at management in the 
context of role and activity in primary care for the first time (Table 5.4) using the 
legacy of fundholding. 
 
Some doctors are motivated into management in secondary care (Fitzgerald, 1994) 
and primary care (Cowton and Drake, 1999a, 1999b). This study has established 
insights into the factors that contribute to engagement in management. This has 
implications for other schemes that involve doctors in management and might be 
applied in different models of in the NHS and other organisations. It seems reluctance 
can be mitigated by bringing the reality of the practice into the model, rather than just 
educating in management techniques as a generic prescription (Table 5.4). Doctors 
can be enticed by harnessing their need to protect the practice domain (encompassing 
the patients). Further while the role of accounting is not itself important in the 
management of such schemes the manifestation of accounting in design via budgets 
presents the possibility of reporting mechanisms that facilitate work sharing with the 
doctor and administrative support, increasing their hybrid manager role and possibly 
effective in maintaining or innovating in the practice. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of using the demands, constraints and choices model was to address the 
research question of how did the lead partner enact the management role; what did 
they do and how did they do it? The aim was to extract from the data what the 
interview questions did not ask directly as the emergent findings needed a more 
creative „bricoleur approach‟ to make sense of the interview data. The evidence does 
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not pretend to be conclusive or generalizable but it does provide new insights to the  
context of doctors taking on a management role in primary care. It enables an 
extraction of the factors that contribute to the degree of engagement in management 
(see Figure 6.5) and the thesis presents new contributions, in addition to already 
published work, that contribute to the literature in primary care, filling the empty cells 
in the primary care column of Table 5.4. 
 
Doctors engage in management in different ways and to differing degrees. When GPs 
were given the choice to engage in a management role other studies reported 
reluctance and delegation. The concept of a hybrid manager as a description of 
somebody in that role is not sufficient and the analysis has enabled hybridization to be 
explored and the development of a model of hybrid manager levels of engagement. It 
shows that some doctors do choose to polarize the two roles but others do not. It 
presents lessons for engaging doctors in management. It also supports the notion that 
accounting is important in the change it brings. It can help construct social order and 
may become accounting in motion (Hopwood, 1987). Accounting goes beyond a 
technical item for administration and constructs a useful fundholding organisation 
towards achieving the aims of NPM and facilitates doctors engaging in management.  
 
Now it is established that hybrid managers existed in primary care and that factors 
have been established that present different levels of engagement in management. The 
study contributes to the overall doctors in management literature but can also go a 
step further by revealing how the careers, the personal domains, of those doctors 
progressed. Is a career in management sustained and how do the different types of 
doctor managers reflect on their management roles?   The next chapter present case 
studies of some of the GPs and will help contribute to the comparison of secondary 
and primary care and the broader literature. It will help fill the gaps (Table 5.3 and 
5.4) where there was little evidence of satisfier, dissatisfier and advice to others from 
the primary care sector when compared to the secondary care literature, contributing 
to the last two rows in Table 5.4 amongst other things. 
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Chapter 7 
 
GPs in Management: A Continued Role 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of new interview data to address research questions 
five and six: did lead partners continue to engage in management after fundholding; 
how did lead partners‟ careers fare after fundholding?  It seeks to identify if 
involvement in management is chosen in primary care after fundholding ended to 
identify any satisfier, dissatisfier elements (Buchanan et al., 1997) and  to consider if 
doctors missed management when budgets as a mechanism were withdrawn (Goldie 
and Sheffield, 2001). This contributes to the doctors in management literature to 
provide insights and an interpretation of the impact of how a time in a role, as a 
„hybrid‟ manager or not, can impact on the careers of a group of health professionals. 
Interviewing the lead partner for a second time enabled investigation of what the 
careers of the doctors who chose management look like and if they continue to choose 
management. 
 
The first section outlines the research method for the second phase of data collection 
and the case studies of each lead partner. The second section summarises engagement 
in management beyond fundholding (research question five). The third section 
identifies and interprets the reflections on the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of GPs in 
management by interpreting their reflection on their post-fundholding careers 
(research question six). 
 
7.2   Engaging the GPs for a second time: Interview Design 
Each of the practices from phase one where the lead partner was interviewed (eleven 
of the twelve), were contacted by telephone asking to speak to the lead partners to 
enable the researcher to identify the current whereabouts and position of the original 
interviewees.  Six of the eleven lead partners from phase one agreed to an interview. 
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Unfortunately one partner had died. The remaining, four GPs, did not respond to an 
initial letter and in all cases at least three follow up calls were made. There were no 
direct refusals for interviews.  
 
GP 
Practice 
Code 
 
 
Type Interview 
Date 
 
Location 
Interview 
Length 
Status 
Relative to 
Practice 
A Guardian 
Strong Hybrid 
manager 
Expert 
16 
December 
2008 
Surgery 42 minutes Semi-retired 
E Opportunist 
Weak Hybrid 
Manager 
 
2 March 
2009 
GP‟s 
Home 
78 minutes Retired 
H Opportunist 
Strong Hybrid 
Manager 
30 March 
2009 
Surgery 50 minutes Full-time 
J Opportunist 
Not a Hybrid 
Manager 
26 June 2009 Surgery 48 minutes Full-time 
M Reluctant 
innovator 
Weak Hybrid 
Manager 
1 May 2009 Surgery  42 minutes Full-time 
with time 
buy out to 
act as PCT 
clinical lead 
in a 
specialist 
area 
O Reluctant 
Innovator 
Not a Manager 
23 March 
2009 
Surgery 24 min Resigned on 
date of 
interview 
Table 7.1 GP Status and Interview Data 
 
Table 7.1 describes the occupational status of the lead partners in the practice at phase 
two, the interview date, location and interview length. One GP was retired, two were 
semi-retired, three were full time and one GP was in „career crisis‟ and retired on the 
day of the interview. This confirms that not all lead partners were the junior partners. 
The interviewed lead partners from phase one will be called GPs and denoted by 
original practice in sub-script for example GPA.  
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The interview questions are located in Appendix 2. Each case for each GP has four 
main sections: reflections on Primary Care Groups (PCGs); reflections on Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs); reflections on career development and the highs and lows. 
 
Compulsory PCGs were created in 1999 made up of a number of GP practices as sub-
committees of the Health Authority. PCTs were established in 2002, each headed by a 
chief executives. GPs could be board members if they were elected to the Professional 
Executive Committee (PEC). The GPs in this study were asked about how they were 
involved in the post-fundholding era of PCGs and PCTs.  It was considered too early 
to question about the start of Practice Based Commissioning (PBC), however, it did 
arise during the course of the interview and a section in each case highlights the 
discussion that emerged relative to PBC where appropriate. The study introduced the 
opportunity for reflection on job history which involved choices and decisions. Arthur 
et al. (1989) explained career anchors according to the model developed by Schein 
(1978) “as a way of explaining the patterns of reasons” and these were used as 
terminology in the interviews to guide the interviewee and provide consistency in the 
data on how careers had fared: technically; managerially; creatively; in terms of 
security and stability; being autonomous and independent. The GPs at interview 
struggled with the meaning of those concepts in the context of the originating model 
but it did help the interviewer focus the GPs.  Most importantly it provided guidance 
and met the objectives of the fifth and six the research questions in order to conclude 
this longitudinal study: did lead partners continue to engage in management after 
fundholding; how did lead partners careers fare after fundholding? 
 
The transcribed second phase interviews were analysed and summarised to present a 
case according to the interview themes: PCGs; PCTs; PBC; and personal reflections 
which were structured with the career anchors (Schein, 1978). The interview 
questions, summary and analysis of phase two interview are independent of the first 
phase in order not to prejudge and anticipate too much in the summary of phase two 
interviews. This approach would capture the essence of the new interviews which 
could then be analysed in the context of the primary analysis and any new key themes 
arising. 
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7.2.1 GPA – Guardian, Strong Hybrid Manager and Expert 
GPA classed himself as semi- retired and at the „latter end‟ of his career. Nevertheless, 
the data indicated he was close to full time, working two and a half days in the same 
practice as phase one. Further, he was occupied for much of the remaining week (and 
evenings) in a large commissioning group within the practice based commissioning 
scheme. 
 
7.2.1.1 GPA and PCGs 
The interviewee was steered back to talking about PCGs after initially referring to 
PBC as he was pre-occupied with his activity in PBC at the time of the interview. He 
was involved early on during the era of PCGs, being the joint chairman of the „city 
wedge‟ PCG, something he did not view as a good period for him personally because 
he did not think that he had  the time to devote to it. After the onset of a period of 
illness GPA handed over the reins in full to the joint Chair  who had “bundles and 
bundles and bundles of time…well it wasn‟t working as two people largely because I 
couldn‟t give the commitment and I wasn‟t sure of the direction”. 
 
For this GP the direction in which PCGs were going was not the way he wanted. He 
chose to step away from close involvement in the initiative. He described the direction 
as being overly political.  Political for this GP was in the context of the number of the 
agencies involved in commissioning, it being more than a practice based initiative and 
with less emphasis on the individual practice aims,  for example, the local Council 
and Social Services were involved which he found “pretty uninteresting”. Though 
active in fundholding, this GP did not put himself forward for committees in the post 
fundholding period of the Primary Care Group. He described the period as not making 
much of a difference with nothing really happening and with little identifiable benefit 
in being personally active in external relations between the practice and the PCG, 
“…couldn‟t see any purpose in it”. 
 
None of the partners in the practice engaged with the PCG over and above that 
involvement personally explained by GPA. However, GPA did identify some things 
that worked well with PCGs and on reflection, something that he enjoyed:  
…getting doctors together to talk was good. I was the clinical governance 
lead…I used to take that seriously…learn but don‟t blame…that was 
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good, I learned, I personally learned a lot from that…with hindsight I 
enjoyed that… The bits that applied to medicine I quite liked but I‟m not 
heavily into joined up management type stuff…bringing this service and 
that service...not what I‟m good at. 
 
Hence, despite reservations about all the other agencies involved, negative thoughts 
on PCGs by this GP were tempered by personal ability to learn something new. There 
were indications that he became used to the idea of „shared agreement‟. Regardless of 
accepting this more collegiate approach, there were two areas where PCGs were 
viewed with reticence. Firstly, the slow process of the apparent „management by 
committee‟ seemed to frustrate this GP as decisions were delayed. Secondly, there 
were issues with incumbent performance measures, “… very dispiriting…elements of 
judgmentalism… where you thought something should happen and nobody would 
actually do anything”. 
 
7.2.1.2 GPA and Primary Care Trusts 
The GP said he was not involved in PCTs at all and nor were other partners from his 
practice. There was opportunity to be Chair of Professional Executive Committees 
(PECs) but this GP was not involved: 
There was a lot of reading involved in all these things and I don‟t get a 
buzz out of that, you know I get a buzz out of doing things I can directly 
see a benefit for my patients…some or all of them were political 
appointments. 
 
Locality managers were appointed by PCTs to manage but this GP contended that the 
practice never saw them. He revealed that he was the locality representative, although 
not part of the committee, “…it all happened outside of our practice in the sort of 
trust buildings…I was waiting for some change.” It seems GP involvement in 
management was put on ice through lack of opportunity to engage in the activity of 
management. GPs seemed on the periphery within their practices, on the outside of 
PCGs, observing them but not feeling a part of the process. What motivated this GP 
in this PCT era was anything that influenced and enhanced at practice level, for 
example, citing the benefit of being able to take on another partner through central 
funding. It seems the centrality of PCTs enabled some practice development which 
pleased GPA , “…we went with it and it was very good for our practice it made a big 
difference”. 
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The ability to gain a partner, at the time of PCTs, arose from the creation of fixed 
payments to GPs for annual provision of primary care services called Personal 
Medical Services (PMS) which were not compulsory, practices chose to join PMS, “I 
looked into that…better than not going… and we went with it, not as early as we 
might have done…that was about delivering extra things in our practice which was 
good”. 
 
7.2.1.3 GPA and Practice Based Commissioning 
The GP was enthusiastic about practice based commissioning. He was immersed in 
the current initiative and keen to talk about it. It was evident that he recognised and 
seized opportunity: 
We understood and we knew that we should be involved in practice based 
commissioning because if you don‟t get involved in things you get left 
behind. It‟s not the best analogy today but the first house in the 
development is usually better value than buying the fourth phase. 
 
The GP got involved in practice based commissioning through being invited to a 
meeting by his previous fund manager, who had not been employed by the practice 
for some time. GPA enjoyed that meeting as it was “energetic and it was very well 
thought out” and since he was “winding down” for retirement he got involved in PBC 
with encouragement from others that his contribution was valuable. It seems this GP 
may have been winding down from general practice but not from „management‟ and 
more strategic things linked to his primary career.  
 
The earlier part of the interview was much about the energy of the people he was 
involved with and suggested the rest of the „day job‟ of doctoring was either not as 
exciting or that he was looking for something to occupy his retirement, or perhaps a 
mix of both. Thus, it was more than a single individual getting involved in matters of 
management as the networking as part of a larger group was important. His expertise 
in management was recognised and he was elected to a board with representatives 
from multiple (but not all) practices:  
Various people spoke at the meeting…there was 50 or 60 people there, 
and they asked me to speak on roles and responsibilities in practice based 
commissioning…I struggled…somebody later described it as 
barnstorming. I‟m not suggesting I‟m that good…So we‟ve got a lot of 
people on our side. 
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„Our side‟ suggest something defensive about this group of GPs joining together in 
PBC. GPA stood for election and to his surprise was voted in „comfortably‟ to the 
board of the commissioning group. A Chief Executive (not a doctor) was appointed 
based on his past experience as a chief executive of a PCG to run what GPA called a 
“very corporate group”.  
It does work well and I think everybody is interested and it is exciting and 
I think that‟s why people are doing it. 
 
Surprisingly, despite being against performance targets in PCG period, this GP was 
active in PBC as a prescribing lead and has a mollified view of targets now as he 
acted as prescribing lead for the practice, “looking at what practices do and 
reaching targets and practice incentives schemes and things like that,”. It seems 
such direct participation with performance targets is acceptable when he is in 
control of the activity, influencing and managing it within primary care, even in a 
specialised role, in this case taking on the role of prescribing lead for the co-
operative of 31 practices. However, for this GP, that level of involvement is clearly 
not acceptable when PBC activity involves secondary care, “I haven‟t been 
involved in commissioning…other people have”. 
 
7.2.1.4 GPA and Secondary Care 
The GP was explicit that he was not involved in commissioning care. However, he 
had learned from fundholding the importance of good systems and the importance of 
monitoring referrals to ensure being correctly charged for the referral. This suggests 
that though  responsibility was devolved he retained financial control, as Llewellyn 
(2001) and Jacobs (2005) had found in secondary care and Hannah et al. (2005) in 
primary care. This need to be „in control‟; is about understanding that activity is being 
properly recorded in order to manage and influence for the benefit of patients. Further 
whilst declaring he was not active in commissioning he revealed that he had been on 
the board of the commissioning group and sought to influence: 
I‟ve been involved in other people‟s things and putting my pen‟orth in 
about that…some retirement, but I quite enjoy it actually I have to say. 
 
Further the GP indicated that he was also on the board of the care group which the 
PCT would commission from and also a venture company for buildings and estates 
effectively a public-private partnership. Clearly this was a portfolio retirement! 
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7.2.1.5 GPA Personal Reflections on Career: “Some Retirement but I enjoy it 
actually, I have to say” 
Asked about technical developments in his career, GPA referred to IT education, 
internet at night and lectures and that he was able to do things better  „in the surgery‟ 
than when he started. On reflecting on those early years as a GP: 
I don‟t think I realised the breadth of general practice and what you can 
do. When I started it was ridiculous. I wanted to be a hospital practitioner 
in junior medicine …they said they couldn‟t afford it in the hospital. So I 
resigned from it and I have to say that was good thing that I did. ..That 
world has now changed…we used to refer people for injections…well we 
do all that now. One thing that has changed…probably harder now is to 
find time to just sit back and listen…Technically the IT is good…now you 
can click on a graph and a patient. 
 
GPA did not regard himself as a „great manager‟ but considered himself a good starter 
and poor finisher. He categorically stated that he would not be going to his retirement 
„do‟ with a speech like he had heard during his period of training to be a GP where the 
GP claimed that: „I‟ve used 5% of my intellect in general practice‟ and will then use 
the rest in retirement. On reflection he did not think he would have been suited to a 
„North Yorkshire…Archers or something GP‟ and that he was very lucky and loved 
his time as a GP. At this juncture the interviewer asked if he had enjoyed it more as a 
result of fundholding coming along: 
I think fundholding gave us a degree of independence that we‟d never had 
which was fantastic…freedom of independence is what people need…but 
in general practice if you are able to be a part of making their own 
decisions it‟s good. 
 
The interviewee struggled with the wording of „career developed creatively‟ and was 
helped with the suggestion with „being able to make a difference‟. The analogy of not 
going about one‟s business resuscitating patients but being able to potentially save a 
life by stopping a 20 year old from smoking was offered. Further GPA suggested that 
while he had been able to specialise in his career in general practice more recently it 
would be unusual to see patients on the back of that specialist knowledge, implying 
general practice had become more even more  „general‟ and perhaps in the context of 
the question, with less potential for creativity. However in direct response to that 
question: 
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No. Now you can definitely do more specialising if you want to without a 
doubt and I‟ve got four partners who do that as a special team who are 
very good. I‟m a generalist I think…older GPs see most things 
twice…most of the rare things they‟ve seen them…you learn ways of 
behaving and how to sort things out. Sometimes you haven‟t the foggiest 
of what is wrong with somebody but you know how to get it sorted and I 
think that‟s the main thing. 
 
On the question of career stability and financial security the GP claimed to be 
financially secure and in a secure job, but that projecting forward that might change 
for general practitioners. Independence was deemed of paramount importance 
particularly as „crucial to the independence of patients‟ - the context of patients 
advocate. It was  suggested that some GPs abuse their own independence and create 
their own agenda, that working in isolation as a risk - an interpretation supported by 
the GP comment that in larger practices there is some protection from such a scenario. 
This is an apparent reference to the „danger‟ of single handed GPs i.e., embodied by 
the Shipman scenario. This then brought the session deeper into independence and 
autonomy specifically, which was immediately coupled with thoughts by GPA on 
independence being eroded through the work of PCTs, but a view somewhat 
tempered: 
I think that if you work with your PCT and try to understand their 
pressures, that they have, you get good management in your practice, you 
know how you can achieve quite a lot for your patients…Finding time for 
patients is hard.. I just think that‟s crass because the Prime Minister was 
embarrassed once…the people who are disadvantaged are the older 
people… the shovers get in now. 
 
7.2.1.6 Changes since fundholding: practice versus GP 
The practice‟s highs, from the perspective of GPA, were of a singular source but with 
consequential benefit; fundholding savings being ploughed into buildings that 
“transformed care on our other surgery” through negotiation with the health authority. 
The lows as far as GPA was concerned were: fundholding stopping; people losing 
their jobs as a result; a sense of what a shame it ended because “we definitely, 
definitely made a difference and were poised to make a much bigger difference”. 
 
For the GP individually the new surgery was a high and it was “good fun at the time” 
and subsequently the number of partners increased. More recently, a salaried partner 
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had been employed by the practice. Immediately there was a jump to the present 
involvement on the PBC group committee: 
…and then I‟d skip on from there, the next thing is suddenly to be involved 
in group with energy that‟s making a big difference and with few more 
decisions in our favour I think we‟ll make  crucial difference to how care 
can be delivered and the sort of access of the area. 
 
This opened up the potential to ask the GP, now he had come back, at this point in his 
career to some form of management activity, what being involved does for him. Being 
part of the decision making process was viewed as being important, making rounded 
decisions and “if I were thought I was being an old fart I‟d stop, straight away, but I 
don‟t think I am.” The lows however were being ill and the volume of work which 
was categorised in the interview to involve: the extent of medical audit; going on the 
internet to keep up to date and essentially being part of a busy practice. 
 
7.2.2 GPE  Opportunist and Weak Hybrid manager 
GPE retired in 2006 and was interviewed at home.  
 
7.2.2.1 GPE  and PCGs 
This GP‟s views on PCGs were very straight forward. At the onset of the PCG era he 
was „relaxed‟ about the move to PCGs. He observed the committees made up of GPs 
and was positive about that  involvement by GPs, but later became disheartened when 
those GPs who actually got on the committees, in his opinion were „not very good‟. 
They were “people who were more interested in politics „to my way of thinking‟ and 
not those who actually understood hands on general practice.” For this GP there were 
clearly three types of person involved in PCGs: the non-GP bureaucrats; the politician 
GP; the hands on GP. GPE at this stage classed himself as being a hands on GP and on 
this personal involvement in PCGs: 
 
By lobbying, chivvying, by doing things my way and hopefully other 
people followed. I was once described by a graphologist who read my 
hand writing as only knowing how to do things my way and she was fairly 
accurate. 
 
 
He thought that the other practice partners left everything to him in respect of PCGs, a 
comment tinged with some bitterness on GPE‟s part, in that he thought that the other 
partners blamed him when things went wrong.  Overall he was distant in his 
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description of matters arising in that time of PCGs, perhaps supporting his role as an 
observer, rather than as active as he had been as a participant during fundholding. 
However, he did describe the PCG as having an advantage, compared to past 
arrangements, being „closer to the ground‟ than the predecessor health authority and 
being more inclusive of nurses, however: 
The serious point is that centre directed medicine does not work. It is a 
recipe to end medical education. You know there is a health authority in 
Wales which is planning to see if they can do away with doctors and have 
nurse practitioners running primary care…they do not have the correct 
knowledge…don‟t have the breadth of general practice…cheaper 
but…they take more than twice as long to do any item of work… there is 
no business case for them. 
 
Through the creation of PCGs he felt “generally ignored” and painted a scene of 
administration and management that was made up of non-medical staff. Further he 
felt that he was dictated to from on high by the Department of Health with: 
dictates that came down…certainly the financial side of it was done by 
dictate not by agreement so that they would change the rules... rules that 
were arcane, were a little confused…It wasn‟t a major problem because 
you know that any GP who was running his own practice and had any 
business sense would use the system. 
 
7.2.2.2 GPE and Primary Care Trusts 
PCTs were viewed with disdain by GPE  who scrutinised successive developments. He 
saw  recycling of‟ “used-up members of the health authority and integration of people 
who had not really succeeded in other areas - like failed practice staff” to such an 
extent he thought that the vast number of GPs would not notice a difference between a 
PCT and PCG - ultimately the same personnel were involved. Personal involvement, 
beyond doctoring, continued with his involvement in an Information Management and 
Technology (IMT) group -voluntary and unpaid. Regardless of involvement in that 
group he suggested that the PCT was distinct because there was less professional (sic 
GP) representation on the PEC.  
 
 GPE declared that he was involved in IMT for „selfish reasons‟ in order to drive 
forward the government policy on computerisation. He objected to the drive to one 
computer system for all which he was “not prepared to put up with” as one of the 
main reasons he was there on the IMT. Involvement in that committee was defensive, 
rather than supportive of the strategic objectives being heralded for IT in the NHS. He 
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did not agree to the centralisation of patient data, viewing it as dangerous and lacking 
confidentiality and having familial consequences in that he did not wish his family 
data to be on there. Therefore GPE was active in the committee to promote IT in 
general practice but also to thwart one central patient record in order to protect 
patients and family:  
I was not prepared to put up with that…suddenly the server went slow and 
I spoke to the PCT…and they said „Oh  yes we were in it at that time and I 
said what do you mean and they said „well we were getting data down 
from it‟. So I said do you have permission and they said „we don‟t need 
it‟. 
 
On what worked well for GPE in the operation of PCTs was the adoption of a 
computer policy, yet without the “ties and strings that they would have liked”. 
However at this juncture GPE digressed back to his loathing of bureaucracy: 
I was just thinking they appointed somebody at the PCT whose job it was 
to go round and check the notice boards in GP‟s surgery‟s to make sure 
that they had good information on them…it was just a notice board 
monitor integrated with a another job… It amused me, what really didn‟t 
work well was that the burdening of the bureaucracy…only way to get 
status in civil service is to have people working for you…but like a 
snowball…it just gathers and gathers. The man at the top has to have two 
secretaries, two assistants and a secretary for each of his assistants…it 
goes on and on and on. 
 
 GPE summarised the PCT era for the practice as having only the benefit of 
improvement in IT, a system necessary, in his view, partly to meet the increasing 
administrative burden being imposed on GPs and partly to meet the demands placed 
on GPs for information and data collection. This was pursued by the interviewer 
referring back to fundholding; had fundholding enabled getting data together for the 
first time in general practice and making sense of it become useful? The GP agreed 
but made clear that that data was not clinical data “so much as administrative 
data…we bought activity and therefore it had to be monitored… couldn‟t trust [us]” 
and that data was mainly primary care data on referral activity beyond practice 
boundaries rather than the activity within the practice. 
 
Reflecting on the respective role of GPs compared to professional managers at this 
time he described the professional managers as carrying out orders on behalf of the 
PCT, trying to make directives work from a GPs point of view: 
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In fact they had very few original ideas…just to make us think that we had 
representation that was meaningful but in fact I cannot remember a single 
decision that they made that was actually beneficial to us and detrimental 
to the PCT. If I wanted something I would go for it myself, and argue with 
the PCT. 
 
This suggests that in GPEs view that PCGs did not behave altruistically ever and 
would not necessarily make decision that were unbiased, thus first and foremost the 
PCT was in control. 
 
7.2.2.3 GPE and Practice Based Commissioning 
If anyone thinks that practice based commissioning, the modern version is 
anything like fundholding then they live in cloud cuckoo land…I think it is a 
very expensive waste of time. 
 
No further word was said on PBC. 
 
7.2.2.4 GPE and Secondary Care 
When asked about his role as a manager in the management of secondary care and 
how that might have changed since fundholding, the interviewee became irritated: 
You‟ve only talked about my role, my relationship and the relationship 
with the general practice, to the PCGs and PCTs in terms of management. 
Management is an entirely different thing; management on a day to day 
basis is running small businesses. Take on the idea that primary care split 
into the surgery units and each of those is a small business and it has to 
be run on business lines. 
 
GPE   pointed out that it “is very easy to lose money in general practice” and the need 
to take care of money in order not to make a loss. He did discuss management beyond 
the general meaning of managing the practice like a small business: managing the 
administrative stuff; managing the clinical side; taking clinical decisions; introducing 
practice formulary; policy management e.g. on generics (drugs) and disease groups; 
managing costs. For this GP involvement in management is inherent to being a 
general practitioner but very much compartmentalised and apparently not across the 
practice boundary (he was an opportunist). 
 
7.2.2.5    GPE Personal Reflections on Career: Retiring to personal development 
One thing about medicine  is that you continually develop your technical 
abilities…things I did 40 years ago would be frowned upon now, although 
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some are actually coming back into fashion…I am a much better doctor 
now than I ever was thirty years ago. 
 
When asked about how his career had developed technically  GPE   reflected on how 
he had personally developed in the context of medicine as an evolving science and 
how that had led his approach to retirement and the choices to be made at that point in 
his career; either coast into retirement or plan to enjoy your retirement: 
…coast down…don‟t want to get up to date, no one is going to notice or 
you can plan your retirement… think to yourself I love this job and I still 
want to continue to do it to the best of my ability…continue the learning 
process and surprisingly since I have retired I actually spend more time 
developing my skills…lots of e-learning, I go on courses not because they 
are of practical use to me, but I just enjoy it. 
 
 
7.2.2.6 Changes since fundholding: practice and GP 
On reflection of personal development of managerial skills the GP came into general 
practice with “no concept of it as a business at all”. He accidentally fell into 
management by a route he cited as, “when the chap that was doing the books came 
close to retiring, none of the other partners were prepared to take on the 
management.” There appears to be some confusion between accounting and data 
management at this point and „management‟ but it appears that „doing the books‟ was 
a foothold by which GPE  could gain control of the direction of the practice. Further,  
the opportunity to redevelop one of the practice sites encouraged him to be involved 
in the management of the development of the practice, also, it was an indicator like 
GPA that the GP liked having financial control. GPE likes to be in control and he 
desperately wanted to manage the redevelopment of the designated practice site, 
however, that was not to be, “they (the partners) were never quite sure that I could be 
trusted” and to that end would not let GPE supervise the build: 
…it was a disaster because the architects were incompetent and the 
builders were incompetent …mistakes that would not have been tolerated 
had I been allowed to do it…gradually they realised I had the skills and 
although it was never actually decided everything devolved onto me. 
 
It is apparent that this GP emerged as a trouble shooter in his career, a „donation‟ 
from other partners since “when it came to hiring and firing the senior partners hired 
but when it came to firing they always left it to me”. However, he believed his staff 
liked him and were „immensely‟ loyal for that reason and that for that reason, “I could 
get anything I liked out of staff.” 
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Fundholding was recognised by GP as a good teacher of “administrative stuff…the 
way to manage a business was to have good financial advice and good banking 
practices, further: 
In terms of career it gave me an incentive which I had not had before…I 
was getting a bit fed up with general practice and fundholding actually 
gave me an opportunity  that really invigorated my interest in general 
practice…insights…opportunities…one of the things you could do with 
fundholding originally was to go on courses, management courses, some 
of them very silly. Also some of the concepts of some management skills 
something you could learn. But you also have to have some attainability – 
you know you can teach a monkey to play one particular pieces of Chopin 
but he won‟t be a concert pianist! 
 
 
In terms of career stability and financial security the GP spoke in the third person, 
for those choosing to come into general practice, in contrast to his experience of a 
secure and stable career, which he no longer considered it to be: 
I went into general practice, you considered it to be a job for life…you 
would take the little pensions at the end and go off very happily into the 
sunset...You know the old Japanese concept of a company made for life – 
it ain‟t so and there‟s far more fluidity. People move from practice to 
practice – people doing career portfolios. Also the concept of owner-
manager- practitioner has gone. 
 
The interviewer pursued the topic of salaried GPs which presented reflections on what 
GPE would have done had he not retired (through ill health), which would have been 
to restructure the practice and use salaried GPs to replace partners he describe as 
useless. „Useless‟ in the context of not being active as partners and therefore not 
working in the practice as a team and therefore already like a salaried (and expensive) 
partner role. Since management for GPE was very much a holistic approach to all 
aspects of general practice there was little sentiment for those who “contributed 
minimally to the management, they were effectively salaried…wouldn‟t even say 
good morning to the staff. That is not my concept of running a practice nor of being a 
partner”.  
 
For this GP the potentially less stable, independent and less secure career prospects 
for a new generation of GPs was a “perfect model for privately owned primary care” 
and not something he would disagree with as if he “were ten years younger I would 
have done that myself because if you know you can do, why not do it”. However 
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when asked if he would have been as satisfied he thought not as he enjoyed the 
“interface with patients but I have entrepreneurial skills and would have gone into 
partnership with somebody who could do it my way”. 
 
On developing creatively GPE stated that fundholding enabled him “to develop things 
I couldn‟t have done and I really enjoyed it…the negotiating which was something 
that was unheard of.” It was the outcome of make savings through the fundholding 
scheme and ploughing back into the practice that enthused the GP. Further, the ability 
to influence the Trust and individual hospital departments that were “starved of 
money” and being “creative with money that I was saving”  was a real driver which 
was a good lead into the career development in terms of autonomy which he 
confirmed fundholding had given “much more” of. 
 
Thus this GP spoke fondly of fundholding as a pioneer would. Fundholding 
allowed „them‟ to look at “innovative ways to fund and to acquire services”. In this 
GP‟s view it enabled the formalisation of previous informal arrangements and 
opened up a new range of contracting such as ability to contract MRI and CT scans 
(more clinical diagnostics). GPE referred to areas where he had been ground 
breaking  prior to fundholding and the difference with fundholding being he: 
…was paying for it, but that‟s fine because you keep control… it doesn‟t 
matter whether I‟m paying for it out of a pot that‟s given to me or the 
government pays it directly… focussing it though me, channelling it 
through me I have control.  
 
Thus although before fundholding he did not directly pay for activity, he was pushing 
the boundaries in general practice. As a budget holder it gave control. He used the 
example of losing control of out of hours GP services as “the biggest catastrophe… 
and I had control…and if there was something wrong they were answerable to me”.  
 
Post fundholding this GP described it as “very different, we lost the autonomy we had 
as fundholders”. This was in the context of the hospitals and secondary care but also 
loss of the autonomy of the “developed relationship” that had enabled him to be 
ground breaking and as an opportunist. There was a new era of obeying “rules and in 
fact it has got considerably worse”. „Worse‟ for GPE meant the introduction of 
pathways and protocols: 
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…pathways for virtually every formal thing now. Which meant someone 
comes to see me and I know the right consultant for them is Mr X because 
they would get on with them; they both have ability Mr X and Mr Y. But 
you choose horses for courses you can‟t do that anymore…you cannot 
refer directly anyway…through a referral system…managed by clerks 
who decide priority. 
 
Post-fundholding the practice highs were the gains for patients: reduction in waiting 
lists; financial reinvestment of savings in buildings; a radical improvement in the 
working environment.  GPE had proposed to the PCG to take his successful 
fundholding as a model and move forward through a federation of fundholding 
practices, with a board funded by a management fee but was “laughed at…said it 
couldn‟t be done”. Pursued on whether this was what was actually happening with 
practice based commissioning, he agreed that was a similar model but that he was told 
categorically “you can‟t do that in the health service and that‟s exactly what they are 
doing”. The lows were not expressly discussed but are inherent from the interview; 
loss of autonomy; lack of choice; inability to execute creativity. 
 
For GPE personally the absolute low was the abolition of fundholding: 
without a proper replacement to put in place…the rapid change without 
clearly thinking through the consequences of that change…the increase in 
the patient expectation without ability to meet that expectation... not 
giving what patients actually want…it‟s what patients think they are 
getting but they‟re not…You try ringing out of hours. 
 
 
7.2.3 GPH Opportunist and Strong Hybrid Manager  
GPH described himself at this time as the „number two‟, that is not the senior partner, 
but with the role of managing the appointments, finance and practice based 
commissioning. He chose to evaluate each period since fundholding as well as his 
roles at those periods of time. Much of the interview wandered into the GP‟s 
aspirations for PBC, indicative of how at the time of the interviews there was much 
reflection about the fundholding period. Involved and interested parties saw 
similarities to fundholding. 
 
7.2.3.1.GPH and Primary Care Groups 
During this period the GPH was the practice representative who felt it was a period in 
the doldrums: 
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I think there was a lot of frustration because you used to remember what 
you had achieved, what leverage you used to have, what you might have 
achieved, all the statistics you had…it‟s been a period of frustration since. 
There have been changes for the better but there have also been changes 
for the worse. 
 
Frustrations were numerous: inability to do referrals to named consultants; the 
“distractions” of a choose and book system; weakness in the information capability 
of the IT which: 
…there is still infancy despite having increase in technology in hospitals 
and the PCT. I sometimes think the end point of what information was 
required – nobody really thought about that and therefore systems aren‟t 
really geared up for it. 
 
He was further involved with the PCG through the PEC (Professional Executive 
Committee) for a while until “the dissenting view wasn‟t always acknowledged in the 
minutes and I got cheesed off”. However, being “cheesed off” also inspired the GP: 
…eventually I thought – OK I‟ll give it a go, trying again. That was the 
route by which a GP might attempt to influence the acute trust…the 
purchase of secondary care, but I became disillusioned because I thought 
I was just being used as a rubber stamp…I‟m not a representative of the 
GPs. I was appointed by you via an interview so don‟t quote me as 
agreeing to all these changes. 
 
This culminated in GPH‟s pique and subsequent resignation at which point he claimed 
to have become “persona non grata”. However, with the advent of PBC he decided to 
smooth the path to a return to influence. Partners in the practice had specific roles 
including joint effort towards targets but he clearly classed himself as practice 
representative during the PCG period. He attributed that role to default and that the 
“biggest mouths… the most agitating” with the practice appreciating his role at 
getting to the bottom of things in his capacity as the “practice Rottweiler”. 
…so you can hopefully treat our patients but we can write constructive 
letters and know how to use the system correctly and when the system is 
sadly on occasion not delivering in  a big way…know how to use the 
system and to get the system back on track. 
 
The respective role and contributions of GPs and professional managers in the work 
of PCGs clearly irked GPH: 
…the problem is that we‟ve had the same manager going through …I 
don‟t see many new faces and this is one of my concerns and 
agitations…they talk about NHS contracts rather than commercial 
contracts, they still seem very distant from the reality of their 
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decisions…just happy that if they tick boxes, hit target… what they‟ve got 
to pick up on just say, there should be a clause, „treat your patients how 
you‟d treat your family‟. 
 
 
7.2.3.2.GPH and Primary Care Trusts 
 
There were further frustrations for GPH with the advent of PCTs, although he was still 
involved in the PEC: 
…they changed the name of the organisation but I really didn‟t see any 
change in culture. All I‟ve seen over the years is an increasing number of 
people working for them, increasing complexity, increasing number of 
people with job titles…virtues correct but you know, where do these 
people tie in? The organisation at one time had practice health 
visitors…great liaison, you got to know them…you trusted them and vice 
versa…I get a letter from them but I don‟t know them from Adam… There 
have been changes for changes sake; I haven‟t really noticed that it has 
improved the bottom line for the patient. 
 
GPH did not seek and was not a member of the PCT board. PCTs advertised and 
offered remuneration if successfully appointed. However, he supported the use of 
targets as it had generated improvements but that “it has become God for hospital 
managers”. There was concern that there had been little policy reflection on what had 
been good and that ultimately the imposition of targets would result in “get them or 
fiddle them”. A positive for PCTs was the view that they had become more “business 
like” but this was couched with the merger of two PCTs which GPH said was 
characteristic of most mergers of NHS bodies, that “they still have different cultures”. 
He reminisced for lost potential: 
 
…one thing that did work a little bit perhaps, there was at the beginning 
an understanding. They understood how they worked and they understood 
how we worked and we are two different cultures…perhaps we are just 
moving apart again, and considering we are both involve in supposedly 
providing health provision, although we are at the front of the 
organisations, is amazing. 
 
The politics of the NHS clearly frustrates GPH, “driven by dictate and targets” with 
senior people in the PCT arguing that the “political imperative” cannot be ignored and 
therefore that there is no discussion to be had. Further irritations included having 
access to a personal hobby newspaper banned from the NHS web, on the basis it was 
linked to gambling, fuelled with the irony that he could still access sites and “learn 
how to grow marijuana… order an escort…” 
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7.2.3.3.GPH and Practice Based Commissioning  
GPH‟s comments suggested that PBC would have been the ideal progression from 
fundholding and regarded the period in between as somewhat of a lull in the advances 
that fundholding had made for general practice: 
 
…in some ways now we look back at practice based commissioning and 
it‟s going the same as fundholding was and you think –yes! But if fifteen 
years ago we did this… we had all the information and I‟ll say we did this 
fifteen years ago…you just sound like an old fogey who‟s going grey like I 
am now. 
 
Current trends in PBC concerned the GP due to delay in data and the quality of that 
data being “dubious” but after becoming persona non-grata he had begun to renew his 
interest with a view that PBC would become a “significant force” and thus “taking it 
gently at the moment”. Though proceeding with some caution this desire to become 
involved in commissioning was specifically stated to be due to the highly likely 
scenario, in his view, of their being a nominal practice budget “by which you 
eventually you will be judged”: 
 
…you are going to have to stick within your budget to a degree, and the 
way they are getting external providers in through Darzi, through other 
things…if you don‟t hit your budget and you‟re going to repeatedly over 
spend they‟ll say – „twelve months otherwise I know a man who can‟. 
 
Regardless of his involvement and perhaps reflected in his resignation from a practice 
representation role, he did not think anything worked particularly well in PCGs: a loss 
of freedom; elimination of the concept of savings (“never saving money by skimping 
on patient care – made sure they got what they needed…cost effective); political 
interference. 
 
The respective role and contributions of GPs and professional managers continued to 
irk GPH under the PCT: 
…interesting that you use the word professional…I do feel there is a 
cultural problem in PCTs, they work in a very civil service bureaucratic 
fashion…not saying we should have health service run like 
Sainsbury‟s…but some of the things done could be improved…the quality 
and nature of the information…so how can they talk about being 
professional managers when they haven‟t done the data things …send you 
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pages of facts…you want a single summary sheet…drowning in data…you 
need someone to get better quality knowledge from the data. 
 
The information was deemed inadequate and took too long to obtain, “five months to 
get figures from the hospital half a mile away”, and that it was often inaccurate and 
lacked comparatives. 
 
7.2.3.4 GPH and Secondary Care 
This was not an elaborate section of the interview. GPH referred to his direct influence 
with an example rather than expressing any involvement in the management of 
secondary care. He described an incident where one of his patients was treated very 
badly by a hospital and he called for an interview with the chief executive of the acute 
trust. The PCT wished a representative to be there but he instructed them that “they 
were not to contribute you are not part of this meeting… I feel sorry for the 
consultants, aren‟t able to control own waiting lists”. 
 
7.2.3.5    GPH Personal Reflections on Career: Priority for the clinical 
The GP described his career developments in two parts, a priority for the clinical and 
how hard it was to keep up to date with the speed at which medicine advanced and 
how “the way you manage patients has been revolutionised”. The second side was the 
“managerial side of it – as you become more senior you take on more serious aspects 
of running the practice”. 
He had reached the status of number two in the practice and showed no desire to be 
the Senior Partner describing that as a presidential role in practice H, “giving people 
flowers on their birthday when they leave and also has the tough thing when things go 
wrong”. GPH described the number two role as: 
…what I call the politics and the upper echelons of the bureaucracy with 
the acute trusts and PCTs…and what I‟ve notice is that it has become 
more centralised and one can argue so care is equivalent across the 
country…increasingly target driven…and I do believe that managing 
targets is a weakness on many levels…so that it is useful but not so that it 
is absolute. 
 
Managerially the GP thought that his career had been “evolution rather than 
revolution…no actual formal teaching for it”. Pursued on why he chose to do it he 
thought it was because: 
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way I‟m made… I do not deal with staff, I just can‟t do HR, I don‟t deal 
with training…my persona…I am more business-like and that‟s why there 
needs to be a blend because someone in the practice does need to 
occasionally pull me back. 
 
In career terms of security and stability he said that he occasionally had to remind 
staff that “we are lucky, people know unless they are really naughty that here is a job 
for us here”. He pondered that GPs did have a degree of independence and referred 
back to consultants been „told‟ what they will operate on further describing the 
discretion, for example, in participating in the interview itself. There were things to be 
grateful for such as the final salary pension, being able to do the right things for a 
family when health issues arose and being able to have other interests, in this case 
racecourse work: 
…you see everybody should have an interest outside just pure general 
practice or I should go nuts 
 
Rather than creative, GPH   thought himself conservative: 
 
I‟m actually quite conservative in many ways and organisational things – 
I think there can be too much fiddling. I do believe that things evolve, 
technically in medicine and also administration but you‟ve also got to 
remember that every step forward is not saying will be the right step, 
occasionally you have to go backwards…we don‟t do everything…it 
doesn‟t disrupt the financial stability of the practice and it doesn‟t effect 
things in a negative way for patients. 
 
As alluded to throughout this interview autonomy and independence in his career 
were important to this GP but with caution that it could not be to the exclusivity of all 
else: 
…unless we tow the line to some degree somebody will be 
found…Autonomy I think sometimes we take it for granted and think we 
will lose it unless we occasionally reflect on how much autonomy we have 
got…I try to think of an analogy…my omelette pan at home, if anybody 
uses my omelette pan for anything other than omelettes and pancakes I go 
bananas, well there‟s no need but I sort of blaspheme…but you know it is 
my omelette pan. 
 
 
7.2.3.6 Changes Since Fundholding: for Practice and GP 
GPH lamented the demise of fundholding and thought that the state of practice was 
currently back to “square one” despite fundholding generating a shift in quality: 
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…out of the hospital to a private provider…revolutionised the service in 
terms of quality…galvanise the acute trust to get act together and we got 
a new consultant…we handed the service back to them. 
 
The lows for the practice stemmed largely from irritation with the system: rearranged 
appointments and subsequent patients that get lost in the system; perpetual bed crisis 
as the system runs on too high occupancy with no slack in the system; running  a 
system based on average which means “half the time you won‟t get it”. 
 
For the GP becoming persona non grata was a low: 
I‟ve got to be careful…from being very much on the inside…to be very 
much on the outside…someone to be guarded against, and it was a pretty 
uncomfortable time. 
 
The highs: 
I think the highs don‟t come from the administrative side of it, I think the 
highs still come from the clinical side of it. 
 
The clinical side was talked about in the context of a holistic approach with a lengthy 
example that if a patient has dementia then the statistic on their cholesterol is not 
significant to the general practitioner, but whether or not their wife is coping is, and 
helping through organisation of respite care. It was evident that interaction with 
patients was important: 
There‟s some doctors who will find that they are more comfortable taking 
a managerial role than a clinical role, that is fine. In some ways I feel 
sorry for them…I think they‟ll miss out a lot because there is an incredible 
buzz from making a diagnosis…managers can say you didn‟t advise 
properly, and if you think better you can come and do it, and if when we 
start doing the management they‟ll say well you should stick a doctor 
in…I think sometimes the NHS is not ruthless enough in getting rid of its 
less effective managers…effective not efficient…the NHS does not attract 
high quality managers…basically hospital managers should not be telling 
me what to do…they should be saying, here are the facilities which we run 
for you, now do it. 
 
 
7.2.4 GPJ Opportunist and Not a Hybrid Manager 
This GP was working full-time in the same practice. He had been renowned for 
setting fundholding up in the county and had a reputation for being outspoken and 
difficult, not least amongst his peers. 
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7.2.4.1 GPJ and PCGs 
In terms of PCG committees, GPJ, thought that the younger GPs who were active in 
fundholding did get involved, having put themselves up for election (suggesting he 
did not) but views “changed once they got on…because they got told they had 
corporate responsibilities for the decisions made by the PCG”.  
 
After some thought the GP succinctly described PCGs “didn‟t really work” for this 
GP; “we had no control over anything at all”. During this time GPJ was Chair of the 
Local Medical Committee (LMC), partly responsible for working with the healthcare 
authority with the role of bringing PCGs in the area together. Regardless of this 
opinion he was able to cite the only „positive thing‟: 
…what we did manage to do at that time was to actually get all the GPs 
united, sufficiently united to form our own on call co-operative which was 
interesting and an exciting time…co-operative worked extremely well 
indeed…GPs I would say were management leaders… used it as an 
opportunity. 
 
Asked further about his role in management at that time he declared he had not been 
involved in management but he had an appointment at the Health Authority as “Non-
Executive Health Director”. There was a ruling that prevented him from taking part in 
PCG management as a consequence of being in that role. But he was able to influence 
in that role by being  “the bad penny, able to ask the awkward questions”. The 
interviewer asked if it was good to be that bad penny and this revealed: 
…there won‟t be many for very much longer because GPs are not being 
trained in the same way they were…they are just coming into it for a job 
and they are prepared to be managed. I don‟t know how they‟ve managed 
the sea change but the profession has changed so much…I mean I‟ve 
watched colleagues of mine going into management and change from 
being GPs into being managers. 
 
However, the sea change was not as mystical as it might seem as the GP believed that 
civil servants had set out to „manage the profession‟ and since they had the power it 
became an inevitability. On being asked what keeps them as managers: 
They lose a lot of their independent thinking…the old thing from a 
dinosaur like me is that GPs are capable of being independent thinkers 
and that‟s what fundholding gave us…it gave us the opportunity for 
mavericks…needed otherwise things never move forward. 
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As far as the practice went no other partner took on a management role, “not that it 
was a spent force, we just didn‟t see any changes from the PCG”. There was some 
reflection that the other PCG had fared better “financially speaking” because it had 
the mass of maverick GPs and hence patients benefited from better services. In effect 
he thought the “whole thing was a shambles quite frankly. We did manage to preserve 
some of the fundholding management structures”.   
 
7.2.4.2 GPJ and Primary Care Trusts 
Primary Care Trusts instilled anger in this GP. It was clear he wished that those 
structures created by fundholding had been preserved, at least those that were GP 
focussed. Asked about roles and contributions of GPs and professional managers he 
became belligerent “none of the personnel changed… none of the personnel 
changed…they sacked us all”. He described himself as being angry at the time at the 
“final dismantling by the new administration of anything that had gone before”. Other 
partners still did not engage with the PCT, and generically “they were trying to dilute 
the medical profession influence on Primary Care Trust and put in so called other 
professions”. What were the other professions? He could not be sure as he: 
…Wasn‟t close enough to the management situation at that time. I‟d 
moved out from the LMC Chair and I was on the Health Authority and 
effectively persona non grata because the audit committee on last refused 
to sign them because they changed the accounting method, the deficit no 
longer showed. 
 
Thus as a non-executive director on the Health Authority and member of the audit 
committee he had refused to sign off accounts where a deficit had been eliminated due 
to an accounting policy change. 
 
Referring to „management‟ as a  third person, “from the management point of view 
things are beginning to work well with PCTs” however he considered that it wasn‟t 
evidenced based medicine but a „knee-jerk‟ approach which inevitably meant, for 
him, that they would run out of money. 
We get driven down the quote „evidence based medicine‟ level. I‟m 
treating individuals. I don‟t treat herds and a lot of the evidence is to do 
with herds…now I am fast becoming one of the vanishing breeds of GPs I 
think … I‟m a little bit worried about that…when I become infirm I don‟t 
want to be treated according to a list of drugs. 
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Further he pondered on the historic introduction of these „guidelines and the assurance 
at the time about what they were: 
...you don‟t have to follow them, they‟re not like railway lines, they‟re 
only guidelines... they now say „shalt‟ and „if thy don‟t thy shalt not get 
enough money to pay thy staff‟. I think over the next few years there will 
probably be general practices going bankrupt, certainly going out of 
business…independent GPs will disappear completely, we‟ll all be 
salaried and we‟ll all be employed by large organisations. 
 
Asked to summarise what he and the practice got form PCTs, the answer again was 
„not a lot‟ with himself „more cynical‟. On the respective roles and contributions of 
GPs and professional managers he ascribed GPs as coming out of managerial roles 
linked to medicine and into PCT managers but that a mix didn‟t work and referring to 
one GP; “he‟s a director not a medical GP any more”.  
 
 
7.2.4.3 GPJ and Practice Based Commissioning: 
The GP described himself as enthused about PBC initially and “we saw it as 
fundholding without the benefits of fundholding” but as the wrong person to get 
involved. He was not involved and suggested that I should speak to a colleague who 
was a chairman of one of the groups. He seemed to have lost interest when his plans 
for PBC were „stonewalled‟ and he was told he was unable to do things that he 
wished. 
 
7.2.4.4 GPJ and Secondary Care 
In the management of secondary care? I haven‟t been involved as a 
manager in the management of secondary care since 1980 when I was on 
the committee. We had less and less influence over it…hospital colleagues 
are being managed…we are less and less able to have as much contact as 
we used to with our hospital colleagues and therefore we are referring to 
people we don‟t know…what about doing this for a patient or what about 
doing that for a patient. It‟s not easy to do that anymore. 
 
 
Thus for this GP, committee membership is construed as being involved in 
management. Although he said he was not involved he had further comment on the 
evidence based route and the drive for the profession to take that road, “thou shalt not 
do that, and… it‟s easy to become a technician”.  
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7.2.4.5 GPJ Personal Reflections on Career: “Well it peaked around about 
fundholding…I feel less secure now than I ever have done in my entire life” 
 
This GP was clear that fundholding had been the hiatus of his career and the point at 
which he had been most creative in his career followed by “gradual burn out or big 
bruise on forehead trying to batter through and knock some sense into people”.  
Creatively?...during fundholding…I probably listened to my patients more 
than I used to…but I think I listen more now, because that‟s all you can 
do for them. Your clinical options have been cut down. 
 
How career had developed technically was taken ambiguously and narrowed down to 
medicine but he was adamant that he carried on treating patients as he always did, 
implying the protocols of evidence based medicine were not his modus operandi. 
When pursued on that; “Yes well it is just another management tool isn‟t it?” and on 
the managerial reflections on career he thought his career had not developed but it 
seems he meant to the current point as he clarified that it ceased when he left the 
Health Authority Research Ethics Committee. The latter was another revelation of his 
involvement on committees. 
 
In terms of career stability and security GPJ regarded the present as the lowest point of 
his life primarily because: 
I am uncomfortable because of my attitude towards general practice…I 
am an individual and I don‟t necessarily fit into the mould…one of these 
days I might not have a good appraisal and that will give me problems 
towards validation. 
 
In context the comment hinged on being appraised by a younger GP and receiving 
complaints for decisions he‟s made that were “attacking” him. 
 
7.2.4.6 Changes Since Fundholding: Practice and GP 
GPJ described fundholding as driving the NHS which was not optimum from the point 
of view of the managers who “couldn‟t control it”, politically it seemed the 
Conservative government devolvement to local control was favoured by fundholding 
but abolished under the Labour administration, driving towards “bureaucracy, 
bureaucratic control”. Issues for and changes for GPJ since fundholding accumulated 
throughout the interview and some are intertwined in other parts of section 6.4 such as 
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a gradual move away from committee involvement and his disparaging view of 
evidence based medicine, further with the onset of the era of PCTs.  
We has a perfectly good system… they changed the out of hours business 
with a new contract…we lost 24 hour responsibility, changed contracting 
local GPs on call which was run by local GPs for the local population… 
the [our] tender was not accepted…The only group I still desperately try 
to maintain continuity and care with are patients of mine who are dying 
and I will give them my mobile phone number…Unfortunately the 
population as a whole are not aware of these changes all they can see is  
„OK can I now get an appointment at the doctors on a Saturday‟ 
 
With a more direct question on changes it was evident that the GP separated the hiatus 
of his career from a more generic view of fundholding as he recognised the system as 
divisive. However, some of the changes were more linked to what he described the 
„hobby horse‟ of things he disliked such as  disposable instruments and towels and the 
lack of evidence regarding reducing infection alongside a concern with the cost 
relative to non-disposable items. Additional “regrets” were the loss of partners under 
the new system (which he thought would not have occurred had fundholding 
remained) through personnel issues and an inability to embed and get approved a 
clinical software system designed by GPs with amplified concerns over the central 
server system being currently proposed. 
 
More recently a significant low for GPJ was at the start of PBC, although he had been 
enthused about it 
We saw it probably as fundholding, more complete but without the 
benefits. In other words we didn‟t have a much freedom to move the 
money around. I‟m the wrong person to speak to, my colleague was the 
Chairman of a large PCG he took over from me… I just got so peed 
off…the mind-set of the people [at the] PCT stonewalling. 
 
   
7.2.5 GPM Reluctant Innovator and Weak Hybrid Manager 
At the time of the second phase interviews, GPM was working in the same practice on 
a full time basis. The practice continued to share premises with another practice 
although by phase two both practices were in purpose built premises.  
 
 
 
 
228 
 
7.2.5.1 GPM and Primary Care Groups 
Post-fundholding, there had been a decision to split the city into four PCGs. There 
was a strategic decision needed by the practice, to either go with a city PCG or one of 
the geographical PCGs: 
There was quite a lot of argy bargeying about who was going to be in 
which group at the time, quite a lot of manoeuvring…we thought with our 
expertise and management going in with x (was a good idea)…with a 
strong position to provide services… (however) less organised, 
problematical, lots of single handed GPs, so in the end we chose to go 
with Y. 
 
At that point in time GPM was on the “sort of steering committee” but the practice that 
premises were shared with had a GP who decided to stand against GPM resulting in a 
split vote which resulted in her “not having much to do with it after that”. She 
confirmed she had wanted to be involved and seemed sad that she had not achieved 
that through personal involvement at committee level. She attributed a link between 
practice sizes and GPs getting on committees, primarily because it was one vote per 
GP, thus the larger the practice (“some very powerful practices at that time”) the more 
votes a GP from that practice would obtain and hence the link between large practices 
and GPs from large practices being committee bound. 
 
The practice of GPM is in a socially deprived are and the role of advocate was 
apparently stronger, or articulated as such, for this GP than some of the GPs 
interviewed in phase one and two: 
They were motivated and they were political animals and they wanted to 
do it…some practices just aren‟t bothered and only moan when things go 
wrong. I wanted here to be represented because we serve a very deprived 
population…make sure our patients get a fair crack of the whip… And I 
think that if you‟re not in there fighting for them sometimes it is easy to 
forget people because they are not middle class and articulate. 
 
Not being involved therefore seems at odds with the role of advocate however it  
could also be explained in that the practice itself was not „in favour‟ during the PCG 
period. Any innovation gleaned from fundholding had been suppressed or dismissed. 
GPM described a wide range of services that had been generated and operated 
effectively for the practice population however it had been led by two „maverick‟ GPs 
which had been dampened by external agents with the introduction of: 
...more and more paperwork and more and more clinical governance 
which is a good thing in many ways...So we stopped doing all that and 
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then converted things into more social stuff so we got the healthy living 
centre…increased mental health team provision so we sort of moved 
things round. 
 
In respect of who got on committees it was suggested that it depended whose „face 
fitted‟ at any point in time and with the practice out of favour, practice M‟s faces „did 
not fit‟ and there was no committee involvement.  
 
7.2.5.2 GPM and Primary Care Trusts 
With the advent of PCTs came new staff within the PCT and GPM thought that the 
practice collectively fared better, however the practice had shifted considerably from 
what GPM called a „medical model‟ to a „social model‟ supported by PCT with which 
there was a much better relationship and further: 
I do have a roll there now and in the district as clinical lead for xyz…get 
paid at the moment…job share but my buddy decided to resign due to 
pressure of work… so I‟m left, yes, doing an impersonation of a headless 
chicken, which is quite exciting and I also do a session in psychiatry. 
 
The GP was asked how she became involved in delivery of this specialist secondary 
care and it arose from having been on a steering group in that specialised clinical area. 
She was approached by a manager to get involved which has culminated in further 
study and professional study for this GP. The further study is in the area of 
management including leadership, service re-design and change management. On 
who got on PCT committees: 
Guess what – same old! Although there was a little bit of a shake-up. To 
be fair, this PCT is committed to clinical engagement…do have a number 
of clinical leads…and we‟ve got a sort of line manager that looks after us 
all and makes sure we are doing our bit. 
 
Thus although not involved in committees, there was participation at clinical lead 
level. None of the other partners were involved in committees. GPM interpreted 
committees in the context of clinical leads within the PCTs, all of whom are line 
managed by a manager in the PCT who looks after the clinical lead group. GPM was 
asked if it was more integrated and supported than when fundholding: 
I think the clinical governance stuff and support for clinicians is better. I 
mean I work very closely with the commissioners now…we talk to each 
other I know what they are expecting, what they‟re wanting and you have 
to be corporate to a certain extent… but they do take on board what you 
advise. 
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Despite a recurrent theme about clinical governance being a good thing, arising from 
that approach GPM did not feel trusted and found it sad that so much auditing of her as 
a GP went on, “taking clinical governance to the nth degree, just in case”. In terms of  
what worked well in PCTs GPM considered that care was improved through that 
mechanism of clinical governance. 
 
For GPM there was concern about the level of staff at the PCT which was also linked 
to her personal issue of „trust‟: 
One concern…a lot of that has come from central…they don‟t always join 
the commissioning, the contracting and the clinical engagement and they 
clearly don‟t talk to each other… They‟re so busy making sure that we 
tick all the right boxes and do you know lots of bean counting… I don‟t 
think they trust us. I don‟t feel trust as a clinician particularly which I 
think is very sad…you‟ve got that many people coming in and auditing 
you and you know messing about… 
 
Despite reservations and lack of „joined up thinking‟ from the bodies that disseminate 
the rules, GPM was positive about what clinical governance had achieved overall, 
reporting that  in terms of performance management, at least for under achieving 
practices, it should have improved care and was therefore contributing to „good care‟ 
overall. In summarising the positive and negatives for GPM, the negatives were the 
bureaucracy but appreciating that it was dictats to the PCT that they were simply 
implementing. The second overall negative for PCTs was the lack of appreciation that 
„ten grand, wow, big deal so what, but to us it could make the difference between over 
drawn at the bank or not‟. Numerous other financial irks were mentioned but overall 
GPM thought she managed it, “I have to go through the budget line by line”.  
 
For GPM, personally the PCT facilitated involvement in a specialist area where she 
became clinical lead which enabled “service re-design, sort the pathway out… a 
vision which locally is healthy ambitions for mental health”. This prompted the 
question, was this as exciting as fundholding or better? 
Not from the practice‟s point of view, fundholding was more exciting, 
because you felt that element of control. You had autonomy and if stuff 
went wrong you could pick the phone up and say “I‟m not happy with this 
and what are you going to do about it”…now you don‟t have that sort of 
power as a practice at all. 
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With that control came power for the practice who could threaten to move contracts if 
there was discontent with providers for whatever reason. GPM had implied that it was 
as exciting personally for her in her current role. 
 
 
7.2.5.3 GPM and Practice Based Commissioning 
GPM‟s practice was part of a PBC alliance which was, in her opinion, a good vehicle 
for obtaining “the extra stuff” which could be more people and other funding through 
„new‟ services. Later, she reflected on the weaknesses of PBC relative to fundholding. 
 
7.2.5.4 GPM and Secondary Care 
This question was omitted in error during the interview 
 
7.2.5.5 GPM Personal Reflections on Career  
GPM had wanted to be a GP but was unable to obtain a job after training because there 
were „too many GPs‟. After a period in waiting and missing a couple of GP posts she 
was eventually successful with the present practice “full time and I just did 
surgeries…nine surgeries a week”. Now that is five surgeries because of the other 
activities which include the clinical lead, specialist surgeries and also chair of the 
attached health living centre which is part of the practice premises. In addition “the 
sort of management stuff” such as personnel. 
 
Technically the GP identified her specialism as having developed alongside having 
“learned a lot of clinical management prescribing stuff…master‟s course…and I‟m an 
expert of Google Scholar”. In terms of developing managerially and security and 
stability it is clear that there had been significant events affecting this small group of 
practices within one building. This included the death, in surgery, of a fellow GP from 
the alliance (also interviewed in phase one of this study), a death of another doctor 
and one doctor being struck off. In terms of creativity in career GPM regarded the 
mental health interest as “more serendipity than anything else” and that she had 
developed now with a “much more systematic “approach. 
 
Autonomy and independence had been mentioned throughout the interview and in the 
context of career this GP had more to say: 
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I don‟t think we are anymore, it‟s a myth. Technically we are independent 
contractors…more from a tax point of view, so we‟re self-employed…we 
have so many hoops to go through…supply so much information and do 
things in a certain way…most of the time they‟re fine [the protocols]…I 
quite like the security of that…this government has made it quite clear it 
doesn‟t like GPs…renegade on lots of things and through spin made GP‟s 
look very bad…salaried GPs don‟t [do extra surgeries] unless you pay 
them extra…and because it is your business and you‟re a partner and 
you‟re committed and go the extra mile. 
 
7.2.5.6 Changes Since Fundholding: Practice and GP 
During the fundholding period GPM observed the practice getting more services in 
house and greater creativity which got services closer to the patients. For GPM it was 
an “exciting time” in the practice history as they were able to think “well we‟d like to 
be able to do this and we‟ve got this money, right we‟ll do that” which all ended when 
fundholding ceased. However, being a small practice without large „consortium power 
was considered a disadvantage at that time, not having the “big power that the bigger 
boys had” which GPM reflected on as being divisive. Practices that did not go 
fundholding, in her view, were disadvantaged, hence the divisiveness which she 
seemed uncomfortable with. 
It was divisive and I suppose going to a model where everybody‟s treated 
the same…same management and performance management does have its 
pluses. But I think in some ways it‟s a shame it went and yes I personally 
enjoyed it a great deal…the new order is better for all practices. I think 
fundholding benefited those practices who really took it on board and got 
out there and were prepared to work at it. 
 
Taking this latter comment further GPM was asked if it was the nature of the practice 
or the lead partners that drove fundholding forward successfully and categorically 
stated that “it‟s your personalities; it‟s your GP and your manager”. 
 
For GPM personally she did enjoy fundholding and thought she had worked very hard 
at in together with the fund manager and had “felt in control…doing something 
personally to benefit the patients. We didn‟t make savings though”. The savings, 
which some practices had used to enhance practice infrastructure (see practice A and 
E for example) were not absent through lack of effort but in this GPs view “they never 
got our budgets right in my view, so we were never going to make any savings”. This 
implies that the she thought there had been a savings incentive built in to the budgets, 
whereas the reality is that in the absence of good data from practices the budget levels 
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were based on chance and fortune, consequential savings of fundholding were not 
really linked to performance. Thus this GP saw fundholding as an incentive scheme 
even though unable to take advantage of it and that the ability to track patients was a 
bonus which when couched in the context of PBC was preferable: 
The problem with PBC is that most clinicians are apathetic about it…we 
go to meetings because we have to... it has done some good things – yes, 
we got new services but the data is appalling …the other thing with 
fundholding, the systems were all set up, you could track the patients 
through. You knew down to the last penny what you‟d spent and what you 
were doing…PBC even with improved IT the data is absolutely 
shocking…how can you act on something and save money unless you 
know what is happening? 
 
 
7.2.6 GPO  Reluctant Innovator and Not a Manager 
This was a difficult interview, albeit short, for different reasons to say, GPE. This was 
because it emerged after a difficult and series of stunted responses that this was the 
day that GPO had resigned. Although responses were stunted they were thought 
without hesitation and resolute. For this reason the interviewer had to question further, 
with responsive questions to sometimes one sentence answers whilst not leading the 
subject. 
 
7.2.6.1 GPO and Primary Care Groups 
GPo   was asked how he was personally involved in PCGs: 
…we had meetings regularly to discuss the way forward. It was by no 
means as hands on as fundholding …fundholding was exciting…and to be 
honest I‟d lost interest a little bit with it. I think the meetings I went to I 
felt quite depressed and down about it. 
 
He ascribed his loss of interest in the era of PCGs down to the degree of change that 
had gone on, change that he could not cope with, and “I think that it was less hands on 
and lost controls”. Having mentioned an alliance, that line of enquiry was pursued. It 
was a fundholding group alliance of similar practices that could work together during 
the slide into PCGs however he “took more of a back seat. I went to the meetings and 
sat there”. Evidently another partner came along at the time and gradually took over 
what GPO described as “that sort to role”. This was pursued and defined by GPO as: 
Sort of external management as opposed to internal management within 
the practice. So he‟s taken over that role, he‟s become a member of the 
LMC…goes to meetings with the practice manager. 
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However GPo did note that the majority of people on PCG committees had been 
involved in the fundholding group, “a continuation”. He did not think anything 
worked well with PCGs and of particular detriment was the “lost track of waiting 
lists, we lost control of the actual money really”. He believed that the practice had 
“lost out” in being part of a PCG and that he got “nothing much at all, I don‟t think I 
got stressed”. On the respective roles and contribution of GPs during this time he 
stated that “I don‟t think I can put anything into words really” and the tone was wry 
with humour, a „no comment‟ scenario. 
  
7.2.6.2 GPo and Primary Care Trusts 
Involvement in PCTs was still in the lead partner role, “a natural progression” and 
again going “to meetings but that was about it”. The partner who had become more 
externally engaged started “to take over more and more”. It was an opportune moment 
to ask about what sort of people got onto committees and if there was any significant 
change to the type of people that became involved during PCTs. That engagement 
was assigned to the “definite clique of people that got on…I think I was being a bit 
cynical about what went on in the committees”. This suggests that he did not assign 
himself to that group, or clique. Reasons for that remoteness became apparent: 
When it was fundholding everything was, or everything was to do with our 
practice, was out in the open, we knew exactly where we were, we knew 
exactly what the money situation was even though it is not real money, it 
was sort of virtual money, and then it was PCTs. It sort of got vague, and 
now it‟s even vaguer. 
 
The interviewer asked if that meant that one could measure the  impact beyond 
doctoring during fundholding, an awareness of the consequence of doctoring actions, 
that is see more of a consequence of what one was doing as a GP: 
Yes I think you could see more of what you were doing but now there‟s 
several black bags of money and money gets transferred from various 
black bags to other black bags and you still don‟t know what is going on. 
 
It seems that fundholding and the costs attached to doctoring were more transparent 
and of some apparent benefit and advantage. Asked what would motivate the GP to 
wanting to know about where the money under more current funding regimes 
prompted the response of “nothing because I‟ve handed my notice of resignation in 
today”.  
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Thus the GP did not think much worked well for PCTs primarily because they were 
becoming “vast organisations” and that ultimately the practice lost out through the 
funding mechanism which in his view averaged funding out as opposed to moving 
practices on. More currently the newer PCTs were being less successful as 
fundamentally different organisations were being forced together. 
 
7.2.6.3 GPO and Practice Based Commissioning 
Thus the vastness of PCTs concerned this GP, more currently the newer PCTs were 
being less successful as fundamentally different organisations were being merged 
with “different financial structures and they tried to pull it all apart again,” On the 
respective roles of GP and professional managers he did not know much about it, 
although thought GPs still had opportunity to get involved “but there seems to be a 
big management organisation down at X Mill”: 
…people have sort of moved about and changed roles and I don‟t know if 
they have the qualifications to do those roles. So it's all management, so 
long as you can manage a flock of hens you know you can manage a 
group of GPs 
 
 
7.2.6.4 GPO and Secondary Care 
Since fundholding had stopped this GP did not believe he had been involved in the 
management of secondary care and missed it but “taking into account  what we have 
to do these day I wouldn‟t have had time now to do that sort of stuff”. 
 
7.2.6.5    GPo Personal Reflections on Career: “Fighting against a river of mud” 
GP‟s views on how his career had developed since fundholding was summarised as 
“just felt more stressful and fighting against a river of mud”.    GPO professed to 
enjoying the patient side but “just all the management side” had gotten him down. 
Technically he suggested that he had “learned more stuff” and on probing he 
described this as a “broader expertise in everything, but not great expertise just little 
bits of expertise”. As far as the management side he explained that he managed the 
financial decisions for the surgery, in conjunction with other partners, taking the lead, 
but did not think he managed anything specific other than that at this stage of his 
career. 
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Security and stability were couched in terms of the resignation and retirement 
coinciding with his wife‟s retirement and “thought mmmm…yes…I‟ve had enough”. 
In terms of creativity he did not believe his career had developed since fundholding 
and on fundholding: 
…we could look at what services were available and there was also 
x
5…almost a poly clinic…Well! It is a poly clinic…all this stuff about poly 
clinics is a load of rubbish…fundholding savings were 
pooled…consultants came in, minor ops…the whole lot…and now it is all 
being dissolved. 
 
It was evident that the dissolution of this poly clinic was a bone of contention and 
sensitive for GPO to both talk about in an interview and for personal reasons.  
 
Questioned about autonomy and independence he was pensive: 
I‟m not certain about that. Probably more isolated which is the same as 
being independent but just a little bit of an edge to being isolated rather 
than being independent… 
 
On further enquiry „isolation‟ was in the context of not being part of a team, 
seemingly GPs “a group of us just generally and gradually pulled out of the 
meetings and we‟re sort of seen as grumpy old men”. This situation, according to 
GPO arose from newcomers (GPs) “coming in at the bottom, taking more of an 
active or pushy role”. However, on reflection he contemplated that “maybe we 
thought we‟d had our time and done what we could and let somebody else have to 
manage the change”. 
 
7.2.6.6 Changes since fundholding: practice and GP 
The highs for the practice were moving into new build premises and the lows were 
illness of GPO and another partner, “that wasn‟t anything to do with the NHS and 
the PCT gave us loads of support”. For the GP himself there had been no highs 
since fundholding, “now it‟s just mundane stuff”, and was fundholding a high: 
 
Oh yes, yes…It just gave us something to do different, you know, it was 
exciting.  
 
 
                                                     
5
 Anonomised to retain confidentiality. 
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7.3 Engagement in Management After Fundholding 
The study so far has examined why doctors took a management role in primary care 
and uses the legacy of fundholding to analyse how doctors in primary care engaged in 
management. As the literature developed post 2000 the doctor in secondary care (see 
Table 5.4) was discussed in the context of a hybrid manager and for the first time this 
thesis brings the discussion to primary care. This section identifies how the GPs 
engaged in management by hybrid manager category in order address the fifth 
research question: did doctors continue to engage in management after fundholding 
and in the case of those who did not take hybrid manager roles did they develop such 
roles after fundholding? Further by asking a sixth question, how did careers fare after 
fundholding there may be some indication of how the factors that influenced the 
engagement fit with a continued or developed role in management (Figure 6.5). The 
analysis aims to identify if doctors engaged in management when budgets were 
withdrawn and if that was an element they missed (Goldie and Sheffield, 2001) which 
would indicate that accounting change is important (Hopwood, 1987) and Hood‟s 
implications for accounting (1991; 1995) are an important aspect in getting doctors in 
primary care involved in management. Aligned with the importance of accounting, 
manifested as budgets in fundholding, some insights may be gained on the 
implications of how clinicians cope with financial responsibility and retaining 
financial control (Llewellyn, 2001; Jacobs, 2005; Hannah et al., 2005). 
 
7.3.1 Strong Hybrid Managers 
The strong hybrid managers did continue some role in management according to 
categories explicated by the adaptation of the Stewart (1992) framework. Both GPA 
and GPH had continued in a variety of management roles post fundholding both inside 
and outside the practice. GPH chose committee involvement in PCGs whilst GPA did 
not because of the over-politicisation of the process. Both clearly demonstrated 
frustration in their roles as PCG‟s functions were more central, more so GPH who was 
piqued by his inability to influence to such an extent that he resigned from his 
management role. GPH did not resume a management role within PBC as the targets 
(which he agreed were a good thing) were used for political ends. On the other hand, 
GPA relished PBC and a return to management. GPA was also in favour of targets for 
the practice as long as he could be involved in the activity of achieving them and 
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influencing outcomes but was categorically not interested in interfacing secondary 
care commissioning process itself but had been on a committee. 
 
One of the key differences that GPA   had compared to phase one was an acceptance 
of a more collegiate/ corporate approach but not necessarily involvement in that 
shared style. Once work share in the capacity of joint chairing arose with a fellow GP 
he stepped aside and became less involved in management. Also, management 
initiatives had fulfilled his „next mountain‟ as he enjoyed learning and development. 
The focus on the unit domain also was important (see Figure 6.5), being happy to 
engage in management if it influences primary care but not commissioning. When the 
possibility of focus on the practice in a management role reduced then the strength of 
engagement was reduced. It seems the more remote the activity from the practice the 
less happy he was to be engaged in a management role. However, public activities and 
networking were still important as he enjoyed being involved with like-minded 
individuals in order to drive things forward.  
 
Similar to GPA, GPH had continued to engage in management but became increasingly 
frustrated as some of the factors (Figure 6.5) were weakened, all of which undermined 
his perceived usefulness as patient advocate and ability to influence the system. 
Additionally he missed being the budget holder, using statistics and information to 
gain leverage for management. This is similar to GPA who missed the target and 
financial aspects and accountability which with it brought visibility. GPH‟s strength of 
engagement was also reduced as he perceived the roles on the larger scale, away from 
the unit domain, as representing GPs as a body rather than the practice – „as a rubber 
stamp‟. This suggests that networking activities have to be linked to the unit domain 
and the patient; that is they must have some internal management benefit. 
 
Thus stronger hybrid managers engagement in management was weakened by: work 
share with fellow professionals; lack of financial data; lack of financial 
accountability; lack of focus on the practice domain. 
 
7.3.2 Weak Hybrid Managers 
GPE did not put himself forward for committees for PCG but GPM did and was 
unsuccessful. GPE was despondent about those who did on the context of their 
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contribution to politicisation and bureaucratisation of the commissioning process. It 
appears that both were unsuccessful in developing their choice of management role 
for political reasons within the geography of the area the respective practices operated 
in and lack of „face-fitting in‟. Despite not engaging in management roles beyond the 
practice boundary GPE was still the practice conduit between doctoring and PCG a 
„lead‟ within the practice. GPE relinquished his external expert role as a doctor in 
management and found a new „hobby‟ in relation to IT and the electronic patient 
record, concerning himself with grander NHS policy.  Similarly because GPM could 
not get on PCG committees she chose the innovation of developing the practice into a 
healthy living centre which subsequently led to involvement of committee in the PCT 
era as a clinical engagement lead. 
 
Similar to strong hybrid managers, for LPE the more remote the activity was from the 
hub of the activity within the practice the less happy he was to be engaged with that 
activity. As a weak hybrid manager, post-fundholding he was less involved in 
committees that related to PCTs and PCGS because of personal characteristics, as an 
opportunist he was always a maverick and opinionated – his way or the highway and 
models after fundholding were less practice focussed. Both weak hybrid managers 
sought committee roles, public activities, one in IT and the other in mental health. 
Although LPE sought such a role for a personal reason LPM specifically went on 
committees in order to influence and present the position of her unit domain in order 
to improve patient care, both factors a positive influence towards stronger engagement 
in management. 
 
On reflection, LPM was attracted by the incentive side of the fundholding scheme and 
the accountability for funds and more disillusioned with PBC for which she could not 
track funds. Fundholding was deemed good because of good quality data which 
helped GPs make informed decisions. It seems that LPM, though a weaker engager in 
management was as much involved as the two lead GPs identified as strong but this 
contrast to LPE. However, LPM was a reluctant innovator and not as selfish (Figure 
6.5) as LPE. 
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7.3.3 Not Hybrid Managers 
Similar to LPE, LPJ was an opportunist who continued to engage in committees post-
fundholding however for both LPE and LPJ committee membership was about broader 
NHS policy (Figure 6.5), IT and ethics, rather than patient centric. They were still 
involved in potential management aspects but not a practice influence level. This 
contrast to GPO who specifically did not get involved in management roles as the lack 
of focus on the unit domain was missing. GPO withdrew back to the internal workings 
of the practice and did not progress towards a management role which is consistent 
with the lack of hybridisation determined by phase one analysis. 
 
7.3.4 How the Factors that Influenced Engagement Fit with a Continued or 
Developed Role in Management 
There is some evidence that work sharing with partners within the practice is not 
favoured by GPs who want to engage in management, GPA disengaged from a 
management role after fundholding when that happened. This may be linked to the 
desire for an expert role as part of the hybrid manger make up and pursuing the next 
mountain. That expert role also seems to be supported when there is potential to 
develop an external expert role pursued through networking in a way that protects the 
practice via boundary management (Stewart, 1982). Networking does foster 
engagement in management as indicated by GPA, GPE and GPM the former indicating 
that networking with the PCT, for example, produced good management practice.  
 
There is less opportunity to engage actively in management for the GPs in terms of 
the design of commissioning models after fundholding and the researcher is unable to 
determine if work share and delegation within the practice are key to better 
engagement in management. However, the extraction of themes arising from satisfiers 
and dissatisfiers based on the Buchanan et al. (1997) summary will give insights into 
work share, delegation and  the financial responsibility by having asked the GPs about 
subsequent commissioning models and the highs and lows of fundholding (Appendix 
2). 
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7.4 The Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction of Being Involved in Management: 
Reflections on Career 
Whilst phase one interviews enabled the identification of the factors that characterised 
different degrees of engagement in management (Figure 6.5 and 6.6) and the direction 
of the factors that influenced the engagement in management, phase two reflection 
and interpretation add a further richness to the study. The questions about PCGs and 
PCTs enabled GPs to reflect on their career and identify what satisfied them and 
dissatisfied them. 
 
The second phase of interviews reveal individual difference and allow the differences 
to be interpreted, helped by the terminology of Schein‟s (1978) model. That model 
was never intended to recommend a model for career development (Arthur et al., 
1989). Accordingly, this study does not seek to recommend a career development path 
for doctors in primary care but it does enable some factors to be identified that might 
engage doctors in management for another end. It seems that having had a taste of 
management in primary care as part of fundholding that all of those who had some 
role as lead partner, continued or tried to continue in some form. Having tasted 
accountability and management as a consequence of being awarded a budget the 
interviews encouraged the GPs to reflect on what satisfied them and what did not. The 
next section seeks to tabulate those factors that satisfied and dissatisfied doctor in 
management supported by hindsight. It enhances the literature because it is a post-
fundholding analysis of doctors in management. Further it can be used to augment the 
missing sections from the comparison with secondary care begun in Table 5.3. Each 
type is considered comparing the two in each group to each other to identify: any 
continuation in management roles; satisfier and dissatisfier elements; reflections of 
career. These stories behind the GPs in management roles beyond fundholding are 
analysed to inform a tabulation of satisfiers and dissatisfiers of doctors in 
management to add to the literature broadly but particularly the gap in primary care 
the latter possible because of the legacy of fundholding). The summary in Table 7.2 is 
extracted from the stories in the case studies in the first section of this chapter. 
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GP Satisfiers Dissatisfier 
A 
Strong 
Hybrid 
Ability to learn something new. 
Benefit for patients – high level of reality 
Influence, enhancement and choice and at 
practice level. 
Delivery extra „things‟ in house. 
Keep ahead of the game – avoid being left 
behind. 
Getting involved in collective management with 
like-minded GPs - networking 
Use of targets for the practice. 
Making rounded and informed decision. 
Independent decision for patient good. 
Being part of decision making process 
Over politicisation. 
Practice being less central to reforms. 
Management activities being held outside the 
practice. 
Not having enough time to do management 
well a part of a core activity. 
Sharing lead roles with fellow GPs 
H 
Strong 
Hybrid 
Leverage to achieve for patients. 
Targets to improve healthcare. 
“Good teacher of administrative stuff”. 
Incentive for and invigoration of interest in 
general practice. 
 
 
 
Practice less central to reforms. 
Inability to send patients to named 
consultants. 
Distractions of headline practices such as 
„choose and book‟ which made little real 
difference to patient care. 
More faceless administrators external to the 
practice and less face to face health care 
personnel in practice. 
Politicization of targets. 
Too much data and not enough information 
from the data – lack of statistics. 
E Weak 
Hybrid 
Ability to use entrepreneurial skills. 
Develop things he could not have done without 
it. 
“Enjoyed it”. 
Negotiating and ability to innovate. 
Developing the practice. 
Ability to influence where organisation was 
starved of funds. 
Autonomy. 
Developing relationships – driving things 
forward with like-minded people. 
Having choice. 
Over-politicisation. 
Non- GP opportunity to contribute to new 
administrative structures. 
Observation of rules and regulations, 
pathways and protocols. 
Not being a budget holder. 
Overly prescriptive rules. 
 
M  
Weak 
Hybrid 
Fighting for patients‟ benefits. 
In-house services bringing services closer to the 
patient. 
Being in control for the benefit of the patients. 
Ability to track patients under fundholding 
initiative. 
Lack of trust from administrative bodies 
demonstrated by audit of GPs. 
J 
Not a 
Hybrid 
Manager 
Being able to move money around. 
Being in control. 
Ability to be creative. 
Ideas being resisted. 
Poor management structures. 
Bureaucratic control. 
O 
Not a 
Hybrid 
Manager 
Excitement. 
Transparency of where money was being spent. 
Being part of a team. 
Not being a ‟hands on‟ and less control. 
More external focus. 
Stress. 
 
Table 7.2 The satisfiers and dissatisfiers of doctors involved in management 
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7.4.1 What Was Satisfying About Being Involved in Management 
The hybrid managers, more so the strong ones, in Table 7.2 were satisfied by being 
able to do something in management for the patients. This is consistent with primary 
care (Brazell, 1987 and Fitzgerald 1994) and that management should have a high 
level of relevance to the reality of the primary role of the professional. Challenge and 
individual development feature strongly, for example learning something new for 
GPA, being taught something for GPH, development and enterprise for LPE, fighting 
for LPM. Even the non-hybrids reflected on and missed creativity and excitement 
which suggest that individual development is a strong motivator into management 
across the profession generally and the individual sectors of secondary and primary 
care (as noted in Table 5.4). 
 
7.4.2 Budgets, Accounting and Financial Responsibility 
The strong hybrid GPs missed targets, the weaker hybrids missed not being budget 
holders and even those not engaged in management missed the transparency of the 
financial responsibility for the money. None of the respondents emphasised financial 
incentive of savings per se but did refer to being able to develop the practice, 
influencing with financial control. The GPs clearly relished financial control because 
of what it facilitated them to do and be. It can be argued that above all it assisted in 
the governance and control of the organisation and the professional lives of the GPs. 
It demonstrates that accounting in situ has begun to create social order (see Table 2.1). 
It enabled influence and enhancement of GP services beyond the practice boundary 
while enhancing the notions of professionalism for the GP ( Harrison and Pollitt, 
1994): it reduced outside interference and created autonomy and enhanced self-
regulation, thus increasing the functionality of professional arrangement; it increased 
occupational control by giving the GPs more congenial working conditions both 
physically and mentally, the latter  through choices; it supported autonomy and 
increased the illusion as they felt more in control and proactive when costs and 
referrals were tied up in contracting. 
 
7.4.3 Dissatisfiers for the Doctors Involved in Management 
What comes across strongly in terms of dissatisfiers is that engaging doctors in 
management may be weakened when the scale of the entity to be organised is too  
244 
 
Evidence from Buchanan 
et al. (1997): Evidence 
from Secondary Care 
Existing Primary Care 
Evidence: Literature 
Review 
Evidence from this Study in Primary 
care 
Tensions develop between 
professionally representing 
colleagues and managing 
(overriding them). 
Tensions: No evidence but 
lead GPs worried about it 
(Newton et al, 1993). Lead 
partner practice role did 
not differ to the pre-
fundholding role. 
Tensions: Not in the fundholding 
practices. Phase two indicates that not 
being able to influence when other could 
by being on committees created tensions 
across the GP community. Work share of 
management type roles for GPs reduces 
engagement in management. 
Defensive engagement: no 
sense of purpose or 
ambition for management 
Common that it was not 
purposeful engagement, 
e.g. Ennew et al, (1998). 
Lead partner types analysis: guardian; 
reluctant innovator; opportunist 
Lack of clear definition of 
the role and lack of 
management training 
Fundamental characteristic 
of the implementation of 
the scheme. 
Fundamental characteristic of the 
implementation of the scheme. The 
choice and freedom to devise 
administrative structures and teams within 
the practice encouraged engagement in 
management. 
Management as a 
necessary burden; a 
position to be handed on 
Disgruntled at 
management role e.g.  
Greenfield and Nayak 
(1996). Concept of the 
„next mountain‟ 
Glennerster et al., (1993). 
Those identified as hybrid managers 
sustained their role as far as the regimes 
post-fundholding would allow. Hybrid 
managers were less influential in 
achieving management roles in new form 
PCGs/PCTs and found other „hobbies‟ 
when the factors that influenced them 
were weakened. 
Influence on the hospital 
management process was 
limited 
No evidence of driving the 
other partner‟s decision 
making in general practice 
process either clinically or 
managerially. 
No evidence of driving the other partner‟s 
decision making in general practice 
process either clinically or managerially. 
However, involvement in protocol and 
pathway audits by those in more 
management roles did cause some 
tensions. 
Satisfier elements: access 
to information; problem 
solving; contribution to 
service development 
No analysis or indicators. See Table 7.2 
Dissatisfier elements: 
unrealistic targets; 
paperwork; time pressures 
No analysis or indicators. See Table 7.2 
Advice to other: Don‟t do 
it; understand the time 
pressure; have prior 
management  training; 
delegate; get good support; 
establish voice on hospital 
board 
No analysis or indicators.  
Table 7.3 Comparing Primary Care Evidence from the Literature to  
Secondary Care: evidence from this study of doctors in management 
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large, not just because of lack of lead roles but because GPs do not seem to like to 
work in shared lead roles with fellow GPs. GPs do not like group representation in 
matters that cross into the practice boundary and refer to over-politicization and less 
practice based reforms. This contrasts to fundholding with smaller units, being in 
control of the practice domain with networking beyond the practice boundary. Further 
dissatisfiers reflect the opposite of choice as there is more prescription after 
fundholding and more external administrative structure, protocols and rules to 
impinge on autonomy. GPs do not take well to being told what to do by fellow GPs or 
managers but do engage in management more strongly when they can create their 
own team and work share with them liaising with other professionals by networking. 
In such a designed structure they are able to devolve financial responsibility but retain 
financial control and be „in‟ management. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to present the analysis to address research question 
five and six: did lead partners continue to engage in management after fundholding; 
how did lead partners careers fare after fundholding?  It seeks to identify if the career 
choices in management are sustained, the interview method allows GPs to reflect, and 
thereby the researcher to identify any satisfier, dissatisfier elements and make 
recommendations for the primary care sector on engagement as a doctor in 
management in the forthcoming chapter. 
 
Fundholding enabled doctors to decide if they wished to sign up for a management 
role. The practice went fundholding and the lead partner took the role. The role of 
doctors in the management of primary care does not have an extensive literature and 
the most significant transformation of general practice via a NPM led reform has been 
little documented. This is the only study that progressed case studies of GPs in a 
management role in primary care in order to identify how doctors engage in 
management and if that role continues to give insights into a hybrid manager role for 
doctors. This enables a contrast to the evidence from secondary care and extends the 
literature on doctors in management in primary care. Table 7.3 compares the evidence 
in this study to secondary care and completes some of the evidence lacking in Tables 
5.3 and 5.4  
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Contrary to the doctors in secondary care, the doctors in this study who adopted 
management are satisfied by it. The analysis has shown that there are factors that 
contribute to the different levels of engagement in management and that even 
unenthusiastic GPs given the right conditions will engage in management activities 
which with the right policy will align with more efficient, effective resource 
allocation in the NHS. It is true to say that not all GPs, given the choice, want to 
engage in management, and even those that do may not become some level of hybrid 
manager.  
 
Choice is important for doctors engaging in management. When larger units of 
accountability reduce choices then doctors may become less involved in the 
management as work share is manifested; not because of lack of opportunity but the 
uncongeniality of such arrangements. Doctors become less involved when the notions 
of professionalism are reduced; essentially the unit domain becomes less of a 
consideration in the structure. The lack of prescription and training actually worked to 
the advantage of getting doctors involved in management as it furthered choice. This 
also suggest that recommending compulsory management training to doctors is 
counterproductive, some will not want to be managers, some will but may be 
dissuaded by the prescriptiveness of the training.  
 
The study has shown that doctors are not always defensive towards management. The 
doctors in the case studies do have a sense of purpose and ambition for management 
as indicated by the satisfiers and dissatisfiers in table 7.2. Further, they do want 
budgets and accountability as it gives them power to influence and enhance patient 
care and their role in the NHS. The fight for autonomy does not loom large nor the 
financial incentives and there is purposeful engagement as indicated by strong and 
weak hybrid managers.  
 
While accounting itself has not proved significant at practice level; it has created 
social order and created the opportunity to engage in management. At first, the study 
concluded that contracting was more important but the visibility that accounting gave 
was missed on the demise of fundholding. Hence, the allocation of budget at the level 
of the unit domain of the practice is an important facilitator for engaging doctors in 
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management. That is not through the purpose of financial incentive but for the change 
it brings through creating order and visibility is an important consideration. 
 
The evidence from secondary care also suggests that doctors advise others to delegate 
as much as they can, which brings along the hybridization versus polarisation debate. 
However, in this study the stronger hybridization is characterised by work share and 
understanding with the management team of fundholding which work stronger with 
the outward facing networking activities. That in turn facilitates stronger boundary 
management to protect the practice and its patients. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined fundholding, an experiment (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997) 
in New Public Management (NPM), which exhibited the elements of NPM suggested 
by Pollitt (1993). It was a voluntary initiative that had implications for accounting 
(Hood, 1991; 1995) when some General Practitioners (GPs) elected for an increased 
role in the financial management of primary care. This chapter summarises and 
develops the work of the previous seven, enhancing the discussion by reflecting on 
the interplay between accounting practice and management activity, and discusses key 
contributions. Through an inductive approach and interpretive analysis this study 
shows how the practice of accounting, creating economic visibility, enabling 
governance and control by GPs, meant that some doctors in primary care engaged in 
management. Accounting is shown to be more than a function and technical 
instrument of NPM (Laughlin, 1991; Lapsley, 1999) revealing interplay between its 
practice, creating accountability, and encouraging management activity that 
culminates in its capability to facilitate a hybrid manager role for doctors, previously a 
profession  reluctant to engage in management, (Hunter, 1992; Dopson, 1994; 
Buchanan et al., 1997). Accounting is found not to be passive and neutral. Accounting 
is seen to be „in motion‟ (Hopwood, 1987), it changes the organisation and the role of 
doctors.  
 
The chapter comprises five sections. The first section summarises multiple reasons for 
practices going fundholding, the significance of the lead partner and a typology 
developed to explicate why GPs take a lead role. The second section explains the role 
of accounting, accountability and its interplay with management activity. The third 
section covers two key aspects about doctors in management in primary care; firstly 
the findings of this study relative to the doctors in management literature; then, 
secondly, the development of the Hybrid Manager Engagement Model (HMEM); The 
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fourth section identifies some limitations of this study and the opportunities for 
further research. Finally, the fifth section identifies the principal contributions. 
 
8.2 Going Fundholding 
Fundholding applied the four elements (Table 2.3) of NPM (Pollitt, 1993). NPM 
devolved budgets into the new territory of general practice in order to make that 
public service more accountable. Resource allocation at practice level and monitoring 
would utilise the finite NHS resource more efficiently and effectively, and therefore 
more economically. NPM had significant implications for fundholding (Table 4.6) 
and therefore Hood‟s NPM implications of accounting (1991; 1995) had implications 
for fundholding: cost centre units and identification of costs; private sector accounting 
norms; more stress on bottom line; fewer procedural constraints; more performance 
indicators; blurring of pay and activity funds.   
 
This study has shown that there were multiple factors that influenced the design of 
fundholding (see Figure 2.2) in seeking to contribute to the marketisation of the NHS.  
The historical context and independent contractor status of GPs within the NHS 
required GPs, as „gatekeeper‟, to be harnessed to help to manage the finite resource of 
the NHS. Historically GPs had fought and retained independent contractor status but 
were now given the choice to volunteer for a practice budget.  Bound by notions of 
professionalism (Harrison and Pollitt, 1993) it was necessary to encourage 
accountability across the practice boundary with top down budget allocation to the 
practice. To incentivise the intrusion of accountability, fundholding was designed 
with a financial reward and practices volunteered in waves. Accounting was 
introduced in the form of a budget for fundholding. New roles within the practice 
partnership developed – lead partners and fund managers. Accounting was therefore 
expected to be a fundamental element of fundholding - contributing to how the actors 
would organise and „play out‟ the activity of fundholding. 
 
 More recently, this capability of accounting and its role in organizing has been paid 
attention by recognizing “the mutually constitutive nature of accounting, organizing 
and economizing” (Miller and Power, 2013, p.557), on reflection, the fundholding 
initiative is consistent with their meaning for „economizing‟- one of the “processes 
and practices  through which individuals, activities and organisations are constructed 
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as economic actors and entities, rather than the popular sense of reducing cost or 
making savings” (p.560). This study examined the process of individuals, activities 
and the fundholding organisation through identifying the key „actors‟ (lead partner 
and fund manager). The importance of the lead partner and how the role of accounting 
was „entangled‟ (Miller and Power, 2013) in the process was revealed. 
 
The aim was to address the lack of attention to accounting and accountability in 
primary care given the fundholding initiative, which was particularly surprising given 
the significant change for the GP as an independent contractor. The study was 
designed to investigate why the practice chose to go fundholding and how accounting 
was implicated in the management of fundholding. Multiple reasons were found and 
have been presented in publications (Cowton and Drake, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). 
Practices went fundholding and did so across a continuum ranging from protecting the 
practice to developing the practice (Figure 4.4). Significantly the lead partner 
emerged as a major factor in going fundholding, even GPs who were not enthusiastic 
about the scheme itself adopted a lead partner role, and a typology was created: 
guardians; opportunists; and, reluctant innovators. While the study does not claim that 
all types of lead partner were identified, it is a theoretical contribution to the reasons 
why professionals take lead roles in general practice. The study contributes to the 
fundholding literature from the perspective of not only the organisation, but also from 
the perspective of the GP. Although this model is derived from one context, this 
typology presents the beginning of a theoretical framework to help explain why 
doctors take lead roles on initiatives. These „types‟ may also be found in other 
profession where there are opportunities to take a lead role while being mindful of the 
contextual notions of that profession such as nurses, teachers and lawyers.  Such an 
application in a different context is particularly relevant where increased 
accountability through the budget mechanism is either enforced, for example head 
teachers in primary schools, or voluntary, for example the application to become free 
schools.  
 
The study involved more cases of practices and more private accounts of key actors 
than any fundholding study published, incorporating more phases and interviewing 
lead partners after fundholding had ceased. This overcame a concentration of studies 
on early waves (Glennerster et al., 1992; Glynn et al., 1992) and the views of only 
251 
 
one person within the practice, often the fund manager or practice manager, which 
had provided a restricted lens with which to view reasons for going fundholding. 
Those early studies reported „fundholders‟ to be behaving entrepreneurially (Ennew et 
al., 1998) which may be due to three factors: early studies concentrated on early 
waves; it was early waves who were lured by financial incentives that did provide 
opportunities for entrepreneurial activity; and studies used existing theoretical 
theories such as entrepreneurship rather than an exploratory approach that this unique 
NPM experiment deserved. This study avoided the murkiness presented in some 
studies caused by taking the view of one individual as a practice wide view, by 
considering accounting as the mechanism that was organizing and enabling 
fundholding.  On reflection, fundholding explored in this way, given the combination 
of being voluntary and phased, reflected the contextual and messy nature of an 
organisational change process (Pettigrew, 1992). The „messiness‟ of the context of 
fundholding might place this study as one of the few that through its longitudinal 
nature allows “the change process to reveal itself in any kind of temporal or 
contextual manner,” (Pettigrew, p.61), as such, it presented the possibility of marrying 
accounting practice (Hopwood, 1987) and theory about management (Stewart, 1982a; 
1982b). The analysis linked the accounting change to what managers do and how they 
do it. It was seen that in this process of „economizing‟(Miller and Power, 2013), 
accounting had a transformative capacity with regard to both the organisation and the 
individual as accounting practice engaged GPs in management. 
 
The study addressed calls for an examination of accounting implications within the 
NHS (Lapsley, 1991; 1999; Broadbent, 1992). It seems the significance of accounting 
in this major change to general practice had been overlooked, possibly as just another 
NPM initiative and possibly due to a concentration of studies on early waves.  
Accounting implications were expected to be important because accounting may 
create change (Hopwood, 1987). Further, when the evaluation of fundholding was 
biased to the early waves and studies with practice managers (Newton et al., 1993; 
1994), rather than the context of fundholding, it ignored the practice as a whole: the 
nature and history of general practitioner status; accounting in a new space; its 
voluntary nature; its occurrence in „waves‟; and, the new roles and potential key 
players in general practice.  
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GP practices went fundholding for multiple reasons and accounting contributed to the 
activity of fundholding, indeed fundholding would not have existed without the 
delegation of budgets to practice level enabling practices to contract with hospital. 
With the lack of regulation (Chapter 2) and lack of guidance on how it could be 
executed and managed within the practice, there were choices to be made by GPs 
about whether to be a lead partner and further, how they could execute that role. 
Having established why the lead partner took on the role with a typology, questions 
were emerging about how the lead partners enacted that role; what did they did and 
how they did it? With the accounting in place, did they engage with it and its outputs 
in their lead partner role? However, before the interplay between accounting and the 
management activity of the lead partner is discussed, it is worth reflecting with some 
theoretical discussion on the role of accounting and accounting change.  
 
8.3 Accounting, Accountability and Management Activity 
This section considers the role of accounting, accountability and how it leads to 
management activity by the lead partner. This „accounting in motion‟ “enables the 
concern of the social...creating organisational practices which can be influential in the 
construction of the world of the social” (Hopwood, 1987, p.214). 
 
8.3.1 The Role of Accounting: Perspectives of Accounting Change and the 
„Accounting Complex‟ 
Having addressed why the practice went fundholding and the emergent significance 
of the lead partner, a further question was „how was accounting implicated in the 
management of fundholding?‟ As a researcher coming from an accounting 
background, in an era of NPM with all its implications for accounting, and from a 
subjective approach it was sensible to consider fundholding within that framework – 
that there would be changes and implications for accounting  as a result of it being 
where it was not before. The calculable space was in place and the possibilities of that 
accounting change (Table 2.1) may have taken one of four perspectives according to 
Hopwood (1987): organisational improvement; constructing organisational order; 
construction of social order – visibility, governance and control; and towards 
accounting in motion – creating organisational practices that are independent of the 
mechanism and the organisation itself. Most recently, Miller and Power (2013) 
categorised four key roles of accounting arguing they become entangled to give an 
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„accounting complex‟ which is messy and constantly changing. It is argued here that 
accounting in fundholding is an example of an „accounting complex‟ and that within 
the „accounting complex‟, accounting is not a dependent variable nor the independent 
variable but a productive force of the four roles identified for accounting (Table 8.1): 
territorialising; mediating; adjudicating; and, subjectivizing. 
 
The accounting change witnessed in this study and its interplay with management 
activity is a demonstration of the „accounting complex‟.  It is discussed further here in 
the context of this study and its major findings. Territorialising (Miller and Power, 
2013)  means that accounting is not merely applied to an organisation, that it is active, 
which is commensurate with the perspectives of Hopwood (1987) and accounting 
change towards accounting in motion. Accounting had a territorialising role (Table 
8.1), linking the marketisation of the NHS to general practice, with an instrument of 
accounting. The practice became an „envelope‟ (Miller and Power, 2013) on which 
calculation could be made. However, the functional and technical aspects of 
accounting, recording and measuring was found to be in the hands of the fund 
manager, whether they had an accounting background or not. Accounting per se was 
not important in itself in the fundholding organisation, nor were lead partners trying to 
understand more about the practice of accounting in fundholding, despite there being 
a budget in this new territory. 
 
Mediating is the process by which the technical instrument of accounting and it 
processes links up the „actors, aspirations and arenas‟ as demonstrated in Table 4.8. 
and the relationship between the lead partner and fund manager. The mediating 
process is active in the outcome of the factors that influence engagement in 
management (Figure 6.4). An example of this is the work share with the fund manager 
and the engagement in public activities such as networking to help boundary 
management. Further, the adjudicating role, of performance measurement for 
evaluation and accountability is implicit in NPM and its implications as budgets are 
placed in the territory of the organisation. The accounting for fundholding and the 
outcomes aligned to it, for example list management and contract performance (see 
Table 4.8), were made visible to the lead partner, with varying levels of 
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Roles for 
Accounting 
  
 
Characteristics (Miller and Power, 2013) 
Territorializing Recursive construction of the calculable spaces that actors inhabit within 
organisations. Costs, revenues, risks can be calculated and defined – an envelope 
can be drawn on which calculations can be made. Accounting is not simply 
applied to organizational activities – it is involved in constituting those spaces in 
which it is active. Achieved by linking the ideas of the market with the 
instruments of accounting. 
Mediating Much of what accounting instruments and ideas do is to link up distinct actors, 
aspirations and arenas. 
Goes beyond the technical which are mobilized by broader managerial and 
societal languages. 
The mediating and connecting role means that accounting is not always connected 
to economic outcomes and ideals – economic conception may be at odds with how 
accounting is actually used. 
Mediating role is more of a permanent process than a stable outcome 
Adjudicating At a simple level - accounting places a decisive role in evaluating performance of 
individuals and organisations, also determining failings and failures. Comparison 
of   performance of one organisation against another. 
As a more general phenomenon - an „avalanche‟ of mechanisms to achieve 
accountability and transparency.  
Creation of territories or entity for accounting and mediation, linkage of actors 
cannot be dissociated from the allocation of responsibility. 
Interrelation of accounting, organising and economizing have the most strength at 
the point of failure or exit from the market game. A factor arising from a cultural 
imperative to adjudicate at the entity level. 
This role is not limited in its objects. Accounting can be used by different 
actors/groups for different purposes. 
 
Subjectivizing 
practice par 
excellence 
Subjects individuals to control or regulation by another, while entailing the 
presumption of the individual free to choose. Subjectivizing and responsibilizing. 
Actors within the organisation are agents who make decisions and choices which 
are calculable when compared. 
Significant in shaping the preferences of the actors to whom it provides 
information. 
Notion of the calculable self –space/territory of accounting enables certain 
economic freedom, agents can occupy different roles and react to efforts to 
account for and evaluate them. 
Table 8.1 The Accounting Complex: An entanglement of four key roles for 
accounting (Adapted from Miller and Power, 2013) 
 
 
 „management‟ activity in terms of day to day activity and frequency of interaction 
with the data but with little concern with the accounting itself. For accounting to be in 
an adjudicating role it can be used for different purposes, it is not limited in its objects 
(Table 8.1), for example, contracts may be negotiated on price to make savings but 
underutilised contracted capacity can be identified to manage waiting lists. This 
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demonstrates the mediating role of accounting (Table 8.1), linking up the distinct 
actors of fund manager, lead partner and entities, which enable lead partners to take 
on levels of management activity – accounting in motion, transforming the GP to a 
hybrid manager in some cases, making choices – and demonstrating the 
subjectivization (Table 8.1).  Thus, the factors that influence the design of 
fundholding (Figure 2.2.), the reasons for going fundholding and the accounting 
implications for the key players, what they did and how they did it led to the 
adaptation of a model designed to help understand managerial jobs (Stewart, 1982a; 
1982b). The model was used to analyse demands, constraints and choices (see Table 
6.3 and 6.4) and has enabled insights into this „accounting complex‟.  
 
The lead partner makes choices in his personal domain once he has chosen the lead 
partner role. This had implications from the perspective of accounting change and the 
level of engagement in management as a guardian, opportunist or reluctant innovator. 
This is consistent with Miller and Power‟s notion of the calculable self where the 
territory of accounting enables certain economic freedoms with agents occupying 
different roles and reacting differently within their working practices. 
 
8.3.2 Accounting Change - Accounting as a Productive Force 
This „accounting complex‟ generates accounting into a productive force and each case 
in the study is dependent on the context of its application.  Accounting in this context 
was based on aspirations for its ability to help with managing finite resources in the 
NHS, hence organisational improvement (Table 2.1). Further, accounting had been 
documented in the construction of organisational order as part of NPM (Glynn et al., 
1992; Humphrey et al., 1993; Humphrey, 1994; Laughlin et al., 1992; 1994; 
Llewellyn, 1998) with tensions, resistance and dysfunction reported. In this study, 
accounting was found not to be significant in those features of accounting change: 
 There was little evidence of demonisation (Lapsley, 1999) 
 No explicit conflict with the values and norms of medical services (Lapsley, 
1991)  by those choosing a lead partner role - in fact it seemed to harness them 
by engaging doctors in management activity 
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Perhaps fundholding placed accounting in a central role after all to contribute to a 
philosophy for efficiency and effectiveness (Broadbent, 1992) as some GPs 
participated in management activity. Something was happening because of the 
accounting change and the „economization‟ as the economic actors and entities made 
choices about the processes and practices they wished to engage in, and accounting 
was certainly no longer simply passive and bureaucratic (Ezzamel and Willmot, 
1993). Accounting within the organisation was enabling a management role to be 
enacted and the potential for a hybrid manager role for GPs. Accounting is found in a 
pivotal role within what Miller and Power (2013) recognise as a „messy world of 
everyday life‟ and as such its practice cannot be divorced from its interplay with 
management activity. 
 
Three of these roles of accounting; territorialising, mediating and adjudicating emerge 
from this research, how the fund manager and lead partner mediate and their roles 
take different forms – the „accounting  complex‟ then engages the GP in a 
management role. The final element of the „accounting complex‟ has a strong 
emergent role in this study – “Accounting is a subjective practice par 
excellence...calculative technologies at the heart of that most private of domains – the 
individual and her choices or decisions,” (Miller and Power, 2013, p586). In this case 
accounting was placed in a new domain – a very private domain of an independent 
contractor - and gave visibility across the practice boundary as part of the 
marketisation of the NHS It is clear that the implications of this accounting complex 
transcend the level of the organisation as some GPs took a lead partner role and some 
began to engage in management. The implications that accounting had for engaging 
GPs in management is well summarised by a quote from the Miller and Power (2013) 
paper – “ If management without accounting has become unthinkable, accounting also 
makes management thinkable and actionable in specific ways,” (p.561) which leads 
into the next section, as a pre-cursor to discussing the Hybrid Manager Engagement 
Model (HMEM). 
 
8.3.3 From Accounting to Accountability, from Accounting Change to 
Management Activity 
The significant role adopted by the lead partner, now clearly identified, also raised the 
question of how they engaged in the management of fundholding. It was found, 
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firstly, that all other partners in the practice delegated fundholding management to 
whoever was named as lead partner. Secondly, there were different types of lead 
partner dependent on the practice reason for going fundholding and the enthusiasm, or 
not, of the lead partner. It was reported in the literature that many gatekeepers did not 
engage in day to day activities of accounting or interact with data at a level that would 
influence the allocation of resources. Such polarisation (Jacobs, 2005; Ostergeren, 
2009) of the management function was usually attributed to the delegation of the 
accountability mechanism to non-medical personnel. Thus while other studies 
recognised there was some role for accounting in the management of resources, it was 
not those who were most knowledgeable and targeted that were in engaging; they 
were, in fact, reported as delegating.  Indeed, that was the case found in secondary 
care and also found here to some extent in primary care. This is an example of the 
messiness of the „accounting complex‟. On the face of it, fund managers were 
absorbing the administrative and accounting function itself and because their role was 
created they were being delegated to. However, by examining the role of accounting 
and the ensuing question of what lead partners did and how they did it, it avoids such 
a simplistic view because the „accounting complex‟ is exposed and it becomes 
apparent that accounting was important in facilitating  management activity for some 
of the GPs. This is an example of the third body of work sought by Miller and Power 
(2013) as this study has an  emergent focus on  “processes by which accounting 
representations and metrics are simultaneously powerful interventions which shape, 
people, practices and organisation,” (p.558). Lead partners did not get involved in the 
process of accountability (day to day activities and use of data) but used the broad 
visibility that the introduction of an accounting function provided. Some lead partners 
took a management role which was enabled by the entangled roles of accounting in 
presenting a  „sum‟ of the „accounting complex‟. For example, some were engaging in 
strategic activity, contract and performance management, and there were different 
degrees of work sharing and networking. What was intriguing and a valuable 
contribution to developing a theory of engagement was how they did what they did 
when the accounting schema produced accountability – it set in  motion different 
ways for GPs to act out their management role and forge activity within primary 
career.  
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8.4 Doctors in Management in Primary Care 
This section covers two key aspects; firstly the findings of this study in primary care 
relative to the doctors in management literature; secondly, the development of the 
Hybrid Manager Engagement Model (HMEM). The adaptation of the Stewart (1982a; 
1982b) model enabled an analysis of how the management role was enacted. A model 
was constructed of the factors, and their direction, to characterise a level of 
engagement in management by doctors in primary care (Figure 6.5) – the HMEM. 
This produced new key findings about doctors in the management of primary care to 
add to the existing literature (Table 5.4) which is predominantly in secondary care. 
 
8.4.1 The Case in Primary Care 
The literature on doctors in management reported a problem with getting doctors 
engaged in management, firstly in secondary care, but also in primary care. Doctors in 
secondary care were reported to be  reluctant to engage in management and those that 
did, did so with half-hearted motivations such as those reported by Fitzgerald (1994): 
part-time; boredom; political; seeking any challenge. The literature was criticised for 
being focussed on definition, of what ought to be done by doctors in management, 
rather than what is and what they did (Dopson, 1996). Buchanan et al. (1997) moved 
beyond that deficit model, of what was lacking that caused doctors not to engage in 
management in secondary care to examine what hospital doctors actually did and 
experienced when involved in management. This study addressed the failure to 
examine what GPs did (primary care) and experienced when involved in management 
using the time frame of fundholding. Those findings from secondary care were used 
as a framework to consider and evaluate the gaps in the more slowly emergent 
primary care literature (Figure 5.3).  
 
This study has contributed to understanding of the factors that influence doctors in 
primary care to engage in management activity and found it to happen more when 
linked closely to primary profession decisions and in alignment with the notions of 
professionalism when in practice. Moreover, it is effective when accounting practice 
is within the domain of the GP practice and has proximity to GP decision making at a 
professional level, even if it is not explicit in those decisions. After the demise of 
fundholding the doctors in management literature opened up an „engagement‟ debate 
in secondary care but not in the domain of primary care, which had reverted to a 
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traditional structure when GPs relinquished budgets, hence financial accountability, to 
PCGs and later PCTs. Thus, the secondary analysis of the interviews from phase one 
enabled consideration of the later developed literature and a comparison between 
secondary and primary care to a depth not possible when fundholding was alive; 
fundholding has a legacy in providing a historical snapshot of when GPs became 
engaged in the management of primary care which does have implications for existing 
and future reforms and policies. 
 
Therefore in the first instance the study adds to our understanding of doctors in 
management by overcoming the deficit model of what ought to be, but, importantly, 
the study adds to the literature on doctors in management by examining accounting 
practice in the context of accounting change, and on reflection, the „accounting 
complex‟ as a productive force. It moves the doctors in management literature 
forward from the context of winners and losers in NPM, and doctors in power battles 
(Hunter, 1994; Morris and Farrell, 2003) to show the power of accounting itself 
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985) which gave GPs the power to do something different, 
through accountability. It shows accounting change as transformative, „in motion‟ 
(Hopwood, 1987), rather than an example of players creating power over accounting 
when there are implied dysfunctional consequences – the latter  more associated with 
Hopwood‟s (1987)  paradigms for organisational improvement and organisational 
order, which ignores „management discretion and choice‟ (see Table 2.1).  
 
There is a distinct body of research on doctors in management that highlight 
reluctance and delegation. However, this study has found that doctors engage in 
different ways and at different levels which can be interpreted as different level of 
hybridisation. Thus, if future policy insists on a management role for doctors in 
primary care these factors can be taken into consideration in designing the 
commissioning models. Research on other models of engagement can be compared to 
the findings in this study. If doctors are given financial accountability within the 
practice domain they have been shown to engage in activities with other players 
which leads them into management within and beyond the practice boundary. 
 
The study has found that getting involved in management is personal to the doctors in 
primary care – a clear case of the subjectivization role for accounting. The reasons 
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they took on the role showed varying degrees of enthusiasm and different types of 
doctors in management: guardian; reluctant innovator and opportunist. Llewellyn 
(2001) concluded that doctors may risk losing clinical visibility and respect and will 
therefore present the management tasks as supplementary. The doctors in 
management literature reports that management roles are often not sustained on the 
„rare‟ occasion they are taken. The demise of fundholding disengaged doctors from a 
lead partner role in fundholding but raised the question of whether other manager 
roles were taken. It was found that GPs in this study did seek management roles after 
fundholding, some were successful in obtaining them, and others were not. Further, 
by being able to reflect on their fundholding experience, conclusions could be made 
about the elements that contributed to satisfaction and dissatisfaction with a 
management role, hence what might encourage doctors to engage in management. 
 
 
8.4.2. The Hybrid Manager Engagement Model 
The study has identified that there are different levels of hybrid manager‟s activity 
(Table 6.62) that are facilitated by different factors (Figure 6.6). The concept of a 
hybrid manager had been criticised for being a mere description of a role (Dopson, 
1996). There was a lack of evidence in the literature of how that role was executed by 
doctors in management which has been addressed and analysed in this study. 
Although Jacobs (2005) did extend the conceptualisation of hybrid manager, by 
introducing potential for hybridisation versus polarisation in secondary care, he did 
not develop the types of hybrid manager, although it did show non-medical managers 
take the management „burden‟. Accounting was implicated in that process of 
polarisation in a very simple way, through evidence of financial argumentation 
(Jacobs, 2005). There was no attempt to consider how accounting might be implicated 
at both organisation level and actor level in hybridisation as part of an „economizing‟ 
role. On reflection, the modelling of the factors that influence engagement in 
management and management activity is largely facilitated by the productive force of 
the „accounting complex‟ and the differing role for accounting. Although accounting 
may not be a force majeure in getting doctors involved in management, it is certainly 
implicated, and found to be favoured by those who had the opportunity to be 
fundholders in a lead GP role. 
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One of the strengths of this study is that it did not rely on self-reports of individual 
doctors about their involvement in management. The analysis (Table 6.3 and 6.4) 
avoided direct questioning. As there are widespread negative beliefs amongst 
clinicians about the nature of managers and management, it is worth pondering 
whether it might be difficult for doctors to say anything other than that they do not 
really want to be a manager and, if they are, they would prefer to return to full-time 
medical work.  In a professional setting it can be hard to admit to enjoying being in a 
position which makes one, in some sense, the „boss‟ of one‟s peers; the notion of the 
„reluctant ruler‟ is far more acceptable.  At the very least it suggests the importance of 
posing questions very carefully, including seeking to gain a properly contextualised 
appreciation of expressed attitudes.  Therefore, the framework for analysis used in this 
study is useful in this context and may be applied in other institutional contexts to 
understand accounting, the complexity of the roles for accounting and the interplay 
between it and management activity.  
 
Direct questions can lead to interviewees responding with what he/she think they 
should respond with hence, by analysing accountability (through the presence of 
accounting activity – Table 4.8) and the choices of lead partners, the potential for 
accounting change (Hopwood, 1987) and the productive force of accounting (Miller 
and Power, 2013) was revealed. This has produced the sum of activity in the job with 
the adaption of the Stewart model (1982a, 1982b) that revealed more about the hybrid 
manager in this context at least. Further, analysis of the case studies have given 
indicators of activity that presents a case for different strengths of hybrid manager, 
albeit only „strong‟ or „weak‟ at this stage of development of a Hybrid Manager 
Engagement Model (HMEM). Further, this approach to analysis of accounting change 
in a specific context has overcome the narrow functionalist approach towards the role 
of accounting which has been criticised by Lapsley and Pettigrew (1994) who 
suggested that the change process is better understood in context. Further, the 
historical and temporal nature of fundholding in this study is shown to be comparable 
to Pettigrew‟s (1992) argument for  contextualist research having value in marrying 
theory and practice, to help understanding  and thus giving “history and social 
processes the chance to reveal their untidiness” (p.62). For some GPs  the choice to go 
fundholding has engaged them in the process of change, brought about by NPM. The 
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implication of accounting is that it has engaged some GPs in a separate activity to 
their primary role, that is, management, becoming hybrid managers as accounting 
practice and management activities mingle. Moreover, this study in context has 
enabled the development of a theoretical model which may be applied in other 
contexts where accounting is placed, to be used and adapted in the context of the 
situation to which it is to be applied to understand the interplay between accounting 
and management activity. 
 
The hybrid manager was a mere concept with some elaboration of  
hybridisation/polarisation. Empirical research reported hybrid mangers as reluctant, 
volunteering for management for negative reasons (Cavenagh, 2003; Dopson, 1996; 
Dopson and Fitzgerald, 2006). This study reveals a typology for those taking on lead 
roles, recognising different levels of enthusiasm,  and  develops a HMEM which is 
supported by interviewees reflecting on their time in management roles. Therefore the  
study also goes a step further by addressing career, post management role, which is 
important as hybrid roles were often left to return to a clinical specialism (Buchanan 
et al., 1997). The departure from management was taken as support for a general view 
that doctors were negative about management and reluctant managers without asking 
them to reflect on their time in management. 
 
Those who had strong engagement in the management in fundholding, as evidenced 
by what doctors did in their management role (Figure 6.4), did continue engaging in 
matters that indicated activity in „management‟ e.g. committee involvement, 
engagement in networking for the new forms of accountability under PCGs and PCTs, 
lead roles in the practice away from doctoring. However, engagement may have been 
weakened by the lack of opportunity to participate, but there could still be choices 
about engaging in a management role. The PCG and PCT structures meant GPs could 
still participate but there were unfavourable conditions according to the HMEM: they 
did not wish to work share with fellow GPs; a lack of financial data with proximity to 
practice decision; lack of financial accountability and overall lack of focus on the 
practice/unit domain. Even weak hybrid managers continued to take lead roles in the 
practice and surprisingly  seemed to have acquired a taste for management and 
actively sought committee representation but were disappointed when not successful. 
Even those who engaged the least in management activities as fundholders were still 
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involved in seeking or acting in management type positions but, like weaker managers 
they were put off the process either because of apparent politicisation or unhappiness 
with what the management role looked like. Ultimately, the second phase of data 
collection enabled identification of the satisfiers and dissatisfiers of being involved in 
management, pursuing the phenomenon of management, in order to complete the 
missing analysis for primary care relative to secondary care (Table 5.3). Further, it 
enabled development of the model with which to recommend the activity that might 
engage GPs in management. 
 
There are two significant contributions of the study that increase our understanding of 
accounting practice and its interplay with management activity: 
 Accounting is seen in motion, transforming the organisation, creating a new 
role for the GP independent of accounting itself as the GP becomes a hybrid 
manager contributing to the management of the NHS. 
 The „accounting complex‟ is a driving force in the  organisation going beyond 
organisational improvement and order. To understand it one must look at 
context including the historical background of the profession, and particularly 
the actors, what they do and how they do it in order to gain a richer and more 
realistic understanding of management particularly where there is a hybrid 
manager role. It is not sufficient to ask the actors what they do. 
 
8.5 Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Further Study 
This section summarises the limitations of the study and recommendations for future 
research. 
 
8.5.1 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations as summarised below.  
1. Firstly, there are only twelve case studies in phase one and six of those are 
continued in phase two. The results are inferred from the findings and do not 
contest that all types of lead partners were found, nor that the levels of 
engagement of GPs in management are conclusive and that there are not other 
levels of engagement. However, most of the studies of GPs  (Table 5.2) are of 
single practices and of less than 12 interviews therefore the twelve case studies 
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are useful in the breadth of waves  and do present variety. Although only half 
were available for the second phase, no other study has examined lead partners 
post –fundholding and there was a balance, more good fortune than planned, 
across the different categories of hybridisation presented in the HMEM. 
 
2. Geographically the practices were from the same county in England and there 
may have been regional variations that would have impacted on the results. 
Further, practice demographics may also be a relevant variable but was outside 
the scope of this study. Indeed, pre-occupation with demographics has been 
argued to hinder some of the more qualitative aspects that could have 
contributed to policies for the NHS. 
 
3. The thesis does not examine GPs in non-fundholding practices or GPs in 
fundholding practices who are not lead partners (although they are an element 
of the practice perspectives in going fundholding) but does provide evidence 
for doctors in management in primary care. It does show that some doctors 
will participate in management, given the choice, and even those who are 
unenthusiastic and reluctant about management will participate if the scheme 
is designed such that they can develop or protect the practice and patients. 
Further, those who have participated have enabled levels of engagement to be 
investigated to inform how others might be encouraged.  The evidence 
suggests that schemes to involve doctors in management must look at context 
and avoid a universal approach for the profession which is often based on 
assumptions about negativity towards management. This would inform the 
design of schemes to assist in achieving the objectives such as the broad 
application of NPM or other initiatives. 
 
 
8.5.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
Further research should be conducted in three main contexts. Firstly, in applying and 
developing the typology and model to refine it and identify further factors that 
influence engagement in management alongside a primary career. The perspective of 
the model could be extended by  identify perceptions about successful contributions to 
management. Secondly, by researching how other primary career holders engage in 
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management roles in other professions and organisational settings similar to Pilbeam 
and Jamieson (2010) in higher education. Thirdly, by expanding the study of doctors 
in management. 
 
Apply and Develop the Model of Engagement in Management 
The adapted model from Stewart (1982a; 1982b)  and interrogation questions (Table 
6.5) can be used to examine how welfare professionals engage in management, ideally 
in the first instance a suitable institutional setting would be in the latest practice based 
commissioning and hospitals settings. However, the model and method could also be 
applied to other welfare institutions as they may be become subject to accountability, 
perhaps as new public governance is rolled out, for example, free schools and 
academies.  In addition to welfare organisation the HMEM (Figure 6.5) could be 
adapted and contextualised by researchers in other partnership settings for 
professionals; for example, the role of management partners in legal and accountancy 
practices. The model applied to interviews would be enhanced by participant 
observations in institutional settings.  
 
At the next level the model may be further developed to introduce the factors that are 
deemed success factors for engagement in management. The researcher would 
strongly support the notion that not all professionals should be forced to engage in 
management activities, if engagement is to be effective, but that certain factors may 
contribute to stronger and better engagement . 
 
Professionals Engaging in Management 
There are an increasing number of governance structures, management structures and 
examples of consultancy associated with the semi-public sectors, particularly health 
and education. It would be beneficial to extend and develop studies of why 
professionals choose a hybrid manager (or even a non-executive) role and how they 
execute it in order to meet organisational objectives to highlight demands and 
constraints. Such cases would help build up knowledge and good practice for those 
entering a hybrid role. Such studies, like this one, may provide insights into how 
funding mechanisms might be designed to draw the professional into a hybrid 
manager role.  
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Practical Implications – Studies in the NHS 
Fundholding provided the first window of engagement in management for GPs. 
Commissioning structures are pertinent with the return of the Conservative 
government (although in coalition) and the plans to return some power and funding to 
primary care. Studies of fundholding frequently suffered from the assumption that the 
practice view was the consensus view about GPs‟ engagement in fundholding, hence 
GPs engagement in management. This study shows the importance of the  individual 
GPs. It is argued that the legacy of fundholding is broader, through the contributions 
noted here, and longer, in the accounts of those living and learning from the 
experience. 
 
The study shows the importance of the individual and  the context of role and 
activities in achieving organisational objectives when there are choices  about getting 
involved in initiatives such as those backed by NPM or new public governance. 
Therefore it will be important to examine doctors in management in the NHS and the 
developing private sector, such as the latest commissioning models. The latter would 
be fascinating given the combined practice structures and the possible models for 
financial responsibility. Indeed, Miller et al. (2012) in reviewing clinical engagement 
in primary care-led commissioning cite the published work from this thesis (Cowton 
and Drake, 1999a and 1999b) as support for the need to address clinical leadership 
carefully, and it is argued here that one variable that need careful consideration is that 
of financial responsibility, specifically how the form of accounting will interplay with 
management activity. 
 
 
8.6 A Summary of Principal Contributions 
There are four categories of contribution: a broad contribution to the literature on 
NPM by investigating its impact on an organisation (Hughes, 2010) from the 
perspective of accounting change in the semi-public sector; a contribution to the 
management of primary healthcare; at the individual level in a professional capacity 
as it reveals how some GPs involve themselves in management;  at a theoretical level, 
in two ways,  by developing a typology with which those taking on lead roles can be 
classified, and, by introducing  the HMEM with which to identify factors that 
influence individuals to engage in management roles, in this context, GPs. 
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The principal contributions, in addition to a more general understanding of the role of 
accounting and doctors in management, are summarized below. 
 
1.  This study has examined a prodigious and unusual child of NPM. It has 
followed the fundholding „experiment‟ in organisational improvement beyond 
its end by examining the  impact on some of those who lived the experience. 
Whereas accounting and accountability has been explored in the literature, 
through institutions touched by NPM, it was about what it could do, rather 
than what it actually did. It has paid attention to notions of accountability 
alongside notions of professionalism and it is argued that by doing so 
accounting must be seen as more productive than a mere technical instrument 
for organisational improvement. Future commentators on both NPM and the 
capabilities of the accounting as a technique, need to consider the different 
perspectives of accounting change, the assimilation of the roles for accounting 
that contribute to the „accounting complex‟, and  how actors link with the 
responsibility because accounting practice and management activity are inter-
linked.  
 
2. It contributes in the simplest sense as a study of an application of NPM that 
was unique because it was voluntary rather than compulsory as in other 
institutions. Fundholding is identified as case of the success of disaggregation 
of budgets to a smaller unit releasing the potential of an accounting technique 
to engage some GPs in management of the larger NHS resource. However, the 
study does not claim to state whether fundholding as a constituent of larger 
NHS policy was a success, merely that where doctors were largely reported as 
reluctant, often adverse, to engage in management, fundholding succeeded in 
engaging them. Indeed, it was missed by even by unenthusiastic GPs on its 
demise, even when alternatives in larger units of accountability were available 
(PCGs and PCTs).  
 
 
3. The study contributes to the primary health care management literature as an 
example of a GP commissioning model, which is a subject revisited in the 
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NHS, and pertinent today. When policy is implemented there is often reported 
initial reaction and research but on rare occasions, such as in this study, the 
impact may transgress the time of the reform. It is argued that the second 
phase of data collection is important to complete the picture of the 
phenomenon of fundholding which engaged some GPs in management, 
enabling participants to reflect.  As a contribution to primary healthcare 
management, fundholding was the pre-cursor for numerous changes in general 
practice A number of interviewees commented both on and off tape during the 
second phase that this study had important implications for the „family 
doctor‟. It is argued that fundholding documents the beginning of the demise 
of the „family doctor‟ and is an important event in the history of general 
practice. It extends the understanding of fundholding because it: 
 
 Covers a broader range of waves  
 Opened up the perspective of the fund manager, who was or was not, 
the practice manager incumbent prior to fundholding 
 Investigates multiple practice reasons for going fundholding and 
providers a deeper understanding of the issues 
 It is a panel study as part of the longitudinal approach with the same 
subjects interviewed twice (GPs) 
 
 
4. It links accounting practice to management activity as the „accounting 
complex‟ is a productive force where the roles for accounting: territorialising; 
mediating; adjudicating and subjectivizing work together, and in this case 
facilitate a hybrid manager role for some GPs. It shows how accounting, 
though not important on its own, was implicated in the creation of social order 
and shown to be „in motion‟ and as such contributed to the engagement of GPs 
in management. Accounting, organizing and „economizing‟ has engaged GPs 
in management. It presents an example of accounting in motion creating an 
example of the „accounting complex‟ of fundholding. Therefore, as an 
experiment in NPM, it provides a contrast to the emphasis on the 
dysfunctional consequences (Hopwood, 1987; Laughlin et al., 1994; and 
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Humphrey et al., 1994) and demonisation of accounting (Lapsley, 1999) 
associated with accounting change. 
 
 
5. The study contributions to the doctors in management literature. As some GPs 
took a management journey, the trajectory of the thesis changed from an 
emphasis on the role of accounting per se towards its contribution to develop a 
HMEM. By gaining an understanding of the managerial job and behaviours, 
what they did and how they did it, within an „accounting complex‟ (Miller and 
Power, 2013) in this contextualised research (Pettigrew,1992), a rich vein was 
opened. This has added to the literature on doctor in management, particularly 
in primary care, redressing the balance of a literature heavily focussed on 
secondary care. The study adds a new dimension to the doctors in 
management literature by revealing how the personal domain progressed. This 
is a valuable contribution because it has implications for other models of 
doctors commissioning care particularly the multiple practice commissioning 
models. The notions of professionalism may be less satisfied when GPs work 
share with fellow GPs at practice level and that may be exacerbated when that 
sharing is with GPs outside the individual practice domain. It is argued that 
some GPs would be less engaged in schemes that do not have financial 
accountability and control for the practice domain and which has less 
relevance for the individual practice and patients. The doctors did miss the 
financial control available through the design of fundholding. Therefore 
delegated budgets are a factor that will influence GPs into management roles 
but the level of engagement will depend on the design of the scheme and the 
choices made by individuals. It is argued that a professional lead (GP) should 
be sought out, to work with the administrative teams to encourage internal 
expertise and promote networking to achieve efficient resources management 
at the micro-level for the macro aims. There is a need for doctors as managers 
and this can be achieved through careful design of the accounting mechanism.  
 
6. The first theoretical contribution is a development of a typology for taking 
lead roles which later contributes to the development of the HMEM. The 
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typology presents an interface between the organisational motivations for 
taking on a particular initiative and the role of the lead, who „chooses‟ that 
role. It is based on the „lived experience‟ (Silverman, 2004) and its analysis 
and exposition (Figure 4.4) may be applied in different contexts and the 
typology expanded accordingly. 
 
 
7. Finally, the second theoretical contribution arises from finding that doctors in 
primary care engage in management in different ways and to differing degrees. 
Those factors that contribute to engagement in management have been 
conceptualised and modelled for the first time to present levels of engagement 
(Figure 6.4) in the HMEM.  The facilitating factor in the HMEM model is the 
presence of accounting, in this instance of budget allocation to the unit domain 
of general practice, therefore the model is significant in developing an 
understanding between accounting practice and management activity. It takes 
the role of hybrid manager beyond a concept to a working model that can be 
applied, and further developed in different contexts. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Phase One Interview Questions 
 
Lead Partner 
 
1. Whose idea was it that the practice should go fundholding? When was that? 
 
2. What were the views of the partners about going fundholding? 
 
3. How did you decide who should be the lead partner? 
 
4. What do you see your role as? 
 
5. How did the practice recruit the fund manager? 
 
6. How was the practice developing over time before fundholding? 
 
7. How has the practice developed over time since fundholding? 
 
8. How did you introduce the initiative into the management of the practice? 
 
9. Did practice members have any special training or study? How do you think that 
went? 
 
10. Did you note any advantages or disadvantages of the way the initiative was 
introduced? 
 
11. Is there something you know now that you wish that someone had told you? 
 
12. What are the critical aspects of successful fund management? 
 
13. What do you do with the information received from the fund manager? And how 
do you receive that information? 
 
14. Is there any information that you do not receive that you would like to receive? 
 
15. Why did you choose the computer package? 
 
16. What aspect of fund management do you spend most of your time on? 
 
17. What are your priorities for the year ahead? 
 
18. What is the future for fundholding in this practice? 
 
19. How would you like to see fundholding develop? And how would this change 
things for you? 
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Fund Manager 
 
1. Whose idea was it that the practice should go fundholding? When was that? Why 
was it that wave? 
 
2. What were the views of the partners about going fundholding? 
 
3. What employment background do you have? 
 
4. How did you decide who should be the lead partner? 
 
5. What do you see your role as? 
 
6. How did the practice recruit the fund manager? 
 
7. How was the practice developing over time before fundholding? 
 
8. How has the practice developed over time since fundholding? 
 
9. How did you introduce the initiative into the management of the practice? 
 
10. Did practice members have any special training or study? How do you think that 
went? 
 
11. Did you note any advantages or disadvantages of the way the initiative was 
introduced? How has it progressed over the years? 
 
12. Is there something you know now that you wish that someone had told you? 
 
13. What financial information do you pass on to the lead partner on a regular basis? 
How do you pass that information on? 
 
14. What does the lead partner do with the information you give him? 
 
15. Why did you choose the computer package? What do you think of that package? 
 
16. Who has advised you during fundholding? 
 
17. What are the critical aspects for fund management? 
 
18. What aspect of fund management do you spend most of your time on? 
 
19. What are your priorities for the year ahead? 
 
20. What is the future for fundholding in this practice? 
 
21. How would you like to see fundholding develop? And how would this change 
things for you? 
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APPENDIX TWO 
 
Phase Two Interview Questions 
 
Thank you for agreeing to this interview. Casting your mind back I interviewed you 
in…. and asked about fundholding and why the practice chose to go fundholding, how 
you became the lead partner. It was very helpful and I published a number of journal 
article so thank you very much. The purpose of this interview is to consider changes 
since then in the management of health care especially changes for you.  
 
1. Please tell me about your experience of being part of a primary care group. 
- How were you personally involved in PCGs? 
- What role did other partners take at that time? 
- Who got on committees and why? 
- What did the practice get from being in a PCG? 
- And what did you get from being in a PCG? 
- What worked well in PCGs? 
- What didn‟t work well in PCTs? 
- What were the respective roles and contributions of GPs and professional 
managers in the work of PCGS? 
 
 
2. Please tell me about your experience of being a part of a primary care trust? 
- How were you personally involved in PCTS? 
- What role did other partners take at that time? 
- Who got on committees and why? 
- What did the practice get from being in a PCT? 
- And what did you get from being in a PCT? 
- What worked well in PCTs? 
- What didn‟t work well in PCTs? 
- What were the respective roles and contributions of GPs and professional 
managers in the work of PCTS? 
 
3. How have you been involved in the management of secondary care? 
 
4. How would you summarise your career has developed: 
- technically 
- managerially 
- creatively 
- security and stability 
- being autonomous and independent 
 
5. Thinking back how would you summarise the changes to the practice since 
fundholding? What were the highs for the practice and the lows? 
 
6. What were the highs for the you and the lows since fundholding? 
 
7. Is there anything else that we have discussed today that you would like to 
elaborate on?? 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Author ( Date) Title Country 
and 
Organisatio
n Setting 
Method Sample Key Theme and Key Findings 
Brazell  (1987) Doctors as 
managers 
UK, 
Hospital  
Interview 15 doctors 
including 11 
hospital and 
1 GP. 
Questionnai
-re follow 
up (27/101 
replies) 
Doctors viewed that they have a management role to play, 
are confused about management roles and a reluctance to 
accept management. Doctors thought that they should learn 
about management but that if they did it  should have a 
high reality for their work. 
Mark (1991) Where are the 
medical managers? 
UK NHS 
Generally 
Discussion 
Paper 
N/A Considers the attempts to develop medical managers and 
need for detailed research study. Suggests that 
organisational considerations are an incorrect approach to 
such development and that individual career paths within 
an NHS learning organisation is the way forward. 
Observed a decrease since Griffiths in the number of 
doctors in management posts and lack of role models for 
doctors considering a shift into management.  Concluded 
that individual career paths are key to organisational 
effectiveness. Concluded that individual development 
through education would be key. 
Hunter (1992) Doctors as 
Managers: Poachers 
turned gamekeepers 
UK  Discussion 
Paper 
N/A Reviews debate about doctors and managers and value 
bases, considering issues at meso and miso level. 
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Newman and 
Cowling 
(1993) 
Management 
Education of  
Clinical Directors: 
An Evaluation 
UK 
Hospital 
Interviews 
(structured 
and semi-
structured) ; 
Pre-and post 
course  self-
efficacy 
questionnai-
res 
2,000 
interviews 
National Evaluation of government sponsored programme 
to send consultants to Business School management 
programmes in 1992-93. Course participants were found to 
feel more confident in current, and for, prospective 
management roles. Relative to doctors in management 
concluded that: management development should begin in 
medical school; management development for consultants 
should not be an isolated activity; management 
development was required after managerial post 
appointment. 
Newton et al. 
(1993) 
Managing the 
Fundholding 
Practice: Who does 
what? 
UK 
GPs 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
with 
clinicians 
and practice 
managers. 
Two phase.  
10 first 
wave 
practices. 
Random 
selection 
Recognised that being able to be fundholding depended on 
administrative and IT capability and no one could “predict 
how fundholding would be managed in practice”. The 
study looked at practice managers and clinicians. First 
phase studied process of becoming fundholders (practice 
manger and lead partner but not fund manager) and second 
on changes in practice management and organisation. 
Identified that structures did not change and decision 
making was by the „clinical partners‟. Key feature was 
practice ability to develop as small business indicated by 
business plans and management systems supported by IT. 
Concluded it worked well despite continuation of 
traditional approaches. 
Newton and 
Robinson 
(1994) 
Fundholding in 
Northern region: 
Practice  Managers 
Views 
UK Practice 
Managers 
Questionna-
ire 
22 Practices First, second and third wave practice mangers involvement 
and views of the scheme and their developing roles. 
Concluded a support (rather than lead) role in fundholding. 
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Cowling and 
Newman 
(1994) 
Turning Doctors 
into Managers: an 
evaluation of a 
Major NHS 
Initiative to 
Improve the 
Managerial 
Capabilities of 
Medical 
Consultants 
UK 
Hospital 
Interviews 
(structured 
and semi-
structured) ; 
Pre-and post 
course  self-
efficacy 
questionnai-
res 
2,000 
interviews 
Report on experience of Newman and Cowling (1993). 
Dopson  (1994) Management: the 
one disease 
consultants did not 
think existed 
UK  
Hospital 
Semi-
structured 
interview 
(two phases) 
16 
Consultants 
Progress in getting doctors involved in management in a 
secondary care setting. 
Mark (1994) Medical 
Management: 
Reflecting on Some 
Ripples in the Pond 
N/A Reflective 2 research 
projects 
Reflects on impact of doctors having being in a 
management role. Risk of not capturing the impact of 
medical management. Concludes there is a need for 
management training even if it only provides doctors with 
evidence that they do not want to be involved in 
management. 
Fitzgerald 
(1994) 
Moving clinicians 
into management: a 
professional 
challenge or threat? 
UK 
Hospital 
Interviews 31 clinicians  Examines issue of drawing clinicians into management and 
widens debate about medical profession dominance 
through the examination of stages of training. Argues need 
to analyse in the context that they work in relative to role 
and activity. What motivated into management role and 
how they perceive their position is part of the study. 
Identifies three dimensions why they are drawn into 
management: from making assessment and judgements 
about the changes in health care; attraction of  part-time 
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rather than giving up primary profession; challenge of 
management i.e. stimulation and interest. Opportunity to be 
involved in key decisions was an attraction. 
Allen (1995) Doctors in 
Management or the 
revenge of the 
conquered: The role 
of management 
development for 
doctors 
UK 
Profession 
Historical 
review 
N/A Considers the factors that have influenced the evolution of 
doctors in the management of the NHS since Bevan. 
Concludes that management training is worthwhile and 
suggest that doctors‟ views on management of the NHS 
would change after „some involvement‟ in management. 
Dopson (1996) Doctors in 
management: A 
challenge to 
established debates 
UK Hospital Semi-
structured 
interview 
32 Consultants struggled to decide if management was 
benefiting the patients; were feeling guilty about spending 
money on management development especially in the 
absence of a clear career path in management; most of the 
consultants were reluctant managers. Recognise problem of 
modelling clinical directors on an average general 
management role. 
Gatrell and  
White (1996 ) 
Doctors and 
Management – the 
Development 
Dilemma 
UK 
Wide 
groups 
including 
Hospital, 
GPs, Chief 
Executives, 
Different 
Trainees  
National 
Survey, 
Questionna- 
ire , and In 
depth 
interviews 
>1000, 
1420, 230 
Study of what managerial knowledge and skills required by 
clinicians and to develop and define the development 
needed by exploring management activities of different 
grades of doctor. Conclusion included the  need to consider 
different learning styles of different doctors and a need for 
managers  to improve their image within the medical 
profession. 
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Greenfield and 
Nayak (1996) 
A management role 
for the General 
Practitioner 
GPs Study 1(pre 
new GP 
contract):Po
stal 
questionnai- 
re (168/307) 
responses 
Study 2 
(post new 
GP 
contract): 
 Hostility of GPs to having management role thrust upon 
them. Different practices responding differently to how 
changes were put on them in terms of organisation of 
management and administration. Any management training 
was too general and not specific. 
Llewellyn and 
Grant (1996) 
The impact of 
fundholding on 
primary health care: 
accounts from 
Scottish GPs 
UK 
General 
Practice 
Interviews 
with 5 lead 
GPs 
6 Case 
Studies 
Focus on prescribing, consultations, referrals, GPs as 
resource managers. The latter related to making more cost 
conscious. Interpreted GPs to have an enhanced 
management role, some enthusiastic and became 
„entrepreneurs of healing‟, delegating administrative tasks. 
Calls for more strategic approach to management 
development in order to identify those doctors who have an 
aptitude and interest for it and to help design appropriate 
programmes. 
Walker and 
Morgan (1996) 
Involving Doctors 
in Management: A 
Survey of the 
management 
development career 
needs of Selected 
Doctors  in NHS 
Wales 
UK 
Hospital 
Survey 209 senior 
registrars 
and 269 
consultants 
Survey to identify development needs based on finding it to 
be unstructured and poorly co-ordinated, yet doctors keen 
to be involved in management. Identified desired categories 
of management education form hospital doctors. 
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Buchanan et al.  
(1997), 
Doctor in the 
process: the 
engagement of 
clinical directors in 
hospital 
management 
UK 
Hospital 
In-depth 
interviews. 
Content 
analysis. 
6 clinical 
directors 
and 19 other 
hospital 
manageme-
nt team 
members 
Medical involvement in the hospital management process. 
Explores and moves beyond the deficit model of 
management competencies and on engagement of doctors 
in the management process. 
Ong (1998) Evolving 
Perceptions of 
Clinical 
Management in 
Acute Hospitals in 
England 
UK 
Hospitals 
Secondary 
data. 
Interviews. 
Two phases. 
3 
directorates 
40 
Interviews: 
Directors, 
executive 
team, GPs 
Explore issues of how clinicians construe their roles. How 
the clinical director role is perceived and the link to 
organizational change. Confirms debate is often focussed 
on professions and power.          
Warwicker 
(1998) 
Managerialism and 
the British GP: the 
GP as manager and 
as managed. 
UK 
General 
Practice 
  Analysis of the managerialisation of GPs. 
Maddox (1999)   General Practice 
Fundholding in the 
British National 
Health Service 
Reform 1991-1997: 
GP accounts of the 
Dynamics of 
Change 
UK General 
Practice 
Panel 
Interviews 
6 GPs, first 
wave only 
Insights into complex dynamics of the reforms and 
emerging concerns. Increasing concerns with general issues 
of policy as progressed and they became less „hands on‟. 
Led to a later, cautious and negative start of future 
involvement in PCGs in leadership roles. 
Fitzgerald and 
Ferlie (2000) 
 
Professionals: Back 
to the Future 
UK 
Hospitals 
Longitudin- 
al (1990-94)  
Observation 
Not clear Impact of quasi-market on professionals particularly power 
and autonomy. Identifies the product of the quasi-market is 
a new category of professional managers who actively 
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 Interviews, 
questionnai- 
res, archival 
manage „colleagues‟ performance. Notion of hybrid 
manager. Focus on the negative i.e. loss of power and 
autonomy. 
Kitchener 
(2000) 
The 
„Bureaucratization‟ 
of Professional 
Roles: The Case of 
the Clinical 
Directors in UK 
Hospitals 
UK 
Hospitals 
Longitudin-
al (1991-
1995) 
Cases, 
Interviews, 
Archival 
 Examined the adoption of medical-manager hybrid roles in 
the context of professional role change to analyse the 
development of the clinical director role and de-
professionalisation. Clinicians are bureaucratised through 
acceptance of increased commercial and managerial 
responsibility; are not de-professionalised. Clinical 
directors “maintain the occupational closure of the medical 
domain,” (p.150). 
Owen and 
Phillips (2000) 
Ignorance is not 
bliss: Doctors, 
managers and 
development 
UK 
Managemen
t 
Developme
nt 
Programme 
Participants 
Course 
questionnai-
res and 
interviews 
26 
questionnai-
res, 16 
interviews 
Empirical study of early career doctors enrolled on a 
management development programme and from across 
health care disciplines. Identifies doctors interest in 
management is neither uniform nor static and adopts a 
course evaluation approach. Concludes that multiple 
discipline involvement in courses may encourage better 
collaborative working in the field. 
Burtonwood et 
al. (2001) 
Joining them up: 
the challenges of 
organisational 
change in the 
professional politic 
of general practice 
UK Action 
Research 
12 practices 
 
Identified that GP CPD, for quality improvement generally, 
made little reference to organisational or local health 
priorities. Explore practical challenges of developing 
general practices to be effective inter-professional and 
inter-agency organisations through Senge‟s phases and 
challenges of change. Amongst other things, identified the 
risk of isolating projects when development work is 
confined to individual responsibility. 
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Doolin (2001) Doctors as 
Managers. New 
Public Management 
in a New Zealand 
Hospital 
New 
Zealand 
Hospital 
Interviews „Interviews 
at all levels‟ 
Examined introduction of budgets in hospitals and extent to 
which the clinician manager adopted manager role. 
Clinicians were disenfranchised managers but a few did 
identify with the role. 
Goldie and 
Sheffield 
(2001) 
New Roles an 
relationships in the 
NHS – barriers to 
change 
Scotland Case Study 4 Health 
Boards 
Empirical study of the implementation of „Designed to 
Care‟. Found GP support for collaborative GP 
commissioning whether they had been fundholders or not. 
Fundholders were missing the benefits that they and their 
patients enjoyed by holding a commissioning budget. The 
influence of managerial domain was still found to be 
limited and the GPs were reluctant to exercise managerial 
controls over peers. 
Llewellyn 
(2001) 
Two-way 
Windows‟: 
Clinicians as 
Medical Managers 
UK 
Hospitals 
Interviews  Seeks to understand the aspirations and activities of doctors 
with management responsibility in the context of the „new‟ 
area of expertise of medical- management using the 
metaphor of a „two-way window‟. Identifies that when 
professional hold budgets but lack expertise (to control 
information on which budget is founded and  interpreting 
their messages) they are able to „devolve financial 
responsibility‟ without transferring financial control.  
Identified doctors may risk losing clinical visibility and 
respect thus presents the management tasks as 
supplementary thus avoiding crossing the divide into the 
domain of management. 
Morris and 
Farrell (2003) 
The „Neo-
Bureaucratic „ 
State: 
Professionals, 
UK 
GPs 
Survey of 
profession-
als 
14 from 
schools, 11 
from social 
work, 7 GPs 
Investigation of the impact of new governance on managers 
and professional in the public sector. Critical appraisal of 
the assumptions made by NPM and its impact on 
professionals and the single sector approach to research. 
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Managers and 
Professional 
Managers in 
Schools, General 
Practices and Social 
Work 
Found GPs not desirous of management role, gained strong 
impression was game playing the system. Overall 
conclusion that impact on professional roles is that they are 
differentiated, mediated and not always negative. 
Braithwaite 
(2004) 
An empirically-
based model for 
clinician-managers‟ 
behavioural 
routines 
Australia Longitudin-
al. 
Assimilates 
from three 
studies 
between 
1989 and 
1994. 
Includes 
participant 
observation, 
content 
analysis, 
field note 
mapping. 
 Seeks to replace normative-prescriptive accounts with 
aposteriori i.e. how they do manage. Presents a conceptual 
model of behavioural routines of clinician managers. 
Provides a “grounded description of clinician-managers‟ 
behavioural routines”, (p. 256). 
Iedema et 
al.(2004)  
„It‟s an Interesting 
Conversation I‟m 
Hearing‟: The 
Doctor as Manager 
Australia 
Hospitals 
Discourse  
Analysis 
8 Extracts How doctor-managers manage their position between 
profession and organisation. 
Kurunmaki 
(2004) 
A hybrid profession 
– the acquisition of 
management 
accounting 
Finland 
Hospitals 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
with 
First phase: 
32 people 
41 meetings 
Second 
Contrasts the intrusion of accounting practices in Finland to 
the UK in the context of the medical profession. Examines 
the calculative practices of managerial accounting in the 
context of Finnish NPM reforms. Doctors accept 
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expertise by 
medical 
professionals 
„persons 
working in 
hospitals‟ 
including 
managers, 
doctors, 
nurses. 
Meeting 
observati- 
ons. 
Collation of 
documents. 
phase: 
13 people 
accounting practice as part of their hybrid role. Financial 
argumentation suggested financial knowledge by the 
hospital doctors largely due to the lack of a formalised 
accounting profession to defend their domain (unlike the 
UK). 
Rundall et al. 
(2004) 
Doctor-manager 
relationships in the 
United States and 
the United 
Kingdom 
United 
States  
United 
Kingdom 
Hospitals 
Questionnai
re 
 Comparative study looking at the strained relationship 
between doctor and managers in hospitals rather than 
doctors as managers. Recommended doctors should 
become more involved in decision making especially 
resource related decision. Both countries showed 
pessimism on the state of the doctor –manager relationship. 
Hannah et al. 
(2005) 
 
Attempts to 
Improve 
Accountability in 
Primary Health 
Care: Evidence for 
a GP Practice in 
Scotland 
UK 
General 
Practice 
Case study: 
Interviews, 
Documents, 
Observation 
Single 
Practice 
Considered the organisational restructuring of general 
practice under various government reforms to highlight 
ways that the single practice had been shaped. Found that 
reforms represented financial control rather than 
improvement in accountability. GPs considered financial 
management important but had no interest in „financial 
details‟ but researchers did not look at the individual GP as 
a unit of analysis rather the practice group. 
Jacobs (2005) Hybridisation or 
Polarisation: 
Doctors and 
UK 
Germany 
Italy 
Multi-site, 
Multi-
country  
21 
interviews 
clinical staff 
Explores medical profession and accounting practices. 
Extends Kurunmaki (2004) to other European countries. 
Uses education as the indicator of hybridisation i.e. has 
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Accounting in the 
UK, Germany and 
Italy 
Education case study. 
Document 
examination 
followed by 
semi-
structured 
interviews 
in hospitals accounting become part of the curricula. This is found not 
to be the case but medical managers absorb the accounting 
and hence the evidence concludes polarisation. Concludes 
that the level of hybridisation is weakest where the 
accounting profession is strong in a country. 
Degeling et al. 
(2006) 
Clinicians and the 
governance of 
hospitals: a cross 
cultural perspective 
on relations 
between 
professions and 
management 
Australia, 
England, 
New 
Zealand, 
China 
Hospital 
 2637 There were cultural differences between professionals and 
organisation. 
Fitzgerald et 
al. (2006) 
Managing Change 
and Role 
Enactment in the 
Professional 
Organisation 
UK 
Hospital 
And PCTs 
Comparat-
ive Case 
Studies 
11 (6 acute 
sector and 5 
PCTs). 175 
semi-
structured 
interviews 
Key question of how clinical directors and service 
managers from non-clinical backgrounds interpret and 
enact their roles. Enactment defined as activities, tasks and 
decisions taken by the role holder in the organisational 
context. Focus on role definition. Hybrid manager roles 
were analysed from an organisational strategic perspective. 
Hybrid manger roles important in the change process but 
are primarily part-time. Clinical managers do not wish to 
remain in management. Called for more research in why 
hybrids do continue in a management role. 
Clark & Armit 
(2008) 
Attainment of 
Competency in 
Management and 
Leadership: No 
UK 
Education 
Literature 
Review, 
Interviews 
Unclear Educating doctors in management. Some management and 
leadership included in medical school curricula. There is an 
emerging competency framework. 
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longer an optional 
extra for doctors 
Kirkpatrick  et 
al. (2009) 
Medicine and 
Management in a 
Comparative 
Perspective; the 
case of Denmark 
and England 
Denmark 
England 
Hospital 
 Secondary 
data sources 
Recognises health reform trend for doctors participating in 
management. Notes similarities and timings in two 
European countries but different response by the 
profession. A more positive response in Denmark. Strong 
focus on power relationships. 
Ostergren 
(2009) 
Management 
Control Practices 
and Clinician 
Managers: The 
Case of the 
Norwegian Health 
Sector 
Norway 
Hospital 
Case study 
of two 
regions: 
Questionnai
res 
42 clinicians Questions, amongst other things, how management control 
systems can lead to hybridisation or polarisation of 
clinician managers. Found that clinicians report deviations 
but do not take on board the „consequences by increasing 
efficiency‟. Two regions had differing degrees of 
hybridisation. Suggests management control systems could 
improve in clinicians interacted with other departments to 
do so. 
Neogy and 
Kirkpatrick 
(2009) 
Medicine in 
Management: 
Lessons across 
Europe 
UK 
Denmark 
France 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
Hospitals 
Secondary 
supported 
by  
Primary: 
Interviews 
(one or two 
per country) 
 Aims to compare the changing role of doctors in 
management across 6 health systems. A key question is 
whether doctors have engaged with management priorities 
and if not why. Concentrates on formal roles in the hospital 
sector. Reports „some‟ progress since Griffiths in getting 
clinicians to engage with the management agenda. And not 
much success in embedding management education into 
curriculum. Questions still raised about how clinicians 
engage in management roles. Accounts of national 
differences in relationship between medicine and 
management and not engagement in it. 
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Kippist and 
Fitzgerald 
(2009) 
Organisational 
Professional 
Conflict and Hybrid 
Clinician 
Managers: The 
effects of dual role 
In Australian 
Health Care 
Organisations‟ 
Australia 
Hospital 
Interviews 
and 
observation 
14 people 
on a 
manage-
ment 
develop-
ment 
programme 
Examines tension between hybrid clinician managers‟ 
professional values and the organisations management 
objectives. Hybrid role may not bring effectiveness because 
of tension when clinician has to abandon hybrid role for 
clinical and other view increase in their workload because 
of less clinical staff. 
Witman et al. 
(2010) 
Doctors in the lead: 
balancing between 
two worlds 
 
Netherlands 
Hospitals 
Interviews 6  Depart-
tment 
Heads, 
Colleagues 
(29 
interviews) 
Examines the leadership in a university hospital by doctors 
who „bridge‟ the medical and management world. 
Sometimes they display managerial behaviour but medical 
habitus dominant. Clinicians are reluctant to manage; may 
be appointed because „someone has to do it‟.  
Russell et al. 
(2010) 
The Social Identity 
of Hospital 
Consultants and 
Managers 
Ireland 
Hospital 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
15 
Consultants 
Explores consultants‟ social identification, how it 
influences their perceptions of management activity and 
change. Consultants thought the public viewed them 
negatively with management perceived, and associated 
with powerlessness, and lack of respect. Identification with 
formal management positions was unattractive. 
Management roles perceived to provide few opportunities 
to experience self –efficacy. Concludes their social identify 
could be under threat 
Ham et al. 
(2011) 
Doctors who 
became chief 
executives in the 
NHS: from keen 
amateurs to skilled 
NJS 
Organisatio
ns in 2009 
Interviews 20 To investigate experience of chief executives to understand 
career paths and facilitators and barriers along the way. 
Doctors experienced a change in identity and the role of 
leaders in hybrid positions is not well recognised. Call for 
move for keen amateurs by education through new faculty 
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professionals 
O‟Riordan and 
Mc Dermott 
(2012) 
Clinical Managers 
in the Primary Care 
Sector: do the 
benefits stack up? 
Ireland 
GPs 
Mixed 
method 
using 
interviews 
from a sub-
set of data 
14 Semi-
structured 
Descriptive and exploratory study. Nature and value of 
clinical management role take by primary care doctors in 
Ireland. States little attention paid to it but a rising policy 
importance. Found that there was a need for policy 
consideration of the role in primary care and need for 
specialist management training. Recognises change 
management issues in the literature and points to problems 
of commitment, role incompatibility, role overload and 
power and authority hence negativity. GPs in informal, 
operational roles supplementing any managerial activity by 
delegation to practice managers. Recommends future 
research to take “account of a variety of structural and 
other contingencies that impact upon the efficacy of the 
role,” (p.637) 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Practice A (Guardian)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
.  LP admits his dominance 
suggest few internal 
constraints, however… 
“I need a day and half 
with fund manager every 
week. I get half a day 
uninterrupted.” 
Limitations of the depth 
of detail in activity 
reports e.g. wanting to 
know more details of 
spend in specialities, 
trends over time, 
projected costs. 
 
Technological constraints 
(see quote 3). 
Financial constraints 
through fundholding 
management allowance 
(see quote 4). 
 
Being viewed as s 
bottomless resource (see 
quote 5). 
Driven by the LP 
according to Fund 
Manager. 
Appointed Fund Manager 
to take over from Practice 
Manager thus inserted 
another manager into the 
practice. 
“...spend a lot of time 
thinking about 
fundholding...” 
Receives monthly reports 
on budget position and 
asks Fund Manager what 
it means. 
Operates as a “team” with 
the fund manager. 
Receives advice by sitting 
Initially filled all the 
forms in and things like 
contracts are in place i.e. 
procedural. 
Delegation of task but 
management of outcome 
e.g. turning data into 
information for decision 
making (see quote 1). 
 
Uses number a lot as 
examples. Likes to 
identify costs so that can 
argue case. Acts as 
negotiator (see quote 2). 
 
Says spends most of time 
on strategy, individual 
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Perceived inadequate 
budget. 
on various committees. 
Attends courses. 
 
Through developing good 
relationships. 
 
Employ non-NHS FM. 
patient problems - 
“...working out what we 
can do...” 
 
Key Quotes 
 
1. “...it is an awful lot easier to look at outcomes… so in that sense it gave us information that kind of thing has been useful for us to know, 
all changes we‟ve made have been based on information and audit. I don‟t think we could if we were not involved.” 
2. “There are costs involved and when you have made savings then you can argue the margin and affect what‟s going on and stuff like that 
and it has helped us…” 
3. On the computer package used: “It‟s not ideal.  I‟ve got Microsoft Office on my computer at home and it just whizzes around, it does 
what you say and if I knew how to use it I could make it dance. EMIS is black and white…absolutely no sophistication.” 
4. “With the amount of money in the management fund you are not able to go into the market and say fine we want an all singing and all 
dancing person who could earn probably 50% more.” 
5. “We get nothing for sitting on Health Authority committees and stuff like that you do because you are interested. I think the idea that we 
are a bottomless resource who can come back and see patients and do surgeries and be sued when we get it wrong and all the rest of it. I 
don‟t think they have any idea of the onerous work load they are building up.” 
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Practice B (Reluctant Innovator)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
.  Relative to other 
practices, a highly 
developed management 
structure e.g. partners 
leading small 
management teams i.e. 
“screwed down 
management systems,” 
(LPB). 
 
 
 
Protecting local cottage 
hospital, constrained in 
contracting etc. 
 
Perceived strong link 
between fundholding and 
practice management (see 
quote 2). 
 
 
Driven by the Practice 
Manager. 
Disaggregation of the 
function from the practice 
management as a whole 
(see quote 1). 
Uses „we‟ and not „I‟. 
“Really just a case of 
employing people to do 
the donkey work to 
administer it.” (LPB) 
“Working out 
practically where you 
were going to do with a 
piece of paper was much 
more important than 
internal systems for 
shifting the paper 
around.” (LPB) 
Tempering the aggressive 
practice manager; the link 
between management of 
fundholding and the 
patient at the heart of the 
main business. 
Weekly management 
meeting of two partner 
and practice manager. 
 
Says concerned with 
strategy, the management 
rather than the 
administration (see quote 
3). 
 
Refers to the „bloke in 
charge‟ i.e. practice 
manager. 
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We get sight of a lot of 
the bottom 
line…photocopied and 
put them in our pigeon 
holes, the two lead 
doctors.” (LPB) 
Employ non-NHS FM 
and indeed practice 
manager one and same. 
 
 
 
Key Quotes 
1. With reference to the small practice management teams configured such that “instead of having fortnightly practice meetings, where no 
decisions were made, because everybody fell out and didn‟t agree, we were then having quarterly meetings…we already had two partners 
in place doing technical management of the practice with the manager.” 
2. “You can‟t separate practice management from fundholding, and now we taken on TPP as well. It‟s so closely inter-linked, each affect 
the other. There was no question of needing to get anybody else.” 
3. On what spends most time on: “It‟s really about policy decisions, about general trends, like are we going to move into the private 
sector?” 
4. On the future: “I hate the thought of being involved even more with responsibility for accountancy if you like, and the management of 
practice.” 
 
 
Note: Very much story telling i.e. foreshadowing. Every question has a story in the ‘we’ sense. 
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Practice  D  (Guardian)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
“...there is 
not a great 
deal of 
training out 
there from 
a GP side of 
being a lead 
partner. I 
think you 
rely on 
picking bits 
out from 
inappropria
te 
courses…le
arning on 
your feet.” 
  Lack of training. 
 
Inaccurate data. 
Describes self as advisor 
and policeman. 
“...trying to observe that 
people follow guidelines 
that we put down for 
referral patterns and 
prescribing...” 
Says he thinks as an 
entrepreneur. 
Appointment of 
individual to computer 
type work – linked into to 
one of reasons for going 
fundholding for this 
practice and subsequently 
that individual appointed 
FM. 
Shared with another 
partner and then that a 
Compliance role – an 
auditor role, “...important 
that you look at what you 
are doing and analyse it 
and be willing to 
change...” 
“...organise good deals 
for the practice...” 
“...bring in ideas...” 
Recruited staff to input 
data. 
 
For LP seems to have set 
administration into place 
in order to become the 
negotiator and savings 
seeker but without getting 
involved in numbers (see 
quote 2). 
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partner stepped down. 
Seek good service at a 
good price. 
“...most staff don‟t have a 
lot of input into 
fundholding...” 
 
Employ non-NHS FM. 
 
Observation (see quote 
3). 
On what he does with 
information from FM – 
“discuss it … much more 
rarely I will take it away”. 
Suggest superficial and 
not as embedded in 
strategy as say practice B 
… “use hem in meetings 
or pass information on to 
other partners, secretarial 
staff”. 
Admits spends most of 
time on contracting. 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Quotes 
 
1. “…trying to observe broad guidelines that we put down on referral patterns and prescribing. I think as an entrepreneur to try and 
organise good deals for the practice…to try to generate some fund savings.  Certainly to bring in ideas.”(LPD) 
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2. “the administrative side of finance the actual accounting side I don‟t really have a lot to do with that” 
3. On what an ideal course might be: “It varies obviously from practice to practice. Some lead partners really just sign invoices I think 
and not much more than that. Other lead partners do do the accounting side. I can‟t see much point in being a partner in a practice 
and doing the accounts really. And I think the role I have here is about right but yes, I have not found a course that has been a 
reflection of the type of job I do.” 
4. Refers frequently to deal and good patient service: “we look out for the best, the most accessible deals with a high degree of clinical 
quality, so they undoubtedly get a good service being here”. 
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Practice   E (Opportunist)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
“…all the 
extra paper 
work… (See 
Quote 4). 
 On 5 of the 6 partners 
wishing to leave 
fundholding…”because 
they don‟t like x pending 
time at meetings and 
away from the practice. 
They want him to see 
patients and not go away 
from the surgery.” (FM) 
 Evidence of sharing 
between LP and FM (see 
Quote 1). 
LP doesn‟t ask for regular 
information, relying on 
the FM. (But see quote 3). 
On want they saw their 
role as: 
“A motivator, an 
innovator and perpetrator 
I suppose” (LP). 
LP receives lots of reports 
some of which is „binned‟ 
and other „sorted at the 
back of his head‟… “I 
rely on my practice 
manager to keep me up to 
date…” (see quote 5). 
Employ NHS FM. 
Based on savings the LP 
“thinks of most effective 
way to spend the savings” 
(FM). Thus he is 
interested in outputs 
rather than the process of 
achieving the outputs??? 
 
Negotiating and 
contracting with 
providers. 
 
Is also on city 
fundholders group i.e. on 
the executive. 
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Key Quotes 
1. “I‟m affectionately known as the boss… well, I just do it. It was put in my job description and Ken and I just do it between us” (FM) 
 
2. On referring to external course…  “he would maybe say it helped him a bit, but he‟s a very good manager anyway” (FM) 
 
3. “Oh actually that‟s not true – there‟s one thing he asks for on a regular basis and that‟s „how many savings have we got left?‟ 
 
4. “…all the extra paper work and for the first few years instead of getting less, it got more and we got bogged down in preparing business 
plans which were never read.. I think somebody actually put „we are going to introduce Popeye and Olive Oil in as counsellors… a 
complete waste of time and they were there to conform to some mythical civil servants idea how this should be run.” (LPE) 
 
5. “I don‟t need regular check-ups because I have a reliable team and I have to rely on them so if you like the 4Ds apply –decide 
something‟s got to be done; do it yourself; delegate it and if you can‟t do any – dump it.” 
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Practice   only FM (use as proxy)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
    Different lead partners, 
changed in two years… 
“to enable different 
people to feel what it‟s 
like and to have a go at it” 
 
Dissemination at 
meetings by the true lead 
– the fund manager. 
 
Employ NHS FM – 30 
years experience 
Used to meet with all 
partners regularly but 
then it fell to two lead 
partners and then reduced 
just to a quarterly update. 
 
Yearly awareness on 
fundholding session by 
FM. 
When asked what lead 
partner does with that 
information (see quote 1). 
 
Key Quotes 
 
1. “Hopefully he absorbs the blessed stuff and remembers it! But basically he will save that for when is in a meeting with providers and when 
there is any negotiation with providers, and for discussing matters with other members of the partnership who are obviously not lead partners.”
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Practice   H (Opportunist)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
Refers to 
core values 
(see quote in 
Ch 6 and 2 
below) 
 Partner trouble (see quote 
1) 
“There‟s still some strain 
within the practice 
Swamped with 
information 
Networked with other 
fundholders (FM) 
 
Employment that is  non-
NHS (FM) 
Preparing own report one 
sheet management  (LP) 
Key quote 3 
Key quote 4 
 
Key Quotes 
 
1. “There was  a bit of  a problem a little while ago perhaps, where it was me versus the partner, but that has been resolved now after a 
couple of vibrant partners meetings where I put to them the problem which the partnership has and we, as a partnership, are going to 
solve it.” (LP) 
2. “… you can‟t just dawdle around and have another meeting because you‟ve patient to see and you‟ve got to deal with it” (LP) 
3. Long quote “… put it all… one sheet management” (LP) 
4. Long quote “… become more streamline, more efficient… commissioning activity.” (LP) 
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Practice    I (Guardian)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
  Internal expert evidence 
emerges 2, 4, 5 
 See 1,2, 3 below 
Financial responsibility 
and service development. 
 
Taking matters to other 
partners. 
FM does all finance 
related (see quote 2). 
As a fundholding practice 
(see quote 4). 
Organic growth (see 
quote 5). 
 
Key Quotes 
1. “…with as little disruption to the normal running of the practice as possible, primarily because the GPs that were anti-fundholding 
didn‟t want to see it making a difference” (FMI) 
2. “[I am] the odd job man. Basically I do everything to do with any kind of finance…IT, maintenance, commissioning, all the lot …” 
(FMI) 
3. …it was felt we could just run fundholding in the background with very little change in the clinical experience [initially]…prior general 
manager from non-medical background…great difficulty adapting to NHS culture… (LPI) 
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5. Cannot be done despite initial enthusiasm to do so…It very quickly became thought of as a central theme of the practice, we were a 
fundholding practice and this is what the practice was about (LPI) 
 
 5.  Critical aspects were deemed to be good contracting, good negotiating and a cornerstone really, keeping your priorities clinical, having 
a view to quality as well as cost. I would have identified those people [being key staff] much more clearly and identified their tasks much 
more clearly instead of letting it grow in this sort of organic way that it did (LPI) 
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Practice    J (Opportunist)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
  None as a balance of 
work between partners 
according to LP - 
democratic 
 “Reading excellent 
summaries”. 
Work done equally 
amongst partners 
Little change (see quote 
2). 
Delegation to fund an 
practice manager 
Receives information 
every month 
 
Key Quotes 
1. I think fundholding helped them to come to terms that they needed a proper manager…and to let go of those traditional roles that each 
GP had…they‟ve a more structured management team and really the management skills they lacked as GPs , their responsibility has been 
passed on to the managers to manage rather than them doing it. (FMJ) 
2. Data collection…it just slid in very gently and what we did was we shielded the partners as much as possible…minimal amount of 
change imposed on the practice by fundholding. (LPJ) 
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3. I used to spend time looking at individual contracts, I now basically just read the excellent summaries…exactly the position where we 
are… delegation is the name of the game…I just give a touch every now and then just to make sure things are going right…clinical stuff 
comes first then the other stuff comes later. (LPJ) 
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Practice    L  (Opportunist)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
    No evidence proffered. Uses the word „we‟ a lot 
but does not elaborate on 
how or what is done. 
Key quotes 
1. ...ball was left with me to start playing with it as I wanted.  (LPL) 
2. We analyse, at the end of each month, when the accounts have been closed we go through the financial statements, we go through our 
waiting list, we go through the priority list…a batch of reports…I am very pleasantly encouraged with the information that I have been 
receiving through my contracts manager…spend most of time on management of lists and make sure that we are not overspending. (LPL) 
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Practice   M (Reluctant  Innovator)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
    Delegation on the face of 
it then apparent working 
with fund manager 
Said left to fund/contract 
manager but then refers to 
using information for 
analysis. 
Site expansion and 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Personal role expanding 
Key quotes 
 
1. …there‟s no point me wasting time entering referrals and messing about with reports and things……to be quite honest and say that I do 
allow my fund manager. Contract manager to largely get on with things… he looks at budgets and things. What he will do is report to me, 
so I monitor what‟s going on… some GPs are much more into contracting side which I‟m not (LPM) 
2. I look at it (laughter), look at all these figure  and, no what we do is if we‟re looking as though we‟re going to overspend which 
happened last year , we‟ll deliberately stop the hospital operating…keep an eye on prescribing budget… so I‟ve done the referral analysis 
by partner and speciality” – looks at service implications (LPM) 
 
    3. Asked directly about the aspects of management:  
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Critical? I think you‟ve got to have the right manager in my view. I am not a manager, I‟m a doctor, and I wasn‟t trained as a 
manager…have a fund manager that you can trust…liaising with Health Authority… keeping you informed (LPM) 
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Practice   N (Opportunist)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
    Advice but not engaged 
in process regularly. 
Grand policies only by 
LP 
 
Key Quotes 
1. I don‟t spend too much time, once a year when the contracting process is in progress…I give them advice yes, we will have to take the 
contract with this provider, but not that provider. I know what my patients want… they like to go to a nearer hospital. I only make the 
grand policies and then I will leave it for the contract manager and the fund manager to make the final negotiations on my behalf (LPN) 
 
2. …In the Long term it is good for patients, it is good for the GP and it is good for the Department of Health because in the long term it 
will save them a lot of money. It is incentive for the doctor, not financially for themselves but for the practice, it is better. It is the 
incentive for the doctor to control the finances in her practice, it is hard work, but at the end of the day it pays dividends and it will be a 
great shame if fundholding is cancelled altogether.(LPN) 
 
3. I don‟t involve myself with the software, people upstairs do…We saved on drugs, we taught ourselves the discipline of prescribing… of 
referring people to hospital…  
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4. At the end of the day fund management is about prudent financing, if you have got a good contract manager, a good fund manager who is 
going to negotiate good contract for you… make some saving… plough the savings next year for the service of the patients and this is very 
important 
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Practice   O  (Reluctant  Innovator)  
Demands Constraints Choices 
Having to 
do certain 
kinds of 
work 
Having to 
satisfy 
certain 
criteria 
Internal to the Practice External to the Practice How the work is done What work is done 
    Informally and not 
clinical involvement. 
Signing invoices – a 
franking exercise hence 
not in management as 
such. 
Key Quotes 
1. I suppose if volunteered myself [laughs].(LPO) 
 
2. I suppose information from the contract manager is more to do with figures. Nothing much clinical…we think about it and report back. 
There‟s no formal written things going backwards and forwards… I suppose it‟s looking at and signing invoices. It sounds very boring 
doesn‟t it really? I think that probably the main [thing I do].(LPO) 
…the attitude is more laid back…practice itself is quite tranquil…everything developed slower (FMO) 
 
3. I think they didn‟t realize what was required…to be honest I don‟t think any practice fully understands what they need to do to make 
fundholding work…a lot went in with their eyes closed… to be honest to make it work you don‟t need to be a GP and you don‟t need to be a 
practice manager…what you do need it a wide range of management experience and you need experience of working in the hospitals (FMO) 
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4. I think the fund manager, who is also the practice manager, is really an interface between the medical side and the accounting 
side.(LPO)
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